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Abstract
Africa is poor in the midst of plenty. Though multiple causes and reasons may be claimed for
Africa’s shrinking state of development, disruptive effects of colonialism takes forefront. Present-day
Africa is literally free but colonial footprints are still apparent in the borderlands. The study pinpoints
how natural borderline development was thwarted by the infamous Berlin Conference of 1884 -1885. As
result, people, ethnic groups, nations and nationalities have been disintegrated. Ethnic disintegration and
arbitrary colonial boundaries lines have been source of unavoidable intra and inter state conflicts in
Africa. Ironically, in fear of opening “Pandora’s Box” that would further unlock unmanageable conflict,
founding fathers of OAU have decided to abide by the colonial boundaries “whether they are good or
bad” in Cairo Resolution of 1964, thereby suppressing Kwame Nkrumah’s vision of forming United Sates
of Africa by removing colonial boundary lines. The study argues that Africa has missed the best
opportunity that would avoid boundary conflict that constitutes 90% of African interstate conflicts.
This study proves deficiencies of the Cairo Declaration of 1964 that has honored colonial
boundaries, as boundaries between independent African States taking Ethio-Eritrean boundary as case
study. The Ethio-Eritrean boundary meant to be defined by the three successive colonial treaties of 1900,
1902, and 1908 that were concluded between Italy, Ethiopia and Great Britain, but the actual boundary
line never been drawn on the ground and cannot be define in accordance with the awkward terms of the
treaties. Any attempt for strict application of the elusive treaty wordings exacerbates the complexity,
confusion and ultimately fuels up conflict.
The study focuses on resolving the current impasse between Ethiopia and Eritrea by drawing an
acceptable boundary line through constructive dialogue. A true and acceptable boundary line cannot be
drawn simply on the basis of elusive colonial treaties, but through constructive and honest dialogue.
Drawing a line of separation is not a goal by itself, but it would perpetuate peace, create good
neighborhood, and contribute for rebuilding sense of brotherhood by avoiding animosity and mistrust.
Peaceful coexistence, coupled with effects of globalization, therefore, would stimulate economic and
political integration that would ultimately remove restraining effects border walls. This will effectuate
AU’s Border Program that aims to change the nature of borders from barriers to bridges thereby enable
everyone to freely move all over Africa once again.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1.

Background

Africa is the first home to mankind1, and believed to be the source of ancient
civilization.2 Emerging archeological evidences and remnants of ancient civilization prove
Africa’s early innovative acumen and progress.3

Moreover, Africa is endowed with

hardworking people, fertile land, and untapped natural resources.4 Ironically, Africa houses
most of the world’s poorest nations that frequently look for external aid.5 This is an issue that
claims diverse socio-economic and political causes and reasons. 6
Devastating effects of colonial policy and resultant recurrent intra and inter state
conflict that has been common in Africa takes forefront position among the variables that have
engendered Africa’s shrinking development. Since independence in 1960s numerous African
states have been enduring violent conflicts that claimed lives of huge number of people and
consumed resources amounting to billions of dollars.7 States and intergovernmental African

1

The oldest modern human fossil was discovered in Ethiopia. See Cook Clive, Discovery of Earliest Homo
Sapiens Skulls back “ out of Africa” Theory BSF, http://www.bradshawfoundation.com/herto_skulls.php
(Accessed: 10/28/13).
2
Gollin Michael remarks, “During ancient times technical and cultural leadership moved from Africa to Europe
and then during [the] middle ages to Islamic societies and China….” (Emphasis added). GOLLIN MICHAEL,
DRIVING INNOVATION: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGIERS FOR A DYNAMIC WORLD,
13(2008).
3
Archeological facts and remnants of ancient civilization prove Africa’s early progress (take for instance the
famous Egyptian Pyramids, 2000 yeas of old churches that were curved from a single stone in Ethiopia, places
and ancient cities some to mention). Some regard Africa as “ The cradle of civilization and the origin of human
society.” See, http://library.thinkquest.org/C002739/AfricaSite/LMEgyptAncient.htm (Accessed: 10/28/13)
4
See,Kaberuka Donald, Africa’s Mineral Wealth: A Blessing or A Curse? http://www.afdb.org/en/ (Accessed,
10/28/13).
5
See, Walker Emily, What we’re Reading: How can Africa move away from aid dependency? ONE (May 2,
2013), http://www.one.org/us/2013/05/02/what-were-reading-how-can-africa-move-away-from-aiddependence/ (Accessed 10/28/13).
6
Acemoglue and Robinson, “ Why is Africa poor?” http://scholar.harvard.edu/jrobinson/publications/why-africapoor (Accessed, 12/12/2013).
7
Stelios Michalopolulos & Elias Papaloannou, The Long-run Effects of the Scramble of for Africa Working Paper
17620 NATIONAL BUREAU OF RESEARCH (November 2011), http://www.nber.org/papers/w17620
(Accessed on 12/10/13); See also Richard A. Griggs, Boundary and War in Africa in 1935: IBRU BOUNDARY
& SECURITY BULLETIN, 64-68 (1997).

1

institutions appear not proactive enough to avert conflict and save lives. Needless to say living
standard of common people has been steadily deteriorating.
Imaginary boundary line that was drawn during the scramble for Africa is often blamed
for triggering recurrent conflicts in Africa.8 Colonial boundary is characterized as “imaginary”
because it was a simple ingenuity of “powerful” people that were far away in Europe and
unfamiliar with the African reality. Lord Salisbury affirms artificiality of African boundary
stating:
We have been engaged … in drawing lines upon maps where no white men’s feet
have ever trod; we have been giving away mountains and rivers and lakes to each
other, but we have only been hindered by the small impediment that we never
knew exactly where those mountains and rivers and lakes were.9

Needless to say, crafters of African borders have partitioned the continent in total
disregard of local conditions, geographic, ethnographic, linguistic and cultural compositions.
In the words of Radie Berketeab, “…the scramble for Africa surgically divided the future
nations … using pencils and rulers without paying any consideration for […] differences.”10
Colonial powers never worried about the interest of Africans nor concerned about negative
consequences of arbitrary border creation. They simply ventured on dividing Africa and
African people in a way avoiding “war” among Europeans in getting their own share of
Africa.11 The people who never visited Africa remotely partitioned it even without taking time

President Chadly of Algeria views colonial boundaries as “delayed action bombs left by colonialism.” See J.R.V.
PRESCOTT, POLITICAL FRONTIERS AND BOUNDARIES, 254(1987). [emphasis added). See also Azure
Gilman, The violent Legacy of Africa’s Arbitrary Borders, http://freakonomics.com/2011/12/01/the-violentlegacy-of-africas-arbitrary-borders/ (Accessed, 12/10/2013).
9
S. N. LALONDE, DETERMINING BOUNDARIES IN CONFLICTED WORLD; THE ROLE OF UTI
POSSIDETIS 106 (2002). Salisbury’s statement of 1890 quoted by Judge Ajibda in Territorial dispute ( Libya v.
Chad) 6 ICJ Rep. 53 (1194). See also 12:5 EJIL 867 – 889 (2001).
10
Redie Bereketeab, The Complex Roots of the Second Eritrea-Ethiopia Wars: Re-examine the Causes, 13 AFR.
J. INT’L AFF. 21, 15 - 59(2010).
11
Stelios Michalopolulos & Elias Papaloannou, supra note 7.
8
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to get some basic information from Africans, explorers or missionaries who had worked for the
great powers.12
Arbitrary colonial boundary has been breeding a ‘painful seed’ that has been generating
terrible memories in almost all over Africa. Colonial boundaries have split communities, ethnic
groups and families that have been living together from the time immemorial and still wish to
live together with their ethnic kinsmen.13 In East Africa, for instance, it is not uncommon to
have a family in Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea or Djibouti, especially in border regions.
Afar ethnic group is divided into Eritrea, Djibouti, and Ethiopia. Half of the Nuer ethnic groups
situated in Gambella region of Ethiopia and the rest in South Sudan, Luo ethnic group has been
dispersed in Kenya, Uganda, South Sudan, Ethiopia, and Tanzania.14 Similarly, “Maasai have
been partitioned between Kenya and Tanzania [….]”15 Ethnic disintegration and resultant
unending conflict is not only features of East Africa. It is an incurable “colonial disease” that
has spread all over Africa. A study reveals 177 (40%) ethnic groups in Africa were split by the
arbitrary boundary.16 Some of the ethnic groups were divided among six states. Ethnic split
into two to four states is very common. 17
Divided ethnic groups often ignore boundary line and crave to socialize with their
peers across the border. This obviously results in interstate conflict or regional war.18
Amaral, remarks,

12

Id. at 3.
After decolonization, Africa was plagued gaining with endless territorial or border-induced conflicts. Lalonde
supra note 9 at 119.
14
Kidane Mengisteab, Relevance of Regional integration in the Greater Horn Region, in KINDANE
MENGISTEREAB & REDIE BREKETEAB (eds.) , REGIONAL INTEGRATION, IDENITY AND CITIZENSHIP
IN THE GREATER HORN OF AFRICA, 8(2012).
15
Stelios Michalopolulos & Elias Papaloannou, supra note 7.
16
Id, at note 1.
17
Luo ethnic group scattered in six Eastern African Countries, see Kidane Mengisteab supra at note 14.
18
See, William Zartman, Bordering on war: The Clear Marking of Boundaries between African Nations can Help
Prevent Costly and Debilitating Border Conflicts, FOREIGN POLICY (May 1, 2001),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2001/05/01/bordering_on_war?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=ful
13

3

… many groups do not identify themselves with the states in which they live. Some
of them belong to the group split by international boundaries which do not conform
to their cultural distribution. Others are minorities seeking either a degree of political
autonomy within the existing states, or total separation. Beneath the surface are
always problems related to the actual meaning of international boundaries.19

The arbitrary borderline has impeded free movement of people and restrained resource
sharing. Before creation of the divisive borderline, Africans used to move freely and shared
common resources. It was their nation, land, and resources that nature offers to all Africans.
Consequently, tribal herdsmen freely moved wherever their cattle moved in search for greener
pasture. The artificial borderline, however, has been restraining this natural movement and has
been source of recurrent conflict. Sporadic conflicts have been surfacing in all corners of
Africa.20 Gilman comments, “ The arbitrary borders of an entire continent have caused untold
bloodshed and misery that could have been avoided.”21 Similarly, Michalopoulos and
Papaloannou note, “ […] partitioning has led to ethnic struggles, patronage politics, and
spurred civil conflict and under development.”22 The researchers further argue that, “ […] civil
conflict is concentrated in the historical homeland of partitioned ethnicities […and] causality
and durations […] is higher approximately by 25% in areas where partitioned ethnicities reside
[….]”23
In addition to splitting inter-related people and tearing the fabric of communal life,
artificial boundary is hard to clearly mark on the ground.24 As pinpointed above, crafters of the
borders were not versant with topographic and socio-economic conditions of Africa, but rushed
to partition the continent drawing an elusive boundary line. This has made demarcation process

l (Accessed:10/2/13). See also Adeleye Oyeniyi, Conflict and Vilolence in Africa: Causes, Sources and Types,
TRANSCEND MEDIA SERVICE (February 28, 2011), www.transcend.org” (Accessed:10/28/13).
19
Ilidio do Amaral, New Reflections on the Theme of International Boundaries” in Clive H. Schofield (ed.)
WORLD BOUNDARIES, I GLOBAL BOUNDAREIS. 17(1994).
20
Stelios Michalopolulos & Elias Papaloannou supra note7.
21
Azure Gilman supra at note 8.
22
Stelios Michalopolulos & Elias Papaloannou supra note7.
23
Id.

4

hard or impossible, or any attempt to demarcate colonial delimitation assumed to create a new
“brand” of conflict. A study conducted by the African Union reveals that before 2007 only
25% of African boundary was actually demarcated.25 Due to Africa’s new approach, in 2010
this figure rose by 10%.26 Residents of unmarked boundaries have been living in a way their
ancestors had been living for centuries. It appears possible to imagine that these people never
thought that they were living in a territory that belonged to a foreign nation, nor in a territory
that belonged to another ethnic group. When they find themselves belonging to a state that they
never supposed to, or when they learn that they were about to split from their kinsmen a
devastating conflict arises. This calls for the need to rebuild a mutually acceptable boundary
line with less restraining effect.27 There is no question in need to redraw boundary line, but
there is no consensus in modus operandi.
At the end of 1950’s, before the formation of Organization of African Union (OAU),
there was revisionist movement that aimed at redrawing African boundaries in a way uniting
disintegrated ethnic groups. S. N. Lalonde notes, “ Boundary readjustment, and even
abolition, was seen as a desirable prelude to the formation of regional groupings based on
cultural. Linguistic, and religious affinity that would eventually become African common
wealth.”28 The Movement held continental conference in Accra, Ghana and called for
“abolition or readjustment of colonial frontiers...”29
Pan African activists were fully aware of the horrific effects of arbitrary colonial
boundary and envisioned to redraw African borders, but the movement itself vanished after the
24

Peter Collier, Boundary Demarcation between British and Portuguese Colonial Territories in East Africa
AFRICANA STUDIA, No. 9 237, 223 - 238(2006).
25
AUBP, Draft Progress Report on the Implementation of the African Union Border Program 6(2012)
http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/auc-com-report-aubp-09-05-2012.pdf (Accessed: 12/12/13).
26
Id.
27
Ilidio do Amaral supra note 19
28
Lalonde supra note 9 at 116.
29
Id

5

formation of OAU due to fear of unmanageable conflicts that thought to “kill” the then young
continental organization- OAU.30 The very motive of the founding fathers of OAU was to
devise an African umbrella organization that can facilitate continental integration. Thus, with a
view to maintain territorial integrity of Africa, founding fathers of OAU starting from the
heydays of continual organization have relied on the international law principle of territorial
integrity norm. Reliance on territorial integrity norm thought to keep undivided Africa.
Moreover, it appears that the Latin American policy of Uti possidetis had some influence in
Organization of African Union’s stand to cherish status quo ante. But the reality of Africa was
totally different from conditions in Latin America. First, substantially a single European power
colonized Latin America and the whole continent considered to be one nation. After
independence regional boundaries were taken as international boundary. The African situation
was different. Africa was partitioned by numerous European superpowers that had conflicting
colonial policy. Colonizers had their own multifarious interests and they had been competing
for African resources.
Despite tragic consequences, founding fathers of OAU decided to respect colonial
boundary line on actual date of independence.31 Founding fathers of the then continental
organization did not like to open “Pondera’s box” in fear of further conflict. This stance may
be taken as the only viable option at the formative stage of OAU in order to calm down
looming conflict scenarios, but it is still a “disease” that never been effectively diagnosed and
cured. Communities and ethnic groups have been suffering because of unfair and unrealistic
colonial policy on boundary delineation. Border related conflict is not uncommon in all corners
of Africa. Unending border related conflict in the Horn of Africa calls for special attention.

30

Immediately after decolonization, while Pan Africanism was at high point, redrawing African boundaries would
have been easier, but Africa has missed the best moment that would have facilitated African political integration

6

Though borderline facts and issues are unique and demand varied resolution strategy, the Horn
Africa case, especially current border related tension between Ethiopia and Eritrea would
explain effects of colonial border policy in Africa.
The Horn of Africa has been suffering from unending current and potential intranational or international boundary conflicts. There is unresolved tension between Ethiopia and
Eritrea, South Sudan and Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia, Eritrea and Djibouti, Somalia and
Kenya. As a result of unresolved boundary related conflicts, residents of border regions endure
extensive suffering.32 Ethiopia and Somalia had undergone shattering effects of wars of 1970s.
Thousands lost their lives, massive property destroyed and billions of dollars was spent to
purchase lethal machine guns and further enriched former colonial masters.33 Huge number of
people fled to neighboring countries. On top of loss of life and property, the distrust and
antagonism has left scars of animosity among neighboring states.

34

Shortly, after seceding from Ethiopia, Eritrea wrestled with multiple border related
wars.35 The boundary war between Eritrea and Yemen, Ethio-Eritrean boundary conflict of
1998 – 2000, boundary conflict between Djibouti and Eritrean not only left permanent scars,
but also subjects of these states endure unresolved tension.36 The people of Horn of Africa

that would absolutely avoid boundary induced conflicts.
Ilidio do Amaral supra note 19 at 20.
32
See Malcolm N. Shaw, Peoples Territorialism and Boundaries 3 EUR. J. IN’T L. Law, 478, 478 - 507(1997).
33
Grggs rightly observes, “… African colonial boundaries are also the causes for high economic costs. … due to
border disputes African countries purchase armaments and sometimes the expense is equivalent to the foreign
aid they are receiving.” Griggs, Richard, A. The Boundaries of an African Renaissance. IBRU BOUNDARY
SEC. BULLETIN, 66(1997), quoted in Wondwosen Teshome, Colonial Boundaries of Africa: The case of
Ethiopia’s Boundary within Sudan, 9ACADEMIC REV. 337 – 367 (2009).
34
Rose Hebert notes, “Although the fighting has stopped, politically Ethiopia and Eritrea seem destined to
maintain a cold war and complete economic separation for the foreseeable future.” See Ross Hebert, The End
of the Eritrean Exception? SOUTH AFRICAN INST. OF INT’L AFF. COUNTRY REPORT, No. 8 2(2002);
Similarly, Redie Bereketeab observes, “ Although the fighting has stopped, politically Ethiopia and Eritrea
seem destined to maintain a cold war and complete economic separation for the foreseeable future.”Bereketeab,
supra note10.
35
Goitom Gebreluel & Kjetil Tronovell, Ethiopia and Eritrea: Brothers at War No More www. Aljazeera.com
(December 08, 2013).
36
Hebert, supra note 34.
31
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pursue uncertain future as a result of potential conflict situation assuming the conflict would
erupt again at any moment. The undefined boundary between the new African states, South
Sudan and Sudan has been problem not only to the region, but disturbs regional peace and
security. 37
The Ethio-Eritrea boundary best explicates challenges of the colonial boundary.38 After
seceding from Ethiopia, Eritrea sought certain territories that were never regarded as part of
Eritrea ever but were marked in a colonial map and vaguely stated in the colonial era treaties.
Residents of these villages and towns never assumed they have been living on an “alien” land.
After five years of secession Eritrea, presumably driven by some economic and political
motives39, moved to occupy villages and towns that were under Ethiopian administration. The
war claimed 70,000 – 100,000 lives and loss of billions of dollar worth of property. For almost
two years OAU, and international community wrangled to convince Eritrea and Ethiopia to end
war and negotiate to resolve the border conflict. Until defeated at Badme and its troops
removed by force, Eritrea turned deaf ear to OAU’s Framework Agreement, Modalities of
implementation and Technical Arrangements. After losing ground in all war front, Eritrea
finally declared acceptance of OAU’s peace initiative. OAU’s Framework Agreement required
the boundary dispute to be resolved in accordance with the pertinent colonial treaties and
principles of international law.
The arbitration tribunal, Eritrea Ethiopia Boundary Commission (hereinafter EEBC)
attempted to resolve the boundary conflict by applying the colonial treaties of 1900, 1902 and

37

Id.
Running for 651 miles (1,047 km.), the Eritrea – Ethiopia boundary extends from the boundary tripoint with
Sudan on the Takkaze Rier in the north west to the tripoint with Djibouti in the southeast. See Gideon Biger,
The Encyclopedia of International Boundaries (1995). (The Jerusalem Publishing House Ltd: Jerusalem).
39
It is generally believed that the Ethio-Eritrea border war was motivated by undisclosed soio-economic and
political motives. Details of the possible causes of border conflict are dealt in Chapter 6 of this Study. See
38
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1908 treaties that were concluded between Italy and the then tribal Ethiopian king (Menelik
II).40 The Boundary Commission repeatedly submitted that the treaties and accompanying
maps lacked clarity.41 There was no consensus in nomenclature of rivers that were supposed to
mark the supposed boundary line. Deceptive acts and manipulations that were exerted by
colonial agents have further complicated boundary setting.42 On top of this, there was
communication barrier.43 The treaties were concluded when Ethiopia lacked expert assistance
and the country ruled by tribal kings that were not versant with international law. The treaties
were not only obscure and lacked details but also favored the colonial power for no
consideration. More over, the Boundary Commission attempted to fill treaty lacunae by
reading maps that were drawn by the Italian cartographers who unilaterally mapped border
regions. This presumably took some Ethiopian ethnic groups that never supposed themselves
belonging to Eritrea.
The current Ethiopian map reveals how colonial masters mislead uneducated tribal
chiefs taking all the red sea regions that were barn at the time and not habitable. For European
powers, however, the red sea shores were very strategic sights to control international

Seyoum Yohannes Tesfay, Eritrea-Ethiopia Arbitration: A Cure Based in Neither Diagnosis nor Prognosis, 6:2
MIZAN L. REV. 172 – 185, 163- 199, (2012).
40
Hebert, supra note 34.
41
Paragraph 4.3 of EEBC award states, “Article 1 delimits the boundary from the frontier with Sudan in the
west to a point in the east the exact location of which is a matter of dispute.” EEBC Decision Regarding
Delimitation of the Border between The State of Eritrea and The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Para
4.3. at 31.
42
Id at para 4.7 on page 33 states, Emperor Minilik of Ethiopia at first sought a frontier considerably to the north
of the Mareb- Belesa- Muna line, but eventually agreed in 1900 to keep to that line (in exchange for payment of
5,000,000 Lires)
43
For example Wuchale Treaty of 19th century was drafted both in Italian and Ethiopian languages. The Ethiopian
King, Minilik II, simply relied on the Ethiopian language (Amharic version), but the Italian version did not
match with the Amharic version. Italian version Article 17 of the treaty stated that Ethiopia could make foreign
relation only through Italy while the Amharic version of the same Provision stated that Italy could cooperate
with Ethiopia in making foreign relation. Finally the Ethiopian King resided the treaty and a massive war broke
out in which white men for the first time defeated by black men.in battle of Adwa. This is an historic battle.
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passageway.44 Though few miles away from red sea, Ethiopia today is landlocked as a result of
mischiefs by the colonial powers.
The Ethiopian government initially refused to honor the arbitral award claiming the
decision parted not only ethnic groups but also families. Due to international pressure, Ethiopia
later accepted the award but insisted discussion before demarcation in order to create lasting
peace by making the boundary realistic. The Eritrean government, on the other hand, has
declined dialogue and has been requesting Ethiopia to surrender regions awarded by EEBC. As
a result, border residents of both states endure not only unsettled future, but also pursue life in
state of tension. The cause of Ethio- Eritrean war at face value termed as border conflict but it
was a cover up for the hidden political and economic motives.45 To build long lasting peace
therefor motives behind the conflict should be addressed. It is “imperative to understand the
underlying motive behind [the conflict].”46
At this point it appears almost impossible to reunite the divided ethnic groups under a
single political authority in their traditional shape, but it is possible to facilitate free integration
of the divided nations in a way akin to the pre-colonial situation. For example, Ethiopian
Somali population were freely interact with their kinsmen in main land Somalia, Kenya or
Djibouti, there would be no reason for Somalia to fight for reunion of divided Somalis. If their
right to freely move, pasture their cattle and use trans-border resources, there will be no
reasonable ground that will instigate conflict, at least as a result of boundary line.

44

Italy bought land from a tribal chief chief’s from Eritrea and finally took its administration. It drew Eritrean
boundary taking all the area surrounding Red Sea port. France bought land from a chief in Djibouti and finally
contracted with the then King of Ethiopia later and held it for 99 years. Somalia was partitioned among three
super powers: Great Britain, France and Italy. The scar is visible currently. We have Somalis in Ethiopia,
Somalis in Djibouti and Somalis in Kenya. Afar, a big ethnic group, divided between Ethiopian and Eritrea.
Some western Ethiopian people got their ethnic parts in South Sudan.

45

For detailed discussion on motives behind Ethio-Eritrean boundary conflict see Tesfay supra note 39.
Alexander Attilio Vadala. Major Geopolitical Explanation of Conflict in the Horn of Africa NORD – SUD
aktuell 627, 627 - 634 (2003).

46
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Realizing adverse effects that elusive colonial boundary lines in Africa, in 2007 African
Union set up African Union Boundary Program (hereinafter AUBP). AUBP is regarded as an
“imaginative program for the management of inter African borders, aimed not only promoting
peace, security and stability but also at facilitating the socio-economic integration of …
Africa.”47 AUBP thus gears toward achieving of two important goals:

working toward

promoting peace security and stability, and promoting and facilitating integration of Africa.
Given elusive nature of colonial boundary lines, and animosity and hatred as a result of
divisive colonial hands that are still alive all-inclusive integration of Africa appears
unimaginable. A playground, thus, has to be leveled before attempting to create United States
of Africa. In this regard AUBP’s objective of building peace, security and stability by assisting
and encouraging AU Member States to redraw an acceptable borderline and complete
demarcation process is vital. Attainment of AUBP objectives is up side journey, but it is
possible. Effort that have been exerted so far and attention given to the very disease that makes
Africa’s future uncertain is appreciable, but AUBP has long way to go. As pointed out above
currently only 1/3 of African boundary is clearly defined. It is understandable that Africa is
crawling with multifaceted socio-economic and political evils that need to be tackled,
prioritizing border problem would solve lion’s share of Africa’s socio-economic evils.
This study suggests possible ways to cure the effects of destructive seeds that were
sawn by colonial powers in partitioning Africa. The best approach that will certainly settle
Africa’s impending border issue is political integration by creating United States of Africa –
“the Gadafi illusion.” Ideally it sounds an innovative idea, but due to external pull and internal
push make the agenda of creating one nation “Africa” appears “daydream.” The other,
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possibly, viable option is regional integration. This plan appears appealing because regions
have already started some preliminary works for regional integration. For instance, East Africa
Economic Community has been moving to issue common currency, free trade, free movement
of goods and services, one passport that will take economic and ultimately political integration.
Similarly, West Africa Economic Community has been aggressively working toward political
integration of Member States. The third possible option is forming joint border commission
that will investigate all border points and assess any potential ground fro dispute and settle it
by drawing acceptable boundary line. Neighboring states should not wait until border issue
surfaces. The Joint Border Commission may be permanent and responsible to report to its
respective states but work by drawing common agenda. This is a proactive approach that would
mitigate destructive effects of elusive colonial boundary. AUBP encourages all Member States
of AU to form a joint border commission in consultation with neighboring states and redraw
elusive borderlines. The current wide spread conflict in all corners of Africa, however, has
limited AUBP’s proactive agenda. Thus, at this time, AUBP has been fully embarked on
resolving current border disputes by assisting demarcation of borders.
1.2. Statement of Problem
In last 1950s, after a number of African nations got independence, African intellectuals
and Revisionist Movement spearheaded by Kwame Nkrumah worked to redraw African
boundaries in a way it coincides with geographic, ethnographic, cultural lines and ultimately
create United States of Africa thereby making divisive colonial boundary line past history.

47

German African Border Project ( GABP), From Barrier to Bridges, (May 2009) hhttp://www.auswaertigesamt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/340666/publicationFile/3720/GTZ-GABP-Broschuere.pdf (Accessed on:
01/13/14).
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However, founding fathers of OAU have trashed Kwame Nkrumah’s agenda48 of revising
boundary lines in fear of opening Pandora’s box that would, supposedly, mess Africa with
unmanageable boundary conflicts. It was not only fear of conflict that had dictated founding
fathers to “acknowledge the sanctity of colonial boundaries.” Some of the founding fathers had
their own interest to control territories of partitioned ethnic groups or remain in power that they
would lose had the boundary been redrawn in way uniting partitioned ethnic groups.49
The decision to maintain colonial boundary, however, did not stop boundary conflict as
it was thought. Devastating boundary wars and conflicts have been so common in all over
Africa since heydays of OAU.50 Vague colonial boundary laws and policies have been causing
violent conflicts and unstoppable wars that sow animosity among African brothers. Boundary
issues are very sensitive and can easily and quickly flare up into armed confrontation have
been consuming lives of tens of thousands of Africans in short span of time.
Ethio-Eritrea boundary conflict has generated the most devastating conflict in 21st
Africa. The war suddenly erupted, and took lives 70 – 100,000 people, resulted in destruction
vast amount of property, displaced millions from their original territories and strained

48

President Nkrumha observed that the rampant boundary justified for political unity stating, “Only African Unity
can heal this festering sore of boundary disputes between our various States.” See Lalonde supra note 9 at 117.
49
One of the proponents of adherence to colonial boundary was Ethiopia’s Haile Selassie I who remarked to
accept colonial boundaries whether they were “good or bad.” See Tomas Bartos, Uti Possidetis, Quo Vadis? 18
AUST. YBIL 56, 37-68 (1997). Similarly the then president of Madagascar, President Tsiranana remarked:
[…]it is no longer possible, nor desirable to modify the boundaries of Nations, on the
pretext of racial, religious or linguistic criteria… indeed, should we take race, religion or
language as criteria for setting our boundaries, a few Stares in Africa would be blotted out
from the map. ( Lalonde supra note 9 at 117.
The president of Mali and Mauritania had there own private interest to keep colonial boundaries. (Id.) Morocco
had claimed Mauritania as historical part of Morocco. It is plausible that Emperor Haile Selasse’s motive was
to escape from annexation of territories of Ethiopian Somalis to Somalia. Somalia and Morocco openly
supported revisionist movement with a view to reunite with divided kinship. In failure of OAU to redraw
African boundaries, and finally due to OAU support to the claim of Western Sahara, Morocco suspended its
membership to OAU until now. Somalia remained as OAU Member State but it objected to the OAU’s
decision to recognize colonial boundary line.
50
Before the signature on OAU’s charter actually “dries up”, in early 1964 a devastating border war erupted in the
Horn of Africa between Ethiopia and Somalia, and in north between Morocco and Algeria. This had motivated
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relationship of brotherly people. Invoking colonial treaties, Eritrea claimed certain borderland
territories that were under Ethiopian control for centuries. This resulted in bloodshed and
confrontation that is still unsettled. The war was formally ended by the Algiers Agreement of
December 12, 2000, but the dispute is pending.
The Ethio-Eritrean boundary was defined by three successive colonial treaties of 1900,
1902, and 1908. Terms of the treaties were extremely vague to set a clear and acceptable
boundary line on the ground. As the supposed boundary line was not demarcated, local people
were ignorant of not only the supposed boundary line, but also the existence of boundary
treaties. Borderland residents continued to live in the area, as their forefathers used to live.
Attempting to resolve the Ethio-Eritrean border dispute, EEBC time and again pointed out that
Ethio-Eritrea treaties were exceedingly vague. Confronted with unsolvable condition, the
arbitration tribunal had resorted to unilateral colonial reports, notes, memorandums and third
party maps that were not known to Ethiopia. This has further complicated boundary setting and
the boundary line that was defined by EEBC remained unacceptable to Ethiopia as it would
further divide families, towns, villages, and ethnic groups that have been living together for
centuries. Some of the villages that were never claimed were awarded to Ethiopia and villages
that were never been under Eritrea or Italian control were allotted to Eritrea.
Ethiopia argues that demarcation on the basis of the current arbitral award would not
bring a lasting solution, and has been insisting for bilateral dialogue with Eritrea with a view to
settle all issues with Eritrea once and for all. Eritrea, on the other has refused to accept
Ethiopia’s stance and has been demanding for strict enforcement of EEBC’s delimitation
decision. For about four years both States had stopped cooperation with EEBC that prompted

founding father’s of OAU to expressly declare acceptance of colonial boundaries “whether they are good or
bad,” in First Summit of OAU, in 1964.
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for declaration of virtual demarcation, which has further complicated the matter. Ethiopia
regards EEBC’s virtual demarcation as a legal fiction that cannot resolve the conflict. Eritrea,
on the contrary, views the border dispute was resolved, and demands Ethiopia to surrender the
claimed territories. However, as the boundary line is not yet marked on the ground, the actual
line of separation remains elusive. Borderland residents now pursue uncertain future, expecting
a devastating war to erupt at any moment.
The other perplexing task that may vitiate the possibility of resolution of border dispute
is the fact that it compounded by other issues that cannot be legally claimed. This means, there
is high possibility for border issue to appear as a bargaining leverage. In the case of Ethiopia,
and Eritrea, the government of Eritrea provoked boundary war after Ethiopia failed to accept
Eritrea’s economic and investment requests that would enrich Eritrea at the expense of
Ethiopia. The boundary issue was not an immediate cause of the 1998 devastating war. Even
the Eritrean government did not plan to cause a full pledged war. Eritrea, supposedly aimed to
pressurize Ethiopia to negotiate economic and investment issues under threat of border issue,
but Ethiopia took forceful occupation of Badme and its environs as invasion and formally
declared war in lieu of sitting for negotiation. In some case, therefore, a mere attempt to
resolve border conflict may not create a lasting peace and normalize relationship. Resolution of
border dispute may demand settlement of other socio-economic issues that may activate
unsettled border issues. Mere reliance on colonial boundary laws or policies may not be helpful
to recreate brotherhood and normalize relationship. The arbitration award is not only difficult
to implement, as it is tainted with unsolved side issues, but also it is unacceptable to the border
residents. This calls for the need to search for another alternatives in order to avoid another
destructive war and create peaceful in the region.
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The complications of Ethio-Eritrean boundary demarcation reveal deficiency of African
border policy and calls for the urgent need to revision OAU’s policy of maintain colonial
boundary as it was on the actual date of independence. In some cases, there is no clear drawn
boundary line to maintain. In other case, it becomes hared to mark the point of separation in
line with the term so colonial border treaty, as facts on the ground do not match with treaty
wordings. Inadequacy of African colonial boundary system, thus, should be cured by urgent
remedial action to avoid or mitigate border related conflicts in Africa.
1.3. Significance of the Study
The study attempts to show the fallacy and inefficacy of African boundary delineation
laws and policies that is based on arbitrary and divisive colonial boundary setting rules. The
study not only shades light how colonial boundary system has strained close relationship
between Ethiopians and Eritrean, but suggests how to rebuild historic relationship and
normalize relationship thereby enhance welfare of the two brotherly people. Consequently,
instead of relying on colonial boundary laws and policies, the study suggests the need to
strengthen the ongoing venture of AUBP to redraw African boundary in a way acceptable to
local people with a view to remove divisive colonial footprints from African borderlines.
The study appreciates historic justification for border creation, but suggests for change
of border in way accommodating changed circumstances and needs of the new generation in
this highly interconnected and interdependent global phenomenon. Removing border walls will
allow free movement of people, good and services. The policy of removing border walls is not
a new concept – it is being applied in Schengen Area of Europe. Given destructive effects of
terrorism, mass immigration, sovereignty issue, and the need to safeguard the interest of
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domestic people from overwhelming foreign labor forces, open border policy may appear
unrealistic, but possible and will better enhance wellbeing of new generation.
After all, border system is not a natural phenomenon, but it is man’s creation that meant
to safeguard the interest of certain group of people that termed as ‘insiders’ from incursion of
outsider that viewed as “others”. Nowadays, on account of globalization the classification as
“insiders” and “others” has been steadily diminishing. Today, criminals in any corner of globe
can perpetrate that act of crime stationed at far location bypassing strong border walls without
being detected by border guards. Borders, in effect, fail to serve their traditional role –
containing ‘others”. Moreover, “others’ may not necessarily be outsiders, but all bad people
(cyber criminals, terrorists, illegal transactions and so forth). In the era of globalization, the
best way to contain “others,” therefore, is not defining traditional borderlines nor erecting huge
border walls, but building strong relationship and global cooperation and coordination among
nations and nationalities is the best tools to control and contain “others.”
The study suggests African Union to further strength AUBP in its effort to delimit and
demarcate elusive colonial border in a way acceptable to all in give and take basis. This is not
to permanently separate Africans from their kinsmen, but a temporary solution to building
lasting peace. AUBP’s venture is a conflict prevention strategy. It is less expensive and not
difficult to attain in comparison to costs that may be incurred in resolving actual dispute. The
study proves that investment in AUBP will bear a good fruit to Africa in short and long run.
The study adds some practical and theoretical underpinnings to the on going African Union
Border Program in its effort to prevent potential disputes by drawing a clear boundary in Africa
and build good neighborhood with the ultimate goal of changing African border from barriers
to bridges.
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In the case of Eritrea and Ethiopia, border delineation is not a goal but itself, but it is
an important step to create good neighborhood and normalize relationship to rebuild
brotherhood. The study shows that EEBC’s legalistic approach cannot help to attain the goal
of normalization of relationship.

Ethiopia and Eritrea should sit together and reach at

negotiated settlement. This will definitely help build cooperative spirit that will change borders
from barriers to bridges. A borderline that serves, as bridge would allow free movement of
people, goods and services while filtering and restraining “others.”

1.4. Methodology
As an applied research, which targets at resolving an actual social problem, the study is
interdisciplinary in nature and legalistic in approach. The Study affords due regard not only to
multiple geopolitical, anthropological, and sociological considerations, but also maintains, the
traditional role of doctrinal legal research method in critical stages. Accordingly, the Study
assesses a range of global boundary setting norms, international law doctrines vis-à-vis
boundary setting, some important decisions of international tribunals, pertinent resolutions of
global and regional organizations, pertinent colonial treaties, international conventions,
national boundary delimitation and demarcation rules, policies, practices, procedures, and
boundary related dispute management systems. Steps taken to resolve the 1998 boundary
conflicts between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and numerous arbitration attempts are given special
attention.
The efficacy of current African border laws, policies, and institutional setup to manage
recurrent and unending border conflicts that frequently claim human lives and economic
resources is critically examined.
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The study considers publicly available data from official web pages of African Union,
specifically AUBP, decisions of EEBC, ICJ, U.N and African states. To authenticate the
reliability and accuracy of data, the author has consulted a number of book, journals, (print and
internet sources) both in international and African boundary making doctrines.
1.5. Coverage and Study Design
The study does not assess the entire African boundary conflict or conflict situation. It
specifically addresses the Ethio-Eritrean boundary conflict as case study, which is not largely
different from other African border conflicts that arise from colonial manipulations. After
making necessary adjustment to suit prevailing socio-economic and political situation, findings
and suggestions posed to Ethiopia and Eritrea boundary conflict may be referred in effort to
resolve other border related conflicts elsewhere in Africa.
With a view to address the anthropological root of boundary system in general, chapter
two of the study briefly summarizes the creation of boundary system in general. Accordingly,
Chapter two highlights the nature of boundary system in general. Boundary/Border is not a
natural phenomenon but man’s creation. Man is responsible for its creation and alteration, and
finally suffers, as a result of border conflicts. Modern state boundary system was born in
Europe and exported to the rest of the world during colonization, or the idea was imported
from Europe. The art of traditional system of bordering was developed and finally in the verge
of demise/change by the process of debordering or rebordering. The study of historical
emergence, function and nature of boundary system in general in Europe appears vital to study
African border and border related problem to get some help, and solve boundary issues.
Chapter two attempts to show a brief overview of the significance of borders for peacekeeping
and security, its historical emergence, its meaning and nature. The chapter thus supplies a
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theoretical guide that would assist in illuminating how to manage the current border tension
between Ethiopia and Eritrea and find out a lasting solution to avoid potentially looming
conflict and thereby set a working norm for the rest of Africa. The current conflicting view
regarding demise of border or change of its nature from barrier to bridge or point of contact is
briefly mentioned. Chapter two is a mix of multidisciplinary concepts involving political
geography, political science, sociology and international law.
Chapter Three explores legal rules, principles and theories pertaining territorial or
boundary delineation. A party invoking a right on territory or intending to set a boundary
between two neighboring territories should prove title over the territory. Part I of this Chapter
accordingly, briefly deals with the traditional modes of acquisition of title to territory and the
prevailing legal rules or international authorities governing the determination of title to
territory. In resolving territorial or boundary issue, especially when the boundary issue arise as
a result of colonial boundary, the principle of uti possidetis is often invoked in international
tribunals. With a view to assess the implications and application of the principle of uti
possidetis to resolve African boundary conflict and in particular the current territorial and
boundary conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, theoretical background and the current status
of the principle of uti posssidetis in international law and it relevance to African boundaries is
outlined. The principle of territorial integrity is another important principle of international law
that African states often invoke to avoid separation and promote peaceful coo-existence.
The application of territorial integrity norm, while keeping territorial integrity of a
given state prohibits invasion and separation. The Principle appears conflicting with selfdetermination and secession. This part assesses how to reconcile the apparent contradiction.
Lastly the process and phases of international boundary making is briefly stated. This Part is
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very essential as it directly addresses the processes and rules governing the actual boundary
making. International boundary making involves four important phases. If all the phases are
correctly and peacefully executed, aligning with local factors such as human and geographic
factors, it is believed that the boundary will be acceptable and stable, thereby building
international peace and security
Chapter Four summarizes African border regime.

It attempts to point out how

colonialism disrupted African border development and planted its divisive rule that has
separated families, ethnic groups and built a border wall that hampered rights of people,
nations and nationalities to live with their kinsmen and use resources wherever it was available
in accordance with African mores. This Chapter pinpoints how the Pan African movement
worked toward removing colonial boundary system and the end of revisionist movement after
formation of OAU. The revisionist movement that spearheaded by Pan Africanist, Kwame
Nkrumah of Ghana had aggressively worked to redraw African boundaries with the ultimate
goal of forming United States of Africa. The agenda of redrawing African boundaries was
dismissed by the founding father of OAU. Though it is often mentioned that founding fathers
of OAU have opted to respect colonial boundary setting rules and policies in fear of opening
Pandora’s Box, the supposed fear was motivated by the desire of the founding Fathers not to
lose territory or people therein. Chapter four attempts to shows the problems of affording
sanctity to the colonial boundary and suggests for redrawing African boundary with a view to
create good neighborhood until the nature of borders changed from barriers to bridges thereby
realizing the ongoing mission of AUBP.
Chapter Five explores the historic link between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Ethiopians and
Eritreans are basically one people. There is no basic difference between Tigrinya highlanders
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of Eritrea, which is majority in Eritrea, and the people of Tigray region of Ethiopia. Both speak
Tigrinya, are members of Orthodox Church, have common culture and intertwined by marriage
and other cultural links. Eritrean Western Regions and low residents are Muslims and have
their kinsmen on Ethiopian side too. That is why President Isias Afework, before outbreak of
border war remarked, it was not possible to build a restraining wall between Ethiopia and
Eritrea.51 But numerous socio-economic causes triggered sudden outbreak of the apparently
border war in May 1998.
The last Chapter examines how the border war was flared up unexpectedly and
subsequent consequences. After eruption of border war numerous international and regional
actors attempted to stop the war and convince both sides to the negotiation table but all efforts
could not succeed. As a result, devastating war erupted in all direction that took lives tens of
thousands from both sides. After Ethiopia regained all of its occupied territories, Eritrea
declared its intention to accept OAU’s Framework Agreement. Accordingly an agreement on
Cease Fire and Cession of Hostilities was signed and an arbitration tribunal was constituted.
Due to elusive nature of colonial treaties, the decision of arbitration tribunal remained
unacceptable. The two brotherly nations are still locked up in unsolvable deadlock. Finally,
research findings, conclusionary remarks are briefly summarized

51

TEKESTE NEGASH & KJETIL TRONVOLL, BROTHERS AT WAR: MAKING SENSE OF THE
ETRITREAN-ETHIOPIAN WAR, 10(2000).
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CHAPTER TWO
The Creation and Nature of Boundary System
2.1.

The Significance and Implications of Boundary
A sovereign power can exert its full authority within the bounds of a territory in which it can

stretch its mighty hands to regulate, control and defend its subjects. Territoriality and sovereignty
are closely associated concepts, as one can invoke all the effects of sovereignty within a defined
(bounded) territory.1 Put differently, sovereignty can be exercised within a territorial space that is
marked by a point or line called boundary. Boundaries are outer edges of a territory within which a
state can exercise exclusive power.2 Boundaries, therefore, are intrinsically linked to the space they
split from the wider global space in which authority over things and people therein can be claimed.
Thus, “ […] borders demarcate state’s sovereignty [which…] starts at its borders and ends at its
borders.”3 Hence, every territorial state needs a defined boundary because, “[… it] is the beginning
of every order and every thing.”4

1

Stanley Waterman, Boundaries and the Changing World Political Order, in CLIVE H. SCHOFIELD (ed), GLOBAL
BOUNDAIRES, 1WORLD BOUNDARIES, 23(1994)., Sir Thomas Holdich, in his early 20th century notorious
book, Political Frontiers and Boundary Making, remarks, “ The territorial limit, of any community state or
nationality […] is usually a fair indication of the distance from the central seat of control that the arm of the law can
reach.” (THOMS H. HOLDICH, POLITICAL FRONTIERS AND BOUNDARY MAKING, 31(1916)). According to
Krukoski, “Territory is the surface, limited by boundaries over which the nation exerts its sovereignty.” See William
Krukoski, Frontiers and Boundaries (Jose Krukosi, trans.), http://info.lncc.br/artigoi.html. Last accessed 11/13/14. )
In very limited circumstances sovereignty can be claimed beyond territorial limit. According to Caporaso, “ States
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As borders of national territory signal the limit of the scope of power, it is significant for the
subjects and the sovereign power.5 After all, “ [b]order making is a power strategy that uses
difference to assert control over space by inscribing difference in space.”6 This assumption has
inspired border scholars to view a territory as a ‘bordered power-container’.7 Similarly,
illuminating the nexus between boundary and authority, Richard Griggs, comments, “Just like
smoke indicates fire, boundaries indicate power.”8 To Griggs, “ Boundaries could be defined as the
very shape of power.”

9

Endorsing Griggs assertion, Donna and Wilson remark, “Borderlands are

sites and symbols of power.”10 Prescott and Triggs, make almost an identical assertion pinpointing
the interface of territorial boundary and sovereign competence.11 In contemporary sense, boundary
is “ the firm and inherent attribute of [a] state.” 12
On the same token, Ruben Zaiotti observes, “ Territoriality – the control of a defined surface
of the globe - and sovereignty […] are two of the key principles defining the modern geopolitical
vision.”13 A sovereign power is exclusively competent to declare compelling laws to regulate
subjects within the limits of the territory, to enforce laws or adjudicate and punish lawbreakers
exclusively. Needless to say, in normal course of things, a sovereign loses his/her might outside the
bounds of a territory that he/she controls. This is because “ … sovereignty over land defines what
5
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constitutes a state.”14 Thus, “Borders represent the very essence of statehood,” as a defined border,
reveals the scope of authority of territorial state in the international system.15
Boundaries or territorial limits of a given nations should, therefore, be unambiguously set.
Delineation of an exact point of boundary is “[…] necessarily an outcome of determination of
territorial sovereignty [… and….] typically defines the jurisdictional reach of the state. ”16 Thus,
borders enlighten the beginning and end of control and power.

Consequently, “All political

systems need some minimum definition of where the boundaries of authorities lie, and a mechanism
for their maintenance and reproduction.”17
Francis Ikone, in his brief article entitled, Africa’s international borders as potential sources
of conflict and future threats to peace and security”, highlights the compulsory nature of defined
boundary for effective function of a state as follows:
In the modern state, well-defined borders are not only a key element of the definition of
statehood…. Legitimate governmental objectives cannot be clarified or implemented unless the
territory where such authority is to be exercised can be defined and understood. [….] While
unconsolidated borders, combined with ineffective political institutions and incomplete
nationalist projects, have been recipes for instability and conflict, the establishment of more or
less stable borders has been identified as a precondition for the building of stable
governments and states.18

An obscure boundary limit obviously results in elusive territory, which in turn, generates confusion
in the scope of sovereignty. Residents of tenuous territory may defy orders of an ‘’ostensible
sovereign’’ that may result in lawlessness and engender conflict. By implication, therefore, a
defined territory is one of the indispensable elements constituting an effective State with a
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sovereign organ that is conferred with irrefutable power over the subjects in the territory.19 Thus,
international boundaries indicate the limits of territory at which “ … the arm of the law can reach or
the jurisdiction of each state….”20 Sumner accordingly remarks, “ The benefit of having territory [
is …] great [as long as ] state borders are clear, because a state’s boundaries must be well defined
for the modern state to function.”21 A territory may be assumed clearly defined when its borderlines
are undoubtedly marked and largely uncontested.22
A defined territory enables the sovereign to discharge its traditional functions of maintaining
peace and security efficiently. The State, thus, can deploy its border guards to defend the territory
and safeguard its citizens from foreign aggression within the limits of its territory. Moreover, a
clearly set borderline affords the sense of security by discouraging unauthorized intrusion into the
territory thereby enhancing stability. In medieval times, boundaries served, as checkpoints to
scrutinize illegal exist and unauthorized entry. Some medieval cities built boundary walls that had
limited gates in which only those permitted could get access. The gates also served as a check point
for regulating exit out of the city.

In case of unauthorized border crossing a clearly set border

enables subjects in the secured border to take protective measures including use of force.
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In this regard, historically, boundary wall had served defensive functions as “foreign
interlopers [within a defined boundary] move at their peril.” 23 In the modern era, international law
authorizes states to take actions against any actual or provocative measures that may threaten the
security of a territory.24 Self-defense can be exerted against actions of another power if the
provocative act targets people, property or territorial integrity of the defender. A claimant of selfdefense, therefore, should prove that it launched the act of self-defense to prevent aggression within
the bounds of its territory. For instance, in our case study, Eritrea sent armed personnel to the area
that was administered by Ethiopia and resided by Ethiopians who have been residing in the
contested areas for centuries. The unauthorized intrusion of armed men provoked the conflict.
Ethiopia considered the unauthorized incursion as aggression, but neither Boundary Commission
nor the Security Council, apart from EECC clearly designated the Eritrean act as aggression.
Ethiopia’s initial use of force appears to meet the definition of self-defense. (For details see Chapter
Six page 293ff).
Territorial boundary is man’s creation, but its sanctity is well accepted in several versions of
the Bible. It is assumed a curse to mess a boundary limit either by destroying boundary marks or
illegal expansion of one’s limit of land. The Book of Deuteronomy states, “Though shalt not
remove thy neighbour’s landmark, which they of old time have set in thine inheritance, which thou
shalt inherit in the land that the LORD thy God giveth thee to possess it.”25
Samuel Finer attempts to reveal mental state of an ideal man vis-à-vis defined territory and
boundary setting in state formation. Finer makes a powerful illustration stating, “ Tell a man today

INTERNATIONAL LAW 128 -129(8th ed.: 2012). Thus, for existence of a state fully uncontested, frontiers is not a
requirement though it is important for effective function of sovereign power.
23
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to go and build a state; and he will try to establish a definite and defensible territorial boundary and
compel those who live inside it to obey him.’’26
According to Douglas Johnston “…political boundaries are a psychological necessity even
in the absence of a direct military intrusion into a group’s living space.”27 Sense of security and
stability not only makes governance easier, but also it is pivotal for maintaining global peace and
security thereby enhance wellbeing of everyone. Diener and Hagen highlight the nature of boundary
as follows: “We live in a very bordered world.

The daily news is filled with controversies

concerning the political, cultural, and economic borders that crisscross the Earth’s
surface.”28[Emphasis mine]. The learned authors further remark, “ Borders are central features in
current international disputes relating to security, migration, trade and natural resources.” 29
A defined boundary also offers subjects with the autonomy and home feeling.
Belongingness is a natural character of human being. A tribe or an ethnic group normally trusts its
fellow group member and strives to maintain intimacy in a territory that is not freely and easily
available to a stranger. This natural character of human being builds some kind of inherently rooted,
but hidden boundary line or encourages construction of notoriously visible boundary.30 Douglas
confirms this attitude of human being suggesting, “boundaries are essential to human autonomy
because they serve to institutionalize our separateness from others, even our closest neighbors.”31
Similarly, Diener and Hagen remark, “ Territoriality […] serves as a social mechanism […]
deriving the process of defining what is ‘ours’, in opposition to what is ‘theirs’.” To them, “ By
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demarcating and defending territory, groups control specific spaces and resources in an effort to
regulate extraterritorial practices, such as entry and exit, and intraterritorial practices, such as social
hierarchies and governance.”32
To Janique Dubois the expression “territoriality” encompasses broader connotation, which is
more than a literal meaning of the term, holding emotional or symbolic value. Emotional
significance of territoriality appears valid to assert the significance of territories having no current
apparent economic importance. For example, desserts (barren lands) currently may have no, or
lesser economic value but embodies stronger emotional implications, which may even supersede
economic considerations. Thus, to Dubois territoriality is a concept linked with “ […] property,
boundary and jurisdiction. 33 In the words of Dubois:
[…territoriality] does not simply refer to national borders or lines on a map. Rather, it
expresses a relationship between land, people and identity [….] Territoriality is characterized
as a process through which places are created to “satisfy both the material requirements of life
and the emotional requirements of belonging – of placing oneself both in time and space”. A
relational understanding of territory takes into account the symbolic as well as the functional
roles [that] geographical areas encompass.34

Emotional and symbolic significance of a territory makes border related conflicts hard to
resolve. Ruben Zaiotti, rightly remarks, “ […] borders are powerful symbols of identity and
historical continuity, both for the state as institution and for the peoples they contain.”35The Ethio –
Eritrea border conflict best explains the emotional implications of economically insignificant land.
Commenting on Ethio-Eritrea war, the Economist cited a quotation,“ Two bald men fighting over a
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comb”.36 [Emphasis mine]. The expression portrays an idea that the two countries were fighting for
a trifling barren land, which in economic terms does not justify for the expensive and destructive
war. But to the people of Ethiopia and Eritrea the disputed village, Badme, was more than a
‘comb”. Badme never been under Eritrean control and no Eritrean regarded it as part of Eritrea
territory, apart from the current Eritrean government. Ethiopians used to live in the village of
Badme from the time immemorial. Residents of Badme never heard about the elusive treaty that
was concluded in Addis Ababa between Emperor Minilik II and Italian colonial power. Eritrea on
the other hand claims Badme has been Eritrean land since colonial treaty of 1902 in accordance
with the Cairo Resolution of OAU, which is akin to doctrine of uti possidetis juris Spanish Latin
America.
For both nations the dispute over Badme appears more than a simple border issue. It involves
the question of supremacy and has renewed the old ethnic issue. Northern Ethiopian region, Tigray
and Eritrea, are power rivalries and often battle for superiority. Eritreans consider them superior to
to Tigray people though both speak the same language, almost the same culture and religion. Thus,
it appears the battle for supremacy, which entails emotional consideration, supersedes economic
and human cost that the war has consumed. On top of this, residents of Badme consider the disputed
border as expression of identity. They have been living in the vicinity for centuries peacefully. If
Badme is surrendered, residents should leave their village and resettle in Ethiopia or Eritrea,
depending upon their choice, which is not simple to decide.
In some cases, border issue demands the need to balance competing interests with a view to
maintain peace and stability. In geographic terms some authors view this internal and external
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pressure as “centrifugal and centripetal forces”. In the words of Douglas, “ … a state is dependent
for its survival on the preservation of a balance between centrifugal and centripetal forces....”37
Subjects of a sovereign state pressurize the government to safeguard their interest against
competing external forces and maintain social and cultural wellbeing while non-subjects compete
for resources and opportunities that are necessary for survival. As Diener and Hagen, rightly
remark, “ … social groups instinctively seek territorial control to secure resources necessary for
survival. This suggests humans are subject to perpetual ‘survival of the fittest’ and deny access to
competing groups.”38
The border between United States and Mexico is a good illustration to demonstrate the
internal and external pressure on the government. Border issue, in United States, is not uncommon,
especially in election seasons. During presidential campaign, Governor Perry of Texas said: “This
violence will not stand [….] If Washington won’t stand to secure the border, as the governor of Texas, I
will.”39(Emphasis added). The enactment of numerous immigration legislations, law enforcement

institutions, and customs and border protection efforts exhibit the government’s battle to maintain
balance between exterior and interior forces.
When the scope of limit of boundary is contested the pressure on the government is so
intense as both internal and external forces rationalize their resentment on economic, social and
cultural grounds. Though there is no active governmental boundary related conflict between
Ethiopia and Sudan, border residents on Ethiopian side often protest against the Ethiopian
government asserting the government negotiated to surrender a portion of Ethiopian farm land.
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Sudanese farmers on the other hand exert armed conflict against Ethiopian farmers claiming that the
land belonged to them. There is an elusive colonial treaty that was never applied on the ground (not
demarcated). The two governments have established a boundary commission and have been
working to settle the issue amicably, but border residents of both countries are not satisfied by what
their respective governments have been doing.40
Boundary related issue is an old one, but it is still a “disease” that never been “treated well
and cured” to the extent of banishment. Human being, in history, has experienced numerous
destructive border motivated wars but all efforts could not end it. Causality of border war appears
out number victims of fatal diseases or natural catastrophe. Scientists often succeed in finding
vaccine for killer diseases. Today, the world is safe from some of the old time devastating diseases
and the race to invent medicine for fatal diseases like Ebola, HIV and cancer is so high. Huge
campaign is being made to eradicate those killer diseases.

But since the emergence of human

boundary, human being has been suffering, but no effective solution was devised to safeguard
victims of border conflict. In some cases, destructive effects of border wars supersede effects of
HIV or cancer. Violent border conflicts destroy thousands of lives in short span of time. For
instance, in two years border war (1998 – 2000), Ethiopia and Eritrea lost about 100, 000 lives.41
Since World War II human being experienced numerous border conflicts, and embroiled by
destructive wars. Vast number of nations is still in confrontation and huge military personnel and
killer machines are ready to release hot fire on the crowd of borderland people. Border related
conflicts are very sensitive and often end up in armed confrontation.
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Most, if not all, medieval international or intergovernmental wars had the issue of territory
one way or another. Boundary conflict was common in primitive communities, as rulers often
wished to have more territory and people as manifestation of power. In present state boundary
conflicts appear never ending, unless national and international agencies honestly work with full
determination to end it by defining borders or changing the nature of borders from barriers to
bridges rather than lines of separation. Christianity supports sanctity of borders but it has no binding
effects and powerful nations often disregard Deuteronomy 27:17, which proclaims: “Cursed be he
that removed his neighbors landmark.” (Deuteronomy 27:17). Though the validity may be disputed
at present, the expression, “ Good fence makes good neighbors (Robert Frost, Mending Wall),”
appears still valid.
Recurrent African territorial violation does not imply that medieval Africa did not have
territorial boundary at all. Though elusive and in some cases difficult to précises locate, as it was
not drawn in modern senses, medieval Africa had its own indigenous kind of territorial boundary.
Every tribe or ethnic groups had their own land with known boundaries that they could exclude
others. Though there was no map or clearly defined frontier, in modern sense, each tribe, ethnic
group, nations and nationalities had their own land with known boundary which was marked by
natural features of land like mountain, in most cases rivers, lakes or forests. Ethiopia, for instance,
has several nations and nationalities that currently constitute one political entity. The territorial
limits of borderland tribes or ethnic groups that make up Ethiopia considered as Ethiopian
boundary.
In ancient times, it was not uncommon to build border fences of city-states. Though not
affording the traditional function of excluding “other”, the Harar city border wall in Ethiopia is still
alive. The city of Harar was fenced with 5 gates that serve now as one of the tourist attraction sites.
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In other areas, though the periphery not fenced like the City of Harar, there was boundary known to
the local people. Unfenced borders were crossable in belief that God has created passage. Border
residents, though they were aware of the facts that they crossed a boundary line and entered into the
land of someone else only in merely exercising their right of passage. This was based on the belief
that God has created lines even in human body (lines in human body in which blood transported).
Thus, everyone had unlimited access unless expressly prohibited or fenced to restrict the access.
In this increasingly globalized contemporary world, territoriality and boundary may appear a
shrinking or obsolete phenomenon, but facts on the ground and emerging global security concern
demand construction of strong barriers and dictate for firm vigilance and scrutiny in all borders of
contact. Thus, in the era of globalization too, borders may be used as protective tools against threat
of security and unauthorized immigration, which may have adverse impact in keeping peace and
security. In the words of Gabriel Popescu,
Recently borders have been taken on heightened significance in an era of globalization. They
are central to the profound changes globalization in generating in the way people and
societies relate to space at the outset of the twenty first century. If during the early 1990s
globalization pressures on state borders led some to envision the emergence of a borderless
world (debordering). By early 2000s it became clear that borders were retaining their
significance albeit under new appearances (rebordering). Despite unprecedented opening up
to various globalization flows, borders are far from fading away.42

Borders are also significant for smooth working of globalization by filtering undesired
actors and facilitating free movement of “good” people, goods and services or the actuality of a new
type of border that can enhance friendship, and contribute for building lasting peace and security.
Global economic inter-dependence will effectively work in friendship atmosphere where peace
prevails over conflict. It may appear awkward to talk about the significance of border while
working for its destruction. Border related disputes are extremely potent to generate armed
conformation, and hence it is almost impossible to deborder unless friendship atmosphere prevails
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by delineating mutually acceptable border lines and build good fences that can create good
neighborhood. Global peace and security smoothens interdependence and would facilitate the
emergence of truly borderless world. According to Prescott and Triggs, “Boundaries are the line of
physical contact between states and provide opportunities for cooperation and risks of discord.
“43The old maxim “ Good Fences Make Good Neighbor”, really works to establish a smooth
relationship and mutual co-existence which is vital for building sustainable friendship and
ultimately transform boundaries from barriers to bridges for peaceful interaction and integration.
2.2.

The Origin and Nature of Boundary

2.2.1. How boundary system was created?
All human beings are “created free”, and endowed with a full liberty on earth.44 As
prescribed in the Sacred Books, God conferred men with utmost freedom to freely move anywhere
and enjoy almost all the fruits of earth.45 Thomas Holdich, in his seminal book entitled, Political
Frontiers and Boundary Making remarks, “ Nature knows no boundary lines.” 46 Similarly, Gabriel
Popescu, acclaims, “Nature does not offer compelling rationales to justify the creation of borders
between places.”47 An African boundary researcher, Cukwurah paraphrases this view stating,
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“Nature Abhors Boundaries.”48 Cukwurah further suggests, “ On the whole, human factors were
primarily responsible for the creation of […] boundaries and for their variance [….]”49 It is true that
human being has crafted boundaries with a view to exclude “other”; frequently ventured to alter it
with the motive to expand territorial limits. Needless to say, the battle for territorial expansion often
causes animosity and tension among neighboring nations.
Naturally, thus, there was no limit or barrier that meant to impede movement. According to
Diener and Hagen, medieval people, “[…] lived within small brands of nomadic foragers known as
hunter-gatherers whose migration [was…] patterned by changing seasons and environmental
conditions that affected availability of food and other resources.”50 Hence, ancient people freely
moved anywhere they wished provided they earth could accommodate they by supplying things to
eat and offering conducive climate.51
This absolute freedom, presumably, encouraged nomadic way of life, which is still apparent
in some societies.52 Nomads often disregard boundaries, like birds and natural beasts. In search for
better way of life and abundant resources for themselves and their cattle, nomads unless impended
by topography or other man-made hurdles, often move, ignoring boundaries.53 As protective
measure against attack by wild beasts ancient people moved in small groups for “hunting, fishing,
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pasture and simple tillage in their earliest form.”54 The choice of route for migration was not a
predetermined one. Migrating people simply avoided natural barriers like mountains, lakes, huge
rivers, unmanageable thick forests, dangerous wild beasts, and moved until they got food for
themselves or greener pasture for their cattle.55 If the nomads or migrants by chance landed at an
area that had been already occupied by another group, the new comers and the original settlers
clash. The winner expelled the looser and strengthened its ownership of the land and resources on it
and set its own boundary. As there was no binding rule yet, self-help was the only way of
protecting ones interest. Social Darwinism best explains how a stronger fitted to a situation and a
weaker wiped out.
The unimpeded movement was curtailed by the emergence of powerful groups that
effectively safeguarded their private land holding and its resources. This has discouraged frequent
migration, and hunting steadily replaced by agriculture. This has facilitated the emergence of
private property.56 Private land holding coupled with human civilization necessitated imposition of
certain limits on the freedom of movement. John Lock’s assertion of origin and rationale for private
property appears to confirm this fact.57 Locke justifies personal nature of property in his notorious
philosophy called Labor Theory. He asserts, “ Though the Earth [… is ] common to all Men, yet
every Man has a property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but himself.”58
[Emphasis added]. Thus, involvement of one’s labor either by occupying master-less land and
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resources on it, or improvements on the land or its resources rendered fruits of labor personal, and
no one could claim it, other than the person who had invested his labor. The restriction that was
imposed as a result of one’s personal belonging (private property) has, supposedly, created
borderline that cannot be freely crossed by an unauthorized person. Accordingly Lock concludes:
“The Labour of [.. man’s] body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say properly his.
Whatsoever, then he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath
Mixed his Labour with , and joyned to it something that is his own, add thereby makes it his
Property. It being by him removed from the common state Nature placed it in, it hath by this
labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other men.”59 (Emphasis
added).

It is true that the emergence of private property by itself cannot curtail ordinary movement
of people but it has evidently restricted free enjoyment of resources that the earth offers. Thus, a
person who invested his labor either by occupying a master-less property or improved it could
deprive a stranger to use the resources already occupied or improved. Excluding others by setting
limits is one of the important consequences of ownership, which makes unwelcomed intrusion
trespass.60
According to Diener and Hagen, ancient societies, though lived in a nomadic way of life,
had territory that they claimed “theirs”.61 They kept moving back and forth and periodically vacated
a given spot, but this did not mean abandonment. In the words of Diener and Hagen:
“[… ] pre-historic humans possessed surprisingly elaborate territorial arrangement. Rather
than wandering aimlessly, hunter-gatherer groups likely operated within relatively stable
local regional foraging ranges or what might best described as networks of foraging sites.
These networks were shaped by extended kinship or alliance relationships, religious beliefs,
and ecological conditions.” 62

Hunter-gatherer groups had invested labor and considerable energy in clearing forests and
paving ways for the effective utilization of natural resources. Even if they knew that they would
59
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move from the spot, depending on the situation, pre-modern men had endeavored to make life
relatively confortable and deserved protection against trespassers. This plausibly accords with
Locke’s Labor Theory, and thus, the law should safeguard fruits of their labor by setting boundaries
to avoid or restrict unauthorized intrusion.
Boundary system starts at individual landholding and goes to national political boundary.63
The first kind of boundary is the one that separates neighbors, be it, individual or community. As
quoted by Krukoski, Castillos Goycochea observes:
The first boundary was traced on the ground by the first being that understood his position in
face of his neighbor's. From individual property it passed to the collective sovereignty, i.e. to
the household, from the household to the city, from the city to the province, and from the
province to the country. Everything has limits, lanes, fences, walls or some other designation

that defines the characteristics of the material possessions, of some being, be that a man
or a social entity.64
Territorial limits of medieval societies had been very porous and often difficult to locate.
Moreover, boundaries were set on the basis of sufficiency of resources, and subjectively on need
basis or on condition of inhospitality of a territory or a given region or obstacles that make border
crossing impossible or difficult such as rivers, mountains and deserts.65 Even though an exact limit
of a boundary may not be easily noticed, it is undeniable fact that pre-modern societies had
territories that exclusively belonged to the society in common in which any member moved freely.
Strangers were not allowed to collect fruits from privately held territories, advance permission from
the group. It is rightly remarked:
Although it is tempting to think of ancient hunter – gatherers groups as nonterritorial since
clear borders seem absent among their modern - day counterparts, these early group most
likely featured complex strategies for regulating membership, territory, and resources that
intermingled notion of exclusively and reciprocity contingent upon animists religious
practices, kinship customs, and resources availability. 66
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For the purposes of exclusive use of fruits of the territory some ancient societies had exerted
efforts to demarcate their territories by investing “ […] considerable energy in claiming and
maintaining exclusive access to specific hunting and foraging areas.”67 Though not free from doubt
and lacked precision, medieval societies had used various mechanisms signaling limits of their
boundary and protected their territorial limit. For instance:
… the Tsimshian, coast Salish, and many other groups in North America Pacific Northwest
developed intricate social systems focusing on ownership of and access to resources sites.
Although punishment for trespassers could be sever, property-owning lineages were expected
to share their bounty through ritual celebrations. The Veddah peoples of Sri Lanka also
marked and rigorously safeguarded specific territories. Each band was expected to be selfsufficient within its own hunting areas, and trespassing was strictly prohibited in nearly all
circumstances. In areas lacking an obvious natural features, the Veddahs would carve
symbols into tree trunks to mark the border. 68

As pointed out elsewhere, some ancient societies, had shared resources of their territories on
reciprocity basis.

69

To this group of pre-modern people, friendly aliens could enter into their

territories and gather fruits provided they get permission form the group who claim the territory.
Members of the group could freely gather fruits in their territory without the need to seek
permission.

Members had option to gather resource and use privately or share it with the

community. There was a system of private ownership of the fruits gathered though the territory
belonged to the group.
The practice of delineating territorial limits (boundary) by using landmarks had originated in
medieval times. The landmark need not be a given point but a kind of zonal area that was
inhabitable or could not be used due to natural inconveniences. For instance, “ Aboriginal ranges
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were bordered by buffer areas, which were used infrequently and apparently not claimed by any
group. “70
To sum up, medieval form of boundary setting was different from a kind of boundary that a
modern man can fairly imagine. Pre-modern societies “ … tended to conceive of these things and
arrange social and political space in ways that differ from contemporary ideals and expectations.”71
The restrictive borders served as “… a means to assign things to a particular spaces and regulate
access into and /or out of specific areas. This innately social and political process links to the idea
of ownership or rightful and permanent possession of land.”72 In the contemporary sense territorial
limit of ancient men appears ambiguous and prone to conflict. Personal or communal land
boundaries were not precisely set. This however, does entail absence of boundary. Ancient societies
knew territories belonged to them though strangers could not easily notice a precise location of the
boundary. Moreover boundary setting was subjective as a private person or community unilaterally
decided limits of their holding on the basis of sufficiency of resources that the territory could afford
or on condition of sheer distance or ability of the person or tribal group to safeguard the territory.
2.3.

Terminology and Basic Concepts
2.3.1. Boundary, Border and Frontier: Distinct or Similar?

Words express idea and belief in concise form. Cognizance of an exact meaning of a term,
hence, is vital to appreciate an underlying phenomenon. The terms boundary, border, and frontier
often appear synonymous, even though they are not identical in all senses. Though the dictionary
meaning of the terms is not similar, repeated use of the terms interchangeably has made the
distinction “invisible.”73 Synonymous use of terms, which are in fact not identical in all features,
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causes confusion and compounds the complication to already hostile environment in which
contesting parties vigorously fight to make use of all possibilities for the purpose of playing a zero
sum game.
The meaning afforded to the terms has been changing from time to time depending upon
their significance. Francis Ikome attests this view stating, “Like many other social science concepts,
the notion of boundary or border has historically shifted in definition.”74 Understanding of the terms
and their socio-political significance and changing nature appears vital to fully address problems
having some kind of nexus to boundary.
In this part we will briefly examine the nature and distinction, if any, and similarity between
the words boundary, border and frontier. Ultimately, we will explore the importance of boundary in
virtually “borderless world.”
In the technology age, where distance has become immaterial, boundary wall may appear
obsolete. Consequently it may seem pointless to explore meaning of words like boundary, border
and frontier. However, the growing religious fanatic group and the resultant 9/11 terrorist attack and
the web of immigration demanding safe haven and the need to curb unauthorized border crossing
has necessitated building new fences and allocation of huge budget for border guarding. The issue
of border and bordering has been important more than ever. More ever, an exact territorial limit of
most former colonies of Africa is not well settled and some parts of Africa has been experiencing
border tension. Colonial treaties and border delineation accords that express the terms boundary,
border or frontier are still applicable and may be presented to prove limits of contested territory.
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Ascertaining ambiguities of the terms, therefore, is helpful to find an amicable solution to border
issues.
Andrei Cusco portrays terminological perplexities regarding the notion of boundary and
related terms as follows:
The conceptual difficulties and terminological confusion reigning within the field of “border
studies” are notorious. [….The expressions] borders,” “boundaries” and “frontiers” are often
interpreted as nothing more than equivalent designations of limits between states that,
though they may convey certain symbolically charged messages, are essentially legal and
jurisdictional linear markers of the extent of a state’s territory. Though scholarly debate has
generally added useful discriminations and nuances to this undifferentiated “common
usage,” the picture is by no means clear in all cases.75

Gabriel Popescu notes similarity between the notion of boundary and related terms, apart
from taking the words “boundary” and “border” simply to mean territorial lines of division.76 This
supports Prescott and Triggs who further remark, “The term boundary, frontier and border are
often used as synonyms in conversation, in newspapers reports and in television and radio
broadcasts.”77
In addition to the terminological confusion and ever changing meaning vis-à-vis variable
social system, the notion of boundary and related terms had served diverse functions78 According to
Diener and Hagen, medieval people like nomadic bands, city-states, and empire had varied beliefs
and practice in organizing boundary.79

The learned authors lucidly put, “ Given differing

economic, cultural, political, and environmental contexts, it should not be surprising that groups in
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different parts of the world and in different times [have] developed varied approaches to territory,
borders, and governance’’80 In the medieval period control aspect of boundary walls as was the
main motivating factor to restrain movement of people, as labor was very crucial at the time. As
Diener and Hagen put, “.. ancient governments were more focused on controlling the movement of
people than controlling actual territory since labor supply was the key factor….”81 At a time where
periodic war with neighboring states had been common, and killer machines were not invented,
fighters with their arrow were pivotal. Hence, controlling human movement was critical rather than
territorial guarding.

Labor supply was also extremely needed for agriculture that was done

absolutely with human labor. As a result, walled borders served as important tools for exit and
access control. Diener and Hagen, remark that this assumption explains why ancient states,
“generally satisfied with the relatively vague borders.”82
Nowadays, the distinction between the terms boundary and frontier is not debatable. Clear
distinction between the terms was gradually developed in 19th and 20th century.83 Experts in the
field progressively identified the difference between “boundaries and frontiers by distinguishing
between a linear and a spatial concept, shifting from place to process and in the meaning and
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surmised that the terms boundary and frontier are not synonymous.84 In the following Section we
will briefly explore meaning and nature of the terms and concepts.
2.3.2. Boundary: Meaning, Nature and Scope
In traditional sense, the notion of “boundary” meant a point of limit that one’s freedom of
movement may be restricted with a view to safeguard property or other interests of another person
or group of persons. The interest holder may use restraining signals (either artificial or natural) to
preclude an unauthorized intrusion. Conventionally, thus, the term ‘boundary’ connotes, “ […]
Imaginary or real lines that divide two pieces of land from one another [….] ”85 It is “a line that
marks limit of an area.”86
Eminent English international lawyer, Brownlie describes the notion of “boundary” in its
functional approach. To Brownlie boundary is “ an alignment, a line described in words, in treaty
and/or shown on a map or chart, and/or marked on the ground by physical indicators.” 87 Brownlie’s
approach appears precise and relatively modern style that reveals an operational meaning of the
term ‘’boundary’’. This definition also underpins the processes of making boundary. Black’s Law
Dictionary, defines the term boundary as, “ …every separation, natural or artificial which marks the
confines or line of division of two contiguous estates, [in which] trees or hedges may be planted,
ditches may be dug, walls or closures may be erected, to serve as boundaries.”88 This definition
appears to connote the term “boundary” as a line of division of a private property. This line of
connotation of the term “boundary’ is not absolutely wrong but confines its contours only to private
land boundary. In international Law sense, the notion of boundary is more than a line separating
84
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private property.
According to Brownie, a boundary line may be “ […] established by law, treaty, or accord
or practice that marks the limit of a political unit’s territory.”89

An ordinary legislative act may

create a boundary between two or more political entities. For instance, most state boundaries in
Ethiopia were created by legislative enactments that were passed by the Ethiopian parliament.90
Treaty is the most usual method of creating international boundary. An exact beginning and end of
two adjacent territories often described in the treaty. Some colonial era treaties, however, lack
precision as the parties may not actually know the limits of spot described in the treaty and facts
included in the treaty may no sharply congruent with the actual fact on the ground. Moreover, the
balance of power between negotiating parties may not match and a weak party either coerced or
consented to an unfavorable terms as a result of some form of vices. A vitiated consent renders the
validity and enforceability of the treaty questionable. Ethio-Italian boundary treaties explain how
the then Ethiopian tribal chief was ignorant of all the facts while consenting to unfavorable terms of
three treaties that never been demarcated or known to the border people for centuries. Though
vague and need supplementary agreement or map, three boundary treats were signed between
Ethiopia and Italy with regard to Ethiopia and Eritrean boundary. Still now, it is very difficult to
implement the treaties as the terms of the treaties did not coincide with physical features of the area
described in the treaty, and if implemented could divide families and ethnic groups. Similarly a
number of treaties were signed between Ethiopia and Great Britain that were meant to delineate
Kenyan and Sudanese boundary. Setting boundary by the instrumentality of treaties is the most
88
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common and amicable form boundary making.
Boundary line may also be determined by an accord until two or more contesting organs
sign a legally binding treaty. An accord is a result of preliminary negotiation by an executive organ
to stop a prevailing atrocity until a final action is taken. It is just a simple agreement that may or
may not reach to the status of a treaty. Treaty, on the other hand, is a legally binding document that
needs ratification in accordance with the law of two political organs.91 In the medieval period
nations had followed some kind of practice in setting boundary line. The most usual method was
applying natural features of land to designate the end of territory. Rivers, mountains, march lands,
forest are the most usual ways of setting boundary line.
To sum up, the notion of boundary implies limits or confinement beyond which one cannot
freely pass. It may be the end of national territory or the last point of private land. The expression,
‘boundary’ may also connote the limit beyond which another phenomenon commences.
Nowadays, the term “boundary” assumed to hold a wider connotation including national and
international aspects encompassing all the processes, institutions, and resources that may be
categorized as border.
To mark boundary, manmade restraining schemes, such as boundary wall, or natural
barriers, like mountains, rivers, lakes, deserts, forests or even big recognizable trees, may be used.
Ancient forms of boundary making practices are still applied in some societies in Africa. For
instance, some indigenous communities in Ethiopia, plant trees to mark land boundaries. The
practice of planting tree that can easily grow on the agree boundary point and cannot dry even in
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dry season is a common practice in the Southern Ethiopia.92 Use of natural barriers as sign of ones
private holding or limits of territory of a given tribe is also so common.
The most common form of natural barrier are: river, mountain, lake, ocean, desert any other
point, including big rocks that can be clearly referred and cannot be easily avoided with a view to
usurp ones private holding. Before 1920s zones or areas with some sort of width were taken as
boundary. Natural zones that are used to delineate limits of territorial holding are known as
marchlands. A desert or large area covering forest, desert, huge hills or mountains were used as
sign denoting ones limit of territory
2.3.3. Border
The terms “boundary” and “border” often viewed synonymous and not easy to distinguish,
if not impossible at all. Nowadays, the ongoing trend is to use the terms interchangeably.93
However, some argue that the contour of two notions is not absolutely congruent stating, the notion
of “boundary” means a geometric line that separates two or more bounded territories while the term
“border” denotes borderland, which includes border regions.94 A borderland is a geographic area in
close proximity to state border consisting all lands even hold by private person, ethnic, tribal groups
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or even by regions or state that situated near the boundary.95 It appears thus imperative to cognize
an exact meaning of critically important words to address border related issues. Are the terms
“border” and “boundary” really synonymous, or do they possess some distinguishable features that
may be taken vital? For the purpose of clarity and with a view to accurately perceive idea
represented by the words, sufficient assessment of, possibly, an exact meaning appears vital.
The International Boundary Commission (IBC) of Canada and United States Boundary
Commission remarks the illusiveness of distinction between border and boundary as follows: “The
border is a boundary, and a boundary is a quirky entity. Like an entity out of Flatland, it only exists
in two dimensions - it has length and height, but no width.” 96 [Emphasis added]. It is true that a
border is an area or a spot proximate to the dividing line (the boundary), but that may not
necessarily mean the two notions are synonymous. Stephen Okhonminia, expresses the notion of
border as “ […] external [lines] of states which have legal significance [.…]”97 This assertion is not
helpful to distinguish the term “border” from the notion of “boundary”, as boundary also may be
taken as an external line having legal effects.
So what is an actual perceivable distinction between the terms border and boundary? If the
two terms are one and the same, why we have these two nebulous words? As has been pointed out
above, the International Border Commission of Canada and United States takes border as boundary
stating, “ The border is a boundary…”98 This gives us an impression that the two terms are similar.
If border is a boundary, then boundary is also border.
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On the other hand, close reading of some of the literature in the field affords an impression
of disparity between the terms “border” and “boundary”. Though Comelli et al explicitly define the
term “border” in two sense depending upon the nature of relationship between the neighboring
states, the distinction between boundary and border can be imagined. To Comelli et al, a boundary
is a line of separation that serves as barrier. This kind of border delineation is practiced when border
crossing is not easy. When the limits of two bounded territories serve as point of contact and free
movement of people is unrestricted, it take the form of border. That is why Comelli et al suggest
transforming EU’s border from boundary to borderland.99 The expression “borderland” is not an
independent citatory but it is a “gray” area between the two bounded territories, which is more than
a line of separation.100 The expression, “… EU’s border from boundary to borderland” thus
suggests the quest to transform lines or points that separate EU member States from barrier to
points of contact. While the former is a boundary in traditional sense, the later is border or
borderland. In a way holding both meanings, Comelli et al, regard the term “border” as, “[…] an
area of division and demarcation or alternatively of contact, exchange and integration.”101 Henk
Van Houtum makes almost an identical observation as follows:

…the balance in the present boundary/border studies, is now leaning towards border studies.
More precisely, boundary studies (where the border is) and border studies (how the border is
socially constructed) have in fact grown apart, have become detached from each other to
become separate subfields [….] There is hardly, and much to my regret, any overlap between
the two sub- fields anymore.102

Though Houtum, uses the terms boundary/border at the same time, suggesting for change of
boundaries studies to border studies which points varied meaning of the terms. Houton further
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remarks that the term ‘border’, “ … has now understood as a verb in the sense of bordering.”103
Houtum discloses anthropological distinction between the terms boundary and border stating,
“…boundary generally means the social spatially constructed differences between cultures/
categories and a border generally stands for a line demarcated in space.”104 Thus, anthropological
sense of the terms “boundary” and “border” is utterly different from political senses.
According to Prescott and Triggs, the expression, “border” or “borderland” denote, “ […]
zones of indeterminate width that form the outermost pars of a country, that are bounded on one
side by the national boundary.”105 The learned authors had ventured to find out meaning of the
terms provided by Lapradelle who called zones that are regarded as border or borderland as le
voisinage which means neighborhood, vicinity, nearness, neighbors.106 Lapradelle also applies the
terms le territoire limitrophe which means “neighboring or bordering area.”

107

In this conception

the term border does not necessarily mean an area of land or a point dividing neighboring territories
but an area near the dividing line (boundary). Supposedly, a bordering area is a territory that
belongs to the neighboring states – not an area separating neighboring territories. Thus, both or all
the neighboring territories have their own bordering land, which definitely belongs to them.
To political geographers and experts in the field of border sociology, the terms “boundary”
and “border” are distinct.108 The former connotes a line separating two or more territories, while the
latter is a gray area adjoining the boundary. In other words, a border is a borderland near the
boundary line. For example, an area of land that belongs to United States and controlled by the
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United States border guards is a United States border or borderland as it is situated near to the
United States boundary line that may or may not be fenced.
Finally, Professor Pratt, Director of Research, International Boundaries Research Unit,
Durham University, makes a vivid distinguishing points stating:
‘Boundary’ is usually used in reference to the line which divides the territory or maritime
space of two State, while a ‘border’ is what has to be crossed in order to enter a state.
Sometimes they coincide exactly, but it is more common for the border to include
infrastructure such as immigration checkpoint, customs facilities fencing and patrol roads
which extend beyond the boundary; and in the case of international air-and seaport, the
border may be located hundred of kilometers from the boundary. A boundary is essentially a
line of definition while a border is usually a more complex entity comprising several lines
and /or zones, whose primary function is the regulation of movement of people and goods.109

According to Professor Pratt, thus, a border is a broad term sometimes comprises of
boundary, zones, infrastructure that may be used to regulate movement of goods and person from a
given state into another. Where there is no entrance, checkpoint, bridge or barrier of some kind, or a
station of border guards, the border is a boundary. Thus, it is possible to distinguish the two terms,
“ border” and “boundary”, but in practice, the distinction is immaterial as both of the terms used
interchangeably in most authorities and there is no clear binding stance. In this work, therefore,
unless otherwise, clearly stated, the expression, “border” may be taken to mean “boundary”.
2.3.4. Frontier
An unlimited area of land that has served as boundary is termed as frontier. When a frontier
was taken as boundary, an exact point of separation of neighboring nations or nationalities were
tenuous. Though it may be possible to know the location and direction of nations or nationalities
that were divided by a zone called frontier, in the contemporary sense, locating an exact point of
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separation is a perplexing task. Confusion regarding the limits of ones possession has been source
of conflict, flared up destructive war. Is there any actual and perceivable distinction between the
notions of border, boundary and frontier?
In common usage it is not unusual to connote the term, “frontier” to the expressions
“boundary or border.”110 Andrei Cusco remarks, “ As is the case with other similar concepts […]
‘border,’ ‘boundaries’ and ‘frontier’ are often interpreted as nothing more than equivalent
designations of limits between states [….] ”111 One of the early boundary theorist, Friedrick Ratzel
rejects, “[… ] the wisdom of drawing a sharp distinction between a linear boundary and a border
zone or frontier.”112 To Ratzel, a territory can be grouped into three zones: outer, middle and inner
zones.113 He regards the outer and middle zones as frontiers.114
Nowadays it is almost universally accepted (at least by political geographers and
international lawyers) that the term “frontier” is undoubtedly distinct from the notions of, “border”
or “boundary”.115 Prescott and Triggs remark, “ A boundary is a line while a frontier and a border
are different kinds of areas.”116 Thus, it is not hard to discern the exact nature of “frontier” and its
distinction from the two interrelated terms: “border” and “boundary”. While boundary is a line,
border and frontiers are an area of land that separates two territories.
The practice of using “frontier”, as a region in between two territories or states was vanished
in early 20th century117, but even after origination of the notion of “boundary” – which is a line
dividing two territories – the term “frontier” was conceived synonymous to the term “boundary”.118
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Only in 1920s a clear distinction between the two expressions was settled.119 Today, “the linear
nature of a boundary and zonal character of a frontier “ is almost universally accepted.120 Holdich
strongly warns against alternate use of the terms “boundary” and “frontier” stating, “ There is no
excuse for geographers who use the term “frontier” and “boundary” as synonymous.”121 The term
boundary refers to a line that sharply divides territories, while frontier is more than a point or a
line.122 Deborah Popper remarks, a frontier as an “outer part of a territory”.123 It is true that a
frontier is a region beyond one’s territory, but the expression, “outer part of a territory by itself does
not explain the exact nature of the term frontier.
A region or a zone that may be termed as “frontier” may take several forms. It may be a
natural barrier having some sort of space and situated in the middle of two disjointed territories.
The region or zone my have occurred naturally without deliberate action of two or more
neighboring States but simply chosen by the States as a limit of their territory. A frontier, thus, may
be any “unfavorable environment, deserts, heavy dissected uplands, thick tropical rain forests and
the like.”124
Literally, the term frontier suggests what is in the front. Kristoff views the notion of frontier
as “an area which was part of a whole […] area of which was ahead of the hinterland.”
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Kristof

further remarks that a frontier “[…] often called the foreland or borderland, or march.”
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According to Kristof a frontier is an outer-oriented part of a territory.127 In this assumption, a
frontier is an area of land having width and depth and situated in between two neighboring
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territories having their own political authority. In short, a frontier is a zone or a region separating
two states.
A frontier was, technically, a no man’s land (terra nullius) and it was a territory frequented
by bandits who fled strong arms of governments.128 It was, supposedly, an area of land that may
not be contested or claimed by anyone of the neighboring states. In medieval times, for various
reasons, a region between two or more nations, tribes or ethnic groups could be terra nullius. The
most usual reason was inhospitality of the region for human habitation. Medieval people generally
opt out an area or a region if it was a desert with harsh weather condition that could not be
endured.129 It could also be a region fairly dangerous or impossible to get access or make use of it.
Thus, it could be a mountain, lake, or even a thick forest that was considered difficult to make use
of it or hard to walk through it. Any unclaimed region (whatever the reason may be), supposedly,
regarded as a mark to designate an end of one’s territory or a beginning of another territory. A
clearly visible, but unclaimed region, had been chosen by states, tribal, ethnic or national groups to
signal separation of territorial holding.130
Being free from human habitation and government control, a frontier had served as a hiding
place for lawbreakers and rebels. As a result, neighboring States commonly negotiated to patrol
and expel unauthorized habitation to safeguard their common interest. Though frequent patrol may
be conducted in accordance with the terms of negotiation, the region did not formally belong to
anyone of the states, nor it was a common territory.
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The other perplexity with regard to the term “frontier” is its double meaning. The term
“frontier’’ may also connote a separating zone of settled and unsettled regions of a territory.131
Settlement frontier may be further divided into primary and secondary.132 According to Prescott and
Triggs, “ Primary settlement frontiers exist where a state is taking possession of its territory for the
first time.”133 It is a frontier “that represents the zonal limit of political authority.”134 It separated the
territory that the state has acquired from indigenous people and controlled by the political authority.
In secondary settlement frontier sense there could be multiple frontiers in a given state or nation.
Zonal nature of frontier, however, makes both senses common.
A political frontier is a region or zone that separates two independent states. This is a region
that is situated between two neighboring countries. Lord Curzon identifies political frontiers on the
basis of their function. The term, “frontier” in both senses (in the sense of political frontier and
settlement frontier) is understood to mean a zone or region that physically separates two different or
assumedly different territories.135 Simply put, the nature and function of settlement frontiers and
political frontiers is almost identical – separating varied space. The obvious difference is the fact
that settlement frontiers separate villages or settlement regions while political frontiers divide two
or more states.136
Some city states, empires or national states had exerted efforts to mark their frontiers by
erecting huge walls, in most spots surrounding their territories. The famous Chinese and Roman
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walls were some of the notorious testimonies.137 The Harrar city wall of Ethiopia is a live
illustration.
When time goes on the function of frontiers changed from frontiers of separation to frontiers
of contact.138 If frontiers were set, as a result, of threat of aggression, the end of threat would
change the purpose of the frontier; and hence, the separation aspect of frontier changes into point of
contact. Contact may be explained in terms of trade relationship between the people of two
territories bounded by the frontier. The frontier may serve as site of tourism or cultural exchange
point.
Frontiers may also be designed for the sole purpose of military defense. In this case, a
certain area of land that is suitable for defense may be used for constructing watchtowers and
warning signals and inhibited by frontiersmen.

For example, “ The German Kingdom was

protected from the Slavs and Magyars by a series of marches stretching from the Baltic Sea to the
Adriatic Sea.”139 The two contending states may also create a frontier by agreement. The states may
create either buffer states or simply buffer zones. A buffer state is an independent political entity
situated in between the competing states. In this case a third nation whose boundary is accepted by
both of the states as end of their territorial holding. This was practically possible during the era of
colonization. For example, Britain and Russia agreed to take an Afghanistan territory as a buffer
state that two states overstretch their hands for more territories. Some colonial powers devised
another form of frontier called neutral zone. The function of neutral zone was almost identical to
the buffer state. It is simply a territory or zone that set by two or more states for the purpose of
avoiding dispute. Neutral zone is not terra nullius, it is a commonly held territory, and may be
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partitioned after the purpose is met or no more security threat.140 Buffer zones (be it a buffer state or
a neutral zone) was a temporary solution to potential threat to peace and stability.
To sum up, a frontier is not simply a line or a point of separation of territories but it is a
zone or a region having width and length of its own and commonly practiced centuries ago.141
Border delineation through “frontier” was so common in the medieval times where it was not
possible to locate an exact point or to draw a clear line of separation of two neighboring states.
Natural zones that are noticeable and can easily signal limits of territory were served as frontiers.
Uncertainty regarding an exact of limits of a frontier and the need for more land for
increasing population, coupled with human civilization that enabled use of previously inhospitable
region, caused conflict among bordering States. On top of this the yearning for greater power
increased the demand for larger territory, as the wider the territory, the greater the scope of power
of the sovereign. As Prescott and Triggs confirm this assertion stating, “ The general impression is
that as states separated by frontiers extend their territory, the unclaimed land diminishes.”
Eventually property disputes [arose]….”142 The drive for more territory, supposedly, had
encouraged powerful nations to wage war against neighboring state, and frontiers served as war
fronts or starting points for territorial expansion. This has, presumably called for frequent territorial
disputes. Lord Curzon’s notorious statement that has been widely cited in most border related
literature illustrates the sensitive nature of frontiers. In the words of Lord Curzon, “Frontiers are
indeed the razor’s edge on which hang suspended the modern issues of war and peace.”143
[Emphasize mine].
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A successive attempt to settle the ever-mounting dispute has necessitated the emergence of
delimited boundary with a clearly set and noticeable boundary marks.144 Moreover, the emerging
technological innovation has enabled man to cope with unfavorable environment, be it harsh
weather or impenetrable forest to turn an area into “heaven on earth, which in turn outdated the
potency of secondary settlement frontier.145
2.4. Creation of International Boundary

2.4.1.

Brief Overview of Emergence of Borders in the Medieval World
As attempted to pinpoint elsewhere, the origin of boundary system goes back to the moment

at which private landholding was began,146 but international boundary was a later advent. Medieval
societies lacked national or international boundary, as there was no government or State.147 Life
was so simple and properties were owned either privately or communally.
The territory of a given tribe or community was simply a set of territories held by
individuals and ethnic groups. It appears, therefore, safe to suppose that the beginning and the end
of territory of ethnic members was territorial limit (boundary) of tribes constituting the group.
When ethnic groups join together (either voluntarily for collective defense or forcefully annexed to
the powerful ethnic group) and form a national state that had jurisdiction over all the groups, then
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national boundary was created. The emergence of nation states has necessitated the emergence of
international boundary, which sets a limit in between two or more nation states. Bakhashab
confirms this conception stating, “… early history of boundaries [reveals…] prescriptive limits of
various units and these units were unified into national states with known boundaries or transferred
by treaty as units from state to state.“148 Tough there is no consensus regarding an exact cause and
a definite time of the emergence of modern state system, it is largely believed that a centralized
state system was appeared in late middle ages.149
The shifting of hunter-gatherers into farming and permanent settlement demanded leaders
who are responsible for the overall governance and security of the medieval people that used to live
in group. Productivity and the emerging civilization had enhanced military power of chiefs and
kingships that turned hunter-gathers system into city-states relatively with certain territorial limits. “
A city-state is a sovereign polity encompassing a relatively small area consisting of an urban core
and surrounding farmland.”150
The advancement of agricultural output and the progress in the military capability had
enabled stronger city-states to conquer and annex the weaker ones in search for more territory or for
collecting taxes. Therefore, the greater the territory of a state, it was assumed that the wealthier the
sovereign. The practice of acquisition of territory by conquer had continued until 19th and early 20th
century as one of the norms of international law and one of the foreign policies of Europeans.151 As
a result, territorial war was a common phenomenon.152 Moreover, sovereignty over a territory had
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been changing, as the defeated city-state loses the territory and the winner annexes the defeated
one.153
“The legitimacy of territorial conquest […] ”154 as a means of acquiring territory, and the
ensuing takeover of weaker city-states and kingdoms created another important institution known as
Empire. An Empire was a combination of set of city-states and administrated by a political organ.
It is bigger in the scope of territory and comprised more population. According to Diener and
Hagen, “An empire is a sovereign political entity usually governed by a hereditary monarch, and
spanning several different regions and peoples which had not traditionally been under single
ruler.”155
The Axumite Empire, for example, was so powerful in the northern Ethiopia. It had
controlled substantial territories surrounding the city-state irrespective of their continental location.
There were several other African empires that had existed in Africa before European colonization.
To mention few: Ancient Egypt’s pharaoh Akhenaten whose capital city was Amarna, the Ghana
Empire, the Mali Empire, the Songhai Empire, the Aksia dynasty are some of the strong empires in
Africa.156 Territorial limits of almost all the empires were not certainly marked. Nebulous character
of territorial limits of Roman Empire caused historian to surmise that Roman Empire had no
international boundary.157 It was supposed that the territorial limit of constituent units (city states
that constituted Roman Empire) was taken as territorial limits of the Empire. The territory of the
Empire was also so wide and not precisely delineated. “The Roman boundaries were mostly the
division of the Roman provinces or of smaller governmental or administrative units of the
153
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Empire.”158 Thus, it appears safe to suggest that the Empire did not manage and control boundary,
as it was the power of administrative units. On the other hand, numerous authorities indicate the
territorial limits of Roman Empire was precisely delineated. According to Diener & Hagen, “ The
Roman Empire appears to embody the ideals of a highly centralized empire with clear external
borders.”159Precisely noticeable monuments were erected to indicate territorial limit of Roman
Empire.160
Empires, like city-states, were often in the state of war and authority over territories had
been shifting, as a defeated empire loses all or a part of its territory and the winner expands bounds
of its territory – setting a new boundary. Thus, a powerful empire used to forcefully annex smaller
ones with a view to expand its territory thereby expanding its territorial limits or creating a broader
tax source and enhancing the scope sovereignty. As a result, authority over a given territory had
been shifting.161 Aggression and forceful acquisition of territories of neighboring empire and citystates, whenever needed, rendered delineation of a precise territorial boundary meaningless.
Due to elusive nature of medieval territorial limit (the boundary) and the expansionist policy
of powerful city-states, empire and nation states, early interstate territorial limit was vague and
“characterized by overlapping jurisdiction.”162 As a result, it was not simple enough to precisely
locate an exact limit of a boundary, and the uncertainty, presumably had generated recurrent civil
and international war.
Territorial limit of ancient Axumite Empire (in current Ethiopia), for instance, best explains
the elusiveness of medieval territorial limits. As witnessed by historians, ancient Ethiopia was much
bigger than the current territorial limit. Various sources indicate that medieval Ethiopia had
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included the whole Horn of Africa and extended up to the port of Yemen.163 The Axumite Empire
of Ethiopia had controlled northern Ethiopia, Eritrea, northern Sudan, southern Egypt, Djibouti,
Western Yemen, and southern Saudi Arabia, totaling 1.25 million square kilometers, almost half the
size of India.164 Lack of civilization (administration by illiterate tribal chiefs, absence of fast
communication channels, outdated transportation system, poverty, ignorance and Christian beliefs
that disregarded some parts of the ancient Ethiopian Muslim land) had blinded tribal chiefs not to
bother for the then unfavorable regions and desert lands with harsh weather condition when
Europeans settled there or when missionaries and explorers paved ways for colonization.165
European powers apportioned parts of territories of medieval Ethiopia into Italian Eritrea,
Djibouti (previously French Somali land), Somalia, Sudan and the current Ethiopia. Though
Ethiopia was never formally colonized, apart from the five years of brief Italian occupation, its
territorial integrity had been severely inflicted by aggressors. Territorial acquisition, initially,
appears to be peaceful with subtle motive and then after building their basis European agents used
all means to take territory, including trickery or corrupt tribal chiefs or in case of refusal wage open
war against the people that were armed with spear and arrow.166
162
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In the Ethiopian case, Italian missionaries and merchants acquired a parcel of land from
tribal chiefs in Eritrea and latter claimed the whole territory of Eritrea as part of Italian colony.
Djibouti was leased to French for 99 years, though never returned back to Ethiopia and practically
never considered as part of Ethiopian territory since the lease.
2.4.2. Modern Nation State System and Delineated International Boundary
Nation state is the advanced form of social organization that has emerged as a result of
multifaceted economic, social and political progress. Successive socio economic changes such as:
increased agricultural output, invention of specialized goods and the provision of efficient services,
including long distance trade and social interaction, had fueled advancement of cities, and
emergence of powerful craftsmen and merchants.167 Advancing cities disrupted feudal system
thereby creating an opportunity for new political system – nation state.168 The emergence of nation
states has facilitated the creation of a clearly defined boundary among nations.169 It is generally
viewed that, “ [t]he modern state system first emerged in Europe and spread to the rest of the world
through colonization.”170
In the feudal Europe, territorial limit (boundary) of constituent nations states was not
precisely defined, and authority over the territories had been overlapping.171 The highly centralized
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feudal system that had controlled several empires, as a result of coercive and recurrent wars, could
not meet the demands of the changed socio-economic system. The powerful and ideologically deep
rooted feudal system did not simply gave a way for nascent socio political system, but had been
forced by the longest and destructive war that Europe endured for 30 years.172 The war ended as a
result of tough and arduous negotiation that was held for years. The negotiation resulted in far
reaching consequences that have furthered the progress of international law and rendered significant
contribution to the global socio-political movement; inter alia, it leveled a ground for clearly
defined territorial boundary at which exclusive sovereignty can be exerted.
In Europe, the coming into existence of clearly marked boundary system was an innovative
indigenous process.173 Other continents, apart from barren land of Antarctica, had their own system
of boundary, which was not well defined, but it was disrupted by the European colonization and not
developed to the fullest level – “died before maturity.”174 Therefore, the historical beginning of a
clearly defined international boundary and the sovereign nation state system was the 17th century
Peace of Westphalia.175
It is believed that the Accord of Westphalia has contributed to the prevalence of better
international peace and introduced mutual co-existence in Europe.176 With this view in mind, the
Congress of the Westphalia relentlessly ventured to devise a precisely defined boundary within
which a sovereign power can exercise exclusive authority, as a ‘’a basic rule of co-existence.”
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Congress as a viable remedy to circumvent recurring conflict for territorial expansion and
dominance. In the words of Zacher,
In these early centuries of the Westphalia order territory was the main factor that determined
the security and wealth of states, and thus the protection and acquisition of territory were
prime motivation of foreign policy. Most wars, in fact, concerned the acquisition of territory,
and most of these wars led to exchanges of territory; this practice continued until the middle
of the twentieth century. These practices were reflected in the legal norm concerning the
legitimacy of conquest.178

To sum up, the treaty of Westphalia has generated remarkably overwhelming consequences
to Europe and offered significant contribution to the global socio-political system in general.179 It
ended one of the longest and destructive wars that perished lives of millions of people and
destruction of huge amount of resources.180 The war was backed by complex motives of enormous
actors: religion, power competition, personal fame and the desire to control more territory. It was
very costly and the longest war ever held at the time. The treaty of Westphalia that ended the war
often praised for fruition of vital international law doctrines such as the principle of sovereignty of
states, territoriality, and autonomy of states.
The other glaring consequence of the negotiation was the emergence of new independent
states: Netherlands and Swiss.

Netherlands got independence from Spain and Swiss gained

independence from Austria. Some countries like Sweden gained territories and cash compensation.
Most importantly, the treaty resulted in clear boundary between rival European powers. Ultimately,
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“European states gradually acquired the ability to demarcate the precise limits of their sovereign
territories.”181
2.4. 3. Globalization and Changing Nature of Border: Is Borderless world Possible or
Desirable?
The maxim, “Good fences make good neighbors,”182 was supposedly coined to illustrate the
traditional functions of border walls in which no one can get into a fenced territory without securing
consent because unwelcomed intrusion results in legal consequences – trespass which entails
criminal and civil consequences. A neighbor cannot trespass into his/her neighbor’s property
bypassing a fence. A good neighbor is expected to seek permission before entering into “other’s”
land. As a “good fence” bars an illicit crossover into the neighborhood property, the assumption is
that the fence has turned all the neighboring people to good ones. Put differently, it was assumed
that no one can bypass a “good fence”, and hence, everybody around a fenced land/ territory is
supposed a good person.
In the era of globalization (which may not respect a good fence), the construction of a huge
border wall may not necessarily secure a bounded territory and create “good neighborhood”.
Tough border walls may impede some form of unauthorized border crossing, traditional border
walls are powerless to guard against “invisible intruders” that can easily transcend a well-cemented
border wall while the perpetrator hiding at a remote distance. As a result, some argue that in the
contemporary world, which is increasingly characterized by global way of life, the traditional
function of border wall is on the verge of being obsolete thereby facilitating the emergence of
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Robert Frost, in his early 20th century infamous poet, “ Mending Wall” stated the phrase, “Good Fences make good
neighbor.” The poet is available at: http://allpoetry.com/Mending-Wall (Accessed 01/30/15). The expression
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German good neighbors in the era of Berlin war? North and South Korea, for all practical purposes, are behind a
psychological fence. Are they really good neighbors?
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borderless world.183 If the emergence of borderless world is an inevitable fact, African border issue
in general and the border tension between Ethiopian and Eritrea, in particular, will be settled when
the global phenomenon eliminates the very border. This Section briefly assesses whether borderless
world is really possible and all traditional border walls may be dismantled like the tumbled Berlin
wall.
Nowadays, a single company can provide almost identical services (products), in almost all
the corners of the globe, introducing similar systems, processes and culture. The proliferation of
multinational companies and resultant trans-boundary transaction, coupled with other effects of
globalization, has been fueling the widespread speculation of the elimination of borders. Borderless
world, in turn means, territorial sovereignty would be insignificant, as global actors appear more
powerful and rapidly moving toward controlling the whole global phenomena. This increasingly
global way of life has potency to penetrate all forms of boundaries thereby making traditional
border functions “out dated.” In other words, traditional border walls may not effectively guard
against all forms of external incursion and impede unauthorized contacts and transactions. In the
words of Gabriel Popescu, “ [...] globalization related developments have challenged the exclusive
bundling of sovereignty, territory, identity, and borders claimed by territorial states.” 184
Several actors and factors are lumped under the rubric of globalization. Global financial
services ( For instance, Visa, MasterCard), transnational corporations that work around the world,
like. Google, Yahoo or e-business corporations like eBay or Amazon can knock all doors (assuming
in a democratic nation internet censorship is unconstitutional) bypassing the restraining barriers of
border walls offering identical products and services throughout the globe. Similarly, the ever-
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changing communication and transportation technology has avoided barriers of distance thereby
making the world reachable to all at a given time.
Global economic institutions like IBRD (the World Bank), IMF, UNDP, WTO are most
powerful international organizations that can subtly dictate territorially sovereign states to act in
some way.
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Though most developing nations consider these mighty institutions as promoters of

western ideology, they have no better choice other than complying with their demands thereby
making sovereignty at stake. Environmental issue is another case that concerns everyone for acts
and facts happen everywhere. Global community cannot keep quiet while a given nation or
company disrupting nature by polluting the earth, as climate change has impact on life of everyone.
Concerned international agencies, thus, can ignore well-fenced boundary, and indirectly dictate the
perpetrator to stop environmentally destructive acts or require the victims to be compensated. 186
Now a day, gross human rights violations and genocide are viewed as international crimes
conferring universal jurisdiction that can supersede the protection of sovereignty and territorial
boundary.
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The doctrine of universal jurisdiction entitles every nation that has incorporated
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human rights norms into national law to prosecute a person suspected of grave human right
violation anywhere in the globe posing a threat to state sovereignty and national borders.188
African states consider International Criminal Court as a threat to national sovereignty and
attempted for mass withdrawal from its membership.189 The International Criminal Court is a
multinational organization having universal jurisdiction to punish perpetrators of crimes against
humanity such as genocide. Territorial sovereignty or national borders cannot impede ICC
prosecutor to indict suspected persons including top public officials of member nations or anyone
including residents of non-member states if the case is referred by the Security Council.190
On top of these global phenomena, the issue of transnational terrorism has been a notorious
challenge to state border and sovereignty.

Al-Qaida neither respects state boundary nor its

sovereignty. Its very motive was to remove sovereign states and establish its own state, which is
ruled by a strict version of Sharia law. For instance, Al-Qaida in Afghanistan frequently ignores
Afghan-Pakistan boundary and terrorize civilian and challenge efforts of government of Pakistan
and allies including United States. In Afghanistan Al-Qaida appears more powerful than the formal
elected government.

In Somalia, the Al- Qaida affiliated group – the al-Shabaab – controls

substantial portion of Southern Somalia and act as a defacto government having its sown court,
police and public administration. Al-Shabaab, not only terrorizes Somali people, but also has built a
terrorist cell in Kenya and frequently repeated disregarded Kenyan border and violated state
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sovereignty.191 It carried out the act of terrorism in Uganda killing more than 70 civilians in
revenge of Ugandan government for sending peacekeepers to Somalia though subsequent attempts
were foiled.192 Other neighboring countries, including Ethiopia and Djibouti are always in target, as
the terrorist group can easily bypass the porous border and commit the act of terrorism.193 AlShabaab made several attempts in Ethiopia dispatching suicide bombers. Similarly, currently, Boko
Haram has been a great challenge, not only to Nigeria, but also to other neighboring nations like
Cameroon, Chad and Niger. It carried out the act of terrorism in Cameroon and Niger defying
sanctity of borders and state sovereignty. Boko Haram may not stop the act of terror in the West
Africa but viewed as a challenge to the whole Africa. That is why the African Union has decided to
send 7500 strongly armed personnel to battle Boko Haram in its session in Addis Ababa.194
As succinctly put by one author, “Al-Qaida is commonly described as a network of
networks formed by loosely associated groups, dispersed, decentralized and without a clear
hierarchy of command.”195 The emergence of terrorist groups inflicts boundary system in two ways.
First the terrorist group infringes the inviolability of borders by disregarding its sanctity by
“jumping “over the fence. The other effect of terrorism is the action states take on boundary. With
a view to tackle the act of terrorism states tighten borders by deploying more aggressive border
guards and reforming immigration laws and allocating huge budget for border protection. After
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9/11 most nations including United States have declared stringent procedures for issuing entry visa
and have been conducting aggressive check up in the airport. Gabriel Popescu states:
U.S. response to al-Qaida has been marked by an inability to think outside the framework of
state borders. Not accidentally, the first actions taken after September 11, 2001, has been the

closing of the U.S. borders implying that these territorial lines could restore the
violated sense of security many people felt.196 [Emphasis added]
Tightening border security or closing borders has been creating burden to legitimate
travellers and people in general by inflicting huge impact on privacy, as border guards have to
check all items and personality using modern scanners. The reliance on border as a best solution to
guard nation against the threat of terrorism has necessitated the construction of border wall more
than ever and allocation of huge budget for border protection and border law enforcement.
Cyber crime is another transnational issue that cannot be protected by well-guarded borders.
Nowadays, it is not impossible to attack vital resources situated in San Francisco without the
perpetrator’s physical presence in the United States or in the nearby regions. A terrorist, hiding
elsewhere in the globe, can stretch destructive hands that may not be easily detected by border
guards or curtailed by border walls. Similarly, a cyber-thief, residing at a far distance, can get
access to bank accounts without physically crossing borders, or a terrorist at a remote location can
disrupt utility plants at any part of the world. Therefore, it appears logically correct to suppose that
traditional border walls are being obsolete as “bad neighbors” are emerging despite well-built
border walls.
Nowadays, it is not uncommon to hear cyber attack and data breach or identity theft ranging
from retail stores like target to highly protected banks to government database. The current cyber
attack on computers of Sony Entertainment depicts the potential of remote attack, which can bypass
any form of fence. Hackers, allegedly from North Korea, have disrupted Sony Film show (The
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Interview) in the holiday season sending threatening warnings which prompted investigation by FBI
and close attention by high ranking authorities of United States, including the President. 197 Sony’s
PlayStation was also attacked in August 2014 and “forced offline by a cyber attack…”198 Though
no evidence is publicly available, and repeatedly denied, it is generally speculated that North Korea
was behind the attack.199 It has also been usual to notice a threat or actually cyber attack from a
group known as Anonymous. There is a sense of insecurity on information on the net. In most
cases, it is not simple enough to notice an exact venue from which the attack springs or the actual
perpetrator, though some perpetrators disclose their identity under the cover of pseudo names.
It is also believed that due to the evolving modern communication and transportation
technology, the world is getting closer by diminishing the traditional barriers of distance. This
appears introducing culture mingling, which would destroy culture-based boundary. If the shield of
“otherness” is pierced through “closeness” and “oneness” that may emerge as a result of high
interaction and culture blend, the purpose and likelihood of separation by a boundary seems
unlikely while “otherness” has effectively faded. Put other way, it is hard to draw a line that can
successfully divide an emerging cultural similarity. As a result, “ Many scholars, politicians,

196

Id at 60.
On Nov. 24 Hackers, known as “#GOP.”, or “The Guardians of peace, “ allegedly beached Sony Pictures
Computer Network. They threatened Sony Entertainment Network posting warning message on the company’s
computers. FBI launched investigation and claimed North Korea was behind the attack. United States, as a result,
threated to take retaliatory measures against North Korea ,which denied the allegation. As reported on BBC, “ A
skull appeared on commuter screens along with a message threatening to release data “secrets” if undisclosed
demands wee not met.” BBC News, Nov. 25, 2014, www.bbc.com (Accessed 4/21/16). The hacking scandal will
cost the studio at least $200 million. The attackers further stated, “ Warning: We ‘ve already warned you, and this is
just the beginning.”
198
British Broadcasting Corporation News, Technology, Nov. 25, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/technology28925052 (Accessed on 02/11/15).
199
Tal Kopan, US. Says North Korea behind Sony hack, Politico, (Dec. 12, 1994),
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/12/fbi-north-korea-sony-cyberattack-113703.html (Accessed 02/11/15). See
also Jonathan Aberman, Commentary: Lessons in national security from the Cyber attack on Sony and The
Interview, The Washington Post, (Dec. 23, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/capitalbusiness/lessonsin-national-security-from-the-cyber-attack-on-sony-and-the-interview/2014/12/23/3a2913b6-8a26-11e4-8ff4fb93129c9c8b_story.html (Accessed 02/11/15).
197

73

business leaders, and activists believe that globalization’s promotion of interaction and integration
is rapidly eroding the importance of nation-states and their borders.”200
Thus, if the purpose of border wall was simply to serve as barrier, the evolving globalization
seems to render border walls out-of-date. This entails the emergence of borderless world as a
factual necessity. Thus, it seems not completely wrong to surmise the fact that globalization will
eventually cause, “[…] deterritorialization of the system of territorially sovereign states, which in
turn will lead to the fading away of state borders.”201 Can we thus conclude that in the era of
globalization and technology age, the deliberations of Westphalian Congress202 will virtually faded
away?
Despite trans – border effects of globalization, states, rely on borders and border walls to
guard the bounded territory against extra-territorial effects that may be viewed as threat to national
security. Enormous nations have been constructing strong border walls and watch towers that are
equipped with modern surveillance equipment with a view to curb terrorism, unauthorized extraterritorial transactions, and control illegal human mobility. Since the emergence of Muslim
fundamentalist group, and the 2001 terrorist attack of United States, global powers have been
bolstering border protection; have reformed immigration laws and have strongly armed border
guards and/or have enhanced institutional capacity of border protection agencies. This includes the
strict control of immigration which in turn demands the need to build strong border fences, training
and deploying powerful border guards, intensifying air and sea port control, promoting and
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deploying consular persons, visa restriction, and enactment of stringent immigration legislations,
strict immigration procedures and control203, building huge controlling towers, and so forth.
United States has been erecting a huge border wall in Mexico border since 1990s.204 Frank
Clifford observes, “The fence along the U.S.–Mexico boundary has helped reduce the flow of
[undocumented] immigrants, but the human and environmental toll has been enormous.”205 The
2006 Secure Fence Act has authorized United States to construct modern and very expensive border
wall with a view to curb unauthorized border crossing, foiling terrorist acts and preventing drug
trafficking. The fence covers 1/3 of United States – Mexico Border across California, Arizona, New
Mexico and Texas.206

Several immigrants have lost their life while attempting to jump over the

fence. Despite human, environmental and economic cost, the Fence has been hampering easy
border crossing. Secure Fence Act of 2006 clearly reveals the significance of border fences and
downplays the assumption of fading away of territoriality and sovereignty.207
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The Secure Fence Act of 2006 supposedly has attracted Saudi Arabia to take the same
measure of border fencing. The initial plan was to fence only the Iraq border to control the
movement of Islamic militant around Saudi –Iraq border but the late king Abdulla changed the plan
to cover the whole Saudi Arabia border. As reported on Aljazeera, “In 2009, Riyadh signed a deal
with European aerospace and defence contractors EADS to secure the Iraq border, but with
increasing fears over infiltration by anti-government groups and al-Qaeda, the interior ministry
expanded the scope to cover all the country's borders.”208
It is not only United States or Saudi Arabia, but also several other nations have either
reformed their immigration systems or built border walls with a view to curb dangerous effects of
terrorism. According to Prescott and Triggs, India has been fencing its border with Bangladesh and
Pakistan; Pakistan, similarly has started to close its border with Afghanistan by a huge border wall;
Iran has been constructing a border wall on Pakistan border. The border between Israel and
neighboring nations has been source of clash between Israeli security forces and Palestinians. To
mitigate security problem, Israel has either constructed border walls either in the West Bank, Gaza
and Egypt.

China, Greece, Kuwait, Morocco, Spain, Thailand, Uzbekistan and United Arab

Emirates have started walling their border. Some of these borders, especially Israel borders walled
before 9/11 but border constructing and wiring has been intensified since the 2001 terror act. 209
Thus, despite the mounting pressure and uncontrollable effects of globalization, the
objective reality on the ground proves the “inviolability” of the traditional boundary system.
Gabriel Popescu, shares this view stating, “The borderless-world thesis [… ] presents a simplistic
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and idealized vision of globalization[….[f]ar from fading away, […] more territorial borders fall
apart, the more various groups around the world cling to places, nations, and religion as markers of
their identity.”
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Similarly, Ruben Zaiotti, remarks that a “ […] discussion about a “borderless

world” brought about by globalization have turned out to be premature.”211 [Emphasis added]. Our
national identity, values and culture, common resources are territorial in nature and cannot be easily
altered with the advance of digital technology. Zaiott further remarks, “ While globalization
processes might have rendered [borders] less visible and politically salient, borders have maintained
a pivotal role in defining who can move what, where and when around the world….[b]orders thus
still matter”212 [Emphasis added].
Hence, boundary walls, coupled with other forms of protective measures, can still serve the
function of filtering “others.” Global responses to the deadly disease, Ebola, in West Africa, for
instance, appear to suggest how states quickly resort to borders to exclude “others” with a view to
guard their subjects. In fear of effects of tragic disease, Ebla in West Africa, most nations including
some African states have closed their border to the people and extra-territorial transactions from
three West African nations – Liberia, Seirra Leone, and Guinea. Australia declared visa denial to
people from Ebola affected nations. Canada followed the Australian stand. Some African countries
were also quick enough to stop flight to or from Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone. . This is a recent
happening that depicts the impracticability of borderless utopia.
With regard to borders and border walls the world is experiencing two conflicting situations.
The uncontrollable nature of globalization that appears to make traditional border functions
meaningless and the interests of territorial states and governments to protect their subjects against

defined political units.... highlighted the lasting relevance of borders in the system’s management and protection.”
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210
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invisible intruders by closing borders or restricting border contacts and mobility are the two
conflicting realities that the modern socio-political system has to tackle. As pinpointed above, states
strongly rely on borders walls to control extra-territorial threats and human mobility. Reliance on
border walls and widespread construction and border guarding indicates the continued significance
of borders and border wall. Equally important is, the effect of globalization on borders. It is not
simply pointless to reconsider the efficacy of borders and border walls to resist the threat of
globalization and global actors that can easily bypass well cemented border wall. In keeping
national and international peace and security, thus, the contemporary world is confronted with two
contradictory situations. Now the question is how to reconcile these conflicting realties?
The three international relation theories would be of some help to the changing global
situation and interest of territorial states to address these conflicting facts. The most important
international relation paradigmic approaches that often cited in dealing with changing global
phenomena vis-à-vis security and sovereignty are: realist, globalist and constructive approaches.213
Realist approaches basis its approach on state security and sovereignty over other competing
powers. Realist approaches is built by Hobbesian approach, which considers everyone as a threat,
and the best solution for survival is to gain more power than rival power.214 Thus, realists believe
that greater power is necessary to maintain peace and security and survive as a sovereign entity.215
Routke remarks, “ Each state must relay on its own resources to survive and flourish....There is no
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authoritative impartial method of settling … dispute – i.e. no world government – states are there
own judges, juries, and hangmen and often resort to force to achieve their security interests.”216
Liberalist approach (aka globalist approach)217 on the other hand builds its theory on
cooperation and interdependence of global actors for common good. Thus, foreign policy should be
designed centering cooperation and altruism.218 For Liberals global peace and security depends
upon the extent of collaboration and global alliance prevailing among states. According to this
approach thus,“… common ideas can lead states into interdependence and to remove […] threat to
sovereignty.”219 It proclaims unity and cooperation the only ways for peaceful co-existence.
International agencies, like United Nations, regional organizations like European Union, African
Union and so forth facilitate the common bond beyond narrow territorial limits. Liberalists believe
that the world is complexly interdependent and tied through international trade, economic, social
and moral interconnections that are regulated by international law.220 In a cooperative work, while
keeping individuality of states, there is no zero sum game. This is a win-win approach that
considers all thoughts and interests based on common deliberations that involve all global actors
“working through international organizations and according to international law.”221
The third paradigmic approach is constructivism. Some scholars argue this is not a theory
by itself, like Realities and Liberal approach, but ontology.222 It considers social situations to derive
conclusions governing world phenomena. Social situations, like societal history, norms, beliefs are
important tools to explain state behavior. Constructivism appears in midway between the two
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former approaches. Like Realism it recognizes state sovereignty. According to this approach, “
State sovereignty has profound influence that precedes any cost- benefit analysis that states may
undertake.” Like liberalism it regards the role of non-state actors in global phenomenon.
Constructivist approach affords greater autonomy and independence to international
institutions stating that they can act in their own right without the influence of sovereign states. To
constructivism, transnational institutions not merely serve as tools for dissemination of state
ideology but they act even against the state that created them or to which they belong. According to
Rourke, constructivist approach is an interactive process between various actors including states,
international agencies, individuals and groups.223 To constructivism, thus, international actors and
their mindset is the most important. They decide who they are, insiders, outsider (others), their
political identity and their spatial border and their state. The actors have inherent power to select
who may associate with them or who cannot, being enemy or strange.224 This pradigmic approach
appears to cure the “flaws’ of realist and liberal or globalist approaches – the two extreme ends.
Constructivist’s mixed approach appears helpful to redress the apparent contradiction in
effects of globalization on borders and interest of territorial states to keep security by relying on
border walls.225 While states have high interest to maintain territorial sovereignty and security
(realist theory) relaying on border walls, globalization appears to ignore it (globalist or
constructivism paradigm).

Total closure of borders and the emergence of borderless world

(absolutely open borders) are neither desirable, nor feasible scenarios. This demands a middle line
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approach that can mitigate undesirable effects of the two extreme ends by mixing important points
from both approaches and design an independent theory (paradigm).
Sociologists and border experts, accordingly, suggest for the transformation of borders from
barriers to bridges, from line of separation to the point of contact, and from scene of antagonism to
the zone of cooperation.226
The transformation of borders from barriers to bridges makes the notion of “border” more
than a physical mark or barriers that signal the end or beginning of a territory. Borders are supposed
to play a greater role by serving as bridges or linking channels that facilitate mobility. In this
regard, borders can stimulate cooperation and mutual co-existence instead separating.227 The term
“border” thus involves: processes, institutions, resources that meant to regulate and promote crossborder transactions and relationships. It encompasses the entire processes vis-à-vis a boundary.
Gavrilis confirms this view stating: “On maps, boundaries appear as static legal divisions between
sovereign states. In reality, they are complex institutions that make political claims about who and
what may cross the line.”228 A mixed approach does not absolutely eliminate borders as globalist
paradigm claims or does not close borders for security causes but the existing borders will be
rebordered (changed into channels of interaction, cooperation and integration).

229

The change in

the nature and function of border, thus, cannot be termed as its demise.
As the prevailing global reality is not sharply uniform, the nature and kind of border may
change with the change of “mishap” that a border wall is expected to tackle, or rebordering may
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depend upon the nature and kind of global actors and factors that the new border has to
accommodate. In this regard Martinez remarks, “Conditions in borderlands worldwide vary
considerably because of profound difference in the size of nations-states, their political
relationships, their level of development, and their ethnic, cultural and linguistic configurations.”230
To accommodate varied situations borders may be classed into different categories. Borders may be
grouped on the basis of political situation, the level of economic development or ideological
disparity among the neighboring nations. The border between United States and Mexico reveals
socio-political disparity between the two neighboring states. The prevalence of a huge economic
gap between United States and the neighboring Latin America has attracted influx of immigration
for better way of life in the United States. This undoubtedly creates enormous economic burden and
security threat to the people of United States, which demands multidimensional efforts to restrain
unauthorized border crossing.
Categorization of borders demands thorough borderland study that will enable states to
design an appropriate border that would suit to the prevailing socio-economic and political
situation. With this view in mind Martinez proposes four possible models of borders.231 The first
model is alienated borderland. It is strictly controlled and generally closed kind of boundary.
Crossing this kind of boundary is almost impossible for some category of people due to political,
religious or cultural animosity prevailing between neighboring nations. The current Ethio-Eritrean
boundary falls under this category. No Ethiopian or an Eritrean is legally permitted to cross the
Ethio-Eritrean boundaries. Despite tight control, Eritrean refugees bypass the perilous border that
could possibly cost life. As United Nations report reveals, “Over 200 Eritrean refugees are crossing

border. The border between two countries is well settled and demarcated. No confusion or contest. Both Ethiopia
and Kenya now working in the same project like road construction, power sharing and peacekeeping.
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the heavily fortified and dangerous border into neighbouring Ethiopia daily….”232 As Martinez
illustrates, “ Warfare, political disputes, intense nationalism, ideological animosity, religious
enmity, cultural dissimilarity, and ethnic rivalry constitute major causes of alienation.”233
The second category of border is co-existent borderland. This is a kind of border in which “
stability is an on and off proposition.”234 Thus, it is not actually closed, but its openness depends
upon situation. However, until some restraining situation happens, borderland people of both states
can cross the border as long as co-existence is not hampered. The third category is interdependent
borderland. This is substantially an open border having no cause for imminent closure, or openness
is not attached to any known condition that may happen subsequently. Thus, “stability prevails most
of the time.”235 This is a kind of border between two friendly nations, which are economically or
culturally interdependent. Subjects of both nations can cross boundary without any barrier, in some
cases just by simply proving their identity. The Ethiopian, and the Republic of Djibouti border
appears the kind of interdependent border. Ethiopians can enter Djibouti without the need to get
visa.
The fourth and final category is integrated borderland. This is a kind of border in which the
bordering people are functionally merged though they are subjected to distinct political sovereign.
Borderlands may merge without serious economic restrictions. The strong relationship between
Ethiopia and the Republic of Djibouti appears moving toward economic integration. Bordering
people both in Djibouti and Ethiopia can own properties in either of the counties. Bordering people
are ethnically and culturally similar. In most cases, borderland people speak the same language and
experience identical way of life. Daily mobility of goods and people from one country to the other
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is so high.236

Simple peaceful co-existence, free mobility of border people and economic

cooperation by itself is not enough to pronounce full merger of two nations. In the words of
Martinez, “Integration between two closely allied nations is most conducive when both are
politically stable, militarily secure, and economically strong. Ideally the level of development is
similar in both societies.”237
Finally, borders cannot simply remain stagnant as “bounded territorial containers” while
their very purpose keeps on changing.238 The meaning, nature, and significance of border has been
changing to cope with the changing world.239.

The conception “borders as lines of separation or

barriers” appears giving way to borders as processes and institutions comprising various factors and
actors. As George Gavrils succinctly put in his book The Dynamics of Interstate Boundaries,
“Borders are institutional zones, not lines of separation between states.”240 To Gavrils, borders are
complex institutions that comprise various actors and processes that involve in managing borderline
transactions and contacts.241
The current European Union border illustrates varied border culture as the old national
border was rebordered without affecting territorial sovereignty and security. Nowadays, EU
members and some non-members experience two kinds of borders: an internal border that allows
free mobility (internal border) without the need to show passports, and a border serving as barrier
(the external border). The internal border effectively serves as bridge by facilitating free movement
of persons and goods. The external border is a traditional form of border that requires stringent
security checkup and visa requirement.
235
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Ruben Zaiotti highlights the evolution of European border cultures from Westphalia to
Schengen.242 We have seen the historical emergence of Wesphalian border culture that is credited
for innovation of clearly defined border system. Schengen initially was started by bilateral
agreement between few European states, but now incorporated into the EU and all member states
apart from United Kingdom and Ireland are party to the treaty that adopted Schengen to EU border
policy. Currently Schengen has 26 members. Most of the signatories to Schengen are EU member
state apart from few non-EU member states. The rationale behind Schengen is allowing free
movement of goods and services – just like a single nation.243 The adoption of Schengen into EU
has created two border systems.
In conclusion, in the technology age, it is not uncommon to notice the “fiction “of vanishing
nature of borders and lessened effects of state sovereignty. A number of states, on the contrary,
have been erecting huge border walls and/or have reformed or working to reform restrictive
immigration laws and boost institutional capability that can withstand extra-territorial effects of
globalization. These are the two conflicting scenarios that call for an effective solution. It is
practically impossible to eliminate all forms of borders with a view to facilitate free mobility of all
categories of people and goods without any form restriction. Unfiltered mobility would enable free
movement “enemies”, unchecked entry of destructive goods like explosives, bombs, guns, and so
forth. Unrestricted access would jeopardize security, and make state sovereignty practically
meaningless as it cannot control and guard its subjects and things in the territory (after all there will
be no limit on territorial space).
Therefore, a theory suggesting for the possible emergence of borderless world appears
simply a utopia that can never happen. Various research works and the prevailing national and
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international reality simply prove the possibility of reterritorization and rebordering – changing the
existing borders with a view to accommodate all interests and tackle threats. According to Popescu,
“ Globalization can be understood in terms of reterritoralization and rebordering dynamics.”244 In
reterritorization and resultant rebordering, geographical locations may be restructured, and borders
will have new importance and role.245 This may seem by itself a challenging solution but it is
feasible and desirable. The new border walls will be designed in a way it would allow free mobility
of friendly (good) people by filtering terrorists (the enemy, strangers or others). It is true terrorist
are also human beings having no special mark that can facilitate filtering as “terrorists” but close
global cooperation and information exchange among states would assist to tackle “bad people”.246
Globalization and resultant global interdependence provides solutions to tackle its evils.
Take, for example, the case of Boston Marathon bombers. Russia had information about the
bombers and their link to possible terrorists groups and passed the information to CIA247. In the
words of Cartalucci:
…Russian investigators contacted the FBI at least as early as 2011 in regards to Boston
Marathon bombing suspect Tamerlan Tsarnaev, and again just 6 months before the Boston
attacks. Additionally, it is now revealed that both the FBI and CIA had Tsarnaev on at least 2
terrorist watch lists, contradicting previous FBI statements that the case was “closed” after
not finding “any terrorism activity, domestic or foreign.”248
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Different theories indicate the fact that globalization creates strong global alliance among
states.249 This strong global alliance and cooperation would facilitate information exchange or
travel data access which will allow border guards to filter people that may be grouped under
“enemy” or “others”. In Boston case, for instance, the Russian information assisted, at least, to
make the Suspects in the watch list though both FBI and CIA did not stop happening of the
destructive incident. This supposedly happened because of the current weak alliance between
Russian intelligence and United States counter parts. It is rumored that Russia did not reveal some
vital text messages that would have enabled FBI and CIA to restrain the suspects.250 But in fully
globalized system, greater alliance, cooperation and friendly environment will prevail thereby
facilitate free flow of information to facilitate the free mobility of people and goods.
This approach mixes both Realist and Globalist (Liberal) paradigmic approaches of
international relation. In line with the Realist theory, territorial sovereignty and security will be
respected though a new type of border system will be “built” to fence changing territories.
It seems a perplexing task to filter “others”, but it is possible. Trained border guards that are
armed with latest technology can filter unauthorized persons and goods from global database and
information available from other friendly nations, and close border walls to harmful people and
transactions. This is an emerging phenomenon that is not widely practiced in all corners of the
globe, and may look like the already existing border. But the new border (rebordered border) is well
tailored to suit varied territories in a given state. For instance, cyber borders are completely
different from borders baring physical mobility of goods and services, as cyber territory is not
physically visible, as its global actors are also not visible when they cross the border. It is just a
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mental imagination and psychological border that has ability to curtail unwanted invisible mobility
(the Others).
The current territory will be reterritorized depending upon the nature of mobility and the
kind of border that can effectively guard the territory. The main distinction between the rebordered
border and the old one is that the new border will allow free and quick mobility of most people “
the insiders” which are normally regarded as “good people”.

It will allow also quick and free

mobility of allowable goods and services. The new border thus requires some kind of information
or a list of exceptional category of unallowable kind of the people, goods and services.
With regard to cyber border, the current Chinese government practice is a good illustration.
China negotiated with Internet giants, Google and Yahoo and opened its borders on condition that it
can control certain information and key words including e-mail addresses of dissents.251 Lyombe
Eko et al remark: “Google and other US Companies have … to satisfy local political exigencies,
obey national rules, abide by cultural expectations and yet remain good US Corporate citizens.”252
(Emphasis added). Google and Yahoo have developed a software (Firewall) that can filter unwanted
data from Internet flow to China on condition to enter into Chinese cyber territory. As China
control its space and technologically can close its border to Google and Yahoo, it is publicly
regarded the two global giants bent their knees to China with objective of getting access to huge
Chinese market trading off privacy of Chinese clients and closed the cyber border of China to
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“undesired’’ channels. The Chinese government is a gatekeeper of Chinese cyber border. According
to Eko and et al, “ The Chinese government has created a closed national internet that it protects
with censorious architecture of information technology, regulatory agencies, internet Service
Providers, and an internet police squad.”253 Therefore, by prescribing conditions, China reborderd
its Internet space. Though it is not a good experience, Ethiopia followed Chinese footsteps and
banned some Internet sites that were designed by dissents and Ethiopian diaspora. One can view
opposition sites like “Ethiopian Review, Ethiomedia, ESAT TV and so forth outside Ethiopia but
the sites are blocked in Ethiopian cyber territory. Thus, Ethiopia has also rebordered its old border
to suit the changing global phenomenon. The same rule can be used to cyber crimes, cyber terrorists
and unwanted cyber transactions.
Cyber territory illustrates how states can deterritorize the traditional territory due to
globalization and reterritorize and reborder it to facilitate quick mobility and control unauthorized
or undesired person, transaction or activity. Cyber territorization does not, however, mean simply
internet censorship or implemented only in dictatorial regimes or developing economies, but it can
be used anywhere to control any kind of social evil like terrorism, tax evasion or cyber crime.
States can also reterritorize their territories and reborder it depending upon global phenomenon and
societal objectives. Terrorist may be denied access to a territory or denied visa or may be detained
and deported on the basis of available information.254 As globalization presumes friendship,
collaboration and border interaction, though some may still cross borders, there will be ample
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possibility for apprehension assuming globalization will create friendship and peaceful coexistence
that will facilitate information exchange.
Thus, in the era or globalization either borders or territorial state will not vanish, but the
prevailing territories may be deterritorized and reterritorized into new shape depending upon
compelling effects of globalization to allow quick and free mobility while controlling (filtering)
unauthorized persons, goods and transactions. The control aspect is an exception whereas, the
general rule is free and quick mobility of goods and services. The new border will facilitate high
interaction among bordered people thereby transforming borders from barriers to bridges.
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CHAPTER THREE
International Law and Territorial Boundary Delineation Norms
	
  	
  
3.1. Introduction
States are the most important subjects of international law, and it is inconceivable to
imagine the existence of a State without some form of territory, as “[t]erritoriality is one of the
fundamental tenets of sovereign statehood.”1 In a way of manifestation of sovereignty, a state
exercises control over people and activities in a defined territory.2 Thus, territoriality and
boundaries are “[…] the key element[s] how states are defined [….]”3 As international law,
basically comprises of rules and principles governing the conduct and relationship of States,
regulating territorial relationship of States is one of the primary objectives of the international law.4
It is generally viewed, and experience so far proves, that conflict over territory and
boundary takes lion’s share of international conflicts.5 As states and territorially are so intertwined,
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the former often aspire to expand its territory to assert more power by expanding the playground.6
This often generates conflict that international law has to address. It is also a proven fact, especially
in Africa, that a simple territorial or boundary disagreement can quickly flare up into armed
confrontation.7 The case of Ethiopia and Eritrea attests this assertion. The two nations were so close
before the sudden eruption of the boundary conflict and things turned down overnight. In the short
span of time, the Ethio-Eritrea war consumed tens of thousands of lives, destroyed enormous
resources and spoiled, not only peaceful coo-existence, but also disturbed regional peace and
stability. Therefore, by creating a smooth territorial or boundary relationships, among states,
international law endeavors to play a significant role in global peace building and peace keeping.8
The right to territory arises either from “legally significant acts” that are recognized by the
international law or treaties concluded by states.9 International law not only sets requirements for
the creation of nation states and describes the scope of their authority over a territory, but also it
serves as an authoritative tool for resolving actual or potential international disputes. Moreover,
international law doctrines and practices play a pivotal role in the interpretation of bilateral treaties,
if dispute arises on the title to territory or in defining a precise limit of territory.
This Chapter reviews some significant international law principles that are central in the
determination of territorial boundary dispute, or that can guide resolution of border disputes. Before
dealing with issues involving boundary or attempting to resolve boundary conflicts, we have to
ascertain whether a state claiming sovereignty over a given territory bounded by the contested
border has some kind of control or has title to the main land (the territory) that it desires to set a
boundary. With this view in mind, this Chapter explores a brief overview of some of the relevant
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international law norms and practices of delineating territorial land boundaries. Accordingly, this
chapter briefly assesses some specific international law doctrines relating to territoriality,
sovereignty, acquisition of title to territory, the stages of boundary making, the principles of uti
possidetis juris, territorial integrity norm that may often invoked in resolving international
territorial and boundary disputes.
3.2. Territoriality and State Sovereignty
As has been briefly pointed out in the preceding chapter, territorial boundary signifies the
extent of the sovereignty of a state, as a sovereign power can exercise its exclusive authority within
the bounds of a defined territory.

The concept of exclusive territorial sovereignty, a defined

territory and equality of nation states, are international law norms that are contributed to the world
by the Westphalian Congress of 1648. In spite of mounting assertion that territoriality, territorial
sovereignty and even if the nation state are fading away and giving way to uncontrollable effects
globalization and global actors, this assertion cannot hold ground for various causes and reasons. It
is true that global actors can transcend traditional border walls without being detected by border
guards or cannot be contained by huge and wired border walls, but the changing nature of borders
from barrier to bridges and building a strong global cooperation can filter network of powerful
extra-territorial or intra - territorial forces and contain them while facilitating free global mobility in
line with the dictates of globalization.
In the era of globalization, states will still remain sovereign in their defined territory,
safeguard the people in the territory they control, and maintain territorial integrity against an
“unregulated global actors”, like terrorists, cybercriminals or external aggression. States will have
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power to restrain global activities that can pass their borders by filtering unauthorized actors and
illegal transactions while facilitating mobility of acceptable persons and transactions. Globalization
creates interdependence and necessitates collaboration among nations. The cooperation would
enable states in their endeavor to filter undesired persons and contain harmful acts and transactions.
There is no legal obligation to cooperate, but it is a necessary consequence of globalization
to maintain peace and stability while facilitating modern life. For instance, Russia has cooperated
with United States by informing terror tendencies of Boston Marathon bombing suspects. On the
basis of the information FBI and followed up the suspects and blacklisted them by listing the
suspects in the terror database though mere blacklisting did not restrain the bombers. For a reason
not known United States agencies failed to contain the suspects by they inflict the act of terrorism.
No one has dictated Russia to supply the crucial information, but it did by its own volition with the
interest to follow up and contain potential terrorists. Recently a suspected terrorist who attempted
to hurt passengers on high–speed Thalys train was known to Spanish intelligence and was tipped to
France even before the actual commission of the act of terrorism, though the terrorist was not
restrained before attempting to carryout the terror act.10 But the most important point here is global
cooperation can thwart or mitigate adverse effects of globalization and protect sovereignty and keep
territorial integrity. United States has been aggressively assessing potential terror act either in
African or elsewhere and has been issuing possible terror act warning to alert states with a view to
avert terrorism. Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Tanzania have been using information supplied by
United States. Each State needs to cooperate to fight the global evil.
Global cooperation, therefore, does not tarnish sovereignty, nor eliminates boundary or
renders the concept of territoriality nonsense. States are always at liberty to close their borders for
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any length of time with a view to contain an act specifically relevant to individual nation. For
example, in early September 2015, some EU members decided to reinstitute border control with a
view to mitigate illegal migration. Hungary has been busy in constructing new fences and has
enhanced institutional and legal authority of border guards. Similar actions are being taken by other
European Union Member States to curb migration influx. The migration influx has posed a great
threat on Schengen, as there is fear that all EU member States would close their border moving
back to the pre-Schengen era. “Chancellor Angela Markel of German has warned that Schengen
would fall apart if Europe cannot agree how to manage migrant crisis.”11 Thus, globalization and
transnational nature of global actors cannot change territoriality, border, and state sovereignty in a
defined portion of global space, or abolish international law. The effects of globalization, however,
will change the nature of borders, which in turn, will enhance cooperation between states, thereby
redefine the contours of international law. Contrary to the speculation regarding falling nature of
some of the important international law principles that were passed by the Peace Accord of
Westphalia like nation sate, territorial sovereignty, and equality of states will remain intact albeit
transformation of borders to suit the changing transnational situation.
As sovereignty, principally, can be invoked within the limits of defined territory,
territoriality and sovereignty are strongly interrelated.12 Territorial sovereignty, however, does not
simply mean power over land or space within the limits of a defined boundary, but it has strong
nexus to the people within the territory, their relationship, interaction, and needs, as territory defines
and shapes peoples identity, culture and values.13 Consequently, a sovereign organ is not only
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vested with an exclusive right and power over territory and people in it, but also has to discharge
duties to the people in the territory.
A sovereign states has duty to “to protect the rights of other states.”14 ICJ while addressing
the issue of legal ties of sovereignty between Western Sahara, the Kingdom of Morocco and
Mauritania has stressed the legal ties between State sovereignty and people in the territory in which
sovereignty can be claimed.15 The State has an exclusive authority to make laws, adjudicate
disputes, or punish violations with a view to discharge its traditional function of statehood.
Therefore, the notion of sovereignty is conferred not only to reap its benefits (power and rights), but
also has to discharge its responsibility to the people in the geographic area where sovereignty can
be exercised.
After brief overview of the issue of state sovereignty, territoriality, and globalization, now
we will explore the determination of the scope of territory and boundary. In order to study the
correct territorial edge (the boundary) the study of international legal norm involving territoriality
appears pivotal.
3.3. Determining Title to Territory
As has been pointed out above, any issue over boundary or a territory is very sensitive, as
territoriality defines one’s identity and values. In conflict over territory, where the disputants
contest for a given tract of land, one can also notice tension as a result of strong public pressure,
animosity, and mistrust among citizens of both contesting nations who have been enduring
unsettled conflict. In an endeavor to resolve territorial dispute the first crucial step is determination
of title to territory. A tribunal or arbitration team to which settlement of territorial conflict was
entrusted should take time to investigate evidences, and has to make a thorough field research to
14
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findout an actual titleholder. Contest to title of a territory or conflict over the precise limits of
neighboring territory is a regular proceeding of international tribunals. About one-third of cases
disposed by international tribunals including International Court of Justice (ICJ), one way or the
other, deal with territorial or boundary dispute.16
Claim over boundary line, and dispute over title to territory are not exactly identical issues
though in some cases both of the issues my overlap. For instance, the dispute over Badme between
Ethiopia and Eritrea appear to involve both issues, albeit, often the conflict is labeled as boundary
dispute. The expression, boundary, connotes a line of separation of two or more sovereign states,
whereas, territory implies a space different from a line having its length and width. The village of
Badme is not simply a line. It is a small town or a village in which thousands of residents dwell.
Thus, it is a territory. The initial issue was title over the town of Badme. Then the issue of unsettled
boundary over the entire Ethio-Eritrea borderland arose. The Ethio-Eritrea conflict, thus, involves
conflict over boundary and territory.
Determination of legal holder of title to a territory, therefore, is a central inquiry in resolving
territorial dispute. In old days it was believed that title to territory acquired in a way similar to
acquisition of title to private properties. The assumption of territories as properties has facilitated
transactions involving territories. A sovereign power that had title to territory used to dispose it in a
way similar to private properties. Tribal chiefs in Africa used to sell, donate or lease territories to
anyone that had fulfilled demands of the chief.17 As a monarch was considered as an “elect of God”
to have power over every thing in the State; he/she was considered as the ultimate owner of the
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State territory and things found therein. Practically, therefore, there was no basic difference
between the monarch’s private property and State property, including territory.
Later on, some distinctions were made in personal property of monarch and state properties
including territorial land. Prominent international lawyer and author, Lasa Oppenheim, remarks,
“State territory is territorial property of a State.”18 Thus, to Oppenheim, it was not the monarch, but
the State that included organs other than the monarch was “proprietor” of the territory.19 In other
words,“ The territory of a State is not the property of the monarch, or the Government, […] it is the
country which is subjected to territorial supremacy of the imperium of a State.”20 This is a great
deviation of the medieval view of ownership of territory. Even in 20th century, however, some
traditional monarchs in Africa, like of kings of Ethiopia, stuck to the old view and considered the
Ethiopian territory as property of the king and freely donated land to anyone he liked. In those days,
there was no basic difference in property ownership of the king and the State. This assumption was
changed immediately after removal of the monarch and change of its regime.
Thus, in old days, as a ‘proprietor’, a State, could sale, lease, bequest, or transfer the
territory in any way, legally possible, irrespective of the interest of people on the territory.21 Thus, a
territory, like any commodity, passed through different ‘hands’ that directly or indirectly involved
in ownership or possession. When dispute arises over title of a territory the tribunal has to ascertain
an actual titleholder at the time of the dispute by assessing how the current title was obtained, as a
transferee can acquire exactly the title of the transferor (the principle of nemo dat quod non habet).
The judicial organ before which a territorial or boundary case is lodged, at the outset, will
ascertain how opposing parties have acquired ownership or possession of the territory. If a party
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proves its title over the claimed territory the next issue will be defining the limits of territory and
emplacing marks on the ground (delimitation and demarcation). Now the issue is how title to a
territory can be legally acquired and how it is possible to prove ones territorial title? Because of the
traditional assumption of a territory as property, the Roman law doctrine of acquisition of title to
private property can be analogized to acquisition of title to territory. Shaw confirms this view
stating:
The international rules regarding territorial sovereignty are rooted in the Roman law
provisions governing ownership and possession, and the classification of the different
methods of acquiring territory is direct descendant of the Roman rules dealing with
property.22

Thus, the traditional modes of acquisition of title to territory are, “… stereotyped way[s]
reflecting those of Roman law,”23 which prescribes five prominent modes of acquiring title to a
property, viz: occupation, accretion, cession, conquest, and prescription. Now it appears fairly
correct to sum that the traditional modes of acquisition of title to territory, with all the defects and
critiques, have got the status of customary international law.24
Though some modes of acquisition of title to territory in 21st century are viewed as outdated
and practically irrelevant, understanding of the historical background of acquisition of territory may
make some help in resolving the rampant territorial or boundary conflict almost all over the globe.
Due to time and space limitation, merely a Birdseye view of each of the modes of acquisition is
briefly stated herein under.

22

Shaw supra note 14.
Crawford supra note 9.
24
Lee supra note 22.
23

99

3.3.1. Occupation
Occupation is the oldest form of acquisition of title to territory that was never been under
sovereignty of another state, or occupation of an abandoned territory.25 The occupant to a valid title
the territory has to be terra nullius. The expression terra nullius may be understood in different
senses depending upon the interest of European powers. First, literally the expression terra nullius
meant an unoccupied (uninhibited) territory. In this sense, a state had an unlimited right to occupy a
virgin land which never been under sovereignty of another state. In the Eastern Greenland Case,26
for example, Denmark exercised sovereignty over unoccupied and uninhibited Eastern Greenland.
Danish people settled in the Eastern Greenland in 1894 and since then Denmark continuously and
peacefully exercised its sovereignty by issuing various legislations to resolve issues involving
Eastern Greenland.27 It granted concession and issued hunting and mining permits over Eastern
Greenland. The Permanent Court of International Justice held that Denmark acquired title to
Eastern Greenland by occupation.28 Norway’s contention of proximity of the land to its territory
did not prevail over Denmark’s occupation and effective control of the territory.
Second, a newly formed land (territory) may also be occupied as master less. Though it may
not be a usual phenomenon, there is a possibility that a new land may emerge in the high sea (res
communis) when the sea dries up or a hill uncovered by water emerges as a result of volcanic
eruption. The first occupier of a territory that emerges in high seas my acquire title to the territory
by occupation. This is almost identical with occupation of terra nullius after first discovery of a
territory.
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Thirdly, a territory inhibited by politically unorganized aboriginal people had been subject of
occupation, as a “sovereign-less” territory.29 Put simply, a territory occupied by disorganized
indigenous people was considered as terra nullius and subjected to occupation. In twenty first
century, this assumption is awkward, but was applied even in United States. The following
statement of Winston Churchill reveals the assumption territories occupied by indigenous people
was terra nullius.
I do not agree that the dog in a manger has the final right to the manger even though he may
have lain there for a very long time. I do not admit that right. I do not admit for instance, that a
great wrong as been done to the Red Indians of America or the black people of Australia. I do
not admit that a wrong has been done to these people by the fact that a stranger race, a higher–
grade race, a more worldly wise race to put it that way, has come in and taken their place.30

History has to be understood by the time, but in current state of mind, Churchill’s statements
are racially biased and offensive. All humans including Native Americans and Black People of
Australia or Africa got their own share of earth on which they were created. They are the original
occupiers of their land and they had their own indigenous type of political system and political
organization that may not be congruent with the political systems of Europe, but often disregarded.
Therefore, it is absurd to disregard a non-European form of organization of people and consider
traditional people that get order from their ethnic elite, as politically unorganized.

This

expansionist policy had initiated the Berlin Conference of 1884 – 1885 to partition Africa among
the European powers. European powers disregarded traditional African political system and
governance, which was different from European system and viewed Africa as terra nullius and
subjected to appropriation. Professor Menon concludes:
The concept that a territory not possessed by a community having a united political organization
[…was] subject to effective occupation by a foreign power appeared to be dominant thought the
later part of the nineteenth century in the contest of the African Continent. The inhabitants of the
29
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territory were considered factually, but not legally, in occupation of the territory.
[Consequently…] occupation of [fictionally] an inhabited territory was possible according to the
then prevalent legal order which was predominantly Eurocentric.31

In Western Sahara Case, Spain argued that Western Sahara was terra nullius though indigenous
people inhibited in it.32

Morocco and Mauritania vigorously opposed Spain’s assertion and

convinced the ICJ panel that Western Sahara was not terra nullius at the time of occupation by
Spain.33 The World Court in its advisory opinion summed that, at the time of colonization, Western
Sahara was inhibited by politically and socially organized people and cannot be viewed as terra
nullius.34 Spain’s argument was awkward as it occupied the territory by concluding treaty with local
chief, but not by mere occupation.35
In medieval society, there were also other uncommon specific situations in which an
occupied territory had been viewed as terra nullius because the residents were “different people”.
In Roman antiquity, for instance, “… any territory which did not belong to a Christian sovereign
was terra nullius, and later in the nineteenth century, any territory which did not belong to a
civilized State was terra nullius.”36
In conclusion, to get sovereignty over territory by occupation international tribunals
consider certain minimum conditions. First, the territory has to be terra nullius. As has been
pointed out above the meaning of the expression, terra nullius has changed from time to time and
depend on socio political system.37 Second the intention of the occupier (animus occupandi) to
exercise sovereignty over the territory. The intention to exercise sovereignty over the occupied
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territory can be understood by the activities the State carries out and the administration of the
territory.38 The intention to occupy a territory has to be permanent. Finally, there should be
continuous and peaceful exercise or display of sovereignty39. Unwarranted interruption and protest
from the beginning may spoil the legality of the occupation.40 Nowadays, there is no unoccupied
land; all the vicinities of earth are occupied. Thus, there is no territory that can satisfy anyone of the
grounds for acquisition of territorial title by occupation, and hence in modern days, occupation as a
mode of acquisition of title to territory is obsolete.
3.3.2. Accretion
The second mode of acquisition of title to a territory is accretion. This is an unplanned
natural addition to a territory that has already been held by a sovereign State. Traditionally, “… a
State has the right of sovereignty over any natural addition, made to its existing territory.” For
example, a border river may divert its route annexing a chunk of land to one of the neighboring
stare, or an ocean or a sea may dry up or diminish its size by increasing territorial land uncovered
by water. With regard to ocean and sea it may be argued that territorial water is already under
sovereignty of the State and any addition of land cannot be viewed as a new acquisition of territory,
but the beginning of territorial water is the shore and the expansion of shore pushes outward to the
37
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territorial water deep into the sea. In the case of high seas Exclusive Economic Zone will be pushed
into the sea forthwith.
Nowadays, the traditional rule of accretion as a mode of acquisition of territory when a river
diverts its direction or dries up appears doubtful. A State that has bordered by a diverted or dried up
river may not be willing to lose a portion of territory it held. The old river line may still continue to
be considered as a land boundary line or the two neighboring States may, by agreement, mark their
line of separation as it is usually done in land boundary. If the river that has diverted its direction
was a navigable one, the middle of the navigable point (thalweg) will be taken as a critical point. In
other cases, the center of riverbank is the point of dividing line of two neighboring states.41
3.3.3. Cession
Two or more sovereign states may transfer all or a portion of their territory for consideration
or for any cause. This is known as cession. According to Menon, “Cession without a quid pro quo
has been by far the largest group of transfer of territory because most cessions were imposed upon a
vanquished State by its victor or upon an unwilling State by an international Congress.”

42

For

instance, Eritrea was federated to Ethiopia by the decision of the winners of WWII and later
approved by the General Assembly though after ten years of cession to the Ethiopian sovereignty,
the monarchy merged Eritrea to one of the provinces, which later resulted in armed rebellion.
Similarly, the Somali region of Ethiopia was ceded to Ethiopia after decolonization. Numerous such
cases have appeared, especially after the two world wars. Cession, thus, is a peaceful method of
transfer of territory from one sovereign to another. It is a “… renunciation made by one State in
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favour of another of the rights and title which the former may have to the territory in question.”43
Cession may also be for consideration. A State may transfer sovereignty of a portion of territory or
some limited instances the whole territory to another sovereign in quid pro quo basis. In old days
states used to sell a part or all of territory for money, just like any property. For instance, in 1803
France ceded Louisiana to United States for consideration just like sale of land in traditional
sense.44 Similarly, Mexico ceded Texas, New Mexico, and Northern California to the United States
for $7.2 million. United States also took sovereignty of several territories, hitherto been under the
sovereignty of Denmark under the doctrine of cession.45 A territory may also be leased for certain
defined period of time or for indefinite time for consideration. For instance, United States leased
Guantanamo Bay from Cuba in 1903, after seizing it at the end of Spanish war. United States
assisted Cuba to get independence from Spain and stayed there holding the territory as naval base.46
Cuba signed a treaty that has authorized United States for use as naval station as far as it is
necessary. If these terms are respected, Guantanamo will be necessary for unlimited number of
years and will be held permanently. Now a days Cuba has been protesting against the lease, but
there is no way out, unless United States by its own free will relinquishes possession. This will
never happen. Similarly a tribal chief who had been in control of territories Djibouti lease it to
France. Finally, Djibouti got independence in 1977.
Before commencement of the formal colonization, European powers were able to step in
African through missionaries and merchants who bought land from local chiefs, and later facilitated
taking of the whole territory by their governments. Then European States either held the whole
43
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territory by force (which is conquest) or bribe tribal chiefs or trick them to sign a treaty legalizing
transfer of tittle to territory. For instance, Italy before invading Ethiopia had attempted either to
bribe or trick the then Ethiopian king. One of the tricks was wrong translation of the treaty. The
Wuchale Treaty that the Ethiopian king assumed to be a treaty for cooperation, stated in its Italian
version that Ethiopia can make external relationship only through Italy. After learning the trick, the
Ethiopian King protested to the treaty and a war broke out in which Italy suffered a great loss and
finally recognized Ethiopia’s sovereign existence before it finally invaded again and occupied the
whole country for five years until driven out by the assistance of Great Britain.
3.3.4. Conquest (Annexation)
Conquest or annexation is another mode of acquisition of title to territory. In old days,
conquest was the most common form of acquisition of title to a territory. Powerful neighbors or a
state with superior military power used to invade a weaker nation and annex either the whole
territory or portion of it into is territory or dominion.

Traditionally the loser of war loses

sovereignty to territory and the winner acquires title over territory.47 The need for more territory
and subjects who may be forced to pay tax or render other crucial service like serving in the
military inspired states to conquer weaker states.
Acquisition of territory by conquest was lawful until the formation of League of Nations. The
first formal prohibition of invasion for territorial acquisition as declared by the League of Nations.
Art. 10 of the Convenient of League of Nations states:
The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external
aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the
League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression
the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.48
47

The view was changed since WWI. The winner of WWI agreed to hold the loser states temporarily with ultimate
goal of enabling them for self-determination.
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The Covenant of League of Nations may be praised for attempting to prohibit invasion for
the sole reason of expanding territory, it failed to stop conquest practically because did not
prescribe possible consequences of aggression. The expression, “In case of any such aggression or
in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise…’’ appears simply a
political commitment which can easily be ignored by powerful nations. It was practically
impossible for weaker nations to stop aggression by peaceful means. Ethiopia was the only African
country that signed the Covenant without any form of Western affiliation, but it was invaded by
Italy in disregard of the Convention. Ethiopia invoked the provision and sought restraint but the
Council could not help. Surprisingly, the Council advised Italy to get certain portion of Ethiopian
territory and stop invasion. Italy, however, disregarded the advice aiming to occupy the whole
territories of Ethiopia. As a result, Ethiopia suffered huge loss and faced massacre by Italian fascist.
Finally, the invaders were expelled during WWII by the Ethiopian resistance army with the help of
Great Britain. Article 11 of the Covenant states that all members of the League will react if any
member states were invaded but no action was taken against Italy.
Art. 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter prohibits threat or use force, unless it is to avert an
invasion. The Provision is the successor of Art. 10 of Covenant of League of Nations, which states,
“All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the Purpose of the United Nations.”49 Though the Security Council is relatively stronger and
effective when compared to League Council, the prohibitory wordings of both Art. 10 of the
Covenant and Art. 2 Paragraph 4 of the Charter stipulate weak enforcement mechanism in case of
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aggression. Several instances of collective measures against invasion were taken, but in numerous
other cases of violations, the Security Council could not restrain use of force that is contrary to the
Charter owing to veto or ideological interests of Permanent Members.
In the Ethiopia/Eritrea cases, the Security Council passed Resolutions No. 1297 which
simply requested for cessation of military actions, and prohibited further use of force and demanded
withdrawal of troops from the illegally held territories.50 In Eritrea’s refusal to maintain status quo
ante bellum, a destructive war that claimed lives of tens of thousands broke out. Finally, Ethiopia
was able to liberate the occupied territories. In the words of Marc Von Boemchen, “ Having
suffered a major defeat, Eritrea eventually accepted to redeploy its forces from all positions held
after May 6, 1998 thereby fulfilling Ethiopian demands.”51 After defeat, Eritrea expressed its intent
to abide by the Resolution No. 1297, which Ethiopia refused to comply with. To deter Ethiopia,
United States sponsored a harsher resolution, which imposed arms embargo on both Ethiopia and
Eritrea and travel ban on Ethiopian officials. Russia objected to the indefinite travel ban and arms
embargo, contending open Arms Embargo did not work in Iraq.

Finally, accepting Russia’s

suggestion, the Security Council unanimously passed Resolution No. 1298 which imposed Arms
Embargo on Ethiopia and Eritrea for 12 months. Ethiopia objected to the Sanction claiming it was
unfair while the country was invaded.52
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Nowadays, therefore, there is no way to acquire title to a territory by conquest. The Charter
prohibits conquest in any form. Apart from certain Balkan Stats that were annexed to U.S.S.R, no
other winner of WWII has retained title to territories of loser States. Israel’s occupation of
territories that were acquired by war has been frequently condemned.53 Iraq’s temporarily
occupation Kuwait resulted in collective action that forcefully driven out the occupiers. A state
cannot acquire title to territory even if it acted in self-defense. At the end of Ethio-Eritrea war,
Ethiopian troops entered deep into Eritrean territory, but immediately withdrew after ceasefire
agreement was reached. In other words, self-defense cannot be ground to acquire title of a territory.
3.3.5. Prescription
A State may also acquire title to territory by acquisitive prescription. The possibility of
acquisition of territorial title by prescription in international law, however, is arguable.54 According
to Jennings and Watt, “There has always been some opposition to prescription as a mode of
acquiring territory.”55 Though there is unanimity, some still show the possibility of acquisition of
title to territory after prolonged possession. In this case, prescription as a mode of acquisition of
title to territory is similar to adverse possession as a mode of transfer of ownership in private
property. In adverse possession, states prescribe time limit within which an original titleholder may
lose ownership. International law does not prescribe a defined time limit, but possession of territory
fairly for long period of time coupled with fulfillment of other requirements may confer title to the
possessor by operation of law.
The length of time need not be immemorial, but some length of time together with peaceful
possession of the territory and actual and open exercise of sovereignty in exclusion of other states,
53
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may confer title to the territory.56 The State claiming acquisition of title to territory by prescription
should prove, among others, the acquiescence of the original titleholder. If the original title holder
keeps quiet for long period of time while understanding another states openly exercises sovereignty,
it is fairly justifiable to transfer title in order to keep international peace and security.
3.3.6. The Contemporary Approach
Eminent international lawyers, Malcolm Shaw and Ian Brownlie, vigorously argue against
the analogy of Roman law modes of acquisition of title to private property to acquisition of title to
territory. Ian Brownlie, persuasively summarizes the inadequacy of orthodox modes of acquisition
of title to territory.57 To Brownlie, when a new state acquires independence and gets statehood, it
acquires title to the territory without fulfillment of any of the traditional modes. Similarly,
acquisition of title of a territory by acquiescence, and acquisition of territorial title by recognition
do not fall in anyone of the traditional modes of acquisition of title to property.58
The orthodox modes do not give room for adjudicator to consider better title (relative title)
in ambiguous situation. When contesting parties furnish confusing evidence, the tribunal may
decide on the basis of preponderance of evidence and confer title of contested territory depending
on weight of evidence. In the words of Brownlie, “ The importance of showing a better right in
contentious cases [may be ]obscured if too much credit is given to the five ‘modes’.” 59 Similarly,
Malcom Shaw observes, “[… Roman rules dealing with property] has resulted in some confusion…
Law, being so attached to contemporary life, cannot be easily transposed into a different cultural
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milieu.”60 Thus, in twenty first century there is no way to acquire title by the application of
traditional modes.61
Shaw and Brownlie agree on the significance of factual and legal conditions under which
title of a territory belong to particular state.62 To Shaw, “ The essence of territorial sovereignty is
contained in the notion of title.”63 To Brownlie, “ […] title is a by-product of the events leading to
the creation of a state as a new source of territorial sovereignty.”64 An international tribunal in
addition to traditional modes of acquisition of territory may require proof of fulfillment of factual
and legal conditions such as the exercise of sovereignty over the territory by conduct, a titre de
sourverain before the date in question.65 The issue of sovereignty carries complex legal questions
including “prohibition” in acquiring the territory and the right to seek invalidity of former coercive
treaties that were entered without the state giving free consent.66
Factual and legal conditions are facts proving that the territory belonged to one or more of
the claimants. After ascertaining the fulfillment of conditions, the tribunal will decide on the issue.
Thus, “[… ] the existence of those factors is [is] required under international law to entail the legal
consequences of a change in the juridical status of a particular territory.”67 In a way different from
the conventional methods, proof of title to territory need not necessarily be absolute; it is based on
preponderance of evidence. This means the international tribunals will decide on relative weight of
the evidence presented by the contending parties. The tribunal thus “[…] will consider all the
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relevant arguments and will award the land to the state which relatively speaking puts forward the
better … legal case.”68
As declared in the Frontier Dispute Case, (Burkina Faso v. Mali),69 contemporary rules of
international law gives preference to title than other rights and privileges over a territory. The
titleholder is presumed to be a sovereign over the territory even if the territory is under possession
of a different organ for whatever reason or cause. The superiority of title over effective control
accords with the doctrine of uti possidetis juris70. In Frontier Dispute Case ICJ remarked, “ The
principle of uti possidetis juirs accords pre-eminence to legal title over effective possession as a
basis of sovereignty.” [Emphasis added]. Shaw shares this view stating, “ Where the act does
correspond to the law, where the territory which the subject of the dispute is effectively
administered by a State other than the one possessing the legal title, preference should be given to
the holder of the title.”71
The question is how to prove title? In private property holding title to a property is
established by registration of the property. In absence of international registry system, how can a
State purporting titleholder prove its status? Ian Brownlie enumerates possibilities one can prove
title to a territory. To Brownlie, “ unquestioned title is a contingency arising from history, general
recognition, and the absence of an other claimant.”72
Title to territory may also depend upon other factors. The private property law maxim of
nemodat quod non habet, may be applicable to acquisition of territorial tile. A state acquiring title
to a territory cannot acquire a better title than the transferor. Thus, a state with a defective title can
transfer only a defective title. Other factors like judicial decision, recognition from some states, ,
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and compromise on territorial title can affect title on territory. Competing claims for title to territory
often resolved in adjudication by international tribunals. In Island of Palmas and Minquieers and
Ecrehos,73 it was remarked that title to territory could be conferred to one of the contending parties
in spite of the fact that there was reason to believe the territory was terra nullius at a given point of
time. In Eastern Greenland case Danish activity in the disputed area had been intensive, but the
Court did not consider the area terra nullius though Danish sovereignty was formally declared on
another ground. Finally, where it is too ambiguous to arrive a given conclusion the court may
simply weigh a given title with another.74
In modern times, most of the traditional modes of acquisition of title to territory are
practically obsolete. As pointed out above, there is no way to occupy a territory, as the earth’s entire
surface has been occupied.75 Consequently Ian Borwnlie suggests the following methods that may
prove title to territory as a matter of convenience.76 First, original and historic title: Possession of a
territory from the time immemorial may be a ground for getting title to territory. This may appear
similar to the traditional modes of occupation, but it need not be occupation of master less territory.
It may include possessing a territory for long period of time without objection or formal transfer.
Titleholder may invoke “… an ancient, original or historic title.”77 To prove title the titleholder may
furnish evidences of “general repute or opinion as to matters of historical fact.” This method of
acquiring title to territory may be relevant to some Asian states in which traditional boundaries
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were recognized.78 In some cases, depending upon facts and evidences presented, “ International
tribunals have recognized the concept of ancient or original title [….]”79
Second, effective control may be a ground to acquire title to territory. In absence of
registration of title to territory, treaty or judicial decisions conferring title a territory by effective
control is an effective legal possibility. In Eastern Greenland, (Denmark v. Norway)80 the
Permanent Court remarked:
“[ … ] Sovereignty based not upon some particular act or title such as treaty of cession
but merely upon continued display of authority involves two elements such of which
must be shown to exit the intention and will to ac as sovereign, and some actual exercise
of display of such authority”81

Professor Menon expounds the requirements for effective control into three parts82. First,
there should be appropriable terra nullius. It is to mean the territory to be controlled should satisfy
anyone of the requirements of terra nullius. Second, there should be a permanent intention (animus
occupandi) to hold sovereignty over the territory, and lastly, the state should display continuous
display of authority (corpus occupandi).83
While continuous display of authority is observable and tangible, as the State has to
effectively control the territory establishing its administration, but the intention to act as sovereign
appears subjective, which may be inferred from actual exercise of sovereignty. This means, unless
the State expressly declares otherwise, permanent intention to hold the territory as a sovereign
power can be presumed from ‘actual control and display of authority’.84 The issue of effective
control arises where the actual holder of the territory lacks proof of original or derivative title. An
uninterrupted control of territory is necessary to prove effective control. The requirement of

78

See Id.
Id.
80
1933 P.C.I.J. (ser.A/B/) No. 53 ( Apr. 5).
81
Crawford supra note 9 at 222.
82
Menon supra note 1 at 135.
83
Id.
79

114

continued display of authority is reiterated in Eritrea/Yemen Case,85 territorial conflict over
Hannish Island, which was awarded to Yemen. Thus, intentional display of authority is the
contemporary rule of proving effective control of a territory in dispute. Exercise of criminal
jurisdiction over wrongs committed in the territory, for example may be an instance of exercise of
authority. Similarly, normal and peaceful administration also proves effective control.
Effective control was also an important procedural requirement when occupation served as
mode of acquisition of title to territory. Discovery of a territory, by itself, was not enough to confer
title to territory. A discovered territory should be effectively controlled. The old rule of mere
settlement and close physical possession of the territory is not `enough. The current view is
effective control, which demands administration with continuous display of authority. The notion of
‘discovery’ entail previously unknown land that never been inhibited by humans. In old time
(fifteenth and sixteenth century) a mere discover was sufficient to confer title.
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Later it was held

that a title acquired by mere discovery was “inchoate’’. An inchoate title is a defective one that can
be disregarded by states unless effectively controlled in a reasonable period of time. In Island of
Palmas case, United States, as a successor to Spain, invoked title by mere discovery of the island
by Spain. This assertion was not accepted, as 19th century law required a discovered territory to be
effectively occupied within a reasonable time of discovery. Ultimately, as a result, United States
took a position that discovery alone cannot confer any form of title. 87
Territory may be controlled directly or indirectly via representation. An effective control
through representation has to be approved to constitute a legal title and confer sovereignty. This is
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called symbolic annexation.88 In Clipperton Island Case, a French man who was authorized by
French government to hold a territory on its behalf occupied the Clipperton Island. The French
Consulate notified the occupation to the government of Hawaii. Later Mexican authorities claimed
title by Spanish discovery of Island,89 but the Island was awarded to France by a binding arbitration
agreement that was entered between Mexico and France.
To sum up, in accordance with the current international law, title to territory prevails over
effective control. Unchallenged title can be acquired by initial occupation and continuous exercise
of sovereignty over the territory peacefully. While this is the usual form, a State with unchallenged
title can transfer its title to another State. The transferee acquires all the rights and the privileges of
the transferor (nomo dat quod non habet). This requires a valid treaty between the transferor and
transferee. The date of coming into force of a ratified treaty is deemed as the date of transfer of title
and sovereignty. This form of acquisition of title is known as cession. A state may transfer the
sovereignty over territory to another state for consideration or other causes. States may simply
recognize the sovereignty of a given territory in consideration of recognition of its own sovereignty
over another territory. This kind of arrangement may be made with a view to settle boundary
dispute between two or more neighboring states. In medieval times, it was common to conclude
treaty with tribal chiefs to take possession of territory. For example, France concluded a treaty with
tribal chief of Afar to take possession of land surrounded by Red Sea and later took sovereignty of
over Djibouti renaming the territory as French Somali land.90 As cited by Brownlie, Judge Huber in
Island of Plamas remarks, “ In substance, it is not an agreement between equals; it is rather a form
of internal organization of a colonial territory, on the basis of autonomy of the natives… And thus
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sovereignty over native States becomes the basis of territorial sovereignty as toward other members
of the community of nations.”91
3.4. The Doctrine of Uti Possiditis
3.4.1. Nature and Origin
Uti Possidits, is a concept of international law that may be used in making territorial limits
of states when new states get independence form colonial yoke.92 Uti possidetis, as a norm of
boundary delineation, was first applied in Spanish Latin America. After getting political
independence from Spain, the Latin American Republics, were confronted with a perplexing task of
settling territorial limits.93 At the time the easiest possible solution to obviate a looming border
conflict was taking colonial administrative boundaries as international boundaries between the
newly emerged republics. Accordingly, the new Republics agreed to honor pre-independence
colonial administrative subdivisions as international boundary defining the jurisdictional limits of
their sovereignty in accordance with the Roman law principles of uti possidetis.94 Given shortage of
resources to redraw a new international boundary, in conflicting situation, the agreement to employ
uti possidetis as a guiding doctrine was a sensible decision. The doctrine of uti possidetis, “[…]
posits that title to the colonial territory devolves to the local authorities and prevails over any
competing claims based on occupation.”95
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Thus, even though the doctrine of uti possidetis was first applied as a rule of international
boundary defining norm in Spanish Latin America, its origin was the classical Roman edict.96
Suzanne Lalonde remarks, “[…] uti possidetis principle [was] originated in Latin America, in fact
uti possidetis is a principle bequeathed to international law by the Roman Empire.”97 In accordance
with Roman law edict, “[…] the Praetor forbade the disturbance of the existing state of possession
of immovable as between two individuals.”98 The principle of uti possidetis derived from the Latin
expressions, “ uti possidetis ita possideatis,” which means, “As you possess, so you may possess.”99
The application of the doctrine of Uti possidetis in Roman law as a safeguarding rule of
peaceful enjoyment of property, and as a rule of boundary delimitation norm in Latin America, is
not alike; but the ultimate goal appears same. In both cases, rights already possessed should be kept
intact. The Roman law doctrine affords temporary protection while action for dispossession
pendingd.100 Authorization of continuity of possession is a common element of both way of
application of uti pssidetis. The Roman law edict had the objective of keeping peaceful possession
and enjoyment of rights on immovable property, as a temporary remedy, until a final decision
declared by court.101 Thus, even a person claiming, “to be an owner” cannot disturb a good faith
possessor until the court so decides.102 In Roman civil law tradition, thus, the expression, uti
possideits, confers a temporary right to use the property peacefully until contrary court order.103 The
good faith possessor may only be challenged by a person claiming to be an owner peacefully
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through action for dispossession and the possessor cannot be forced to vacate until final
judgment.104
Unlike the Roman law doctrine of uti possidetis that protects actual physical possession, the
international law principle shields juridical title. Thus, in international law, actual possessor of a
territory may be forced to surrender the territory to the titleholder. In both cases, however, the
claimant cannot physically force the actual possessor to surrender possession.105 Needless, to say
the claimant should not take law by its own hand – there should be court order or arbitral award.
The other basic distinction between application of uti possdetis in Roman law and Spanish Latin
America is the object of the right. In international law the principle of uti possidetis governs
territorial possession, while Roman law edict deals with private property. The other glaring
distinction is in international law, the principle creates a definite status unlike temporary protection
of Roman law.106
The Roman Law expressions, “ […] uti possidetis, ita possideatis ( “as you possess, so may
you possess”), indicates the significance of factual possession.”107 Derivatively, in international
law, the notion of uti possidetis, refers to legal right to possess as you possess.108 In relation to
territory, it means possessor of a right over a given territory will continue possessing in the same
way even after the old regime is gone by whatever cause. By doing so, the rule of uti possidetis has
maintained peace among the newly liberated nations. Technically the principle of uti possidetis
keeps territorial integrity, as no boundary or territorial change is expected. Thus, there is nexus
between the doctrine of uti possidetis and the doctrine of territorial integrity norm. Founders of the
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new republics of Latin America were inspired by the old Roman law as a guiding principle to keep
territorial integrity as defined by the colonial Spain.109
As a concept of defining international boundary, legal history has recorded two forms of uti
possidetis.110 The oldest form of uti possidetis was based on the actual possession of immovable
property. This version of uti possidetis is known as uti possidetis de facto. The actual possessor of a
property may not necessarily be an owner, or the possession need not be backed by title, or
approved by authorities.111 The other proper version of uti possidetis is uti possidetis juris. In this
case, the claimant of a property may be taken as a legal owner of the property who may or may not
necessarily be in actual possession, but cannot lose the ownership simply because s/he is not in
possession. In Roman law titleholder of a property who temporarily parted the property, either by
some kind of arrangement or by involuntarily means may not lose ownership of the property and
assumed constructive possessor of the property. Constructive possession is a legal assumption that
empowers an actual titleholder to retake the property. The actual holder cannot refuse to give the
property when the court so orders.
In Roman civil law tradition, the expression, uti possideits, confers a prima facie title to the
good faith possessor. The good faith possessor of an immovable property is presumed an owner by
mere possession, unless some one with a better title challenges it. This rule of civil law is still a
binding law in civil law tradition. In Ethiopia, for instance, good faith possessor of a movable
property is presumed as titleholder.112 The presumption if rebateable by contrary evidence. Under
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the Ethiopian Civil Code, after lapse of certain limited period of time, a good faith possessor
acquires ownership of the property by virtue of law. In Roman law, however, the rule of uti
possidetis governs transfer of title of immovable properties to the good faith possessor. The good
possessor may be challenged by contrary evidence.
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The Roman law doctrine of good faith

possession is equivalent to the common law doctrine of “adverse possession”.114
The Roman Law expressions, “ […] uti possidetis, ita possideatis ( ‘as you possess, so may
you possess’), indicates the significance of factual possession.”115 Derivatively, in international
law, the notion of uti possidetis refers to legal right to possess as one possessed.116 In relation to
territory, thus, it means possessor of a right over a given territory will continue possessing in the
same way after decolonization. By doing so, the rule of uti possidetis has contributed to maintain
peace among the newly liberated nations. Technically the principle of uti possidetis keeps territorial
integrity, as no boundary or territorial change is expected.
Thus, each republic was allowed to continue possessing a territory that the colonial power
had allocated as administrative subdivision. The doctrine of uti possidetis, “[…] assumes that
internal administrative boundaries are functionally equivalent to international boundaries.”117 At a
time where there was no better option to avert a looming boundary conflict, other than resorting to
colonial boundaries by the authority of principles of uti possidetis was a very apposite stand.118
In early 19th century after decolonization in South and Central America (Latin America), the
Roman law of private property norm was transformed into a principle defining international

acquisition only to movable properties. As movable properties require registration for valid transfer of title, the
doctrine of good faith acquisition is not applicable. This is contrary to the Roman law doctrine of uti possidetis.
113
Bartos, supra 1 note at 40.
114
Id.
115
Id. See Report by the British Institute of International and Comparative Law for her Majesty’s Court, Sep. 2006,
http://www.biicl.org/files/2350_advposs_sep_ftnsv3.pdf
116
Id. see also Hasani supra note 92 at 86
117
Sumner supra note 1 at 163.
118
Hensel, et al, supra note 99.

121

boundary.119 The two version of uti possidetis were invoked in different sense, albeit, uti possidetis
de facto did not win international recognition as a doctrine of delineating international boundary. It
was only Brazil that claimed the application of ut possidetis de facto as a norm of defining
international boundary. Brazil had the ambition of expanding territory. Its very aim was to extend
its territorial possession to the unoccupied regions under the guise of occupation of terra nullius.
Consequently, “ Brazil generally rejected the application of uti possidetis de jure (legal possession)
in favor of uti possidetis de facto (effective possession) an alternative doctrine that determines
ownership of territory based on physical occupation rather than colonial title.”120 Brazil’s
expansionist policy to go beyond the supposed 1810 legal border was opposed by all former
Spanish colonies.121 Consequently, Spanish colonies never took uti possidetis de facto as a
governing principle. Swiss Federal Council in arbitral award of territorial dispute between
Colombia and Venezuela briefly elaborated uti possidentis de jure vis-à-vis territorial boundary as
follows:
When the Spanish Colonies of Central and South America proclaimed themselves independent
in the second decade of the nineteenth century, they adopted a principle of constitutional and
international law which they gave the name uti possidetis juris of 1810, with the effect of laying
down the rule that bounds of newly created Republics should be the frontiers of the Spanish
provinces to which they were substituted. The general principle afforded the advantage of
establishing an absolute rule that there was no in law the old Spanish America any territory
without a master.122
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Thus, the de facto version never been taken as a governing norm for defining international
boundary. In the words of Bartos, “ […] once the principle became relevant in international law, its
emphasis apparently shifted towards a legal right to possess.”123
3.4.2. Contributions of the Principle
Soon after getting out of colonial yoke, there was no better option to avert territorial and
boundary conflict other than resorting to the doctrine of uti possidetis. It was the easiest and the
cheapest option to create a mutually acceptable boundary line in short period of time.124 This
principle has saved time and resources by a mere recognition of already functional colonial
administrative boundaries as international boundary line.125 In other words, colonial administrative
boundary lines that had separated colonial administrative subdivisions were taken as international
boundary.
As colonial administrative boundaries largely known to the public, unless otherwise agreed,
there was no need for further delimitation or demarcation. Negotiation to extend pre-existing
colonial administrative boundaries into international boundary may not take long time nor require
highly skilled boundary experts or boundary engineers. As pre-independence boundaries are already
known and accepted by the local people, the boundary may be stable and permanent. Boundary
making on the basis of the doctrine of uti possidetis is not hard and is not time consuming. It may
also be negotiated on phone or may be deliberated on decolonization document or by national
congresses of respective newly constituted States.
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The process was acclaimed as, “[…] a proscription against the violent acquisition of
territory.”126 Any attempt to redraw territorial limits would generate unending destructive war. As
Edwards remarks:
Already frontier questions were beginning to appear and in order to prevent the conflicts to
which they might give raise, it was decided that in the absence of special stipulation the
boundaries of the varies states should be those existing at the time of their emancipation from
the Spanish rule.127

With a view to subdue the possibility of costly border conflict, at a time the newly emerged
republics could not bear it, accepting pre-independence territorial limit was the best political
decision that has been exemplary global practice and has made tremendous contribution to the
international peace and stability.
To avoid foreign aggression or further colonization under the guise of occupation of terra
nullius, the young republics were guarded by the principle of uti possidetis that conferred
constructive possession of all territories including unsettled barren lands on the new republics. In
the words of Bartos, “This convenient legal fiction of constructive possession was peculiarly
adapted to a continent which was, sparsely populated.”128 Thus, “It scotched the designs of
competing colonial powers who may have made claims to territory on the basis of terra nullius
[….]”129 According to old Spanish law in Latin America, there was no territory without an owner.
All territories including unsettled regions were assumed owned. This has established a constructive
possession rule baring an alien to create ownership by occupation. Under uti possidetis juirs, an
alien actually possessing anyone or more of the unsettled territories that were previously presumed
to be under Spanish control cannot claim title simply by virtue of actual possession. The new
Republics, therefore, deemed by law occupying all the former Spanish Latin America territories as
126
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it was assumed that there was no Spanish American territory without an owner.130 Put otherwise, in
accordance with the old Spanish colonial rule, all the Latin American territories were occupied,
albeit, not settled by residents or frequently used. By virtue of the doctrine of uti possidetis, the
new Republics were conferred with automatic transfer of legal title to the entire territory belonged
to them during colonial time and they will be conferred with title to some unoccupied regions. As
there was no terra nullius in Spanish American, the same rule was applicable to the new republics.
This ownership over unoccupied territory is known as constructive possession. Pursuant to the
doctrine of uti possidetis juris, the actual possessor may be dispossessed at any time if the
titleholder wishes to exercise its legal right of ownership. Brazil’s contention of uti possiditis
defacto, which confers title by actual possession, did not prevail, as the contemporary rule is based
on uti possidetis juris.
Though later territorial conflicts were surfaced in Latin America, at the foundational stage
of application of the principles of uti possidetis juris curbed possibilities of territorial or boundary
conflict. As Hensel remarks, “ […] uti possidetis norm constituted a proscription against the violent
acquisition of territory [….]”131 The principle also effectively reduced the possibility of forceful
annexation of territories. Application of the principle has also proved the possibility of territorial
change through peaceful means.132 For instance, some Central America States merged to constitute
a single strong nation but later disintegrated peacefully.133 Thus, the “ […] application of uti
possidetis left open the possibility of peaceful territorial change by mutual agreement, only
opposing the threat or use of force for the acquisition of territory.”134
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Though it is arguable, the principle has impressed founding fathers of Organization of
African Unity to take “existing” boundaries as binding international boundaries in Africa. There
are also wide spread assumption that the principle of uti possidits juris has guided during
disintegration of nations like U.S.S.R or other former communist States like Yugoslavia and
Czechoslovakia.
3.4.3. Limitations of the Principle
Since its inception, application of the principle of uti possidetis has been “[…] plagued by a
number of problems.”135 The most obvious short comings of the principle of Uti possidetis vis-à-vis
international territorial delimitation was its reliance on pre-independence colonial boundaries that
were set in a way meeting colonial interests that often disregarded geographic and human
conditions of local people. As Hensel et al attest, “ The Spanish often changed the border of their
administrative units over time though seemingly arbitrary royal decrees or cedulas from Madrid.”136
The principle of uti possidetis thus keeps colonial ‘evils’ vis-à-vis territorial division to continue
even after getting freedom from the old colonial yoke. McCorquodale and Pangalangan, remark:
“ [T]he consequences of adopting [the principle of uti possidetis] is that territorial boundaries
operate inequitably and in favour of the colonial power’s division of territory [….] [S]o the
rule developed by the international legal system to deal with boundaries are affirming of the
state structure of that system.137

On top of this, boundary makers had little or no empirical facts before crafting colonial boundaries.
As Suzanne Lalonde observes, “ The lack of trustworthy information during the colonial period
with respect to large sections of the continent created serious difficulties.”138 The continent was not
fully explored and not known even to the local people. Colonial legislations often ignored
geographic facts and maps were imperfect. Natural futures of land that were referred either
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disfigured or could not be located.139 This is a crucial problem and […] often criticized for being
source of conflict. Most territorial conflicts stem from disputes “[…] the location of old colonial
boundaries.”140 Though founding fathers of OAU have decided to honor pre-existing African
boundaries, which are largely defined by colonial powers, colonial boundaries have created
permanent scare that cannot heal at all. Colonial boundaries in Africa have disintegrated closely
associated ethnic groups, caused animosity among the brotherly people that had been coexisted
peacefully before colonial boots landed in Africa. Some neighboring states currently have been
enduring unsolvable boundary issue due to the complicated colonial boundary delimitation.141
These borderland people often disregard the boundary line if they need to use resources such as
grazing land or hunting on the other side of the territory.
The Principle of uti possidetis, has suffered interpretational problem, which resulted in
confusion and conflict in Latin America.142 Interpretational issue evolved as a result of perceived
and actual possession of territories during colonial time. During colonial time, administrative units
had exercised jurisdiction beyond the actual possession. The provincial administration supposedly
acted in good faith without any evil intent of usurpation.143 As the administrative units were
controlled by the colonial power, internal boundaries were not strictly adhered like international
boundaries and hence the units did not regard action beyond formal lines as an issue. According to
Lalonde, “ […] at the time of independence the colonial administrative authorities of a given
territorial unit had in fact been exercising civil jurisdiction beyond the line designated as the limit of
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their territorial jurisdiction.”144 The issue surfaced after administrative units got independence and
their common command of chain was lapsed.
The new independence States that have got freedom from colonial Spain and Brazil, wrangled
over interpretation of uti possidetis. While the Republics wished to draw international boundary line
beyond the actual possession including all the territories perceived by colonial rule invoked uti
possidetis juris (legal possession), Brazil invoked uti possidetis de facto (actual effective
possession). Lalonde terms the two forms of uti possidetis as “ Rival Version of the Uti Possidetis
principle.”145 Prescott expounds competing versions of uti possidetis as follows:
Some states regarded the rule as applying to the limits legally in force when the act of
decolonization occurred. Others believed that the rule was concerned with the boundaries
observed for practical administration by the colonial authorities. These two lines did not always
coincide and competing states would urge the interpretation, which suited themselves best. 146

As has been pointed at the outset, Brazil asserted for definition of uti possidetis on the basis of
effective possession while rejecting the application of uti possidetis de jure. But the new republics
contested for legal possessions (uti possidetis de jure).147 Proponents of both forms of uti possidetis
were able to produce evidences proving their respective position. But there was no document
proving equal application of both categories of uti possidetis at the same time.148 The dispute
between Bolivia and Paraguay over the Chaco Boreal territory illustrates interpretational fight
between the two former Spanish administrative units.149 In this case, Bolivia and Paraguay invoked
a version of uti possidetis, supporting their position. While Bolivia invoked uti possidetis juris of
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1810 “[…] appealing to her status, as successor to the Royal Audiencia of Charcas […]”150
Paraguay relied on uti possidetis both de jure and def facto” arguing that it was successor to the old
colonial province of Paraguay and considered that Chaco belonged to her on the basis of afore
stated principle.151 It was finally held that “ de facto occupation became ineffective and of no legal
consequence.”152
Brazil has rejected the application of uti possidetis juris regarding it alien to the original
Roman law principle of uti possidetis. It views the Spanish republics attempt to ‘‘inject into the
Roman formula a meaning entirely alien to its origin, namely the right to possess independent of
effective possession,” beyond the spirit of original Roman law.153 Brazil contends that uti possidetis
principle was based on real and ‘effective possession independent of title’.154 Building its position
on the basis of actual possession at the critical date of independence, Brazil’s ultimate aim was
expanding its territory to disregarding the rule of constructive possession.155 By doing so, Brazil has
defended Portuguese expansion during the colonial time and attempted to protect her own interest
for further expansion into the unoccupied territories of Spanish Latin America territories. Spanish
America Republics, however, disregarded Brazilian version of uti possidetis de facto favoring to uti
possidetis juirs.

which incorporates both actual and constructive possessions. Construction

possession (Juridical title) on the basis of title granted by the colonial decree. Thus the republics
were entitled to the territory they had actually possessed at the time independence, and territories
that they were entitled by “[…] the decrees of the sovereign they had had a right to possess.”156
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The problem of interpretation of the Principle not only limited to the creation of rival
doctrines, but also dwells in the meaning of s single version had surfaced. Though Dominican
Republic and Haiti agreed to be bound by uti possidetis juris in the delimitation of their boundary,
they were unable to agree on the exact meaning of the term. They submitted their dispute over
terminology to an arbitrator.157 Abdelhamid El Quali plausibly argues that “[…] the inconsistency
of the uti possidetis […] raised serious doubts on the legal character of [the principle of uti
possidetis.]”158
Though the doctrine of uti possidetis, made a great contribution in curbing disputes among
the emerging nations, it did not stop territorial or boundary dispute as it was initially thought. As
Cukwurah, remarks:
It was widely anticipated that the doctrine would do away with boundary dispute
between the new States of Latin America. But, as experience has shown, the facts
confounded people’s expectations as indeed, such disputes occurred159
Thus, in fact, the principle of uti possidetis has merely postponed potential disputes, but not
completely stopped them.160 After decolonization a number of territorial and boundary disputes
have surfaced. According to Bartos, more than 30 boundary disputes, some of which lasted more
than a century, were erupted in Latin America.161 Recognition of a defective colonial border as a
territorial limit binding the new independent States, therefore, may not build a stable boundary.
Though the application of principle of uti possidetis in Africa is arguable, application of
colonial boundaries in Africa has been source of most of interstate conflicts. The founding fathers
of OAU have affirmed to respect pre-independence boundaries with a view to avoid unmanageable
boundary conflicts, as a result of poor delineation of pre-existing boundary, clashes were
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rampant.162 The Cairo resolution of July 1964 was actually reaffirmation of respect to colonial
boundaries.163

Most inter-state African conflicts were one way or the other related to colonial

boundaries.164

Territorial and boundary conflict, in Africa, has been incurable disease that

consumes lives of huge number of Africans and no viable solution yet devised.165
With a view to get relief from actual and presumed boundary conflict, founding fathers of
African Union (OAU) in the Cairo Summit of 1964 decided to honor boundaries existing at the date
of acquiring independence.166 The Cairo Resolution was a response to the on going boundary and
territorial disputes. Morocco was in war with Algeria and Somalia lodged a case against Ethiopia
and Kenya. The dispute between Dahomey and Nigeron, the border dispute between Ghana and
Upper Volta were some of the ongoing territorial and border disputes that the First Ordinary
Summit of OAU had to resolve. The Cairo Resolution thus, was not only preventive but also a kind
of judgment that was meant to solve actual boundary disputes. In this stressing situation, the
Assembly almost unanimously decided to abide by boundaries existed on the date of independence.
Only Morocco and Somalia objected, asserting to redraw boundaries on the basis of cultural, ethnic
and historic basis. Prime Minster of Kenya proposed for a specific and strong continental charter
that explicitly declares the preservation of territorial status quo.167 Emperor Haile Selassie of
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Ethiopia remarked, “ [A]cceptance of colonial boundaries was necessary for Africa’s safety
[….]”168 Incorporating these strong suggestions posed by the prominent founding fathers of the
continental organization and the consideration of ongoing territorial and boundary disputes
culminated at express restatement of sanctity of pre-existing boundaries. Apart from Somalia and
Morocco overwhelming majority adopted the Resolution, but it did not stop territorial or boundary
conflict. Since the adoption of OAU Charter or the Cairo Resolution of 1964, Africans have been
enduing frequent border related wars.
To sum up, though the principle of uti possidetis calmed boundary or territorial conflict in
formative stage of Spanish Latin America republics, in fact it did not resolve territorial or boundary
conflict. During Spanish rule some areas were never been clearly marked due to ignorance of local
geography.169 Vaguely defined boundary was inadequate to govern international relationship. The
porous provincial boundary has not only caused serious conflict, but also frustrated the newly
independent Republics. For example, the incomplete or vaguely defined Bolivia-Chile and BoliviaParaguay border raised the issue of territorial expansion beyond the presumptive border.170 Thus,
even if the principle uti possidetis temporarily suspended a looming territorial conflict, actually it “
[…] did not solve the problem of delimitation, to which it was meant to apply.”171 Commentators
suggest that reliance on the principle of uti possidetis has caused territorial and boundary dispute
more than it initial benefits.172
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3.4.4. The Status of Doctrine of Uti Possidetis in International Law
Even though the principle of uti possidetis, is a Roman law advent, its approach as a
doctrine of determination of international boundary, is a Spanish Latin America formulation. Soon
after decolonization, the new Republics attempted to avoid impending territorial and boundary
conflict by applying the principle of uti possidetis modifying its traditional sense as applied in the
Roman law. The principle of uti possidetis helped the Republics to tackle imminent boundary
conflicts that thought endangered their very survival as independent political entities. With a view
to evade a looming conflict the Republics decided to abide by the pre-existing colonial
administrative divisions as international boundary lines. The principle of uti possidetis has also
shielded the Republics from further colonization through the Spanish colonial law that regarded the
entire territory, be it occupied or unoccupied, as already owned. The principle of uti possidetis was
overwhelmingly accepted by the Republics to govern their territorial relationship. Since its
inception in 19th century, the principle of uti possidetis has attracted international law scholars and
tribunals to resolve a number of boundary disputes.173
Though the principle uti possidetis is one of the oldest and widely invoked to resolve
territorial limits of emerging states, it is still not free from confusion and misconstruction.174
Regarding the scope, relevance and binding nature of the principle of uti possidetis, we have
diverging views among international law scholars and international tribunals, including
International Court of Justice (ICJ). Some scholars and tribunal offer a broader scope to the
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Principle with the intention to apply it in all situations of territorial dispute whenever a territory is
inherited from colonial power.175
Some commentators suggest the application of the Principle in all situations of acquiring
independence including disintegration of States like the former U.S.S.R or Yugoslavia. During
formal disintegration of U.S.S.R, the Heads of State of the Russian Federation, Belarus and
Ukraine, proclaimed a declaration akin to the territorial integrity resolution as enshrined in the
Charter of the African Unity. It stated, “ The High Contracting Parties acknowledge and respect
each others territorial integrity and the inviolability of the existing borders within the common
wealth.”176 This bilateral resolution does not expressly mention the principle of uti possidetis, but
any attempt to import application of the principle of uti possidetis is based on assumption. Suzanne
Lalonde who thorough researched the role of uti possidetis, questions whether the international law
has to relay on a principle when its basis are ‘shaky’ and unsettled to extend application of the
principle to non-colonial situations.177
The Frontier Dispute Case (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali) takes forefront among the
attempts to afford a general scope to the Principle. The Chamber of Frontier Dispute case bids to
expand the contours of the Principle and extends its applicability in all situations wherever
“independence occurs.”178 This appears a “novel” idea, but it goes beyond the imagination of the
original crafters of the principle. As pointed out in Paragraph 20 of the Judgment, ICJ has disclosed
175
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that disputants have agreed their boundary dispute to be resolved in accordance with the “[…]
principle of the intangibility of frontiers inherited from colonization.”179 There is no doubt that
Burkina Faso and Mali, who have inherited territory from common colonial power – France,
empowered the tribunal to decide their dispute in accordance with the pre-existing boundaries that
aligns with the Cairo declaration of July 1964.
The Chamber of Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali) Case has attempted to make the
principle of uti possidetis as a general principle of international law and ultimately to build its
binding nature as customary international law.180 This appears unsubstantiated and unpersuasive
conclusion that may easily be challenged, as the principle of uti possidetis is not a universally
binding norm even in Latin American.
Paragraph 20 of the Frontier Dispute Judgment reveals the chamber’s unsuccessful attempt
to afford a wider global status to the principle uti possidetis. The Chamber concludes:
[…] the Chamber cannot disregard the principle of uti possidetis juris, the application of which
gives rise to this respect for intangibility of frontiers. It emphasizes the general scope of the
Principle in matters of decolonization and its exceptional importance for the African continent,
including the two Parties to this case. Although this principle was invoked for the first time in
Spanish America, it is not a rule pertaining solely to one specific system of international law. It is
a principle of general scope, logically connected with the phenomenon of the obtaining of
independence, wherever it occurs. Its obvious purpose is to prevent the independence and
stability of new States being endangered by fratricidal struggles provoked by the challenging of
frontiers following the withdrawal of the administering power. The fact that the new African
States have respected the territorial status quo which existed when they obtained independence
must therefore be seen not as a mere practice but as the application in Africa of a rule of general
scope which is fairly established in matters of decolonization [….] The principle of uti possidetis
juris accords pre-eminence to legal tide over effective possession as a basis of sovereignty. Its
primary aim is to secure respect for the territorial boundaries which existed at the time when
independent was achieved.”181 (Emphasis added).
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This decision thought to be game changing, as it appears to make the principle of uti
possidetis generally applicable in all situations whenever new States get independence either as a
result of decolonization, or disintegration, no matter what cause triggers the independence. The
expression, “ “It is a principle of general scope, logically connected with the phenomenon of
obtaining of independence, wherever it occurs,”182 reveals the Chambers intended to extend the
scope of the Principle to govern all cases of getting independence irrespective of the cause of
independence and intention of the parties. The Frontiers Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali) Case was
inspired by the Gunine/Guinea Bissau Martime Delimiation Case, in which the arbitration tribunal
has considered the African colonial status quo policy was equivalent to the Latin American
principle of uti possidetis.183 This assumption does not align with the original meaning of the
Principle in Latin America. Whenever boundary dispute surfaces in Spanish America, the
disputants often make express agreement to abide by the principles of uti possidetis.184 Moreover,
the principle of uti possidetis is irrelevant when boundary of neighboring States is defined by
treaty.185

It is, therefore, fallacious to apply the principle of uti possidetis in all cases of

independence or in all situations of boundary conflict in Africa or elsewhere.
The principle of uti possdetis is consensual in nature.186 Baratos in his inspiring article
confirms this view stating, “ The principle has never been applied by a tribunal in the absence of
specific compromise or direction by the disputants to that effect.”187(Emphasis added). The
arbitration tribunal of Dubai-Sharjah Border Arbitration declares that states are in liberty to reject
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determination of case in accordance with principle of uti possidetis and adopt a different
approach.188 The earliest and most cited authority was, the Swiss Federal Council in a Dispute
between Colombia and Venezuela, the contested consented to be bound by the colonial boundary
lines.189 Thus, the principle of uti possidetis cannot step in the litigation, unless parties express their
consent to abide by the principles of uti possidetis. Parties to the Frontier Dispute Case (Burkina
Faso and Mali) never requested the tribunal to decide their dispute in accordance with the principle
of uti possidetis juris. They have requested the tribunal to decide the Case on the basis of the
boundary existing at the time of independence which accords with the Cairo Resolution of July
1964, but ICJ implausibly assumed the demand of the Parties to mean uti possidetis.
Similarly, in Guinea – Guinea-Bissau Maritime Delimitation case, an arbitration tribunal
consisting of three judges of ICJ took a similar stand. The Parties to the case requested their
boundary dispute to be resolved in accordance with 1886 convention of France and Portugal, the
tribunal did not find boundary delimitation in the convention as requested by the Parties and
resorted to the uti possidetis stating it as one of the relevant rule of international law.190
The tribunals in both of the cases went beyond the mandate granted by the Parties. The
Parties of both cases did not take uti possedits as a governing law. In a situation where the parities
never referred to or the African continental organization never formally recognized, why the
tribunals of Frontier Dispute Case or Guinea- Guinea-Bissau Maritime Delimitation Case relied on
the principles of uti possidetis? The founding fathers of African continental organization (OAU) did
not directly import the Latin American principle; rather they have declared a different approach.191
In a situation where the real ‘owners” of the boundary have opted for a different alternative while
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they had a possibility to explicitly state the principle either in the constitutive document or in the
Cairo Resolution, can ICJ make a binding law that changes the Cairo Declaration of 1964? Bartos
strongly disagrees with the assumption stating, “ Equation of the preservation of colonial
boundaries with uti possidetis is “both false and misleading in an African context.192
In Latin America, as has been pinpointed elsewhere, the application of the principle of uti
possidetis juris was legally confined to the former Spanish colonies (Spanish Latin America). Brazil
explicitly disregarded the Principle contending it encompasses rights constructively possessed,
which Brazil views contrary to the original Roman law. To Brazil uti possidetis de facto accords
with Roman law doctrine of uti possidetis, that shields peaceful enjoyment of immovable property
that was actually possessed. Brazil’s motive was to expand its territory into the unoccupied
territories.193 Even some of the new Republics were not consistent enough in applying the principle
of uti possidetis. Susan Lalonde confirms this view stating:
In addition to the various and often conflicting versions of the uti possidetis principle, there was
also inconsistent State practice in the particular version adopted from one treaty to another.194

Moreover, Some Republics disclosed the tendency to recognize actual possession rule contracting
with Brazil. For instance, Peru, Venezuela and Bolivia concluded a treaty with Brazil in accordance
with uti possidetis de facto.195

There also instances in which Latin American Republics set

boundary inconsistent with the principle of uti possidetis.196 The establishment of big union of
States (Central American Republic) was not in line with the Latin American principle of uti
possidetis.

191

Although the Cairo Congress did not expressly state a reason to ignore half a century old doctrine that that was
accepted in Spanish Latin America, century old no clear reason to ignore the principle of uti possidetis in Cairo
192
Bartos supra note 1 at 60.
193
As Lalonde asserts, Brazil by relying on the “[…] de facto version of the principle, […] was able to defend not only
Portuguese expansion during colonial times, but also her own expansion during the post- colonial era.” Lalonde
supra note 93 at 32.
194
Id. at 36
195
Id.

138

In a situation where original architects of the principle not consistently adopted binding role
uti possidetis juris, it appears implausible to confer international sense of obligation by recognizing
the Principle as a universal binding norm thereby extend its role beyond the expectation of the
original designers. Thus, in spite of the fact that the principle of uti possidetis has got some general
recognition in the former Spanish Latin America, “[…] it has no validity in universal international
law.”197 (Emphasis added). As vividly stated in Beagles Channel Case, “[Uti possidetis] is peculiar
to the field of the Spanish –American States whose territories were formerly under the rule of the
Spanish Crown.”198 A quote from Whiteman by Bloomfield in an article regarding Egypt, Israel and
the Gulf of Aqaba regarding status of uti possidetis as follows:
[…] in no case has the International Community recognized [the Principle of Uti Possidetis] as
an institution of international law [….] It remains, just like Bull of Pope Alexander VI wherein
it originates, derogatory to general international law, which insist on occupation as a basis for
sovereignty. A rule derogating to generally accepted customary international law is binding
only on those persons which have, by convention, expressly agreed to it.199

The principle of uti possidetis temporarily shielded the Spanish Latin America Republics from a
destructive territorial and boundary conflict, it did not win universal acceptance even in Latin
America, as there was inconsistence in state practice concerning the application and binding effect
of the norm. The principle did not get constitutional protection, nor clearly stated in treaties. In this
unsettled situation it is too early to regard the principle of uti possidetis as a binding international
norm.
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3.5. The Principle of Territorial Integrity
3.5.1. Obsoleteness of Conquest as Mode of Acquisition of Territory
In contemporary world there is no vacant territory. Thus, occupation as mode of acquisition
of new territory practically obsolete, and before outlawed, the only possible way to expand
territory was conquest. Before use of force as a means of acquiring territory was formally rendered
illegal, conquest was a legitimate mode of acquisition of territory though it could be carried out at
the cost of the actual possessors. In pre-modern era, therefore, conquest became “the law of
necessity” and it was “universally acknowledged.”200 Before coercive use of force was legally
banned, it had been a normal practice to invade a weaker nation in search for more territory with a
view to expand the scope of sovereignty, and in quest for more people that served in the imperial
army.201 Territorial expansion was considered as a way of making wealth202, as prosperity of an
empire was measured by the territorial possession.

It was also viewed as a method of

strengthening security of an empire by pushing external security threat away from the power
center. As a result, protection and acquisition of territory was one of the guiding directives of
foreign policy of medieval States.203
At a time invasion for territorial occupation was a permissible norm, the competition to
acquire more territory generated frequent territorial dispute and war.204 As John Vasquez rightly
remarks, “Of all the issues over which wars could logically be sought, territorial issues seem to be
200
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the ones most often associated with wars.”205 Dispute over territory can easily flare up and
generate destructive war either among the colonial rivalries or a colonial power and indigenous
people who actually hold the territory.206 For instance, until finally settled in the Berlin Conference
of 1884 -1885, powerful nations had competed among themselves to occupy African territories.207
Art. 34 of the Berlin Act required colonial powers to report their occupation of African territory
and Art. 35 the Act demanded effective occupation in order to avoid war among the colonizers for
reoccupation.208
3.5.2. Emergence of the Principle of Territorial Integrity
At the end of 19th century, most precisely in early 20th century after the end of WWI, the
traditional conception and practice of conquest as a legitimate means of territorial expansion was
steadily diminished and virtually substituted by the principle of territorial integrity norm.209 The
principle of territorial integrity is one of the core principles of international law that was evolved
as a solution to avoid frequent territorial expansion wars. Thus, it is a “[…] positive norm of a
paramount importance in the contemporary international society.”210 The principle of territorial
integrity norm prohibits use of force for territorial expansion.211 Simply put, the principle of
territorial integrity prohibits compulsory dismemberment of a territory or impairment of state
sovereignty or intervention in domestic affairs of a given state.212 It was based on the objectives of
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the 19th century nationalist movement that advocated for respect to sovereignty of state and
sanctity of territory. According to this movement “ […] a territory belonged to the national
grouping and it was wrong to take the land from a nation.”213 It was viewed that the French
Revolution has spurred the nationalist movement in its bid for abolition of conquest as a means for
territorial expansion. The Movement was also supported by the Napoleon’s stand for selfdetermination.214 The principle of territorial integrity requires all States to respect territorial
integrity of fellow State and not to encroach an occupied territory, either directly or indirectly.
Thus, the principle of territorial integrity is based on a rule that an already occupied territory
cannot be reoccupied by force, thereby ending the legitimacy of conquest as a norm of territorial
acquisition.
The principle of territorial integrity has got legal recognition and “formal support” since the
end of WWI.215 Art. 10 of the Covenant of League of Nations specifically declares the duty of
member States to respect territorial integrity of another State as follows:
The member of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression
the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League. In
case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council
shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled. 216

Art. 10 of the Covenant of League of Nations was a product of W.W.I. It was a provision
proving, “formal support for the territorial integrity norm.”217 It was designed to discourage
conquest for territorial expansion. Historically, as Graham states, the duty to respect territorial
integrity was not a novel creation of the Covenant.218 Graham remarks, “The passive aspect of this
territorial guarantee ‘to respect” was no departure from the existing practice under the international
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law in 1919.”219 It may be rightly argued that since the Westphalian stipulation, international law
has firm stand for respect for a defined territory. The motive of Westphalian congress was to avoid
war by setting a clearly defined territory and inviolability of State sovereignty.
In this respect Graham was right, but the Westphalian stipulation did not deter territorial
invasion. Since then the world has experienced numerous wars that aimed at territorial expansion.
Graham in his seminal article, however, did not deny the novel contribution of Art. 10 of the
Covenant of League of Nations. The Covenant for the first time declared the duty of member States
to “preserve” territorial integrity. Graham states the duty to “preserve” existing territory of member
States as “[…] a new obligation previously unrecognized and implied a potential coercive duty as a
consequence of the new order.”220
The League of Nations attempted to discourage conquest by requiring member States to
settle disputes peacefully.221 Though the Covenant has made a great contribution, at least, by
formalizing the legality of the principle of territorial integrity, in effect, the League failed to stop
violations and territorial invasions.222 Two major aggressions by member states against another
member states often cited for the ultimate demise of the League. After 10 years of membership of
League of Nations, Italy invaded Ethiopia, a member of League of Nation, and Japan invaded
Manchuria.223 In the former case, the then Ethiopia’s king, Emperor Haile Selassie appealed against
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Italian invasion in person, but the League could not stop the invasion. In defiance of Italy to stop
the invasion, the League in accordance with Art. 16 of the Covenant, imposed sanction on both
States that mainly harmed Ethiopia. The League prohibited sale of arms to both nations. The
sanction had little impact on Italy as a maker of arms, but it had crippled Ethiopia, which totally
relied on import.
Surprisingly, contrary to Art. 10 of the Covenant, the League advised Ethiopia to surrender
certain border territories to Italy as a consideration to stop the invasion. Italy, however, refused to
comply with the advice longing to occupy the whole Ethiopia – not simply annex border territories.
With the help of superior arm and highly trained military personnel, and use prohibited poisonous
gas, Italy occupied the whole nation until driven out after 5 years of the occupation. The League
was not only powerless, but also slow in responding to territorial invasion. For instance, after Japan
invaded Manchuria, it took the Council of League a year respond to the request by the victim to
avert the situation. After twelve months of lodging of petition, the Council visited Manchuria but
could not stop the invasion as it simply sought Japan to leave the invaded territory. Weak response
of the League, supposedly, motivated Japan to invade more territory. Ultimately both Japan and
Italy left the League. Subsequently, Germany disclosed an extensive aggressive behavior and
invaded more territories under the leadership of Hitler.224
Though the principle of territorial integrity had already got international legal recognition,
signatories of the Covenant of League of Nations were not actually committed to respect binding
provisions. Expansionist ambition never stopped. Very few African States were members of League
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of Nations.225 In actual fact there was no difference in being member or non-member as the League
was not effective in discharging its goals. Powerful nations were not really committed to abide by
the Covenant. This had rendered weaker nations, like Ethiopia to lose hope. The League was unable
to maintain global peace and security. It practically failed to control widespread violations of
territorial integrity and political independence. As a result, at the end of WWII a new relatively
effective global organization, the United Nations, constituted thereby ending League of Nations.
3.5.3. The Principle of Territorial Integrity Norm after WWII
The end of WW II has heralded multifaceted socio-economic, and political changes. Most
importantly, the global political system has been restructured.226 As Stuart Elden attests, with a final
goal of maintaining global peace, preservation of existing boundaries was one of the core tenets of
this structure.227 The weak League of Nations was dissolved and a “progressive” global umbrella
organization, the United Nations, was constituted. The most important mission of United Nations is
maintaining global peace. As United Nations may be viewed as the product of WWII, it is not an
exaggeration to say that it was an organization meant to keep global peace. Peacekeeping mission
of the United Nations can be observed from the very first line of the preamble. It states, “ WE THE
PEOPLES OF UNITED NANTIONS DETERMINED to save succeeding generation form he
scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind.”228
In reorganizing the global organization, world leaders have determined to build unshakable
global peace, and thereby avoid another world war. Tolerance of member States of United Nations,
peaceful coexistence, fostering to unit, and strength maintenance international peace and security,
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development of good neighborhood are among the principles that are enshrined in the United
Nations Charter.229 As a modality of keeping peace and security the Charter strictly prohibits use of
force for any motive save self-defense.230 The act of self - defense may be carried out by the victim,
or collective action may taken to avert an aggression.231
It has been repeatedly pointed out that border issues can easily and quickly generate armed
confrontation and spoil global peace. With a view to avoid use of war to resolve border conflict or
territorial dispute, the charter has reaffirmed territorial integrity of member States as one of the
important tenets for maintenance of global peace and friendly relationship. Art. 2 (4) of the Charter
in this case is vital. It declares, “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”232 Use of force for the
purposes of territorial expansion or redrawing boundary, thus ipso facto, illegal. A State having
territorial or border issue has to resort peaceful dispute resolution method. Any attempt to force a
neighboring State surrender an illusive territory or border is illegal and, in principle, can trigger
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collective action.233 “The principle of territorial integrity is considered as one of the primary means
in achieving and maintaining international security and stability in the world.”234
The principle of territorial integrity norm has been strictly enforced since Second World
War.235 The only exceptions were temporary acquisition of sovereignty of former colonies of Italy,
Germany and Japan by the allied forces, and Soviet Union’s annexation of Baltic States. While the
former was temporary until colonies got ready for independence, the latter States retained under the
federation of U.S.S.R until Soviet Union finally disintegrated.236 Despite Soviet Union’s actions of
traditional practice of taking sovereignty of territories of loser of war, almost all the founding
members of United Nations have accepted the sanctity of territorial integrity norm.237 Since then the
Principle of territorial integrity has become “[…] one of the cornerstones of the U.N. Charter
system and the post-Second World War international legal order.”238
Following the Charter, several international agencies and movements, either under the
auspicious of United Nations or regional organizations, have acknowledged the need to preserve
existing territorial limit and the need to keep them whether they are good or bad with the goal of
maintaining international peace and security. The 1960 United Nations Declaration accordingly
states, “ Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity or territorial
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integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations.”239
In 1970 United Nations further clarified how to effectuate the decolonization process while
maintaining territorial integrity. It is clearly pointed out in Clause 5(6) of the Declaration of
Principles of International Law that territories of colonies and other self governing entities was
separate from territories of colonial powers240 Thus, self-determination of a colony cannot be
viewed as an act distracting the preservation of territorial integrity, as colonies were allowed to
declare their independence within the bounds of their own territories. But ethnic groups were not
entitled for the unreserved declaration of independence.241 In Africa, for instance, most colonial
boundaries were arbitrary and ethnic groups were split into several colonial powers; granting
independence to ethnic groups would obviously disrupt territorial integrity thereby generating
unmanageable territorial and boundary conflict.
The 1970 Declaration of Principles of International Law, and Friendly Relations and
Cooperation among States has further strengthened the sanctity of existing territories. The
Declaration reaffirms that territorial integrity norm has reached the level of customary international
law.
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territorial integrity of any state.243 The Principle of Territorial Integrity also endorsed by some
regional organizations. The Charter of the Arab League of 1945 and the Charter of Organization of
American States 1948 acknowledged the sanctity of territorial integrity of member States.244
Similarly, the 1963 Charter of Organization of African Unity (OAU) and subsequent 1964 Cairo
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Declaration approved the principle of territorial integrity.245 The Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) reaffirmed the territorial integrity. The present Europe also
acclaimed the respect to territorial integrity by the Paris Charter of 1990 and by the Dayton Peace
Treaty.246
Now it appears almost settled, that the existing territories should not be disrupted or
disintegrated, as the preservations of inherited territories for the maintenance of international peace
and security. Thus the only available legal option to redefine international boundary is peaceful
means; use of force to redraw boundary is strictly prohibited and contrary to the United Nations
Charter.247 The strong and sensitive statements of founding fathers of OAU reveal this fact. Elden
pinpoints remarks of Michael Walzerin as follows:
Although boundaries may be arbitrary, rooted in history and subject to the politics that condition
the making of maps, they are the grid that create a “habitable world.’ State sovereignty generally
provides a measure of protection within those borders. While [ Michael Walzer] recognizes that
adjustments may be necessary, in a most cases borders should be preserved. In deed, if ‘an
invasion has been threatened or has actually begun, it may be necessary to defend a bad border
simply because there is no other.’248

Thus, the existing international law favors stability and integrity of territory. It is plausible that
keeping territories stable and intact makes immense contribution for stability of international peace
and international solidarity. By implication, as territorial limits are identified by their borders, the
existing international borders, should remain undisturbed. That is why most nations chose to honor
existing boundaries, despite their elusiveness or arbitrary nature.
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3.5.4. The Principle of Territorial Integrity and Self-determination
In this Section we will briefly look at the relationship between self-determination in noncolonial situation and implications of the principle of territorial integrity norm. The question is
whether ethnic groups or an administrative region of a given nation can exercise self-determination
or the principle of territorial integrity bars the right of self-determination outside colonial setting.
The right of self-determination is a universal right.249 As clearly stated in international
human rights covenants, “All peoples have the right of self-determination.”
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Thus, as a rule all

people can exercise the right of self-determination. On the other hand, the principle of territorial
integrity requires territory of a given nation to remain in tact. Thus, the two principles are
apparently contradictory.251 Therefore, an inquisitive mind may fairly question how to reconcile this
apparently conflicting situation.
In non-colonial sense the principle of self-determination applies to internal self-governance
of ethnic or territorial units of a given nation.252 This stand is well clarified by the Declaration of
International Law, which reaffirms both territorial integrity norm and the principle of selfdetermination. Clause six of the Declaration is very pertinent in this regard. It states:
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action
which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unit of
sovereign and independent States conducing themselves in compliance with the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a government
representing the whole people belonging of the territory without distinction as to race, creed or
colour.253
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As mentioned in the purpose clauses Art. I(2) and Art. 55 of the United Nations Charter and
international covenants, the principle of self-determination is peoples’ right – it is about “equal
right and self-determination of people.”254 It is not dismemberment or interference in domestic
affairs of a nation. If the right of self-determination is invoked to dismember a territory, then it will
turn to be secession, which will be briefly discussed later. Self-determination, therefore, need not be
secession. In non-secession context, the principle of self-determination affords autonomy to selfadminister an administrative unit of a State.255 As Vidmar lucidly remarks:
[The principle of territorial integrity] “limits peoples’ right of self-determination, so the
elaboration reflects the doctrine that outside of colonialism, the right of peoples to self
determination will be normally consummated internally within the international borders of the
parent State and thus will not result in a new State. 256

Though the principle of self-determination may appear to include secession or
dismemberment, close assessment of the rule reveals that the right of self-determination is
independent of secession or dismemberment. It is simply the right of people, nations and
nationalities for self- governance, which does not affect territorial integrity. Secession or
dismemberment obviously affects territorial integrity, as both actions result in disintegration of
territory.
3.5.5. The Principle of Territorial Integrity and Secession
Secession results in dismemberment of territory and hence, affects territorial integrity of a
given State, and post-colonial practice reveals that in the case of unilateral secession, the claim for
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territorial integrity is “prima facie applicable.”257 So is it permissible to unilaterally secede while a
parent State objects? If so, what international law authority supports it? This question often asked
than answered. Prevailing authorities simply support the sanctity of territorial integrity and prohibit
dismemberment of existing territories, but in realty we know new state emerge by secession. For
instance, the world’s newest nation, the Republic of South Sudan has declared its independence in
2011 after more than 30 years of armed struggle, and Eritrea split from Ethiopia in 1993 after
fighting one of the longest civil war in Africa during cold war era.
With regard to unilateral secession, international law appears neutral. In normal course of
things, international law does not acknowledge nor explicitly prohibit unilateral secession.258 Once
a new State acquires independence without a counterclaim by the parent State or the parent State so
consents to the secession by waiving its right to claim the principle of territorial integrity,
international law acknowledges the new State. But where a parent State makes the claim of
territorial integrity, international law never affords recognition, unless the situation falls in one of
the strict exception. For instance, de facto independent States like Somaliland, Taiwan are not
independent States; as their respective parent States make territorial integrity claim. However, in
very limited instances exceptionally, Security Council may disregard the counterclaim for territorial
integrity and confer independent existence of a new secede State.259 For instance, where the parent
State makes explicit discrimination or causes grave human rights violation in a territory demanding
unilateral secession, the claim for territorial integrity may be disregarded.
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As Marc Waller argues in Kosovo Advisory opinion, unilateral secession may bestow
statehood, if and only if the new State is conferred with “legal authority.”260 It is an authority that
may be granted either by the parent State or collectively by international community including
Security Council for just cause.261 A parent State may expressly or impliedly consent to the
secession. In the case of session of Eritrea, for example, Ethiopia was the first country to recognize
Eritrea as an independent State just after the people Eritrea opted for secession by U.N sponsored
referendum. Recognition by Ethiopia was waiver of the claim for territorial integrity thereby
created legal authority for the creation of State of Eritrea. Almost an identical procedure was in
secession of South Sudan. Legal authority may also be created by constitutional process. For
example, the current Ethiopian Constitution legalizes secession if certain procedural requirements
stipulated in the Constitution are met.262 A constituent State of the Federal Democratic Republic of
Ethiopia can get an unchallenged statehood by the authority of the FDRE Constitution.
As pointed out above, in very exceptional cases, as a result of grave human right violation
and injustice, the Security Council may act under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to
confer legal authority that may enable secession in rare cases. This situation may surface if
collective action is taken under the auspicious of Security Council. Where Security Council
confirms unstoppable and widespread human rights violation against a specific category of nation
by mother nation, or grave discrimination that cannot be averted and thought to destabilize the State
and affect international peace and security, may grant legal authority. Similarly wide spread
recognition may confer statehood. Say for example, if almost all State recognize State hood of
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Somaliland, and if there is no way for Somalia to avert the situation through claim of territorial
integrity, Somali Land may be conferred legal authority to secede.
3.6. Stages of International Boundary Making
International boundary making involves some basic stages. The stages are commonly
adhered though strict adherence is not a legal requirement, or not a necessary step that need to be
strictly. However, the stages naturally involve in international boundary making. For instance, the
territory to be separated by a boundary line should be determined; then the criteria for the actual
separation should be set. The size, width, length, the method of delineation is supposed to be
expressed in the boundary making treaty. The territory then will be apportioned in accordance with
the pre-determined rule. Each part of territory will be described in a way it is possible to
specifically distinguish from the other portion of territory. On the basis of the description, and
accompanying map, boundary markers will be emplaced on the actual point of separation (the
boundary line). Boundary markers may be pillars, monuments, posts or beacons that signal the end
of territory of a given State and the beginning of another. These are normal procedures that
naturally involve in the international land boundary making.
The stages of international boundary making termed until finally settled with clearly
articulated expressions. For instance, in Argentine-Chile case of 1902 Edward VII captioned the
stages as definition, delineation and fixation.263 Definition holds the initial stage of boundary
making, including agreement on the territory to be partitioned, deliberation on areas to be
apportioned, the extent of the division and the part to be ceded to or given to a neighboring State.
The stage of definition is too general, which may not specifically locate a given boundary line. The
263
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next step, delineation, is description of each part of territory including maps. Fixation is the last
stage in which visible signs will be planted on the actual point of separation. In 1902 Sir Thomas
Holdich termed the last stage of boundary making (fixation) as “actual demarcation”.264 Lord
Cruzon in his 1907 lecture describes the second stage of boundary making (known as delineation at
the time), as a work of diplomats that require the art of diplomacy, whereas, the last stage (fixation
at the time), as a mechanical process.265 It is a mechanical process because it is a stage of
implementation of deliberations of political authorities that is already described in the boundarymaking document. At this stage, boundary engineers will build pillars signaling the end of one’s
boundary and the beginning of another.
French International Jurist, Paul de Lepadelle, however, chose other captions denoting
international boundary making. To Lpadelle, boundary making involves three important stages:
preparation, decision and execution.266 Apart from variation in caption, in essence all
classifications of boundary making stages are similar.
In the middle of 20th century Stephen Jones came up with the expressions that clearly reveal
practical functions of stages of boundary making which has got universal acceptance. Jones in his
notorious book entitled, “Boundary-Making A Handbook for Treaty Editors and Boundary
Commissioners) illuminates four stages of boundary making: allocation, delimitation, demarcation
and maintenance.267 Allocation is a political decision to divide a given territory among two or more
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contending States. The next stage of boundary making is a stage of precise delineation of the
allocated territory. It is known as delimitation. 268
Delimitation can be effected in numerous ways and by different organs depending up on the
nature of the contest relationship between contending States. It may be stipulated by treaty,
resolutions or minutes of political decision makers, resolution of international organizations like
Security Council, UN General Assembly or regional organizations, court decision or arbitral award
and so forth that can effectively determine territorial limits of two or more states. The next most
important step in international boundary making is demarcation. It is generally viewed as the last
stage in boundary making, as it finalizes the most important aspect of boundary making by
emplacing boundary signs at the actual boundary point, in accordance with the act that has created
the boundary. Maintenance is routine administration and periodic inspection of the boundary. It is
“maintenance of the boundary makers […] as long as the relevant boundary lines run.”269
Delimitation is more specific phase when compared to allocation but less precise when compared to
demarcation. 270
These historical classifications of phases still dominate boundary-making literature. As
pointed out above, the stages of boundary making may not necessarily be strictly followed step by
step in each case. In some cases some phases may be merged together, or in other cases it may be
overlapped or delayed for centuries.271 For instance, allocation and delimitation may be decided in
the same forum, as both steps may be decided simultaneously.272 Allocation may also take place by
a unilateral action of one or more of parties and the other party may simply acquiesce by conduct or
268
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expressly approve the stand of the contending party to take a given portion of territory before a
precise scope is delineated. Thus, where the boundary is allocated for whatever reason before the
formal delimitation, there is no need for reallocation, unless the parties involved disagree with the
action of another.
The stages of boundary making may also vary depending upon the situation. Though the
timing at which the parties involved, or the prevailing scenario on the ground may vary, each
boundary making process involves some common phases. In some case parties may have involved
in violent confrontation and either attempting to end the ongoing war or simply attempt to take
time, tactically to prepare for a bigger war, or genuinely negotiate to end confrontation. The forum
of negotiation may be bilateral, or mediated by third party, or it may be arbitration tribunal or
International Court of Justice, which exercises a formal judicial process.
Execution of each phase demands resources and knowhow – expertise.273 Some times a
political will or a motive may determine the actual process of boundary making. Depending upon
urgency, after dealing with some pressing issues, states my keep a given phase for later
consideration until financial or technical preconditions are met. In some cases demarcation may be
delayed for centuries, unless there is a pressing issue for immediate actual demarcation. The nature
of territory and its economic value may determine the moment of demarcation. Needless to say, if
the territory is economically important and involves high cross boundary contact, states may be
motivated to demarcate the border as soon as possible. On the contrary states may not prioritize
demarcation of a barren land to other pressing issues. States may opt to use meager resources for
necessities of life thereby reserving demarcation of unimportant land for some time in the future.
Political, administrative, economic, technical considerations may therefore play a role in deciding a
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moment in which a delimited territory has to be demarcated. Thus, depending upon the variables,
after delimitation on paper, the boundary may remain unmarked for a long period of time.
This Section highlights each of these phases with a view to appreciate the legal, socio
cultural and economic problems that may arise as a result of poor boundary making. International
boundary making process, technically, starts with allocation or division of territory among
contesting political organs. After a successful allocation, the next step is defining each point or
negotiating on exact lines of separation. After an agreement reached on the specific points of
separation then the actual boundary will be marked on the ground. The later stages are more of
boundary management that may be done routinely. Some of the important steps are briefly
summarized below.
3.6.1. Allocation
The first step in boundary making is to allocate a territory among the contesting parties.
“Allocation is the initial political division of territory between two states.”274 Stephen Jones limits
the number of parties to which a territory to be allocated into two, but in some cases a territory may
be allocated among numerous States; there is no reason to limit the number of parties into two. It is
not the number of beneficiaries of allocation that matters, but its meaning and nature. As pinpointed
above, allocation is a political decision or an agreement authorizing a given state/states to legally
possess a certain part of territory that will be specifically described under the stage of delimitation.
For instance, Italy and Ethiopia agreed that the Kunama ethnic group (borderland residents in the
north west of Ethiopia) was on Eritrean side. This is a general agreement because an exact limit of
the territory that belonged to Kunama was not specifically described, even it was not actually
known at the time of the allocation. The “contractants” agreed to deal with the actual specification
of an exact limit of territories of Kunama later on.
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In colonial times, territories were allocated among the European superpowers. Most of
African territories were allocated among the colonial powers in the Berlin Conference. This process
was continued even after WWI. For example, Great Britain and France agreed the former Levant
(Syria and Lebanon) to be allocated to France and Palestine to Great Britain.275
A territory may be allocated to contending parties as a temporary relief on going conflict.
First, allocating a territory by referring to indigenous communities like Kunama, as pointed out
above. This is known as allocation referring to the “general inherent boundary”.276 In this case, the
parties refer to a boundary separating tribes, villages or watersheds. The very purpose of this kind
of clearly unsettled or precisely undefined distribution of territory is a temporary measure that
would avoid dispute by giving some relief to the parties until a clear boundary is set.
Parties may also refer to a previously known administrative boundary.277 The previous
administrative boundary may not necessarily be precisely delineated, but it can serve as a temporary
solution until a joint boundary commission or any other designated organ makes a final and clear
delineation. In some cases, allocation may be simply recognition of sovereignty of a given political
organ. Allocation, however, is not identical to recognition of a state by another political entity
having no territorial link. A State negotiating with another State to get a given portion or part of
territory may be a constituent part of a bigger State. For instance, former U.S.S.R member States or
a state from which a given constituent political organ was seceded can recognize territorial holding
of the parted State. After collapse of the U.S.S.R most former members have recognized the
independence of another State before dealing with the actual boundary that has clearly divided
them. For example, “Ukraine has signed bilateral and multilateral agreements with all of its
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neighbours that recognize sovereignty over their respective territories and the inviolability of
boundaries that defined them at independence.”278 Parties may also use geometrical method at
distant location without having topographic view or actual holders of the territory. This was the
method applied in Berlin Conference during partition of Africa. In a situation where geographic or
human realties were not known, the only method was using meridian and parallel lines. Eastern
Sector of Ethio-Eritrean boundary was delimited by mathematical system of boundary making.
This method is also known as astronomical method.279 This method may appear the actual
delimitation but it has an element of allocation too.
Allocation is a procedure of boundary making that is often done at a time where no clear
knowledge about the geographic or human realties on the ground is available. It is a temporary
solution, but effective use of some available information would make delimitation quicker and
easier. Needless to say, an ambiguous allocation would result in a messy delimitation that would
plant an unmanageable conflict like the one Africa has been enduring. The decision to allocate a
territory may not necessarily specify every aspect of boundary points but it should address all the
possible issue that may halt delimitation. The political decision “ […] should better address the
problems that are likely to emerge in the later stage of delimitation or demarcation.”280 Thus, the
quality and efficacy of demarcation depends upon clarity and preciseness of allocation. Jones
remarks, “ If territorial allocation has been unwise, the utmost nicety of treaty phrasing or surveying
will not make a stable boundary.”281 On the same token, a well-allocated boundary should also be
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specified in the treaty or other forms of delimitation precisely; otherwise, demarcation would be
impossible or conflict may arise during demarcation.282
3.6.2. Delimitation
3.6.2.1. Meaning and Nature
Delimitation is a legal process in which two or more sovereign nations “establish and
describe” the location of their common border.283 McMahon, the first person to coin the notion of
“delimitation” defines it as, “…the definition on paper either in words or on a map of the limits of a
country.”284 To Professor Cukwurah, delimitation is “ […] a diplomatic procedure, the business of
treaty makers, who should decide on the trustworthy evidence the line which will be acceptable to
both high contracting parties.”285 Stephen Jones illuminates delimitation as, “… the choice of a
boundary site and its definition in a treaty or other formal document.”286 Other formal documents
include judicial decisions, arbitral award, or compromise in which boundary dispute is resolved.287
Thus, delimitation is a process in which an exact specification of the scope of boundary is
stated. The extent of boundary description or specification may vary with the level of development
and technological progress. Each separating point will be pinpointed in a way it is possible to
emplace boundary makers on the borderline. Delimitation, therefore, services as a blueprint that
guides the actual boundary making. As preparatory stage for the actual boundary making,
“Delimitation covers […] all the preliminary processes and procedures involved before a boundary
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is laid down on the ground [….]”288 Thus, all acts and procedure that involve in boundary making
before the stage of demarcation commences is viewed as delimitation.
It has been pointed out that delimitation is a description of supposed boundary. As a
procedure leveling ground for erection of boundary markers, delimitation should be clear enough
specifying all the boundary points in consideration of local geographic and human factors. The
question then is how to gauge the clarity? The bottom-line for delimitation is its unambiguous
guidance to set an actual boundary line on the ground at the demarcation phase. It is not only the
clarity that matters, but as Professor Cukwurah points out, delimitation should be acceptable to all
involved.289 This aspect makes the work of delimitation hard, as it is not possible to win consensus
of all involved in the boundary making. To settle issues that may arise during delimitation,
compromise appears mandatory; otherwise, peace cannot prevail in the region.
The clarity of delimitation, therefore, depends upon its quality to ease the demarcation
process. Boundary engineers can easily understand a clear delimitation that coincides with the
border facts to erect boundary markers. The demarcators will be able to build pillars or other forms
of boundary signs just by reading or observing the delimitation without the need for further
clarification or negotiation. The engineers or other experts may not necessarily be people who took
part in the delimitation negotiation to have personal knowledge of the geographic or human realties
on the actual boundary. They will be guided only by the statements and figures stated in the
delimitation.
3.6.2.2. The Need to Know Geographic and Human Situation
To make an acceptable borderline, treaty makers should know the nature of borderland. As
Stephen Jones rightly remarks, “[…] a boundary is not an idea, nor a paragraph in a treaty, nor a
288
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line on a map, but a functional feature of the face of the earth.”290 Boundary making, therefore,
involves a hybrid process. It is a mix of multifaceted facts and factors such as historical facts,
political and economic considerations, and demographic factors.291 Needless to say, delimiters
should have a clear understanding of all of these complex realities on the ground.292 Therefore,
actual field visit and observation appears a necessary requirement that need to be carried out before
actual commencement of delimitation. Stephen Jones, thus, rightly remarks, “The best definition or
description of a boundary is that based on personal knowledge of the area in question [….]”293
(Emphasis added). Put simply, before attempting to delimit a borderline, there should be a complete
field study of bordered regions.
A mistake in one stage of boundary making may hamper execution of the other stage. It may
also lead into friction and stale the whole process or may even lead into war. The best approach to
avoid or reduce mistake is to have personal knowledge of the borderland facts or gathering
information from all possible sources if delimiters cannot personally visit the borderland.294
Participation of all relevant organs in boundary making would also reduce the possibility of
mistake. Numerous people, with diverse expertise and political commitment, may take part in the
delimitation process. Diplomats/ politicians, lawyers, surveyors, civil engineers, are among the
persons that may be chosen to describe (delimit) an exact boundary line. As International
Federation of Surveyors suggests, “[S]ince the precision of the delimitation process is very
important, in order to avoid problems during the demarcation on the ground, the participation of
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practical experts, who are capable of anticipating the practical problem of demarcation, is
essential.”295
International Federation of Surveyors, suggest the need to form a joint team of experts who
may reconnaissance border situation before carrying out delimitation. The team will analyze facts
on the ground in light of demand of States to be separated by a boundary line. The team will regard
historical facts, natural features and impact on the borderland residents. Investigation of facts on the
ground may include studying and interviewing borderland community and their wishes. The team
will also consider the actual evil of the prevailing boundary ( dejure or defacto). The team “
[…should be assigned to the task of defining and preparing all the necessary professional data and
tools for the boundary annex, of the treaty including defining the wording and the graphical
expression of the delimitation which will be incorporated in the Treaty.”296 Despite paramount
contribution of expert team that may ease the whole task of delimitation and shorten the time to
complete border making, in a hostile environment that may be backed by multifaceted motives (like
a situation border issue is simply a bargaining leverage, like Ethio-Eritrea border case), it is almost
impossible to constitute a team of experts.
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Constitution of expert team will not only facilitate

boundary making, it will formulate an acceptable borderline.
If delimitation carried out without assistance of experts and in disregard of local situation, it
may not be implementable – or would be extremely be hard to implement, if not impossible at all.
According to Stephen Jones, “ It is highly desirable that no boundary be defined irrevocable in a
treaty until a technical adviser experienced in boundary problems has been consulted upon the
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choice of the site and the working of the definition.”

298

This reconnaissance need not consume

much time but may prevent delimitation of unsuitable lines and reveal inaccuracies on maps.
Eritrea and Ethiopia border delineation best explains ambiguous boundary delimitation. .
During colonial time, the Ethio-Eritrean boundary was delimited in the treaty of Addis Ababa,
which was far away from the boundary area. It was very hard for the Ethiopian King who was not
from Tigrai Region to know an exact boundary line. Given the absence of quick communication or
modern transportation facility that would enable Ethiopian negotiators and experts to contact border
people, it is incomprehensible to admit that facts in the border were known.299 Presumably, as a
result of unfamiliarity of the border regions, serious errors have been made which referred a
boundary point to a non-existent river (Muna/ Berbero Gedo) or a confusing river that was referred
several times in the map ( maiteb, maiten, Meeteb or Maeten, Belesa A, B, C), that confused EEBC
to draw an acceptable boundary and stuck the whole process of boundary making. The delimitation
decision by the Eritrea/Ethiopia Boundary Commission has been unacceptable to the border
residents, especially Irob people.300 As Stephen Jones attests, delimiters may commit a grave
mistake if they are not familiar with the boundary, unfamiliarity with geographic and human facts
or lack of knowledge of defining boundary.301
To be familiar with the boundary in question one has to visit the borderland and observe
facts on the ground. This method may, however, be impossible due to several contingencies. As
physical visit is the best choice, members of the boundary commission should exert utmost effort to
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visit the actual boundary. It is true that physical visit by high-ranking political personalities may
not be possible, but authorities may delegate experts who can relay them documented facts on the
ground. An actual physical visitation and reconnaissance of the borderland reality will consume
much time but will save a lot during the delimitation stage and avoid errors and consequential
confusion and conflict. Ariel photograph and satellite picture can be used, but may not effectively
substitute an actual physical observation. In a situation where it is absolutely impossible for
physical observation, the aerial photograph or satellite image may be the only option.302
3.6.2.3. Methods of Delimitation
Jones has provided numerous options for defining boundary.303 The first method is complete
definition. In this case, the whole boundary line will be defined. This kind of delimitation makes
demarcation easier as each point of boundary will be clearly spelled out. A boundary commission
or other experts may opt to define boundary with the possibility to deviate. This means, delimiters
may expressly authorize demarcators to deviate from the terms of delimitation in case of unforeseen
situation that may not coincide with the terms of delimitation surfaces. One scenario may be human
relationship like the situation of native border people. A treaty entered between Estonia and Latvia
best illustrates this point. The treaty had authorized the Boundary Commission to make certain
adjustments in consultation with the Parties to introduce changes to accommodate local facts, for
example to “ […] reunite farms which had been divided by the Arbitrators, and to make most
reasonable use of the channels of communication.”304 The treaty may restrict the Boundary
Commissions power to adjust by using words like “slight” or “minor”305 or the treaty may express
302
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the extent of deviation that the demarctors may go. It may be in terms of length. Costa Rica and
Nicaragua, for example, authorized the Commission to depart up to one mile from the line drawn in
the treaty.306
Delimitation may also be made in terms of turning points. This is the most common method
of delimiting an exact scope of the boundary. The boundary point may be located by latitude and
longitude (geographic coordinates). For efficacy of delimitation by turning points, the points should
be clear enough so that a straight line to be drawn without any deviation. In some cases, a clear
turning point may not be available. If the points were at a known place, the name of the place may
also be used.307 It may be hard for the demarcators if the turning point cannot be found. This
situation happened in Somaliland-Ethiopia border.308 It would have been easier, had the delimitors
used the name of the place at which the turning/boundary point was located.
A zone may be defined as a point of demarcation in the delimitation. This method, however,
is not advisable unless the two neighboring States have a reliable and strong friendship.309
Similarly, a boundary may be delimited by referring to natural features of land. This is the most
common method of delineation in old days. In medieval times it was common to delimit boundary
by referring to natural features of land. Mountains, rivers, lakes, oceans, are the prominent natural
features that were commonly used as points of division of territories of two or more states.310 Land
holding of a given ethnic group had also been used as the end of territory of a given states. When
delineating the Ethiopia and colonial Eritrea territory, Ethiopia and Italy agreed the Western Sector
of the boundary to be territorial limit of Kunama ethnic group. Delimiting by the location of
mountain, forest and desert is also elusive as an exact diving line can be doubtful. The very purpose
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of boundary setting is to avoid possible territorial dispute, but is an elusive delimitation is not
helpful to locate the actual boundary and dispute may arise.
As rivers cover a longest distance of boundary often used as point of separation of two ore
more states. It may be used on assumption of clarity or for defensive purposes.311 The colonial
boundary treaties that were concluded between Ethiopia and Eritrea referred to rivers. If the river is
not big enough, it may dry up or its name may vary from one locality to the other and create
confusion during demarcation. Before delimiting borderline, by referring to river, a thorough study
of nature and common naming is helpful. Delimiting by referring to river nowadays is almost
settled. The actual boundary depends upon the kind of river. In non-navigable river, in absence of
contrary agreement, an exact boundary is exactly the middle of the river, whereas in the case of
navigable river, an exact of point of separation of two states is thalweg.312
Thus, delimitation by natural features of land often causes trouble.313 Maps drawn on the
basis of natural features of land may be inaccurate, and indequate map may cause conflict during
demarcation. This situation exactly happened in the Western and Central Sectors of Ethiopia Eritrea border. The 1900 colonial treaty mentioned three rivers: Belesa, Muna and Mereb as
boundary rivers separating Eritrean and Ethiopian land, but the river Muna was not known in Irob
districts and could not be found. As result a huge mistake that may split Irob indigenous people and
permanently change their lives was committed. The Irob people have been fighting to convince the
Ethiopian Government to ignore the decision of Eritrea/Ethiopia Boundary Commission. This and
other similar issues have practically staled the demarcation process.
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A boundary may also be defined in principle. It is a flexible form of delimitation. Boundary
makers depending upon the prevailing circumstance may adjust boundary with a view to reduce
rigidity. Delimitation in principle, thus, is not a comprehensive and fixed type of definition.
Delimiters authorize demarcators to consider geographic and human factors into account. This kind
of delimitation is based on fairness. It is a form creating boundary line by considering the need and
interest bordered people. For instance, Boundary Commission may ignore a borderline that may
split closely related indigenous people; it may be set by considering resource sharing, among
communities, or follow prevailing trade line.314 Delimitation in principle cannot be used to delimit
the whole boundary but can only be applied in need basis to create justice among the closely related
border residents. This kind of delimitation gives high latitude to demarcators, but is time
consuming, as the demarctors have to investigate the prevailing geographic reality and border
residents’ way of life before deciding on the point of separation (the border line). With a view to
limit the power of Eritrea-Ethiopia Border Commission (EEBC), the two States have expressly
avoided consideration of fairness (the principle of ex aequo et bono).
3.6.3. Demarcation
3.6.3.1. Nature and meaning
It has been point out that delimitation is a blueprint in boundary making process – it is a
plan that directs the process of boundary making at the demarcation stage. Delimitation, in fact, not
only guides the process of demarcation, but also controls demarcators to carry out the boundary
making in accordance with the specification enshrined in the delimitation document (the treaty).
Work procedures, governing laws, personnel and financial consideration, and so forth are expected
to be exhaustively dealt at the delimitation stage. The number of demarcators, composition and
314
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power, the extent of neutrality expected from the expert demarcators, security personnel, assistants
and laborers, medical personnel, scientific staff, resources, the extent of each party’s share of
demarcation expenses, supplies and transportation are some of the points expected to be decided at
the delimitation stage.315 The demarcation process, thus, may not be as tense as delimitation and
will be carried out by experts and technicians, relieving high level authorities from routine technical
matters, unless unexpected event that would stale the work of demarcation surfaces.
To geographers and other experts in the field, the notions of “demarcation” and
“delimitation” are very basic concepts, but to an ordinary people the terms may be vague or may
appear one and the same. An ordinary person may have notice of a border when it retrains
movement. But a border wall or a fence that restrains movement comes into existence after the
stage of demarcation is completed. Therefore, one may question what demarcation is and how it
actually works? Who carries out the demarcation and what makes it less tense than delimitation?
How unexpected situations that may surface during border making may be managed? These are
some of the issues that need brief explanation.
According to Stephen Jones demarcation, “ […] by its very nature, [is] a field operation,”316
It is a work which “ […] is strictly technical: control by astronomy, triangulation, or aerial
photography, projection of the line, mapping a boundary strip and erection of monuments.”317 A
pillar, post or monument will be erected at the spot stated in the delimitation and shown in the map.
As has been pointed out else where, a map may illustrate textual description of treaty, court
decisions or arbitral award regarding a given boundary. In all cases an exact boundary point at
which a pillar may be placed is expected to be pinpointed in the delimitation. Surveyors and
cartographers can easily locate the boundary point as stated in the delimitation and boundary
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engineers will erect boundary marker. After boundary markers are erected at all the spots, and
other complementary tasks are discharged, the demarcation team will be discharged and the
processes of boundary making may be complete.
It may happen that demarcation, for various reasons and causes, may not be congruent with
the boundary points as stated in the delimitation. For instance, a boundary pillar, by mistake or in
deliberate foul play, may be implanted at a wrong location contrary to the treaty wordings. The
problem may be discovered after centuries and the two neighboring States may not reach into
agreement to amicably resolve it. This was an actual problem that surfaced in the boundary between
Israel and Egypt. In this contradictory situation which one shall prevail? The boundary point that
was specified in the delimitation treaty about 100 years ago or the location of pillar on the ground
which was known to the local people as a boundary point for several years? Each State will
supposedly favor an interpretation that adds more territory. The disparity between the two important
facts of boundary making may happen due to mistake, foul play or a pillar may have been moved
unilaterally by one of the neighboring State or it may have happened by third parties or by non-state
actors. The point in this situation is not investigation of how the disparity surfaced, but how to
resolve such a situation? Put other ways, if delimitation and demarcation don’t coincide which one
prevails?
In Israel-Egypt case, the joint Boundary Commission could not solve the contradiction and
referred the case for resolution by a neutral court.318 As delimitation is simply a description stated
on the paper – be it treaty, judgment or arbitration award with or without accompanying map - the
boundary marker – may be pillar, monument, post or there mark denoting boundary line on the
boundary spot, which is known to the local people, and presumably impliedly approved by serving
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as a line of separation of two neighboring States is preferred to an abstract delimitation, which may
not be known to the local people - the actual beneficiary.
3.6.3.2. Demarcation on the Basis of Natural Features of Land
It has been pointed out elsewhere that before advancement of technology to precisely locate
an actual boundary point on the ground, nations had relied on natural features of earth like
mountain, river, ocean, sea and even dense forests. If a treaty simply refers to a given land scape as
boundary, say for example, a given river or mountain as a boundary between two or more states,
then the law regards the stated land scape as a point of separation between the neighboring States.
The problem of delineation with “natural boundaries” is its elusiveness. An ocean, a river or a given
forest may be large enough having its own width to specifically demarcate. Thus, demarcation by
using these natural features of earth may arise a question, “Where is an exact boundary line?” If a
treaty, for instance, stipulates, “The boundary between China and India is Mountain Everest,” one
may fairly ask if which State owns the mountain or if the mountain is taken as commonly owned, or
the extent of share of China’s or India’s share of the mountain. Therefore, delineation of boundary
on the basis of natural features of land may not be precise enough to tackle boundary conflict.
However, experts in the field have attempted to mitigate the elusiveness of natural
boundaries. For instance, in the case of mountain boundaries, unless otherwise agreed, the
watershed is taken as boundary point.319 In the case of dense forest or desert, however, an exact
dividing line is still elusive. As Cukwurah, rightly points out deserts or dense forests may afford
effective barrier for border crossing, “[…] yet unlike mountain, they do not possess naturally
marked sites for boundary lines.”320 The most rational solution appears to take the median point of
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the desert. Otherwise, a forest boundary will be deemed as a zonal boundary that is in between the
bordered States.
The traditional rule of delimitation in non-navigable river boundaries was riverbanks as
boundary line and making the riverbed common to the riparian States.321 In this changing world
where all spaces can be exploited for natural resources, this rule is not adequate enough to preclude
the possibility of conflict. Thus, unless otherwise agreed to the contrary, a separating line extends to
the riverbed. In the case of non-navigable river, the center of the reverted riverbed is boundary
point; whereas, in the case of navigable river, it is thawleg, (the median channel) of the riverbed is
a boundary point.322 Apportioning the navigable part of the river allows both riparian States to
benefit the navigation function of the river. Its side effect is the possibility to annex more territory
to the other side if the deepest navigable side of the river squeezed to one of the banks.
The other related issue of river boundary is the legal effect of boundary when the river
changes its route. The old rule was that the boundary follows the river. This means, if the river
diverts to the other riparian territory, the old bed will belong to the other adjacent territory, making
the owner of the territory to whom the river diverted lose some portion of territory including the
former waterbed. This rule appears unfair, as it makes one of the neighboring States to lose a
portion of its territory because of the diversion of the river. The current law has changed the
unfairness of the old law by making the former riverbed to continue serving as boundary point.323
River diversion, therefore, cannot change the old boundary. It will be changed into a land boundary.
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Regarding water boundaries, it is not only river that poses puzzle, but also litigation and legal
wrangling is common in respect of boundaries of stationery water like lakes, oceans and seas. Who
owns for example, an inland lake that is bounded by two or more States? For instances, numerous
States are surrounded by Lake Victoria.

It is true that each neighboring State has interest in the

lake and its rich resources. International law has to address an apparent conflict of interest. A lake is
inland water; thus unless otherwise agreed, the rule of delimitation and demarcation of river
boundary governs demarcation of lake boundaries.324 A lake is normally navigable, and hence, the
median channel, thalweg, is the boundary point. Thus, territorial jurisdiction of State extends up to
the middle of thalweg of the lake.325 It is a matter of measurement and physical assessment that can
be easily determined by the neighboring States with the need of judicial assistance.326
In the case of sea, it is also settled that jurisdiction over coastal states goes up to 12 nautical
miles,327 with the possibility of EEZ of 200 nautical miles.

The fundamental principles of

international law governing international sea has been never doubted since the judgment of the
seminal case, Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case,328 which extends territorial limit of coastal states to
certain predetermined scope of international sea. The core principle is the adjacent land determines
the possibility of extending territories into the sea. ICJ in the Anglo Norwegian Fisheries cases has
declared, “ […] the belt of territorial water must follow the general direction of the coast [….] ”329
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A 1920 Peace Treaty between the former U.S.S.R and Lithuania directly address this issue. Art. 2 of the Treaty
declares, “ in those cases where the frontier is carried along lakes, and canals, it shall pass though the middle of
these lakes, rivers and canals, unless otherwise provided for in this treaty.” Cukwurah supra note 115 at 69 quoted
from Doc.E/eCE/136,at 18.
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328
I.C.J Rep., 1951, at 115, 133.
329
Id.
325

174

Demarcation and boundary making is generally sue generis, though territorial limit of sea is
as a general rule is applicable through out the globe. Unless the parties stipulate otherwise, a
commonly accepted international law norm governs the demarcation of international maritime
boundaries. Territorial water limit of a State is demarcated virtually through geographic
coordinates.
3.6.3.3. Is demarcation a necessary requirement in all cases?
Demarcation is sign making on the actual boundary line to indicate the end of one’s territory
and beginning of another. Should the point of separation of two nations still be demarcated while a
clear boundary line is set at the delimitation stage? Technically, it is possible to say that if all the
contours of the boundary are precisely and exhaustively spelled out at the delimitation stage,
demarcation may be redundant. For instance, if negotiating States have exhaustively described a
boundary line and if the boundary line is unambiguously clear, demarcation will be redundant. If
the negotiating parties have agreed a specific river, mountain, or another form of permanent mark to
be a boundary point, and an exact point of separation is clear, there is no need to carryout
demarcation.
In practice, however, delimitation by using natural features of land can never be precise.
Nature is always in the state of change and so does the landscape of earth, but boundaries are
expected to be permanent and stable. For instance, a river may divert its bank, or may dry up or
perimeter of a mountain may be wide enough and later on conflict may arise. Thus, if the clarity of
the boundary line is doubtful or subjected to varied interpretation, it is advisable to erect a pillar or
monument that will sharply indicate a specific point of separation between the neighboring States.
The very purpose of demarcation is to set an unambiguous mark that can clearly reveal a point of
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separation. If this point is naturally and clearly set, and the Parties have consented to it, there no
need for demarcation – delimitation in this case serves both functions.
3.6.3.4. Demarcating Personnel
Enormous people with diverse experience, professional capacity and political interest may
involve in the demarcation process. Depending upon terms of the delimitation, boundary engineers,
surveyors, cartographers and other supporting staff will carry out the actual marking of exact of
point of separation (the boundary line). The Parties in, accordance with terms of delimitation, will
name demarcators. The number of demarcators, their professional expertise, nationality and the
scope of neutrality expected to be specified in the delimitation.
In the case the demarcation personnel was not stated in the delimitation, the highest officials
of the concerned States have to name the demarctors or set a criteria for the appointment of
demcarctors.

Demarcation traditionally performed by a group of people assigned from the

neighboring States. Each State will appoint certain number of persons as stated in the delimitation.
The number of demarcators from each of the States may be equal, but this is not a requirement.
The experts (engineers, surveyors, cartographers, researchers, doctors, other assistants, like drivers,
cook, security personnel and so forth) may be appointed either by the joint Boundary Commission
(usually highest category).When delimitation is court judgment or arbitration award the tribunal
may also be entrusted with power of demarcation. The judges or arbitrators may not personally
carry out the demarcation, but can hire experts who work under their guidance and close scrutiny.
In other cases, tribunals simply decide on delimitation and another group of people may be
empowered to demarcate the actual boundary line. The Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, for
instance, empowered with the power to delimit and demarcate.
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3.6.3.5. The Power to Adjust Boundary
It appears unwise to refer all minor contingencies that may surface during demarcation to the
busy political authorities for explanation. As a result, it has been an established practice to authorize
expert demarctors to adjust the delimitation line if an unforeseen barrier emerges out during the
demarcation. Put simply, the demarctors may be empowered to make a minor adjustment in the
boundary line, should strict application of terms of delimitation thought to hamper peaceful
coexistence or if it is manifestly impracticable to demarcate.

International boundary experts,

including Stephen Jones, agree with the possibility of adjusting boundary to suit to the borderland
facts and geographic realties.330 In the words of Jones, “Many treaties leave, and all should leave, to
the demarctors the final adjustment of the line to local needs and the realties on the terrain.”331
(Emphasis added). The very purpose of boundary making is to create a lasting peace. If the
boundary fails to meet this objective, it would be waste of time and resources. Therefore, unless all
situations were empirically studied and considered in advance, the demarcating team should be
conferred with fair latitude of power to adjust an actual line before drawing a final boundary line. It
is the demarcating team that interacts with two sides of border residents and observe an actual
problem on the ground. A notorious boundary-making expert remarks as follows:
[…] when Commissioners reach the locality of demarcation, a reasonable latitude is
commonly conceded to them in carrying out their responsible task. Provision is made
for necessary departure from the Treaty line, usually on the basis of mutual
concession. 332
The demarcating team will analyze the impact of a given boundary line on border
interaction and border transactions. The team knows the weather condition, shared resources like
water springs, grazing land or forests for firewood. If a power to adjust boundary line is given in a
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Jones supra note 268 at 165.
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Ruthworth, supra note 263.
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treaty with the objectives of making lasting peace, the borderline will be respected forever and will
be a gate for interaction thereby changing the traditional restraining function of borders. Therefore,
adjustment of the border by the demarcators who may take local facts into account will have a
paramount significance in building a smooth functioning border.333
3.6.3.6. Ancillary Functions of Demarctors
A demarcation team may extend effort beyond border marking to peaceful and stable border
making. In other words, demarcators in addition to emplacing border markers, may endeavor to
improve borderland interaction by encouraging bordered people to socialize. Socializing bordered
people will build confidence and avoid animosity. In the words of Stephen Jones, “A demarcation
commission has also a third function, seldom, if ever explicitly stated.” That function is according
to Clifford, the improvement of frontier relationships.334 Though not empowered with the task of
border making, the United Nations Mission on Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) has attempted to
connect Ethiopian and Eritrea church leader with a view to build confidence between the two
brotherly people. A border marking (demarcation) team is the only neutral body working in the
borderland with a view to create peace in the region, especially in a situation where the scares of
violent conflict not healed. Peace making, thus, is complementary to border creating and hence
helpful to build an acceptable and effective borderline that can create a lasting peace.
3.6.4. Boundary Administration (Maintenance)
A demarcated boundary should serve the goals of keeping peace and stability by signaling
an exact limit of boundary line between neighboring States. Visibility of a boundary marker avoids
confusion and conflict that may arise as a result of inadvertent intrusion. Travelers crossing a well-
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Jones supra note 268 at 165.
Id. at 268.
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demarcated boundary with a clearly noticeable boundary pillar, voluntarily submit themselves to
the jurisdiction of a State that has sovereignty over the territory.

A boundary marker is an

important tool to regulate the behavior of border residents or anyone around the border.335
Erecting boundary markers is not the end of the “ business” of boundary making. Boundary
pillars have to be kept in tact in a way visible to the actual and potential boundary crossers. A
boundary marker is a man-made building that may be destroyed either by naturally catastrophe,
wild animals or by human act. To be specific, a pillar or other form of boundary marker may be
destroyed by wear and tear, it may fall or may be dismantled by flood and erosion, or may be wiped
out by wind and other forms of natural disaster with/without influence and contribution of human
being. A pillar may be obliterated or moved from its original location by human act or by other
unforeseen cause. Visibility of a boundary marker may also be vitiated as a result of growing trees
or vegetables that may cover the boundary marker. This calls for a periodic inspection and a
remedial action with a view to obviate an act or fact that can hamper the important functions of the
boundary markers. The inspection and reconnaissance of boundary markers is a permanent activity
that should be done periodically at a predetermined time gap.
Stephen Jones classifies this stage of as a fourth stage of boundary making, and labels it as
boundary administration. It is also known as boundary maintenance. Is boundary maintenance,
which is unending enterprise, a stage of boundary making? Both boundary administration and
maintenance

are

permanent

in

nature,

as

far

as

the

boundary

exists.

Boundary

administration/maintenance is vital to keep boundary markers to continue “making good neighbors”
by keeping peace and stability.
Boundary administration has to be

preplanned as a part of boundary negotiation at the

delimitation stage or can also be done during demarcation, or may be agreed immediately after
335
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completion of the demarcation.

Treaty makers should devise a specific provision governing

boundary administration. Cukwurah attests this view stating, “The delimitation and demarcation of
an international boundary will be no avail if, in the long run, no provisions are made by parties for
the protection, maintenance and repair of an established boundary.”336
According to the Federation of International Surveyors, with a view to keep border stability,
boundary markers should be maintained continuously in regular intervals.337 An uninterrupted and
periodic maintenance demands a clear procedure and a regular reconnaissance.338 It may be carried
out by a professional team, who may work either jointly or separately depending upon the terms of
negotiation. A periodic inspection and reconnaissance can be effected through a joint boundary
commission. Joint boundary team of China-Mongolia boundary commission, for instance, in
addition to the partial investigation that can be carried out as needed, the joint team works within 5
years, while Israel – Jordan carries out reconnaissance within a year.339 Boundary administrators
will jointly or individually resolve boundary problems depending upon the terms of agreement or
the nature and volume of the problem. All problems and solutions should be documented.340
Boundary Commissioners of United States/Canada are authorized to permanently administer
United States – Canada boundary.341 Each State appoints a commissioner who makes annual report
to State department. The Commissioners have their own staff that assist Commissioners and
remunerated by their governments. The boundary commission works in accordance with the treaty
that was approved by the States. Some boundary commissions discharge the normal periodic duty
of inspection separately in accordance with prearranged method while others may carryout the
336

Cukwurah,supra note 101 at 83.
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For example, Art. 4 of the U.S.A Canada treaty of Feb. 24, 1925 empowers a joint team to monitor the boundary
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inspection jointly.342 While inspection has to be done individually, unless there is issue, each teach
team should not repeat what the other has done. It is possible to apportion the duty to inspect the
pillars among the team. If anyone of the team finds some thing unusual, has to report the finding to
the other team and action can be taken jointly.

341
342

See International Boundary Commission,
Pillars with the tag of odd numbers were allocated to Chinese team, while even numbered pillars were allocated to
Mongolian team. FIG supra note 295 at 35.
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CHAPTER FOUR
African Boundary Regime and Governing Principles
4. 1. Overview
There is little doubt about the arbitrary and divisive nature of African colonial boundaries.
African boundaries were set in complete disregard of geographic, linguistic, and ethnographic
affinity, and have planted unending conflict and animosity among Africans.1 Ironically, in fear of
presumed chaotic situation that thought to surface, had the boundaries redrawn2, founding fathers of
OAU have decided to respect boundaries existed on the critical date of independence.3 Despite the
decision to abide by the pre-independence boundaries with the intention to avoid the presumed
chaotic situation, colonial boundaries have been source of most of Africa’s “civil and [international]
wars that have ravaged the continent, and brought misery to many of its inhabitants.”4 In some
cases, arbitrary boundaries are pondered as time bombs that may explode at any time and in any

1

The very people who partitioned Africa admit ignorance of African facts when partitioning Africa. Lord Salisbury’s in
his 1890 speech regrettably remarks, “We have been engaged … in drawing lines upon maps where no white man’s
feet have ever trod; we have been giving away mountains and rivers and lakes to each other, but we have only been
hindered by the small impediment that we never knew exactly where those mountains and rivers exactly where those
mountains and rivers and lakes were.” (Emphasis mine) ( Lord Salisbury’s speech of 1890 quoted in Territorial
Dispute (Libya v. Chad) by Judge Ajbola in his separate opinion, ICJ Reports 6(1994) at 53 quoted in Robert
McCorquodale and Raul pangalangan, Pushing Back the Limitations of Territorial Boundaries, 12:5 EJIL 867, 867 –
888 (2001). See also Johson Oalaosebikan Aremu, Conflict in Africa: meaning, Causes, Impact and Solution, 4(4)
AFRICAN RES. REV. 559 551, 549 – 560 (2010).
2
Ikome terms the takings of founding fathers of OAU as, “ … partly because of a legitimate concern that any attempt
to review the boundary will lead to anarchy.” Francis Nguendi Ikome, Africa’s International Borders as Potential
Sources of Conflict and Future Threats to Peace and Security, ISS PAPER NO. 233 12 (2012). According to Ikome,
though “inviolability” of existing border did not absolutely avoid border conflict, had the borders been reviewed quite
more chaos would have been emerged. Id.
3
Apart from Morocco and Somalia, the rest of the founding members of OAU have consented to respect boundary
lines drawn before decolonization, See the Cairo Resolution of Assembly of Heads of States and Governments
(AHSG/Res/16(1) July 1964
4
Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the 34d Conference of African Ministers in Charge of Borders
Issues, EC.CL/726(XXI) 9- 13 July 2012. See also Depart of Peace & Security of African Union Commission, From
Barriers to Bridges Collection of Official Texts of African Borders from 1963 – 2012 22(2nd ed. 2013). It is aptly
stated, “ Africa became the theatre of the most devastating wars that have occurred in the world since 1945.” Id. See
also Samuel G. Amoo, The OAU and African Conflicts: Past Successes, Present Paralysis, and Future Perspectives,
WORKING PAPER Inst.of Conf. Analysis and Res, George Mason University, (May
1992).http://scar.gmu.edu/wp_5_amoo.pdf
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direction.5 Continued push by the separated tribal groups for unity, irredentist movement, vague
boundary line that is hard or impossible to demarcate on the ground has been perpetuating unending
conflict in Africa.6 As a result, more than any continent in the world, Africa suffers from protracted
territorial and boundary wars.
As do pre-Westphalian European boundaries, pre-colonial African boundaries were porous
and had been changing, as tribes, ethnic groups, nations or nation states frequently move or migrate
from one place into other looking for favorable environment or resources necessary for conducive
life. Despite some attempts to devise a clear boundary line, the Westphalian formula of creating a
linear boundary was largely “imported” to Africa by colonial powers. The African Westphalia,
however, was arbitrary. The actual people for whom the boundary was set or their representatives
did not take part in the boundary making to suggest a better working boundary line that would align
with facts on the ground.7 African boundaries were drawn far away in Europe by the people never
been in Africa and were not aware of African terrain.8
This Chapter briefly assesses African boundaries starting from Pre-colonial era to the
current state. Part I reveals that pre-colonial Africa had an indigenous form of boundaries that had
separated territorial holdings of nations, nationalities, and tribal groups. Pre-colonial African

5

President Chadly of Algeria views colonial boundaries as “delayed action bombs left by colonialism.” See J.R.V.
PRESCOTT, POLITICAL FRONTIERS AND BOUNDARIES, 254(1987). For detailed consequences of colonial
boundaries see Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou, The Long-run effects of the Scramble for Africa,
WORKING PAPER SERIOUS, NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, WORKING PAPER 1720
(2011), http://www.nber.org/papers/w17620
6
Ikome, supra note 2. See also Agulbou Diarrah, An Overview of the African union Border Programme, in
DELIMITATIONA ND DEMARCATION OF AFRICAN BOUNDAREIS: GENAEAL ISUES AND CASE
STUDY, DEPT OF PSC, COMMISION FOR AFRICAN UNION 8(2013).
7
Professor Mutua surmises, “Unlike their European counter parts, African states and borders are distinctively artificial
and are not ‘the visible expression of the age-long efforts of [indigenous] peoples to achieve political
adjustment[….]” See Makau wa Mutua, Why Redraw The Map of Africa: A moral and Legal Inquiry, 16 MICH JL
INT’L L. 1115, 1113 – 1176 (1994 – 1995). Thus, colonization and resultant arbitrary boundary has interrupted
evolutionary process of African boundaries by implanting arbitrary European formulation. Id. Professor Mutua,
contends that foreign imposition of African system would lead into African extinction and proposes for readjustment.
Id. at 1118.
8
Lord Salisbury’s admission of arbitrary delineation of African boundaries is often cited.
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boundaries were analogous to the European boundaries before the historic Westphalian Resolution
of 1648. All boundaries, being human creation are artificial, but all boundaries need not necessarily
be arbitrary. A boundary that is set by the common will of the people who reside therein in, or by
their representatives who took geographic and human factors, may not necessarily be regarded
arbitrary. Part II of this Chapter illuminates the scramble for Africa and partition of its territories
and people by the European colonial powers. Finally, the post colonial movements to revise African
boundaries during pan Africa movements, the stand of founding fathers of African umbrella
organization (OAU) and subsequent efforts to stop recurrent territorial and boundary conflicts in
Africa is briefly outlined.
4.2. Pre-Colonial African Boundaries
As pinpointed in Chapter two of this work, the emergence of private property has
necessitated the creation of boundaries in medieval times. Traditional African societies share this
characteristic, and had indigenous type of boundaries that separated private holdings of ethnic and
national boundaries.9 The state of pre-colonial African boundaries was almost identical to the preWestaphalian European boundaries.10 As boundary setting was started with frontier system, early
African boundaries were zonal (frontiers) in nature. Though porous and periodically changed,
African Empires, nations or cities states had their own territories and boundaries before European
boots landed in Africa.11 Take, for instances the boundaries of Axumite Kingdom. Despite it often
worked to expand the scope of its territory, Axumite kings were fully aware of territorial limits of

9

Adekunle Ajala, The Nature of African Boundaries, 18:2 AFR. SPECTRUM, 178, 177-189 (1963).
As pointed out chapter 2 of this work, it was in 1648 that the Westphalian congress deliberated for the linear
boundaries and sovereignty of states in their respective jurisdictions within the clearly defined boundaries.
11
Ajala supra note 9. See also Edward Kofi Quasbigab, Legitimate Governance: The Pre- Colonial African
Perspective in LEGIMATE GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA international and Domestic Legal perspectives, 43(Edward
Kofi Quashigah & Obiora Chinedu Okafor eds. 1999).
10
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the kingdom. Expansionist tendencies and even the possibility to lose one’s territory cannot lead to
suppose pre-colonial Africa did not have boundary.
There is an assertion that pre-colonial African societies “[…] were neither in need nor
capable of projecting their power over large territories.”12 As a result, Englebert and colleagues
argue that pre-colonial African kingdoms claimed political authority and property rights over
people more than land.13 Consequently, the learned authors surmise, “[…] with few exception such
as Ethiopia the concept of territorial delimitation of political control was by and large culturally
alien.”14 This assertion is not acceptable, for instance, to the pre-colonial dweller of Ovamboland,
Namibia. In Ovamboland, according to Gregor Dobler, “Territory did matter for pre-colonial
political domination, even if land as such was plentiful and different polities lay for from each
other. […] The King and his power were strongly linked to the land.”15 In medieval Africa, thus, it
is not only the people, but also the territory in which authority may be exercised was considered
vital.
As do pre-Westphalian Europe, some nation states in Africa had their own boundary walls
that are still standing. The Harar City wall in Ethiopia manifests this fact.16 The wall was erected
with a view to defend residents of the City State from frequent external invasion. The invaders need
not be neighboring city-states, empire or ethnic groups but extra-continental invaders like Turkish,
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Pierre Englebert et al, Dismemberment and Suffocation (A Contribution to the Debate on African Boundaries), 33:10
COMP. POL. STUDIES, 1095, 1093-1118 (2002).
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Gregor Dobler, Boundary drawing and the notion of territoriality in pre-colonial and early colonial Ovamboland, 3
J. OF NAMBIAN STUDIES 16, 1 – 25(2008).
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Harar City Wall is one of UNSCO Heritage sites. For details see,
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Ajala, supra note 9 at 178.
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Both Hadya and Wolaita ethnic groups are now under their own separate zonal administration of Southern Nations
and Nationalities Regional State in Ethiopia.
20
Now the ditch is situated in the middle of districts neighboring Hadya Zone of Wolayta Zone (former Boloso Sore,
Damot Gale and Damote Woyde districts).
21
Oromfa speaking zone of Amhara Regional State is an exception.
22
This is simply to show that pre-colonial African societies had boundaries that were either altered or redefined by the
colonial powers. This is author was born and raised in Wolayta nation and personally aware of the boundaries
of
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Arab or Europeans. Pre-colonial African borders, like pre-Westphalian European borders, had been
delineated by the natural features of land. The boundaries often set unilaterally and marked by
natural features of land. Rivers, mountains, deserts, forests, watersheds, marshlands, lakes and sea
were some of the dominant method of marking boundaries between tribes, nations, city-states, or
Empires. Ajala attests this view stating, “ Pre-colonial Africa adopted age–old systems of using
zones or border marches as buffer between kingdoms.”17 Some of the zonal areas may be wide
enough to cover deserts or dense forests. As land and resources were more than the need of people
at the time, there was no question whoever uses the resources in the buffer zones. Practically no one
cared about resources, as resources were naturally abundant. Buffer zones that separated territories
of the neighboring tribes were no man’s land.18 This, however, does mean, anyone could occupy the
boundary zone. It is implied that the zone belonged to the neighboring polities.
Some pre-colonial African kingdoms have attempted to draw a clear boundary line. The
Wolayta Kingdom (now Wolayta Zone in the Southern Nations and Nationalities Regional State in
Ethiopia) unilaterally drew its boundaries with Hadya ethnic group by digging huge and long ditch
that covered the supposed boundary.19 The ditch was a clear mark of the end of territories of
Wolayta. The kingdom of Wolayta had been in frequent war with the neighboring Hadya nation,
quickly went beyond the ditch line when it won another war and succeeded in acquiring more
territories.20 The eastern boundary of Wolayta Kingdom was the river Bilaate. The river still serves
as the boundary line between Sidama and Wolayta Zones of Southern Nations and Nationalities of
Ethiopia. The river Blaate is traditionally an accepted boundary line between the kingdom of
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Ajala, supra note 9 at 178.
Id. at 179.
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Both Hadya and Wolaita ethnic groups are now under their own separate zonal administration of Southern Nations
and Nationalities Regional State in Ethiopia.
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Now the ditch is situated in the middle of districts neighboring Hadya Zone of Wolayta Zone (former Boloso Sore,
Damot Gale and Damote Woyde districts).
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Wolayta and Sidama. This boundary line never doubted, by the former and current residents of the
two neighboring nationalities.
The western boundary of Wolayta ethnic group is river Omo. River Omo separates territories
of Wolayta and Dawuro ethnic groups. The Dawuro ethnic group, the Gamo, and Goffa ethnic
groups share some of the features of Wolayta and Wolayta never sought to take territories of these
ethnic groups. The border of Wolayta and Gamo and Goffa ethnic groups is very porous when
compared to Sidama and Dawuro, but no known territorial or boundary conflict ever been surfaced.
No one clearly knows an exact time of the creation of these boundaries. The creation of these
boundaries may be equated with the creation of the two separate kingdoms and their territories.
Ethiopia has several ethnic groups, kingdoms, nations and nationalities. Most of the
boundaries of nations and nationalities are still kept intact serving as internal administrative
boundaries. Boundaries of several Oromfa speaking kingdoms constituted the Oromia Regional
State21, the Amhara kingdom changed into the Amhara regional State, and so forth.22 Boundaries of
Tigrigna speaking ethnic group constituted Tigray Regional State. In Western and Eastern Ethiopia,
there are several ethnic groups and nationalities that kept their traditional boundaries until
reshuffled by the colonial powers. For instance, before French occupation of Western Africa, the
territory had been divided into various independent regions, which were also subdivided into
independent regions that were settled by the local ethnic group.23 The local people undoubtedly
knew the limit of territories of each of the regions and sub regions. The limits of territories, be it
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Oromfa speaking zone of Amhara Regional State is an exception.
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river, mountain, watershed, forest or desert or some kind of zone having its own width and length
may be taken as boundary.
Pre-colonial African boundaries were generally elusive, but did not create problem or never
been considered as problem or actually created problem at the time. Traditional African people
never fought for boundaries or transgression on boundaries, but the fight was for expansion of
territories and desire to have more people that can serve the empire. Frequent territorial expansion
had rendered the meaning and purposes of boundary meaningless, as there was no guarantee for
permanent holding of a territory. For instance, the kingdom of Dahomey (now Benin) in West
Africa and Buganda often invaded their neighbor to expand their territorial holdings.24
Expansionist character was the feature of medieval kingdoms throughout Africa. In a
situation where a powerful ruler could forcefully cede the whole territories and capture its residents,
the only concern was to protect territories and the people from frequent invasion either from the
neighboring ethnic groups, tribes or from foreign aggressors. Grazing land or other resources
including timber, water was not scarce. When things were abundant, boundary conflicts rarely
surfaced. For instance, nomads of neighboring Sidama tribe in Southern Nations and Nationalities
of Regional State of Ethiopia often crossed the border - river Bilaate- and pastured their cattle in the
Wolayta side, but there was no complaint. Now resources are scarce and everyone expects another
not to encroach borderlines and use scarce resources. The competition for scarce resources has been
source of territorial or boundary conflict.
As Ajala pinpoints, pre-colonial African boundaries can be classed into three categories.25
First, pre-colonial boundaries did not absolutely retrain movement. Pre-colonial African
boundaries, as Schengen currently does in Europe, served as points of contact. In frontiers of
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contact, neighboring kingdoms or ethnic groups were lived side by side and passed territories of
each without impediment. The southern boundaries between Wolayta, and Gamo and Goffa fall
under this category; still now, there is no impeding mark or some kind of barrier that separates the
two groups. So far there is no boundary conflict. The boundary between Wolayta, Hadya, and
Kambata has no restraining barrier or boundary mark. The ethnic groups, however, know the limits
of their territory and there is no boundary dispute. Even if one inadvertently trespasses, the conflict
could easily be resolved through traditional peaceful dispute mechanism. Any misunderstanding
can be cleared on spot and easily. As a result, no one knows if there was a boundary conflict.
The second kind of frontier, according to Ajala, is frontier of separation. In this case two or
more bordered groups were separated by wide border mark – the frontier. The mark may be a river,
as between Sidama and Wolayta or dense forest or a desert that was hard to cross. The ditch that
was dug between Wolayta and Hadya may be an exceptional kind of clearly delineated boundary
line. In the eastern boundary of Wolayta and Gamo-Goffa, there is Lake Ababa. But it never
impeded both groups, as each group was not barred to use the Lake or resources therein. Daana
Forest, a frontier, on the Western side may be used both of the groups as far as they needed it.
There was no issue in pastureland or water. But borderland residents of both ethnic groups know
their respective territories that are bounded either by the forest or lake. According to Ajala, “ […]
states of Central Sudan including Bornu, Maradi, Air and the Fulani Emire had frontiers.”26
The third form of pre-colonial Africa boundary was a kind of overlapping boundary. This is
a rare kind of pre-colonial boundary. This was a mixed type in which different ethnic groups lived
separately in different localities. It is hard to know an exact boundary between different tribes and
ethnic groups, as one may be situated within a territory of a bigger group. When ethnic groups were
mixed the only possible way of boundary setting was individual land boundary. As ethnic groups
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were too liberal and scattered among another group, there was no way to know boundaries of a
single ethnic group. A group may also be an enclave within territory of a bigger unit. In this case,
ethnic boundary setting, however, is not hard to perceive. Nomadic life also makes boundary setting
impossible or hard to prove. For example, migratory nature of the Masaai and Tuaregs makes it
hard to exactly locate their boundaries.27
4.3. Partitioning Africa: Drawing New Boundary Lines in Europe for Africa
4.3.1. Introduction
This Section briefly outlines how colonial powers apportioned Africa and redrew its
boundaries disregarding geographic and human facts on the ground. Though there were sporadic
individual attempts to occupy African territories by European powers since yearly 1830s28, African
territories were largely partitioned by the Berlin Conference of November 1884 – February 1885.
The Conference was sponsored by Otto van Bismarck with a view to amicably divide Africa among
European powers. One of the important resolutions of the conference was the requirement to report
occupation of a given part of Africa to the potential colonizers. This avoided war among the
Europeans, as a colonized territory could not be recolonized. Thus, Berlin Conference ‘[…] was
meant to defuse colonial tensions and avoid the risk of war among the conferees.”29
4. 3. 2. Arrival of Foreign Agents in Africa

26

Id.
Id.
28
For instance France invaded Algeria I 1830, British and King Leopold got territories long before the Berlin
Conference. After all, the Berlin Conference was the consequence of competition of European colonizers on Africa.
See Mutua, supra note 7 at 1126. The most important objective of the Conference was to partition Africa legally and
formally by avoiding war among the Europeans.
29
Id. at 1127.
27
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Before the actual colonization, European explorers, missionaries or traders had explored
Africa and exposed its economic significance to their respective states.30 Some under the guise of
spreading Christianity had permanently settled while apparently preaching and coaching African
tribal chiefs. While it may not be possible to categorize all the missionaries and explorers as spies
or agents of European colonial powers, undoubtedly they served as source of information to the
European powers. Explorers, missioners and traders31 relied important facts and potential benefits
of occupying African territories.32 Some missionaries or traders bought land as any private African
person from local chiefs who did not suspect that they would be swallowed later, and would be
considered slaves in their own territories. Unwary native people and naïve traditional chiefs had
created a conducive situation to the agents and representatives of colonial powers to settle on the
land that was already acquired with the hidden motive of subsequent expansion of the territory and
for the ultimate occupation of the entire territory.
The original visitation or settlement was very peaceful. The European visitors concluded
treaties with the local chiefs pledging to help the kingdom or offered gifts or arms to the chief. In
Ethiopia, Italians who purchased land in coastal areas of Red Sea donated guns that served the
ruling chiefs to wage war against rival kingdoms. The Kingdom that had modern guns easily
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Lalonde, supra note 23 at 105. Lalonde witnesses that “Until the latter half of nineteenth century the impact of
Europe upon Africa in general terms was relatively minor. […] By the late 1870s, however, the increasing activity in
Africa by explorers, merchants and missionaries led not only to a greater impact upon indigenous societies but also to
a growing awareness in Europe’s political capitals of the advantages to be derived from a more forward policy in
Africa.” Id.
31
Prescott enumerates some of the commercial companies that facilitated colonization of Africa. For example, the
British South Africa, the Royal Niger Company in Nigeria, the Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft fur sud West Africa in
the Namibia, the Nord West Kamerun Gesellschaft in Cameroun, and several French commercial firms Congo,
Gabon and the Central Africa Republic. See J. R. V. PRESCOTT, POLITICAL FRONTIERS AND BOUNDAREIS,
242(1987).
32
It may be surprising to know that missionaries served some political purpose under the cover of religion. In medieval
Africa European missionaries acted on behalf of their governments by spying African kingdom and relaying
information. Most importantly, the missionaries bought land on which European colonizers were able to settle before
the virtual taking of the whole territory. Bishop Desmond Tutu’s statement vividly explains how missionaries took
African land. In the words of Desmond Tutu:
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conquered rival kingdoms that were not exposed to the foreign handouts. For instance, King Minilik
II of Ethiopia had conquered almost all the Southern Kingdoms using arms donated by Italians who
occupied some Red Sea coastal regions, which later termed as Eritrea.33
Initially, the European agents stationed at the coastal areas, but later penetrated into the
interior territories. For instance, according to Prescott, “The first British fort at the mouth of the
Gambia River was built in 1664. […] France’s concession at Grand Lahu on the Ivory Coast dated
from 1787; a Portuguese fort was built at Luanda in 1575.”34 However, there is conflicting view
regarding an actual date of the commencement of the scramble for Africa. Hertslet points to 1882
in which Belgian expeditions, the International Association of the Congo started in upper Congo
and Niadi-Quillou.35
4.3.3. Pre-Colonial Treaties
Pre-colonial treaties were apparent promises of European powers to “protect” African chiefs
– often called Protective Treaties or treaties conferring territorial rights. According to Mutua,
‘treaties of protection’ were imposed to effectuate colonial rule between African rulers and
European powers.36 For instances, the International Association of Congo, after arriving in Congo,
concluded a treaty that may also be taken as contract and got territorial right, before the ultimate
control of the whole Congo territory by the King of Belgium.37 Similarly, a German colonization
society concluded treaties with local chiefs in the East Africa and obtained concessional right over

“When the missionaries came to Africa they had the Bible and we had the land. They said “Let us pray.” We close our
eyes. When we opened then we had the Bible and they had the land.” See www.globalissues.org/article/84
33
This process has led to the colonization of the northern regions of that had been under the Axumite empire from the
time immemorial. They saw the seed of difference and separation among the two closely related people that
ultimately led the Eritrean secession and bloodshed. After Eritrean independence Ethiopia remained landlocked as
Italian colonizers occupied all the coastal regions that ceded later to Eritrea after occupation of the whole Eritrean
territory. The current generation, as a result suffer from non-healing wound.
34
Prescott supra note 31 at 246
35
Lalonde supra note 23 at 105.
36
Matua supra note 7 at 1131.
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territories while the other German group of explorers entered into the South West of Africa and
concluded treaties that legally authorized colonial power to have territorial right.38 The German
explorers also entered into protective treaties in West Africa.39 Similarly, Great Britain agents
entered into treaties with a number of local African chiefs.40 The consideration to African side in
almost cases was very minimal or none. Offering guns and bombs was the greatest gift that thrilled
local authorities to perpetuate their dominance against local rivalries.
European agents had deployed all possible tactics to secure ostensible “consent” of tribal
chiefs in surrendering their sovereignty, the territories and their people contractually through
‘shame’ treaties. Colonial agents offered priority to peaceful method of acquiring territories by
convincing or inducing local chiefs. Bribery, inducement, intimidation, or coercion commonly
applied to secure signature of local authorities. It may be shocking to know that local authorities
had surrendered sovereignty of their kingdoms for silly consideration like beads, cloths or old pair
of boots.41 Gift of arms to wage war on other rival African kingdoms was so common.42 When all
deceptive method of securing treaties fail to work, colonial powers invaded African territories for
establishing their sphere of influence through effective occupation.
On account of signature of naïve local chiefs, some authors tend to argue that Africans were
involved in colonial boundary making in Africa. Touval, for instance, asserts that Africans were
indirectly involved in colonial boundary making in Africa. 43 It is true that African local chiefs had
37

Lalonde supra note 35.
Id.
39
Lalonde supra note 23 at 105.
40
Id.
41
Mutua, supra note 7 at 113.
42
The 30000 rifles and 28 artilleries that were donated by Italy to King Minilik of Ethiopia were helped Minilik fighter
to fight Southern kings like the Kingdom of Wolayta – Kaw Tona. Without such assistance it was almost impossible
for Minilik fighter to occupy Wolayta, as tough fighter of Kawo (king) Tona had defeated Minilik soldiers four time
before. The rifles made Minilik and his fighter superior to the fighter of Kawo Tona who used simply traditional
spear and courage to defend their territory and their king.
43
SAADUA TOUVAL, THE BOUNDASRY POLITICS OF INDEPENDENT AFRICA, 5(1972). Nevertheless,
Touval admits that Africans were naïve but not passive at the time. Their decision making power was influence by
38
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signed on the pre-drafted standard treaty documents that were written in a language alien to the
signatories and very technical to comprehend. In most cases the chiefs were cheated, induced, or
coerced to sign the documents. How a signature that was acquired by coercion would prove
participation of Africans in redrawing boundaries? For example an African chief who refused to
surrender sovereignty of his kingdom to British peacefully signed a treaty with the following terms
with a view to end war and killing of his people:
I Docemo, do, with the consent and advice of my council, give, transfer, and by these present
grant and confirm unto the Queen of Great Britain, her heirs and successors for ever, the Port
and the Island of Lagos, with all the rights, profits, territories and appurtenance and the direct,
full and absolute dominion and sovereignty of the said port, Island, and premises, with all the
royalties thereof, freely, fully entirely, and absolutely.44

If Trouval regards Chief Docemo has involved in the redrawing the colonial map of Nigeria, it
appears not only wrong, but also it is a blind ignorance. Chief Docemo initially refused to surrender
his territory, but was overpowered to accept whatever his captors dictate him. A defective consent
to a treaty term that was tainted by fraud, deceit or inducement cannot be taken as participation of
colonial boundary making.
To view Africans had indirectly or directly participated in the partition of Africa is not only
unconvincing, but also appears endorsement of the methodologies of the infamous Berlin
Conference. No African was invited to take part in the partition process, and no attempt was made
to collect empirical data before splitting Africa. In the words of Matua, “Little consideration was
given to pre-colonial inter-state relations or other relationships between different traditional states.
In the majority of cases, map-makers were proceeded as though Africa was a blank slate,

either coercion or inducement, by the ‘stick and carrot.” Id. In this situation it is doubtful to conclude that Africans
also participated in the boundaries.
44
U. O. UMOZURIKE, INTERNAITONAL LAW AND COLONIZLISM IN AFRICA 40(1979), Quoted in Mutua
supra note7 at 1132.
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uninhabited.”45 Needless to say, local people should have taken part in crafting the treaty terms -they should have all possibilities to say no. In a situation where there was no option, “signing” on a
treaty documents that was “alien” in all terms is simply unconscionable and an assumption that
Africans were involved in partitioning Africa is utterly wrong.
Explorers, traders or missionaries or in some cases government agents proceeded to the
inland where they concluded bogus treaties with the tribal chiefs. According to Prescott, these
treaties apparently offered exclusive trading right or trading depot and sometimes the treaties
concerned with protection of chief’s territory and payment of subsidies.46 Thus, the treaties were
colored by some apparently economic or friendship objectives. For instance, when Italy attempted
to colonize Ethiopia by the treaty of Wuchali (also known as Uccali) stated in the treaty that
establishing friendship and cooperating between Ethiopia and Italy while the latent motive was to
take sovereignty of Ethiopia. The three treaties that EEBC wrangled to delimit Ethi-Eritrea
boundary were concluded with the objective of establishing friendship with Ethiopia. The bogus
treaties were drafted and presented for monarch’s signature.47 Almost all of the pre-colonial treaties
disclosed non-occupation objectives – the most usual objective was protection, assistance or
friendship. After the treaties signed, the latent motives behind the treaties surfacef. As Prescott
attests, “ Once a treaty had been signed, that territory was reserved for possible annexation in the
future.”48
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Mutua, supra note 7 at 1135. See also A. I. ASIWAJU ( ed.), PATITIONED AFRICANS: ETHINCI RELATIONS
ACROSS AFRICA’S INTERNAITONAL BOUNDARIES 1884 – 1984 1(1985). Asiwaju observes:
[…] despite it significance for the subsequent history of Africa, [the Berlin Conference] was essentially a
European affair; there was no Africans representation, and African concerns were, if they mattered at all,
completely marginal to the basic economic strategic and political interest of the negotiating European powers.
(Id.)
46
Prescott supra note 5 at 126.
47
The details of these treaties will be stated in Chapter Four of this Dissertation.
48
Prescott supra note 46.
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The illusive treaties49 also severed as evidence to prove existing interest before any other
super power – a potential colonial competitor.50 In accordance with the Berlin deliberation of 1884 1885, to avoid war among the colonizers, agreement among the colonial powers were necessary for
the partition of Africa.51 Proving prior interest or sphere of influence was one of the important facts
to get priority in agreement concluding the sphere of influence. As a result, “[i]t was always
considered to be an advantage to possess a treaty which bore an earlier date than that held by a
competitor”52
A ‘phony treaty’ that was apparently concluded with local African chiefs served as evidence
supporting the establishment of the sphere of influence. These fraudulent documents often invoked
as binding authorities conferring a right on African territories.53 Colonial powers did not concern
about clarity or correctness of the contents or terms of the shame treaties as the very motive was to
get some kind of evidence signed by the local people. As Ajala witnesses, “Such ‘treaties’ served
many purposes but more importantly they were used to back up their claims for the territories
involved.”54 Traders or explorer’s at the time carried standard treaty forms in which local names
and names of chief and witnesses to be signed.55 A commercial representative who carried out a
printed treaty forms and had signature of local chief in Africa attests the following illustrative
declaration:

49

Most progressive people agree that the colonial tries were simply shames that were not negotiated in full
comprehension of its terms. Touval attests that “The treaties can of course be questioned on moral and legal
grounds.” Touval supra note 43.
50
Id. at 6.
51
For instance, in 1989 Great Britain and France conducted a convention for deliberation of their respective possession
and delimitation of boundaries of West of Niger and the spheres of influence to the East of Niger river was signed.
See Ajala supra note 9 179.
52
Prescott supra note 5 at 246.
53
According to Touval unless the treaties are challenged immediately being faulty, taken as authoritative documents for
determining African colonial boundaries. Touval supra note 43 at 10.
54
Ajala supra note 9 at 179.
55
In 19th century apparently commercial companies, such as East India Company, served not only commercial
objectives but also acted as political purposes. Colonial powers used such alias companies to put their boots in the
territories they desired to occupy. See Id.
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I had bundle of printed treaties which I was to make as many people sign as possible. This
signing is an amiable farce, which is supposed to impose upon foreign government, and to be
the equivalent of an occupation… A ragged untidy European, who in any civilized country
would be in danger of being taken up by the police as a vagrant, lands at a native village, the
people run away; he shouts out after them to come back, holding out before them a shilling’s
worth beads… the so called interpreter pretends to explain the treaty to the chief. The chief
does not understand a word of it, but he looks pleased as he receives another present of beads;
a mark is made on a printed treaty by the chief and another by the interpreter, the vagrant, who
professes to be the representative of a great empire, signs his name… The boat sails away, and
the new ally and protégé of England or France immediately throws the treaty into the fire.56

Thruston’s declaration evidently depicts the scenario and character of the pre-colonial
treaties. It is just an obligation imposed on African kingdoms for nothing. In the words of Mautua,
“[…] it would make a mockery of the notion of a treaty and the concept of freedom of contract.”57
It is absurd and unacceptable to true mind an African chief to surrender sovereignty of his kingdom,
his people, and his territory for no consideration. It is of course not natural and unacceptable. But if
the chief’s state of mind was controlled either by coercion or inducement, a mockery treaty should
not be taken as a binding document as it cannot establish legality and fairness.
As has been mentioned out elsewhere, the immediate cause of the war between Ethiopia and
Italy was deceptive wordings of a “Treaty of Friendship and Trade between the Kingdom of Italy
and the Empire of Ethiopia” ( the Treaty of Wuchale).58 The treaty was written in Italian and
Amharic languages. While the Amharic version revealed the true sense of the treaty, the Italian
version took Ethiopia’s sovereignty claiming Ethiopia must deal all foreign relationship by the good
office of the Government of Italy while the Amharic version stated that Ethiopia could use the
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A. B. THRUSTON, AFRICAN INCIDENTS 170-171 (1900) quoted in Ajala supra note 54.
Mutua, supra note 7 at 1132.
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See Daniel Berhane, Text of Wuchale Treaty/1889 Ethio-Italian Treaty – HORN AFFAIRS – ENGLISH, AUGST 17,
2011, http://hornaffairs.com/en/2011/08/17/text-of-wuchale-treaty-1989-ethio-italian-treaty/ ( last visited Sep. 30,
2015 at 9:11 PM. ) Article XVII of the treaty was wrongly translated to mean Ethiopia must have all foreign relation
through good office or Italian government. The Italian translation reads: “ His Majesty the King of Kings of Ethiopia
allows you to make use of the Government of His Majesty the King of Italy for all business dealings he had with
other powers or governments.” While the Amharic vision of Article 17 states: “ His Majesty the King of Kings of
Ethiopia could allow you to make use the Government of His Majesty the King of Italy for all business dealings he
had with other powers or Governments.” See http://snem.tk/documents/wuchale.pdf As a result, “Italians proclaimed
a protectorate over Ethiopia.” (Encyclopedia of Britannica). The then Ethiopian king renounced the treaty as a result,
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Government Italy while dealing with foreign powers. In rejection of Emperor Minilik II to respect
the treaty terms, Italy invaded Ethiopia but suffered huge blow that resulted in nullity of the
deceptive treaty.
The defunct Wuchale treaty, in addition to attempting to take away Ethiopian sovereignty, had
annexed some Ethiopian territories to the Italian Eritrea.59 Almost identical treaties later concluded
after the battle of Adwa in Addis Ababa that were considered by the Eritrea - Ethiopia Border
Commission when attempting to settle the Ethio-Eritea border conflict in December 2000.60 The
Ethio-Italian treaties do not sound binding treaties in modern sense. The objective of the “treaties”,
their appearance and procedures involved don’t confer treaties in the sense of Vienna Convention of
Law of Treaties.
Matua rightly summarizes, “ It is difficult, if not impossible to sustain the legality of the
treaties of protection’ even under extant European law at the time.”61 First only states can make
treaties and there are strict procedures that should be followed to attain the legality and binding
force of a valid treaty. Genuine and free negotiation, free consent that is not tainted by any vitiating
factors and fulfillment of fair procedures including ratification, gives force to treaty. Thus, a treaty
obtained by explicit or implicit coercion, intimidation, fraud, deceit, or even by error cannot
legalize cession of a territory. In the modern sense, the treaties do not qualify as binding documents
as treaties were signed people representing an entity that did not qualify as a state in terms of
Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties.62 Moreover, Europeans at the time did not recognize

Italians attempted to occupy Ethiopia by force but suffered embracing defeat in which black men for the first time
defeated what forces.
59
Bogos, Hamasen and Akale Guzai were granted to Italy while Italy gave money and 30,000 muskets ( rifles) and 28
cannons which of course gave some assistance to Ethiopia when fighting the war. ( See Treaty of Wuchale,
ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF BRITANNICA., WWW.BRITANNICA.COM
60
For details see Chapter 5 and 6 of this Dissertation.
61
Mutua, supra note 7 at 1133
62
Id. at 1134. According to Matua, “ one African scholar has argued that these principles, which existed then
invalidates the treaties.” Id.
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signatories of the treaties as states. For them Africa was no man’s land that could be occupied as
medieval people were considered as politically unorganized and their territories may be occupied
akin to vacant land.

4.3.4. The Berlin Conference
The Berlin Conference of November 1884 – February 1885 has got important place in the
international political history. After 1870s due to exposition of Africa and African resources well
known by the European explorers, missionaries and traders, more European powers attracted and
started partitioning Africa which created tension among the competing powers. With a view to
settle the tension among the European powers, especially between Great Britain and France thereby
avoid potential war in Europe63 the then German Chancellor Otto Von Bismarck organized the
notorious Berlin Conference for smooth partition of Africa.64 Before the Berlin Conference, the
Scramble for Africa was unregulated and there was fierce competition and tension to occupy the
already occupied African territories. By the request of German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck,
fourteen powerful nations of the time attended the Conference.65
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Ajala states that, “[…] rivalries among the European powers that at the times even threatened the peace of Europe
when the partition of Africa was in progress.” See Ajala supra note 9 at 180. The tension among the colonial power
did not afford time to make empirical survey before partition of Africa. Id.
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As Elizabeth Heath summarizes partition of Africa started before the Berlin conference. The Conference with
organized by the Otto Von Bismarck with view to avoid conflict among the European powers unilaterally launched
campaign to colonize Africa. There fierce completion among British and France in West Africa, the Portuguese and
British in East Africa, French and King Leopold II of Belgium in Central Africa. Finally a strong rivalry between
Great Britain and France lead intervention by the Otto Von Bismarck that culminated in organizing an international
conference in creating peace among the European and legalizing the scramble for Africa. See Elizabeth Heath,
Encyclopedia of Africa
http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780195337709.001.0001/acref-9780195337709-e-0467
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Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Russia,
Spain, Sweden-Norway, Turkey, and the United States of America were the States that attended the Conference. The
Conference was Chaired by the Otto Von Bismarck. France, Germany, Great Britain, and Portugal were the most
important players of the Conference.
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The explicit agenda of the Conference and its latent but the most dominant motive were
different. The express objectives of the Conference were: To make Congo and Niger basin free and
open for trade. The conference has explicit purpose of working for the elimination of slave trade
and maintenance of political stability in Africa.

One may fairly questions whether African

kingdoms asked for such help or the then African situation created some international problem
affecting the interest of super powers. The issues may appear senseless, as the very motive of
behind the Conference is self-evident – sharing African territories peacefully among the European
powers. The conference took unusually long time:

November 15 – February 26, 1885 was

extraordinarily long for a conference, unless it was training. The colonial powers were furious not
to miss their target of acquiring more territories and not to fight among themselves. The participants
took time in devising the best mechanism that would help get their share of Africa to collect raw
materials and labor for the developing industry and market for industrial product.
As stated in the Article 34 of the Berlin Conference, each European nation had to report to
the other its sphere of influence, which has to be sufficiently proven. At the time of the Berlin
Conference 80% African territories were administered under indigenous kingdoms.66 Most coastal
areas, however, were long occupied by Europeans. The Berlin Conference has enabled colonial
powers to penetrate deep into the interior. One of the requirements of Article 34 of the Berlin
Conference was effective occupation, which can easily be proven by bogus treaties that were singed
by naïve tribal chiefs and fraudulent commercial representatives or other foreign actors. Copies of
the treaties submitted as proof for occupation in accordance with the geometric map drawn by the
Berlin Conference.
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See A Brief History of Berlin Conference, http://teacherweb.ftl.pinecrest.edu/snyderd/MWH/Projects/munbc/History.htm See also A. I. Aswaju, The Conceptual Framework in PARTIONED AFRICANS: ETHINIC
RELATIONS ACROSS AFRICA’S INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES 1884 – 1984 (A. I. Aswaju ed.) 2(1985).
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The Berlin Conference is not only condemned for disregarding African interests, but also it
is blamed for sawing vicious seeds that periodically bear violent territorial and boundary conflict in
Africa. The arbitrary geometric boundary has split interrelated ethnic groups and lumped them with
culturally, linguistically and religiously unrelated groups. Needless to say, the Conference did not
offer an opportunity for the African indigenous people to suggest the bet option. The architects of
the colonial boundaries were rather relied by the bogus “[…] treaties, concessions and account of
European travellers as well as personal reports of local European agents or ‘the men on the sport’ to
do their job.”67 Whenever these source not available in certain areas, the crafters of the African
boundaries ‘resorted to ingenuity.’68 It has been a usual saying that the crafter of African boundary
just took “a blue pencil and a ruler and began drawing lines from one point on the map to
another.”69
4.3.5. Effects of Arbitrary Boundary on Local People
The devastating effect of arbitrary boundary was separation of closely related ethnic groups
into several colonial powers.70 Tough figures are not uniform in all instances, 30 – 40% of African
ethnic groups were split into different states. According to Asiwaju, about 177 African tribes are
split into different States.71 This makes 30 – 40 % of ethnic groups. The case of Somalis is often
cited in this regard. Somalis were split into French Somaliland, British Somali, and Italian Somali
and Ethiopian Somali, Somali region of northern Kenya. The statement of the first Somali present
appears heart touching. He said:
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Ajala supra note 9 at 180.
Id.
69
Id. This aspects African boundary arbitrary which has been non-healing wound causing animosity among Africans
and has been source of most African conflicts.
70
Anthony I. Asiwaju, Borders and Borderlands as Linchpins For Regional Integration in Africa: Lessons from
European Experience, I WORLD BOUNDARIES: GLOBAL BOUNDARIES 61 ( Clive H. Schofield ed. 1994).
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Asiwaju, supra note 66.
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Our misfortune is that our neighboring counters with whom, like the rest of Africa, we seek to
promote constructive harmoniousness relationship, are not our neighbours. Our neighbours are
our Somali kinsmen whose citizenship has been falsified by indiscriminate boundary
arrangement. They have to move across artificial frontiers to their pasturelands. They occupy
the same terrain and pursue the same pastoral economy as ourselves. We speak the same
language we share the same creed, the same colures and the same tradition. How can we regard
our brothers as foreigners? 72

It is pretty clear that Somalis in East Africa share common culture, identical way of life,
same religion, but some are Ethiopians, Djiboutian, or Kenyans. But this trait of partitioned
societies is not peculiar to Somalis. Similarly, the Afar ethnic group is also split into three States.
Afar’s main land is in Ethiopia in Afar Regional State, whereas the Red Sea Afars who reside in the
coast of Red Sea are allocated to Eritrea. This was the spot where Italians initially settled by
purchasing land from a local chief. The rest of the Afars are in Djibouti. The Masai nomadic people
were split into Kenya and Tanzania.73 In West Africa the Gyaman, Indenie, Sefwi were partitioned
between Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire, Kakwa ethnic groups is found in Uganda and South Sudan,
Mandara partitioned between Cameroon and Nigeria, Iteso people found in Kenya and Uganda,
Bobo ethnic groups divided between Mali and Burkina Faso, Chewa and Nagoni found in Zambia,
Mozambique and Malawi, Hausa is split between Niger and Nigeria.74 The Ewe in West Africa was
split into three colonial regimes:

French Togo, British Togoland and British Gold Coast.

75

Similarly, “the Bakongo across the Gabon-Congo, Congo-Zaire and Zaire – Angola boundaries.”76
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JOHN DRYSDALE, THE SOMALI DISPUTE, 8(1964), Quoted by Said S. Samatar, The Somali Dilemma,: Nation
in Search of A State, in PARTITIONED AFRICANS: ETHNIC RELATIONS ACROSS AFRICA’S
INTERNAITONBAL BOUNDAREIS 1884 – 1984. 155 ( A. I. ASIWAJU (edu.) 1985).
73
Enormous ethnic and tribal groups were split due to arbitrary nature of the African boundary. The main ethnic groups
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Touval supra note 43 at 19.
76
Asiwaju supra note 66. Asiwaju provides several list of petitioned ethnic groups. The Lunda, the Zande, the
Yorubathe Wolf and the serers of Senegal and Gambia, the Sonninke and the Tukulor the Tubu the Tswana are some
of the ethnic groups that were petitioned by the colonial boundary. See Id.
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The arbitrary boundary not only split the closely related kinsmen, but also restrained
movements and inflicted economic hardship and social inconvenience. In the words of Ajala,
“[Africans] suddenly discovered that they could not longer move freely across areas which they and
their forefathers had for centuries regarded as their virtual backyard.”77 Africans were ignorant of
the Berlin deliberation and never cared about the action of colonial powers in Berlin, but they felt
brunt of the boundary after its demarcation. Their natural right of free movement was suddenly
restrained. After creation of the boundary wall either they were required to have permission to enter
into the artificial alien land or they had to walk far distance to the checkpoint. The artificial
boundary has introduced different way of life, different laws, tax system and so forth. The problem
of separation of ethnic groups turned the life of nomadic people from bad to worse. Nomads are
moving people looking for pasture and water for their herd. The artificial barrier thus has deprived
economic opportunity.
In addition to the physical, social and economic restraints, arbitrary boundaries take
forefront among the factors that has been fueling conflicts in Africa.78 The war between Ethiopia
and Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Morocco and Algeria, Libya and Chad, Mali and Burkina Faso,
are some of the African border related wars that erupted after formation of OAU. The partitioned
ethnic groups have been fighting for unity and in the case of civil war, the split group on another
side of the boundary served as hiding place. Any attempt of hot pursuit generates dissatisfaction and
animosity which in turn interstate violent conflict. For example, suspected rebels allegedly
belonged to Afar Ethnic group that killed and abducted tourists in the northern Ethiopia fled into the

77
78

Ajala, supra note 9 at 181.
Touval however does not agree with the assertion that arbitrary colonial boundaries are as source of conflicts in
Africa. Touval argues that the assumption that African “[…] borders would give rise to many biter conflicts,” was
unsubstantiated. According to Touval, “ the expectation has not been born out.” Trouval supra note 10 at preface.
This stand is contrary to the takings of most African intellectuals and friends of Africa. Kwame Nkrumah propagated
for either redrawing of African border or total unification of Africa to avoid the effects of arbitrary boundary. The
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Eritrean territory of Afar region. Hot pursuit by the Ethiopian arms resulted in condemnation by the
State of Eritrea, on the ground of encroachment of state sovereignty.
4.4. Post Colonial African Boundaries
In the eve of decolonization, the Pan African movement had campaigned to take away the
arbitrary colonial boundaries. The aim of the Pan African movement was to reunite partitioned
Africans by avoiding restraining colonial boundary walls by redrawing lines that would reunite the
divided ethnic and tribal groups.79 The Movement pioneered by the Pan Africanist leader of
independent Ghana, President Kwame Nkrumah who felt, Ghana’s independence was meaningless
while other African states were colonized.80 Supported by the progressive Pan Africans the
Movement conducted the first Pan African conference known as “All African People’s Congress”
in the African soil in 1958.81 As one author rightly attests, Kwame Nkrumah was “[…] regarded as
one of the principal spokesmen of African nationalism warned in 1958 against the danger of
inherited in the colonial legacies of irredentism and tribalism.”82 The Congress was led by the

revisionist movement that was centered in Ghana in late 1950s nevertheless discarded by the founding fathers of
Organization of African Unity. See Touval supra note 43 at 18 – 19.
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The Movement was inspired by the Pan African movements of 1919 – 1945 which aimed to unit West African tribes
that were former German colonies but later among the territories colonized by France and Great Britain. The 1945
Pan African Conference was held in Great Britain but the participants were Africans. The conference did not discuss
the whole African boundary problem but the point of discussion was boundary problems of West African and
Ethiopia. See Id. at 18. With regard to Ethiopia, the Congress of 1945 has passed very important resolutions that
contributed for maintenance of territorial integrity of Ethiopia. The Congress opposed keeping Massawa and Asmara
under international administration, demanded Eritrea and Somalia to be reunited to their mother land, Ethiopia and
required Great Britain to surrender administration of Eritrea handing it back to Ethiopia. See Id. at 23.
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South African History online ( SAHO), All African People Conference is held in Accra, Ghana, Nov. 8, 1958,
http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/all-african-people-conference-held-accra-ghana
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Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Prospect, 37 Foreign Aff. 45, 45 - 53(1958 -1959). Nkrumah who was secretary of the 1945
Manchester Pan African Conference, has presided the first Pan African Conference in Accra, Ghana. Limited
number of free African States took part in the Conference. Statesmen from Ghana, Ethiopia, Liberia, Morocco,
Sudan, Tunisia, and United Arab Republic ( now Egypt) took part in the Conference. After the Conference Nkrumah
visited capitals of all the participating nations to know more about African issues (common problems and purposes.)
Id.
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Touval supra note 43 at preface. The effort of Kwame Nkrumah to unit Africa and abolish all arbitrary boundary
that has disrupted communal life in Africa has been revived during the formation of African Union which decided
construction of Statue of Kwame Nkrumah in AU’s heard Quarter – Addis Ababa Ethiopia. See also Lalonde supra
note 23 at 116.

204

courageous Africans who worried about the future of Africa and campaigned for revision of African
boundaries all together or redraw African boundaries in a way it would reunite the split ethnic
groups.83 The 1958 Pan African conference of Accra among other things passed the following
border related Resolutions:84
o denounced artificial boundaries that has divided the people of Africa,
o demanded abolition or adjustment of colonial boundaries as soon as possible; and
o

asked independent States of Africa to work for the permanent solution for the
destructive colonial boundaries.

Pan African movements finally culminated in founding the first continental umbrella
organization.

Foreign ministers of independent African deliberated in Addis Ababa shaping

directions forward and paving ways for the historic mission of forming a continental organization –
the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

Determination of the nature of the continental

organization divided African leaders into two major camps.85 The Unionist Camp demanded
immediate political integration of Africa thereby abolishing colonial boundaries, whereas, Statist
group advocated for a loose continental organization in which the sovereignty, independence and
political integrity of constituent members maintained. Samuel Amoo succinctly puts the scenario of
formation of OAU as follows:
The OAU was very much a product of its time, and its principles and provisions reflect the
aspiration, concerns and fears of the founding fathers. [It…] evolved as a compromise solution
to the ideological disputes and divisions, which dogged Africans states at the initial stages of
systematic relations.86
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Touval supra note 43 at 18.
Id.
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Ideological division of African leaders had been boiling since All Peoples Conference that was held in Accra, Ghana.
At the time the balance of movement was toward political integration of Africa but when time went on African
leaders tend to support sovereignty and independent existence of each of the States. Ultimately the Statists
movement dominated the Unionist ideology which lead into formation of a compromised continual organization. See
Amoo, supra note 5.
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President Kwame Nkrumah had a strong will for the political unity of Africa with a view to avoid
the effects of arbitrary boundaries once and for all. However, most the founding fathers of OAU,
including King Haile Selassie, Jomo Kenyatta did not accept the political unity of Africa at the
time.87 The overwhelming majority of founding fathers were under statist camp decided to form a
loose continental organization. Ethiopia proposed a draft Charter which served as starting point for
deliberation on drafting the Charter of OAU. Most of the principles of the OAU charter were
dedicated to maintaining sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Member States
“preferring loose form of [continental] association based on principles of functions and
cooperation.”88
The original version of the Charter of OAU of 1963 did not explicitly stipulate how to deal
with the border issue that had been boiling since late 1950s, and that was the center of campaign by
the Pan African movements. Pan African movements openly blamed the arbitrary colonial
boundary that has split Africans. African border issues and liberation of Africa were among the top
points of deliberation in pre-independence conferences and in revisionist movement. Silence of the
original version of OAU Charter on African boundary issue may appear strange but it was for good,
as it gave time for the young continental organization not to be thwarted before its birth. African
border issue is very complex that affects everyone and not easy to resolve. In a situation where
compromise may not be easily reached, the founding fathers traded time by avoiding anything that
would block formation of the continental organization that thought to facilitate African unity.
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Kwame Nkrumah advocated for full continental integration as a necessary means to solve African socio-economic
and political deficiencies, due to inexplicable justifications, other founding father of OAU refused to honor the idea
of integration of African states forming a loose continental organization. The very motivation behind formation of
continental organization was integration but several limitations and constrains surfaced ( see SAHO, African Union
and Regional Economic Integration, http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/african-union-and-regional-economicintegration). See also Lalonde supra note 23 at 117.
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Amoo supra note 5.
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Due to the arbitrary partition of Africa, territorial and boundary issues were widespread.
There was hot territorial and boundary issue in North Africa. Morocco claimed the whole territory
of Mauritania and Sahara Arab Republic and portion of territories of Algeria. In East Africa
Somalia already started claiming certain territories of Ethiopia, Kenya. In a situation where every
state and founding fathers were overwhelmed with variety of interests, any attempt to deal with the
“unsolvable boundary issue” feared to turn continental relationship from bad to worse. Therefore,
prioritizing organizational unity before attempting to deal with inescapable colonial seed was a wise
decision.
The founding fathers of the continental organization have decided to keep status quo with a
view to maintain territorial integrity of Member States. It was absolutely not possible to go back to
the traditional African boundaries (pre-colonial boundaries), as the whole terrain was altered.
Colonial power had repeatedly changed pre-colonial frontiers, which rendered traditional zonal
nature of boundaries unrecognizable. Any attempt to redraw African boundaries in accordance with
the pre-colonial boundary lines would further complicate continental relationship. As a result, the
Charter sets out guiding principles instead of a specific provision that meant to resolve border
issues. In Art. 3(3) of the OAU Charter African Heads of State and Government have agreed to
maintain “[…] territorial integrity of each State and […] its inalienable right to independent
existence.”89 This provision does not directly address the impending border dispute but rather spells
out a general norm. Thus, territories of Member States were expected to continue as it was inherited
from colonial powers. The Revisionist agenda had been set aside in fear of opening Pandora’s box
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that was thought to activate unmanageable territorial and boundary conflict at all corners of
Africa.90
Remarks of the President Tsiranana of Madagascar and President Modibo of Mali at the in
the inaugural Conference of Organization of African Unity reveals compelling causes for African
territorial integrity norm.91 Apart from Morocco and Somali, the rest vast majority of newly
decolonized African States have unreservedly “endorsed the supremacy of the principle of
territorial integrity.”92 This was formally negotiated and incorporated into continental rule in first
ordinary OAU Summit, July 1964. Put simply, the founding fathers of OAU have consented to
recognize boundaries of new States, as it was existed on the critical date of independence. This
decision thus has effectively trashed the idea of redrawing African boundaries on the bases of
culture, religion, and ethnic affinity or the possibility of abolishing borders at all thereby creating
United States of Africa.93
Shortly after formation of the OAU, devastating border wars engulfed in the north and
eastern Africa. To find African solution for the on going wars and settle other looming border
issues, OAU convened the first ordinary session of Assembly Heads of States and Governments in
Cairo, Egypt. The Cairo summit has devised a specific rule governing issues involving African
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While President Kenyatta proposed for a special charter that expressly bound OAU Member States declaring
preservation of the territorial status quo, King Haile Selassie I of Ethiopia stressed for the “acceptance of colonial
boundaries necessary for Africa’s safety.” See Lalonde supra note 23 at 119.
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Unity, but “African leaders soon realized the risk involved in the abolishing the entire colonial territorial framework
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on independence. (Id.)
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boundaries. The main point of the Summit was the agreement to, respect border existing on
achievement of national independence.94 The motive behind the Cairo Resolution was maintaining
territorial integrity of Member States, and avoiding unmanageable territorial conflict. In Cairo
Summit, the Assembly Heads of State and Government pledged to respect borders of each Member
State actually possessed on achievement independence.95 The Assembly has agreed to respect
existing boundaries whether it was good or bad.96
Unlike Art. 3(3) of the OAU Charter, the Cairo Resolution was very specific and self
explanatory. Again, apart from Morocco and Somalia that had expansionist motives, the
overwhelming majority has voted to respect boundaries existed on critical date of independence.
Boundaries existing on the date of independence means boundary lines that a given state possessed
on the actual date of declaration or granting of independence. Therefore, unless otherwise agreed, a
State cannot claim a territory beyond the boundary it possessed on the date of independence. It
appears that the proponents of Pan African Movement who sought to revise colonial African
boundaries have changed their position and agreed to comply with the boundaries existed on
independence. This rule effectively bars Somalia and Morocco’s claims.
The Cairo Resolution of July 1964, in effect, appears synonymous to the Latin American
principle of uti possidetis.97 The usual issues with regard to the Cairo Resolution of 1964 was
whether it is an African innovative formulation which is different from the Spanish Latin American
principle of uti possideti or it is actually an African uti possidetis? This issue has split international
lawyers and tribunals as two camps. As the final goal of the Cairo Resolution and the Principle of
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Tomas Bartos, Uti Possidetis, Quo Vadis? 18 AUST. YBIL 56, 37-68 (1997
97
The African rule of “ respect for boundaries existing on independence” and the Principle of uti possidetsi appear
conveying the same meaning. The principle of uti possidetis, as has been discussed in chapter Three of this
Dissertation, means “ You may possess, as you possess” which basically the same with the meaning of continuing
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Uti possidetis, are analogous, international lawyers who are familiar with rationales the principle of
uti possidetis are quick to read the Cairo Resolution of July 9, 1964 to mean African uti
possidetis.98 Most commentators admit that the principle of uti possidetis is implicit in the Cairo
Declaration.99 Garth Abraham states,

“In its Cairo Declaration of 1964 the principle of uti

possidetis, although not explicitly referred to by name, was formally adopted by the organization of
Africa Unity.”100
Close assessment of the Resolution vis-à-vis the principle of uti possidetis, however, points
the contrary. A simple question that has to be answered at the outset is, if the founding fathers of
Organization of African Union were inspired by the Latin American Principle, as a conflict
avoidance tool, why they kept shy away from express recognition of the principle of uti possidetis
in the Cairo Resolution? The Cairo Resolution was passed at a time in which the contours of the
principles of uti possidetis were well settled, but why the African Heads of States and Governments
at the Cairo Summit opted to use a different the expression instead? Though some international
lawyers view that the founding fathers of OAU were inspired by the Latin American principle of uti
possidetis,101 it appears that the founders of African continental organization have deliberately

possession of boundaries that an African States continue to possess as it possessed on actual date of gaining
independence. The procedures entitling to continue possession, however, are not identical.
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As Lalonde attests, “Many commentators have argued that this respect for boundaries inherited from the colonial past
is simply the application in the African context of the Latin American principle of uti possidetis.” See Lalonde
supra note 5 at 104. Contantine Antonopoulos, for instances, states “ The Principle of uti possidetis Juris was also
applied in the course of decolonization in Africa.” Antonopoulos, supra note 95 at 32. Antonopoulos, assumes the
founding fathers of Organization of African Unity in the formative document declared the Principle and reaffirmed
the same principle in the Cairo Declaration of 1964.
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avoided use of the expression uti possidetis by applying a general expression “ boundaries existing
on the date of independence,” which need not be a boundary defined by colonial powers. The
intention of African leaders can also be read from objectives of Pan African Movement. The
Movement had a motto of redrawing boundaries of Africa to reunite the partitioned ethnic or tribal
groups, until it changed its stance by accepting to respect boundaries existed on independence.
There are numerous justifications to prove incongruence of the African meaning of colonial
boundary delineation rule, and the Latin American principle of uti pssidetis.

Unlike Latin

American States, Africa houses some States that never been colonized.102 As the principle of uti
possidetis explains only boundaries inherited from colonial powers, it has nothing to do with the
boundaries of States never been colonized. Most importantly, the principle of uti possidetis, as a
principle of defining international boundaries, was born in a situation where administrative
boundaries were inherited from a single colonial power - Spain. The principle of uti possidetis
never been applied even in South America States that were not colonized by Spain. Brazil which
was a colony of Portugal or other enclaves of South America that were colonized by other European
colonial power do not recognize the Principle of Uti possidetis Juris.103
Africa was colonized by several European powers. In some cases, a single ethnic group was
split into several European powers. Even if nations opt to rely on the principle of uti possidetis
acknowledging the doctrine of uti possidetis with all its deficiencies, it can be used to delimit
Resolution has some element identical concept. Antonopoulos poses the same view stating, “ The adoption of uti
possidetis juirs in Africa by virtue of the 1964 Cairo declaration has worked as the legal vehicle of reaffirming the
right of territorial integrity.” Constantine Antonopoulos, The Principles of Uti possidetis juris in Contemporary
International Law, 49 RHDI 29 996. Similarly, Thomas Bartos, for example, summarizes, “ Since the Cairo
Declaration says nothing of situations where colonial boundaries are physically non-existence, or incorrectly
demarcated, or where boundary documents cannot be interpreted without recourse to arbitration, the Declaration is
meaningless unless viewed as standing only for a broad principle of inheriting colonial boundaries.”
102
For instance, Ethiopia and Liberia never colonized. Ethiopian boundaries were set by treaty with the neighboring
States that were represented by their respective colonial powers. Boundaries of Ethiopia and Sudan, boundaries
between Ethiopia and Kenya, boundaries between Ethiopia and the current Somaliland were set by the treaties
concluded with Great Britain, while Eritrean boundaries was defined by three defunct treaties while Ethiopian and
Djibouti boundary was set between Ethiopia and France.
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boundaries that were inherited only from a single colonial power. This accords with the traditional
sense of the Principle as practiced in Spanish Latin America. In this regard, Bartos suggests, “[the
principle of uti possidetis] needs to be applied where the new States succeed to different
administrative units of the same colonial power.”104 In a situation where states have inherited
boundaries from different colonial powers, “It is unnecessary to have recourse to uti possidetis.”105
The situation in Africa is, essentially different from Spanish Latin America. Africa was not only
colonized by numerous colonizers, but also colonial powers repeatedly altered African territories
with a view to smooth their administration under divide and rule system.106 Apart from Ethiopia
that survived colonization by resisting several colonization attempts and Liberia that was protected
by the United States, the rest of Africa was partitioned among various super powers. A single ethnic
group, in certain cases was split into administration of multiple colonial powers. In east Africa, the
Somali ethnic group was shared among Great Britain, Italy, and France. In West Africa, the current
Cameroon was split into Great Britain and France. If the Principle originally meant to apply to
colonial administrative subdivision of a single colonizer, how could it work in Africa?
On top of this, most African boundaries were delineated by bilateral or multilateral treaties
either between African States among themselves after gaining independence, or an African State
and a colonial power. For instance, Ethiopia concluded a number of territorial or boundary treaties
with colonial power that had occupied neighboring east African States. In defining the northern
boundary, Ethiopia in 1900, 1902 and 1908 concluded boundary treaty with Italy that colonized
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Eritrea. Great Britain and Ethiopia concluded various colonial treaty governing Kenya, Sudan and
Somalia. After decolonization, Kenya, Sudan and Somalia succeeded the treaties thereby complying
with the boundary lines that were set by Ethiopia and Great Britain. Ethiopia concluded boundary
treaties with Italy regarding Ethio-Somalia boundary and successive treaties governing Eritrean
boundaries though Italy shortly terminated the treaties by invading Ethiopia thereby attempting to
unify both countries as Italian East Africa Colony.
Thus, if any issue arises in boundaries between Ethiopia and Kenya or Sudan it is possible
to resort to the Cairo Resolution. Had there been no treaty, by chance, the scope of the boundary
would have been determined in accordance with the limits of territory actual held on the critical
date of political independence. The principle of uti possideits can offer no better solution than the
Cairo Resolution in this regard. Boundaries of French Somali Land (now Djibouti) were set by
colonial treaties that were entered between Ethiopia and France. The same situation prevailed in
other areas of Africa.107 In this sui generis boundary setting that was created by bilateral or
multilateral treaty, it is the treaty that defines boundary – not the principle of uti possidetis.
The Cairo Resolution dictates Member States to respect pre-existing boundaries on the
critical date of independence. There are various ways of proving either critical date or colonial
boundaries. The date in which the colonial power expressly declared decolonization or forced to
leave political administration to the local people may be taken as the critical date in which the
starting point of the existing boundaries. Colonial treaties, colonial maps, other documents that can
prove the extent of colonial boundary limit, or in absence of all these effective control may prove
the limits of the colonial boundary line. Unlike the Latin American principle of uti possidetis juris,

War/Decolonization, INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FIRST WORLD WAR, http://encyclopedia.19141918-online.net/article/colonial_empires_after_the_wardecolonization (last visited Aug. 5, 2015 5:44 PM).
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the Cairo Resolution refers to the boundaries actually held on the very date of independence. Put
simply, boundaries were set by effective possession.
Thus, a nation cannot invoke a territory that it did not effectively control on the date of
independence. There is no assumption of possession. In accordance with the old Spanish law, the
Latin American principle of uti possidetis juris assumes all vacant lands were also assumed
occupied. But the African rules respects sanctity of territories of already occupied by the claimant
state. This aspect makes the African boundary law completely different from the Spanish Latin
American principle of uti possidetis. The principle of Uti possidetis de facto, which recognizes
boundaries of territories actually held on independence appears relevant to the African boundary
law, it is not an established international law even in Latin America.108
Moreover, the principle of uti possidetis never been consistently applied even in Latin
America. Brazil always rejected the principle of uti possidetis juris opting for application of uti
possidetis de facto. Even some former Spanish American colonies, albeit certain limited instances,
sidelined the Principle by contracting with Brazil or forming a bigger union of States reforming an
already formed international boundary into different form of internal boundary. Moreover,
application of the Principle of uti possidetis was effectively suspended territorial or boundary
conflict temporarily, but it did not offer a lasting solution for territorial or boundary conflict. The
usefulness of the principle of uti possidetis specifically to Africa, therefore, is unsubstantiated.
ICJ’s equation of the expression, “boundaries pre-existing on independence” with the
Spanish Latin American principle of uti possidetis juris in Frontier Dispute Case ( Burkina Faso
vs. The Republic of Mali)109 was not supported by any evidence, nor the intention and conduct of
founding fathers, suggest such assumption. The Cairo Resolution that was passed at a time Africa
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was chocked with engulfing territorial or boundary conflict did not mention a word or there is no
clue to deduce the possibility of application of the doctrine of uti possidetis in Africa. Given the
popularity of the Principle in 1964, Suzan Lalonde, aptly surmises that omission of the Principle of
uti possidetis from the most pertinent declaration, the Cairo Resolution of 1964 was “a deliberate
choice.”110
The Cairo Resolution by referring to expressions, “boundaries pre-existing at independent”
meant boundaries that a State possessed exactly on the critical date of independence and that can be
proved by unequivocal evidence. Thus, the African policy was effective occupation.111 Any attempt
to go beyond the lines effectively controlled at the critical time of acquiring independence, appears
contrary to the OAU charter and the Cairo Resolution. The Cairo Resolution gives no room to
constructive possession – in African sense, only territories actually possessed on the critical date
confers title. The actual possession rule aligns with the Brazil’s position of uti possidetis de facto,
but it is not an international law principle.112
4.5. Current State of African Boundaries: Transforming Borders from Barriers to Bridges
4.5.1. Moving Toward Integration of Africa: Leveling the Play Ground
The Pan African Movement’s motto of creating an independent, prosperous, peaceful and
united Africa appears revitalizing since the Algiers conference of Assembly of Heads of State and
Government.113 The 35th Ordinary Session of Assembly of Heads of State and Government took
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the initiative to work beyond “business as usual.” The Summit ended up with a great motivation
and ambition to move for ultimate political integration of Africa “[…to] enter the third millennium
with a genuine sprit of cooperation.”114 The Assembly of Heads of Stats and Governments (AHG)
in quest for unity, economic and social development have deliberated in length the possibility for
leveling the play ground for the ultimate political integration of Africa.115
The Assembly of Heads of States and Governments reassessed the socio-political and
economic journeys that OAU has travelled and have supported Colonial Muhammad Gadhafi’s
proposal for greater unity and cooperation of Africa to resist the challenges of globalization and
changing world phenomenon and improve living standards of Africans.116 The Algiers Resolutions
underpin the need for thorough deliberation to attain a greater unity with a view to cope with the
changing global social-political and economic situations that demand greater unity, strength and
determination to uplift the state of Africa.117
Visionary African leaders have expressed their dedication to change the usual journeys of
OAU by transforming its nature. African leaders applauded OAU’s success in playing pivotal role
during liberation movement against colonialism and apartheid. But due to external and internal
factors, OAU could not fully meet the expectations of Africans. According to Vincent, though

35th Ordinary Session of Assembly of Heads of State and Governments (AHSG) that was held in Algiers in July
1999 deliberated variety of continental and international issues. Among other things the proposal suggested by the
late Libyan leader, Muhammad Gadhafi geared toward political integration of Africa. The declaration of 35th
Ordinary Session of African Heads of States and Governments reveals that Muhammad Gadhafi suggested for
reshaping OAU and creating a strong continental organization that can align with the changing world phenomenon.
To deliberate on this noble agenda Assembly of Heads of States and Governments scheduled an extraordinary
conference to be held a month later ( Sep. 1999) in Sirte, Libya by the invitation of Colonel Ghadhaffi.
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“OAU played a central role in the political emancipation of colonized African states, but beyond
that it was of little relevance and effectiveness in shaping political, economic and social
development of the continent.”118Lack of good governance, neocolonialism, sporadic conflicts,
protracted territorial and boundary induced wars among Africans, and corruption have been the
usual phenomenon.
African leaders offered credit to the philosophy of visionary Pan Africanist,119 who sought
to abolish colonial boundaries and redraw genuine African boundaries in a way uniting balkanized
nations and nationalities with the ultimate goal of creating united Africa under the auspicious of
Pan African movement.120
Kwame Nkrumah’s vision of creating a united Africa was ultimately trashed in the Addis
Ababa Conference of 1963 that founded the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Kwame
Nkrumah foresaw possible consequences of fragmented Africa and arbitrary colonial boundaries
that has partitioned communities and restricted their right to use natural resources like grazing land
and water. President Kwame Nkrumah at the early days of independence of African nations
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Nimehielle supra note 115 242. Africans though technically free, but still remained under the bondage of poverty,
recurrent war, political instability, famine, corruption ( all sorts of evils). African
See Sirte Declaration Clausees 3 and 4 which recall the heroic struggles during liberation movement. Assembly of
Heads of States and Governments afforded respect to the Pan Africanists and the people of African for efforts
endeavored to consolidate African Unity. (Clause 4 of Sirte Declaration). The decision to erect a Statute in memory
of Kwame Nkrumah at the newly constructed AU head quarter in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia proves the credit afforded
to the extra-ordinary vision of creating United Africa. The Statute of Kwame Nkrumah gives grace to the head
quarter of the AU. The aspiration of the Pan Africanist was dumped at the very formation of the continental
organization where some parts of Africa were under the yoke of colonialism. Various rationale may be speculated:
interest of “corrupt and inept political elites” to be sovereign in their local land over the divided people with
competition for long time. (See Matua supra note 7 at 116. In fear of opening Pandora’s box that would saw
unavoidable boundary conflict all over Africa may be another reason why founding fathers of OAU have opted to
give respect for the colonial boundaries though it was arbitrary and artificial. The other reason may be the interest
of super powers that have been remotely controlling African leaders. For instance, Liberia did not out rightly reject
the idea of forming a United West Africa, but later changed it stance of joining the already united Ghana and
Guinea. Later on the then Leader of Liberia together with the leaders of Mali, and Ethiopia adversely fought Kwame
Nkrumah’s vision of forming a United States of Africa.
It was viewed that colonial boundaries disrupted the natural evolution of African indigenous boundary. Arbitrary
colonial boundary disregarded “[…] the age-long efforts of (the indigenous) peoples to achieve political adjustment
between themselves and the physical conditions in which they live.” J. C. ANENE THE INTERNIOANAL
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vigorously worked to create a unified and independent Africa with a view to fight natural and
manmade evils that have been cursing Africa. President Nkrumah went beyond mere political
campaign to create a united Africa.

121

Before the formation of Organization of African Unity

President Nkrumah attempted to unite neighboring regions of West Africa – Union of West Africa
States.122 Ghana and Guinea formed a United West Africa and attempted to incorporate Liberia.
After 50 years of the formation of OAU, facts on the grounds have been completely changed and it
appears not easy, if not possible at all, to launch a single continual political entity - the United
States of Africa.
The possibility of uniting Africa, however, is not a dead agenda.123 Inspired by the
cooperative spirit of Assembly of Heads of State and Government at the 35 Ordinary Session of
OAU in Algiers Algeria, the late Libyan strongman, Colonel Muhammad Gadhafi, vigorously
campaigned for immediate political unity of Africa. He invited African leaders to deliberate for
instant political integration of Africa. Clause 7 of Sirte Declaration manifests Gadhaffi’s
enthusiasm to form politically integrated and strong Africa that can resist challenges of

BOUNDARIS OF NIGERIA 1885 – 1960 3(1970) Quoted in Makau wa Mutua, Why Redraw the Map of Afirca: A
Moral and Legal Inquiry, 16 MICH. J. INT’L 1115, 1113 – 1176 ( 1994 – 1995).
121
Mwangi S. Kimenyi and Katrin Kuhmann, African Union: Challenges and Prospects for Regional Integration in
Africa, 13 WHITEHEADJ. DIPL. & INT’ REL. 7-27 (2012).
122
Paul-Mare Henry, Pan-Africanism: A Dream Come True, 37 FOREIGN AFF. 450, 443 – 452 (1958 – 1959).
123
After 50 years of decolonization, due internal and external factors good brotherly relationship is spoiled.
Communism and cold war era world relationship has spoiled Africa. There is a wide gap in socio-economic and
political development among Africans. Colonialists, with a view to divide and rule Africa, have spoiled African
nationalism and good brotherly relationship by Africa by planting protracted problems as a result of which brotherly
people sought separation with a view to exploit weak side of neighboring States that was built by colonial powers.
Take for example the boundaries of Ethiopia. Before Arrival of Italian boots in coastal areas of Red Sea, in all
standards and proof, Ethiopia’s boundary extended into the Red Sea. Italy cut all the coastal areas and formed the
colony of Eritrea by changing its former name “Bahir Negash.” France took the coastal land- Djibouti and Ethiopia
though few miles away from Red Sea now landlocked. Now separation from the motherland, Ethiopia, has been
source of income to Eritrea and Djibouti as they can simply live by the income they get from the port fee that
Ethiopia pays. African unity would avoid this advantage to Eritrea and Djibouti. Moreover, the leaders of this tiny
States would compete with more competent persons to lead the nation. It is hard to convince selfish leader who
desire to retain power for life. In order to Unit Africa as a one political entity, it may take years to change the
attitude of African leader and level ground for creating United States of Africa by reducing poverty, developing
infra structure and developing stronger tie by creating peace. Border can play vital role in uniting Africa by creating
peace among Africa.( the role of borders in keeping peace among the neighboring States will be dealt later.),
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globalization and protect interests of Africa. With this view in mind, by the invitation of Colonel
Muhammad Gadhafi, fourth extra-ordinary Summit of Assembly of Heads of States and
Governments was held in Sirte, Libya to assess possible ways for political integration of Africa.124
Assembly of Heads of State and Government, in principle, accepted the possibility of
uniting Africa as a single political entity.125 Simply put, there was no strong objection against the
proposed political integration of Africa, but immediate political integration was almost impossible.
In a situation where divisive consequences of colonization have been spread all over the continent,
immediate political integration would easily be thwarted. Due to arbitrary colonial partition of
Africa and other disruptive seeds that were sown by the colonial powers, animosity and hatred still
reigns in some vicinities of Africa.126 There are potential internal and external forces that can spoil
any move for immediate political integration: former colonial hands still subtly control Africa.127
Consequently, African Heads of States and Governments have agreed to level the
playground for viable political integration before rushing to set up a single continental political
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The Fourth Extra ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government was inspired by the Pan
African movement that restlessly worked of the pressing African issue of the time and attempted to create United
States of Africa. As stated in the Sirte Declaration, participants of Summit declared: “ […] we were inspired by the
ideals which guided the Founding Fathers of our Organization and Generations of Pan-Africanists in their resolving
to forge unity, solidarity and cohesion, as well as cooperation between African people and among African States.”
Sirte Declaration Clause 3.
125
Participants of Sirte Assembly expressed their inspiration by the proposal of Colonel Muammar Ghaddafi and “his
vision for strong and united Africa capable of meetings global challenges and shouldering it responsibility to harness
the human and natural resources of the continent in order to improve the living condition of its people.” See Clause
7 of Sirte Declaration.
126
Take for example the case of relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The ambiguous boundary line between
Ethiopian and Eritrea has created animosity among Ethiopians and Eritreans. Both of the States host rebels of each
other. Almost an identical attitude exists between Eritrea and Djibouti.
127
It appears not completely wrong if one says Africa is not completely independent. Though, technically Africa is free
and independent, neocolonialism still persists. Most African State depends on foreign budgetary subsidy. Under the
guise of human rights violation or western ideology, African States indirect control of the West. One can fairly
imagine if any former French colonies integrate with another African nation. For instance, France has military base in
Djibouti. If Djibouti, for instance, moves for political integration with any other African State, France would not keep
quiet. With respect to political changes taking in any of the former French, colonies France is quick to react than any
African neighboring States or Regional Economic Communities or African Union. In current state if Africa moves for
political integration, it is not hard to guess the direct or indirect reaction of United States or other European powers.
Therefore, for a meaningful integration to take place all threats have to be tackled. Smoothing relationship among the
member states may take time but would produce a suit fruit. Thus, border issues have to be resolved amicably and
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entity. Accordingly, in Sirte Summit Assembly Heads of State and Government extensively
deliberated on possible ways of setting up a continental organization that can effectively work
toward fulfilling the mission and attain the vision of African integration goals by keeping “[…]
pace with political, economic and social developments taking place within and outside […the]
continent.”128 As Nmehielle, attests, “The Sirte declaration was based on frank and extensive
discussions on ‘how to proceed with strengthening of the unity of our continent and its people’ and
contained a decision to establish […]”129 A continental organization akin to the European Union in
which each Member State retains its sovereignty until facts on the ground steadily changes for the
future political integration. At present Europe is moving toward political integration under the
strong continental organization – European Union. Internal national boundaries have been changed
enabling everyone to move freely in the Schengen area. Free movement and monetary union are
some of the achievements of the European Union that may lead into a smooth political integration.
In relative thinking, it may be said that Africa was in a better position for integration during
the Pan African movement. Africa has missed a better moment for possible political integration
when Pan Africanism was at its high and enthusiastic African intellectuals were with full vigor and
spirit of Africanism.130

Since launching of OAU, African States have messed with evil

consequences of colonization that seeded perpetual antagonism.131 For instance, due to expansionist
move of Morocco and Somalia destructive wars erupted. Somalia attempted to unit ethnic Somali

good neighborhood should be created. Economic empowerment brings about political empowerment, the African
Union should work for economic integration before moving for complete political integration.
128
Clause 2 of Sirte Declaration EAHG/Draft/Decl.(IV) Rev.1 FOURTH EXTADODINARY SESSION OF THE
ASSEMBLY OFHEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT 8 – 9 Sep. 1999 See also Nimehielle supra note 111
at 241.
129
Id.
130
This does not, however, mean that Kwame Nkrumah’s effort for political unity was failed without resistance.
Ethiopia, Mali, Liberia strongly argued against political integration. Liberia spoiled the already started political
integration with Ghana and Guinea. Though a clear justification is not revealed, one may speculate foreign
interference against formation of a strong Africa that may be easy to manipulate.
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people in Ethiopia and Kenya by waging war against both of the neighboring States. There was
boundary war between Egypt and Sudan, Morocco and Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania, Morocco
and Sahrawi Arab, Chad and Libya, Nigeria and Cameroon, Mali and Burkina Faso, Tanzania and
Uganda and so forth.132
With this goal in mind, African leaders in Sirte, Libya have decided to phase out OAU and
set up a new continental umbrella organization, African Union, to accelerate political integration.
The constitutional document (Constitutive Act of African Union) was deliberated and adopted in
Lome Summit of July 2000.133 African Union was officially come into existence after 36th
accession of Nigeria on May 26, 2001.134 For the purposes of paving a smooth road map by
structuring and defining the role of constitutive organs of African Union Lusaka Summit was
convened. The Lusaka Summit of July 2001 set up major department that thought to play
significant role for realization of the objectives of African Union. Finally, in December 2002
African Union was formally launched thereby formally dissolving OAU.135
Though there are lingering doubts among ordinary Africans and the academia136 that the
transformation of OAU into AU was merely a change of name, the mission and expected goals are
not strictly alike. According to AShlegh Lezard, a contributor of African Inventor (Ai), while
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See Abdalla Burja, African Conflicts: Their Causes and Their Political and Social Environment, DPMF Occasional
Ppaer No. 4 (2002), http://www.dpmf.org/images/occasionalpaper4.pdf According to Abdalla, though all post
colonial African Conflicts were not border motivated, about 80 conflicts surfaced in Africa. Id.
132
According to Timothy Besley and Marta Reynal- Querol, since 1950 African conflict propensity approaching to
double the rest of world. In Armed Conflict Database (ACD) “measure of Civil Conflict on threshold of 1000 battle
deaths suggests that around 8.5% of country years in Africa since 1950 are conflict years compared to 5% of [ …
]the rest of the world.” Timothy Besley and Marta Reynal- Querol, The Legacy of Historical Conflict Evidence from
Africa, EOPP/036 (2012), http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/dps/eopp/eopp36.pdf
133
See http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/african-union-au/
134
Jeremy I. Levitt et al, The African Union and The New Pan Africanism: Rush to Organize or Timely Shift, 13
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTMP. PROBS. 2 (2003).
135
Thirty Six Ordinary Session of Assembly of Heads of States and Governments, AHG/Decl.2(XXXVI) Tog Lomme
July 10 – 12, 2000, http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/treaty/CSSDCA_Lome_Decl.pdf, See also
http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/african-union-au/o
136
See Levitt et all supra note 121. Dero Olowu expressed his doubt stating: “[…] despite noble pronouncement, the
African Union is dogged by doubts that it will not achieve any more of tis goals than its predecessor, the OAU.” The
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“OAU was about ‘Unity”; the AU is about ‘Union’ [and] unlike OAU, the AU is preparing to take a
stand.”137 Among other things, the formation of African Union has created new feeling and boosted
“[…] consciousness in the African continent among its leaders and its citizenry arising [….] That
feeling or consciousness is expressed in the term African Renaissance [….]”138 African Renaissance
means Africa should be able to solve its problems and uplift moral and logistic needs of its people.
Business as usual should end and Africa should unit to tackle all socio-economic challenges that the
continent has been wrangling.139
As underpinned in the Sirte Declaration, the prevailing continental and global challenges
have necessitated the formation of a strong continental organization that can empower Africans to
address the socio-economic and political hurdles of contemporary world.140 The objectives,
modalities, and modus operandi of African Union are different from the purposes and goals of the
OAU.141 AU is conferred with variety of responsibilities to accelerate a way for African political
integration. The creation of African Union Peace and Security Department is a noble move that
make AU practically differ from OAU. OAU was guided by the neutrality principle, which

authors agree to Olowu stating, “ This skepticism may be well founded because of formidable normative institutional
, and structural imperfections.” Id.
137
Ashelegh Lezard, Valuing Integration, AFRICAN INVETOR (Ai), July 1, 2004,
http://www.africainvestor.com/article.asp?id=468
138
Vincent O. Nimehielle, The African Union and African Renaissance: A New Era for Human rights Protection in
Africa? 7 SINGAPORE J. INT’L L & COMP. L. (2003) Quoted in Nimehielle supra note 111 at 242
139
This was Gadhafi ‘s vision. Colonel Gadhafi was regarded as dictator and synonymized as African Sadam Hussen,
but his ambition for African Renaissance appreciated by many Africans. With a view to speed up African political
integration Colonel Gadhafi, invited African Heads of States and Government to conduct a fourth extraordinary
meeting in Sirte, Libya.
140
See Clause 6 of the Sirte Declaration.
141
While promoting unity and solidarity of African States was one of the prime objectives of OAU, AU is expected to
achieve a greater unity and solidarity between African States and the people of Africa. The extent of unity that AU
has to achieve is greater. AU is not simply expected to promote unity and solidarity, but has been endeavoring to
achieve it. AU is also mandated to achieve the unity among African people and strengthen it. Some of the objectives
of OAU are already phased out. One of the objectives of OAU was eradicating colonialism. The purpose is already
attained. AU is mandated ‘to accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent. While working
for ultimate political integration is not the main motto of OAU, AU is expressly mandated to promote peace,
security and stability on the continent. Though this was implicit in the OAU’s mandate, the Constitutive Act of AU
has afforded constitutional authority that must be achieved. Unlike OAU, AU got a wide range of mandates that
consider socio-economic and political development.
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prohibited interference in domestic affairs of Member States.142 But AU is legally empowered to
intervene should grave atrocities that could spoil peace and stability surface in anyone of the
Member States.143 AU has clear vision and mission – facilitating political integration of Africa –
with the motive of making Africa a nation caring for all Africans equally. Anything short of this
may be redundant or simply a side issue.
With the objective of building strong and close relationship among the Member States, AU
is set to perform variety of tasks that may foster friendship, cooperation and regional integration.
New Partnership for African Development, NEPAD is among the programs that are believed to
bolster smooth ties among Africans.144 NEPAD has the objective of uplifting the economic position
of Africa, which in turn would make positive contribution for African political integration.145
Specifically, NEPAD aims at eradicating poverty in Africa.146 Poverty affects integration – a
prosperous nation may hesitate to mingle with a weaker one that comes with burden, but has little to
offer.147 Today, trade relationship among African nations is very low.148 This may be explained in
various ways. A poor nation is generally unproductive and may simply look for assistance. Even if
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The Rwanda Genocide has shaded a dark strain on OAU, as it did little to avert the slaughter of African on account
of maintaining the policy of non-interference in domestic affairs of Member States.
143
The main objectives of PSC is to oversee African peace and stability, which includes conflict prevention measures,
conflict management and resolution. PSC has the objective of controlling acts and facts disturbing peace in Africa. It
will have a regular force that may be deployed instantly to avert a grieve condition that may lead into gross human
right violation or genocide. See Ahlegh Leznd , Valuing Integration, AFRICAN INVESTOR ( Ai), July 1, 2004,
http://www.africainvestor.com/article.asp?id=468
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Declaration AHG/Decl.1 (XXXVII) adopted by the 37th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government of the OAU, Lusaka, Zambia 9 – 11 July 2001.
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African States have to open their doors to their neighbors; a nation cannot interact with neighbors while locked up by
borders. Mo Ibrahim, Africa’s telecommunication Miguel, remarks,
“[…] people normally trade with their
neighbors first and then move further afield. That hasn’t been the case in Africa and that what we really need to start
encouraging. We need free movement of people and over trade across local borders. Not only will that encourage the
economy, it is also a safeguard against conflict.” See Ashlegh Lezard, Valuing Integration, AFRICAN INVESTOR
(Ai), Jul 1, 2004, http://www.africainvestor.com/article.asp?id=468
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Nimehielle supra note 138
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Though border dispute takes lion’s share of interstate conflict in Africa, poverty is another ground for conflict. See
See also Johson Oalaosebikan Aremu, Conflict in Africa: meaning, Causes, Impact and Solution, 4(4) AFRICAN
RES. REV. 549 553, 549 – 560 (2010).
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Mwangi S. Kimenyi and Katrin Kuhmann, African Union: Challenges and Prospects for Regional Integration in
Africa, 13 WHITEHEADJ. DIPL. & INT’ REL. 7-27 (2012).

223

it is able to export some to the neighboring nation, commodities may be uncompetitive in term of
quality and cost. After all, products of most weak nations are agricultural produce and a
neighboring state may not have taste, as it also produces an identical product. On top of this, poor
infrastructure, and undeveloped transportation channels increase cost. As a result, African States
prefer to trade with Europe or Asian States in exchange for their industrial products.149
Fragmented nation states, and their boundaries worsen the situation.150 Due to dispute most
boundaries are not open for free passage, which requires to travel far distant that adds up cost.151
The effect of arbitrary colonial boundaries is very evident in the cases of landlocked States. Africa
houses 15 of the world’s land locked nations that depend on boundaries of neighboring states that
may not necessarily be open in all times.152 As Uprety attests, “ Excessive high transit costs inflate
the consumer prices of imported goods in LLDC and undermine the competitiveness of their
exports in foreign market. They are thus a serious barrier to trade.”153 It is not only changing transit
cost but also the whole situation depends upon political will of the neighboring state. For instance
due to Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, the border has been closed for more than a decade and Ethiopia
cannot use the port that it built before Eritrea’s secession. Ethiopia has to depend on small Djibouti
port or has to travel long distance to port Sudan or to another longer distance Mombasa port,
Kenya. In all cases Ethiopian people suffer from additional unnecessary cost. This also affects
competitiveness of Ethiopian products in continental or global market.
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Id.
For instances the cost of import cars manufactured in Ethiopia to Ivory coast will coast $5000 while a better can be
imported from Japan to ivory cost at $1500. Similarly, it is cost effective to deal with Europe or Asia to the Eastern
African nations. Thus, poor infrastructure and fragmented boundary system discourage inter Africa trade. See Id, at 9.
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Available at http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/documents/JHD051P003TP.pdf
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To achieve the vision of continental unity and ultimate political integration among the
Member States, all “stumbling blocks” should be tackled – closed boundary walls are some of the
determinants. Removing boundary wall or changing its nature from barriers to bridges will speed up
integration and ultimately enhance wellbeing of common people. This will enable Africans to trade
with their fellow Africans and will boost global competitiveness. Free movement of goods and
services will not only reduce cost and promote welfare system of bordered people, but also it would
strengthen interdependence and unity.154 Realization of NEPAD’s objectives would make immense
contribute for AU’s integration goals by emancipating Africans from economic dependence, which
would indirectly affect Africa’s political integration.
The other important milestone of AU is the objective of maintaining continental peace and
stability. In addition to the economic challenges that Africans have been struggling, erratic conflict
that unexpectedly explodes at all corner of Africa is another factor that would hamper
integration.155 The Chairperson of the Commission in the report for the African ministers attests this
points.156 Needless to say conflict resolution or prevention is pivotal for keeping peace and stability
to create smooth relationship among the member States for the ultimate goal of political integration.
As revealed in Clause 6 of the Sirte Declaration, the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments
have expressed their commitment to eliminate “ […] the scourge of conflicts, which constitutes a
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The current friendly relationship between Ethiopia and Djibouti explains positive effects of changing barrier nature
of border to bridges. While Ethiopia uses Djibouti port, Djibouti gets low cost hydroelectric power from Ethiopia.
Ethiopia also provides free underground water to Djibouti. Ethiopians do a lot of investments and businesses in
Djibouti. As a result of socioeconomic link between the people and good relation between the Government of
Ethiopia and Djibouti, the President of Djibouti tipped the possibility of political integration of both nations, if the
people of both States so desire. See also Addis Tribune, May 08, 1998 which quoted Mr. Ismail Omar Geleh saying
that authorities in Djibouti would exert every effort to work for economic and political integration of two countries.
See http://www.biyokulule.com/Ethio_Djibouti_Union.htm
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Report of the Chairperson of the Commission (AUBP) on the 3rd Conference of African Ministers in Charge of
Border Issues ( EX. CL/726(XXI).
156
The Chairperson states, “ [N]on – definition of borders constitutes an obstacle to the process of economic
integration, which the Member States are striving to achieve.” Id. Non-definition – imprecise boundary line by itself
cannot affect integration but its consequences obviously strains good relationship with also strains integration. If
there is suspicion or animosity, states stay away which makes integration impossible.
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major impediment to the implementation of […] development and integration agenda.” (Clause 6 of
Sirte Declaration). Conflict over territory or border conflict takes lion’s share in Africa. As pointed
out in Chapter 2 and 3 of this work, territorial or border conflict is very sensitive and can
unexpectedly flare up into armed confrontations. Therefore, avoiding root causes of territorial or
border conflict has been the most important concern of the continental organization (AU and even
the predecessor OAU).157
For the purposes of solving existing territorial or border conflicts and tackle other
multifaceted intra or inter- state disputes, that may obstruct political integration of Africa, the
Constitutive Act of African Union has created an organ that is responsible for overseeing the
maintenance of peace and security in Africa.158 The protocol for setting up of African Peace and
Security Council was initiated in Lusaka Conference of 2001 at which the structure of AU was
designed.159 This means the architectural design of main constitutive organs of AU was devised at
the Lusaka Conference of July 2001. At the Lusaka Summit, African Heads of State and
Government have “ […] decided to incorporate Central Organs of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict
Prevention, Management and Resolution as on of the organs of the Union in accordance with
Article 5(2) of the Constitutive Act [….]”160At the Durban Conference, 23 Member States of AU
have signed the Protocol, which was ultimately ratified in Maputo Summit.161 The Protocol
Relating to the Establishment of Peace and Security Council came into force on December 26,
2003.
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Government of the OAU 9 – 11 July 2001.
160
Preamble to Draft Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union ( 9
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Peace and Security Council (PSC) is one of the core organs of AU that is responsible to
speed up the realization of the visions of AU by working for “prevention, management and
resolution of conflicts.”162 It is “ […] the African Union’s standing decision–making body
responsible for maintenance of continental peace and security.”163 PSC is analogous to the Security
Council of UN. Members of PSC are elected from each zone. The number of members of PSC is
equal to the members of Security Council of UN, but PSC bestows neither permanent membership
nor veto power – all the Member States have equal role and power. Five of the Member States from
each zone elected for 3 years terms and the rest 10 members elected for 2 years. Re-election is
possible.164
PSC is entrusted with multifaceted powers that are assumed to make immense contribution
in the endeavor to maintain peace and security in Africa. As the name suggests the PSC Department
of AU has the objective of promoting peace, security and stability in Africa.165 The three objectives
of PSC are vital to the conflict-ridden Africa. Africa is blessed with natural resources and hard
working people on whose labor enriched “others”, but ironically at present Africa is struggling to
feed its people. It is puzzling to import food from Europe while Africa is endowed with fertile land
and hard working people. The driving force behind Africa’s poverty is not secret. Since heyday of
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See Ahlegh Leznd , Valuing Integration, AFRICAN INVESTOR ( Ai), July 1, 2004,
http://www.africainvestor.com/article.asp?id=468
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See www.peacau.org, The creation of PSC decided by the declaration AHG/Dec160 (xxxvii) of Lusaka Summit of
July 2001.
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Art. 2(1) PROTOCOL REALTING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL
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THE AFRICAN UNION. AU’s Peace and Security Department will be assisted by the Commission, council of Wise
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THE AFRICAN UNION

227

its independence Africa has been messed with unending international or civil wars.166 Needless to
say, Africans will reap a better life by using resources that the continent is endowed with if peace
and security prevails in the continent. Admittedly, no external force can change the prevailing
African situation – only Africans can transform Africa. To this end, Africans should get united and
use all available resources and power at disposal to fight colonial and neocolonial evils that have
been “embarrassing” Africans and strain peaceful coexistence. With this goal in mind, PSC has set
a road map to tackle causes of conflict being assisted with other organs of AU.167 Currently, PSC is
reactive, which exposes weakness of Africa to resolve its problems. But PSC has to be proactive
which will enable Africa to anticipate potential conflict situations and contain it before it actually
flares up. PSC has the responsibility not only to make peace in Africa but also it is entrusted with
peace building role which also includes “[,,.] post conflict reconstruction activities to consolidate
peace and prevent the resurgence of violence” by coordinating and harmonizing continental
efforts.168
PSC respects “[…] the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Member States.”169 One may
fairly question how PSC may intervene without encroaching sovereignty of a state? Non 166

Abdalla Burjua surmises that almost all interstate conflicts in Africa are border conflicts. See Abdalla Burja, African
Conflicts: Their Causes and their political and social Environment, DMPF No. 4 5, 1 – 49 (2002). See also Johson
Oalaosebikan Aremu, Conflict in Africa: meaning, Causes, Impact and Solution, 4(4) AFRICAN RES. REV. 559
550, 549 – 560 (2010). Aremu aptly observes, “The history of Africa as a continent is replete with conflict.” Id at
549. The Moroccan war against the neighboring states and the expansionist policy Somalia are repeatedly as wars
among Africans even before colonial boots completely left Africa. The current chaotic situation in South Sudan
explains how seeds of colonialism spoil internal and external relationships. The cause for split of Sudan is the
divisive polity of Great Britain, which favored the Arab north. Sudan experienced a clear visible division in terms of
education, power sharing, culture, religion etc. On top of this, administrative boundaries were porous. The South and
North Sudan could not see each other as brothers; as a result they battled for separation. After getting independence,
the North Sudan and South Sudan fought over undefined boundary lines and border resources. Antagonistic
relationship with North and South Sudan compounded with internal ethnic division, power trust, lack of good
governance and poverty.
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Id. Art. 4(b) , Art. 5(b) See also Art. 7 (1) a Early Warning System and assessment and advice of Wise Men, armed
force that can take quick action in case of grave atrocity are some of the organs of Au that can assist in realization of
the objective of PSC.
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Id. Art. 3(b) (c) PROTOCOL REALTING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PEACE AND SECURITY
COUNCIL OF THE AFRICAN UNION Id. Art. 6(e).
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Id. Art. 4(e).
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intervention in domestic affairs is one of the basic pillars upon which principles of AU are built.
There are certain preconditions that need to be satisfied before PSC intervenes. First, PSC will not
intervene unless a grave situation that is thought to adversely spoil peace and security (like mass
atrocity) surfaces and a Member State that is primarily responsible to protect its people and either
unable or fails to discharge its responsibility.170 The other important oversight is the need to get
authorization. Before intervening in the affairs of a Member State, PSC has to secure the go ahead
from Assembly of Heads of State and Government pursuant to Art. 4(h) of the Constitutive Act.171
The failure of AU to deploy peacekeeping mission in Burundi was the first challenge that PSC has
confronted with. The Government of Burundi strongly condemned AU’s decision to keep peace
threatening to fight peacekeeping mission. This has halted the plan.
4.5.2. African Union Border Program (AUBP)
As border conflict takes lion’s share of Africa’s interstate conflicts and wars,172 AU has
launched a special programmatic approach called African Union Border Program (AUBP)
specifically meant to focus on border problems.173 AUBP is the most significant innovative
approach of AU. As Ambassador Lamamra remarks:
Africa is finally waking up to the fact that the absence of visible boundaries on the ground can
hamper the co-existence and trade that are driving Africa’s demographic and economic
dynamism. The African Union Border Programme (AUBP) is a vital factor in importing and
modernizing the continents border regimes.174
170

The intervention mechanism of PSC are identical to R2P when gross human rights violation occurs and the State that
has the primary responsibility to protects is the perpetrator or is unable or unwilling to stop it. See DAN KUWALI
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Dealing with African borders is a conflict avoidance or conflict prevention strategy. As has
been repeatedly pointed out, African boundaries are not only arbitrary and divisive, but also poorly
defined and not precisely demarcated or impossible to demarcate. It is often said that porous nature
of African boundaries has been source of protracted conflict and seed hatred among the neighboring
States and their subjects. To avert divisive effect of the boundaries and create friendship among the
Africans Pan Africanists moved to unite Africa by abolishing colonial boundaries, but in fear of
presumed chaotic situation, the founding fathers of Organization of African Union have trashed the
revisionist agenda of abolishing colonial boundaries. The Assembly of African Heads of States and
Governments has concluded that any attempt to revise borders to go back to the pre-colonial state
would cost more than it would benefit. Now, it appears neither possible nor desirable to redraw
African borders in way reconnecting the balkanized ethnic or tribal groups back to the original
form, but it is possible to unit the partitioned people by changing the nature and effect of borders.
As Lord Curzon rightly observes boundaries hold two opposing scenarios: war and peace.
Lord Curzon when asked to lecture at his former University on any topic of his interest, his first
choice was to lecture about frontiers. The points of Lord Curzon’s famous lecture of 1907 are still
relevant to the 21st century Africa.175 He rightly said, “Frontiers are indeed the razor’s edge on
which hang suspended the modern issues of war or peace of life or death to nations.”176 (Emphasis
mine). Borders thus have potential to ignite war or are channels for building peace among bordered
people. Needless to say we have to avoid the “war” side of borders and build the “peace” aspect– it
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Conflicts involving frontiers is an old issue and it was so hot in late 19th and 20th in which European colonial powers
were rushing to occupy territories of Africa and Asia. The rush and competition to occupy African territories has
sawn permanent wound in Africa that is not easy to treat. Therefore, boundary issue is still current in Africa and has
been consuming lives and resources. Border issue is still hot in Africa in 21st century. To build peace in Africa and
thereby change lives of perishing Africans there is no priority than settling with border issue.
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Lord Curzon, Text of the 1907 Romanes Lectures on the Subject of Frontiers,
https://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/ibru/resources/links/curzon.pdf accessed 10/30/15 at 11:43 A.M
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is not a matter of choice, but it is a matter of death or life, which any perceptive mind cannot take a
second to choose.
The current state of African boundaries points the length of journey that AUBP has to go in
order to attain it goals. African borders are still elusive and remain as battle ground that still bear
poisonous fruits that destroy Africans. In 2007 only 25% of African borders were demarcated and
in 2012 this figure moved upwards by 10% (totally 30% African borders were demarcated).177 In
order to realize a viable political integration this situation has to be changed. Being aware of the
fact that undefined boundaries can hamper the move for political integration AU has set up African
Union Border Program (AUBP) as a unit under the Peace and Security Department.
AUBP is mandated to build peace in Africa by changing the nature of borders in a way it
could be used to bear integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa. Changing the current state of
African borders is not easy, but it is possible. African Union, under AUBP has been intensively
working to change barrier nature of borders that has been source of animosity to bridges that would
serve as points of contact and cooperation. Numerous conferences of African boundary experts,
council of ministers and Assembly were held and declarations were passed.178 Transforming
African borders from points of separation to the points of contact is one of the objectives of African
Union Border Program (AUBP). At the time of liberation of Ethiopian from five year so Italian
occupation an author remarked, “ The tendency today must be towards integration, not partition.
The balkanization of Africa can hardly be the aim of enlightened statesmanship.”179 By shaping
borders from barriers to bridges, it is certainly possible to reunite the partitioned ethnic or tribal
177

Report of 3rd Conference of African Ministers in Charge of Border Disputes, Niamey, Niger 14 – 16 May 2012.
(EX.CL/726 (XXI) Annex I The goal of demarcating all African boundaries is postponed until 2017 but no current data
publically available.
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The Conference of March 2007 of African boundary experts was held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The Addis Ababa
Conference of June 2007 passed the first declaration on African border program, the July 2007 Conference that was
held in Niamey, Niger that passed the second declaration, and 2010 Addis Ababa declaration that passed the third
declaration.
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groups thereby resolving the age old question of free passage to their ancestral land or grazing field
or water sources.
AUBP is entrusted with a huge and difficult of task of assisting coordinating the making of
clear boundaries within the defined time framework. There was a plan to delimit and demarcate the
whole African boundary by 2012, but little gains were achieved.180 As a result, the time framework
has been extended to 2017. So far there is no data indicating further work or it is not publicly
available. Given the volume of work and outstanding border conflicts and shortage of resource, it is
not hard to assume further extension of time framework. The border conflict of horn of Africa is
simply suspended. Ethiopian and Eritrean troops are extremely vigilant expecting to full trigger at
any moment. Almost the same scenario is expected in border between Eritrea and Djibouti. The
Ethiopia Sudan border though appear settled as a result of the current friendly relationship between
the two governments, imprecise border (Non-demarcated) border has been source of tension.181
AUBP is empowered to enforce African border related laws since heyday of OAU,
resolution of African Heads of State and Government, Declarations of Council of Ministries, AU
Constitutive Act, and other continental and international principles of that meant to keep peace and
security. Brief overview of the governing principles, mandates, achievements, and challenges of
AUBP are briefly summarized below.
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Robert Gale Woolbert, The Future of Ethiopia, 20 FOREIGN AFF. 546, 537 – 551 (1941 -1942).
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note 177.
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4.5.2.1.

Legal Authorities and Guiding Principles182

1. At present, the supreme legal authority governing border delineation in Africa is the
Constitutive Act of AU. The Act has reaffirmed the Cairo Resolution of 1964 in which
African Heads of States and Governments adopted to respect borders existing on
independence and incorporated into the AU Constitutive Act.183
2. The principle of negotiated settlement of border dispute is one of the guiding principles of
AU as a successor of OAU.184 In accordance with the Resolution CM/Res/1069 (XLIV)
adopted by the 44th Ordinary Session of Council of Ministries of OAU in 1986, Member
States of AU should endeavor to resolve all territorial disputes peacefully.
3. AU’s affirmation to carry out delimitation and demarcation all African boundaries for the
purpose of building peace and security in Africa with the goal of achieving socio-economic
progress (affirmed in Resolution CM/Res.1069(XLIV).
4. The Memorandum of Understanding on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in
Africa (CSSDCA) that African Heads of States and Governments have adopted to delimit
and demarcate African boundaries in first ordinary session of AU, Durban 2002.
5. The mission and vision of AU that derives all constitutive organs to work for the ultimate
end of political integration of Africa. In this regard legal framework for cross border
cooperation that would accelerate the integration of Africa.185
6.

The Declarations on the African Union Border Program adopted by the Conference of
African Ministries in charge of border issues.

7.

African Union decisions related to border issues including Decisions EX CL/370 (X) and
Ex, CL/Dec.461 (XIV) adopted by the 11th and 14th Ordinary Sessions of the Executive
Council of the African Union in June 2007 in Ghana and January 2009 in Addis Ababa.
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DEMARCATION OF AFRICAN BOUNDAREIS: GENERAL ISUES AND CASE STUDY, DEPT OF PSC,
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COLLECTION OF OFFICIAL TEXTS OF AFRICAN BORDERS FROM 1963 – 2012 7(2013).
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183
Resolution of First Ordinary Session of Assembly of the African Heads of State and Government, AHG/Res. 16(1)
on principle of respect of borders existing at the time of accession to national independence (Cairo July 1964). This
Resolution directly succeeded by Art. 4(b) of AU Constitutive Act. See also Peace and Security Department,
Declaration on the African Union Border Prgramme and The Modalities for the Pursuit and Acceleration of Its
Implementation, 3 (2010), http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/aubp-dec-e.pdf
184
Peace and Security Department, Declaration on the African Union Border Prgramme and The Modalities for the
Pursuit and Acceleration of Its Implementation, 3 (2010), http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/aubp-dec-e.pdf
185
Niamey Convention on African Union Convention Cross-border Cooperation May 17, 20012.

233

8. The Resolution of 8th ordinary Summit of Heads of States and Governments the need to work
conflict prevention though AUBP.
9. The International initiatives on the delimitation and delineation of maritime borders and
provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea.
4.5.2.2. AUBP Mandates186
1.

Facilitate and Support Delimitation and Demarcation of African Boundaries.
AUBP is expected to play a vital role in African integration by working to avoid border

related disputes by facilitating and supporting the effort of AU and Member States to build peace
and harmony. Creation of smooth relationship among the Member States is the most important
strategic tool for regional or continental integration. Therefore, all causes and cases of conflict that
may strain relationship among the Member States should be tackled. The most usual source for
interstate dispute is elusive colonial boundary, which so far has caused almost all international
conflicts in Africa. It is not exaggeration to say that the end of border issue in Africa would mark
the end of interstate dispute.
To this end AUBP is set to fulfill “ two pronged objectives.”187

One is “Structural

Prevention of Conflict” and the other is the need to “deepen the integration process.” 188 Fulfillment
of these two interrelated objectives is one of the core objectives of the AU. Other organs of AU are
also mandated to work for fulfillment of anyone or both of these objectives. The main agenda of
PSC, for instance, is maintaining peace by preventing and resolving disputes in Africa. As most
inter-states conflicts in Africa arise from problems related to borders, AUBP, being at the forefront
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of issues involving borders, is very pertinent to the attaining of objectives of PSC, AUC and the
other organs of AU.
Success of the objectives of AUBP, therefore, would cut the roots of “poisonous tree” that
was planted during colonial era, which makes African “brothers” fight each other.189 To root out
toxic effects of arbitrary boundary lines (the colonial seeds), establishing unambiguous point of
separation (delimitation and demarcation) is vital. It may appear weird to suggest projecting to draw
dividing lines while campaigning for political integration. It has been repeatedly pointed out that to
have a true economic or political integration, a cooperative environment has to be created. Settling
border issues by drawing unambiguous limits of borderlines would stimulate cooperation among the
bordered states. The adage of “Good fence make good neighborhood” really works. It is possible to
mingle good neighbors. In the words of Ikome:
“ [... B]order delimitation and demarcation is seen as a precondition for successful
integration, because a non-defined border is susceptible to being a source of contention,
even conflict. Border demarcation therefore should be seen as having the potential to
open rather than close the doors of cooperation and integration.”190
Currently, less than half of the Africa’s boundaries are unambiguous.191 This suggests that most
of the African boundaries are still susceptible to fuel conflict or actually ignited one. In this
scenario Colonel Gadhafi’s move for immediate political integration was impracticable. As a result,
founders of AU have rightly decided to prepare grounds through AU for the ultimate political
integration.
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Describing Ethiopia and Eritrea war, Western Media titled, “… brothers at war.” It is true that Ethiopians and
Eritreans are brothers. Just based on facial or physical appearance it is not easy, if not difficult at all to distinguish an
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AUBP is entrusted with the task of facilitating the intended integration by building fences
that would contain destructive colonial seeds. The fences are temporary measures and will be
destroyed when the actual integration takes place.192 Therefore, as means of clearing ground for
political integration, ABUP has to work for complete delimitation and demarcation of African
boundaries. This solution is not easy to attain, but it is possible. The prevailing reality (socioeconomic and political situation) may not be conducive enough for contesting parties to devise an
amicable solution of African border problems. It may take painstaking journey to secure agreement
of contesting parties, but there is no better option to obviate boundary conflict other than drawing
an acceptable boundary line (delimitation and demarcation). Member States of AU have agreed to
speed up delimitation and demarcation where not already done. These processes include
maintenance of already demarcated borders, and densify boundary beacons, if necessary.
Neighboring states should be willing to compromise their interest with a view to make life more
confortable to their people by avoiding possibilities that would ignite wars that often consume lives
and resources. With full understanding of possible response from the contesting parties and
prevailing reality on the disputed area, AUBP has to endeavor through the PSC to support
contesting parties to comply with the AU’s mission of peaceful dispute settlement objectives. To
tackle actual or potential border disputes or disputes that may arise while attempting to delimit or
demarcate borders, African States are required to apply all possible options for peaceful resolution
disputes peacefully (negotiation, mediation, conciliation, inquiry, regional and international
arbitration or use of Intentional Court of Justice).

demarcated.” See also Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on The 3rd Conference of African Ministers in
Charge of Border issues ( EX – CL/726(XXI)
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2. Coordinate Cross Border Cooperation as strategy for African Integration.
By facilitating the processes of setting clear and acceptable boundary lines, AUBP can
achieve its objectives of preventing conflict and promote cross border cooperation. In vicinities
where there is no border issue, AUBP has to work for enhancing cross border cooperation with the
ultimate objective of changing the nature of borders from barriers to bridges. Cross-border
cooperation is:
[…] any act or policy aimed tat promoting and strengthening good neighborly relations
between border populations, territorial communities and administration or other
stakeholders within the jurisdiction of two more Sates, including the conclusion of
agreements and arrangements useful for this purposes.193
Take, for example, the boundaries between Ethiopia and Kenya. The boundaries of two
Eastern African countries are almost settled though sporadic conflict among neighboring nomads
can be observed as a result of cross border crimes. Nomadic people of South Omo region of
Ethiopia sometimes cross Kenyan border and raid cattle from their Kenya counterparts. Kenyan
nomads may take the same action. This has nothing to do with the boundary and cannot change the
prevailing smooth relationship between Ethiopia and Kenya. Building cross border cooperation can
change the situation. The border people can effectively police cross border criminals.
Residents of Ethiopian Moyale town and Kenyan side freely cross the border even noticing
there was border or freely transact without thinking they belong to a different State. Thus, for some
residents of Moyale town, Ethiopianness and Kenyanness is simply a term on their IDs and borders
are simply check points sometimes may be used to filter unwarranted persons and goods.
Nowadays, numerous cross border activities are taking place. Kenya is set to get hydroelectric
power that will connect both countries. Similarly, the relationship between Djibouti and Ethiopia
goes beyond port use. After Ethiopian and Eritrean relationship is spoiled due to border conflict,
192
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Ethiopia has stopped using Assab port and has shifted to port of Djibouti. Now Djibouti gets free
under ground water from Ethiopia. Train lines, oil pumps and regular inland and air transports are
some of the projects that link Ethiopia and Djibouti. Similar to Eritrea, Djibouti was separated from
Ethiopia as a result of colonization. The two main ethnic groups of Djibouti have their kinsmen in
Ethiopia who speak the same language, have almost identical culture and practice the same religion
and pursue identical way of life. The relationship of Ethiopia and Djibouti now appears well
cemented on mutual advantages. As a result of strong economic and cultural links, both States have
been assessing the possibility of future economic and political integration to reunion the two
brotherly people. The Ethiopia Sudan border is not fully demarcated, the two countries have agreed
to respect the colonial delimitation and demarcate the boundary line. This agreement has enhanced
Ethiopia Sudan relationship. There is regular land and air transport that link the people of Sudan
and Ethiopia. Ethiopia has been importing oil from Sudan and agreed to use Port Sudan for its
import and export.
Thus, “[f]acilitating the development of cross-border integration dynamics sustained by
local stakeholders” is one of the prime objectives of the AUBP. AUBP should enhance such good
border relationship and cross border projects that would ultimately enable integration of the whole
Africa. The Niamey Convention on Cross Border Cooperation will boost AUBP in effectuating its
mandate of promotion and coordination of cross border relationship, projects and commercial
activities. The Niamey Convention has been ratified by some Member States and expected to come
into force after fifteen ratifications.
The on going work on regional integration will facilitate much needed continental
integration. Africa has about 10 REC’s and all African States are members one or more of the
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Regional Economic Communities.194 In some cases membership is overlapping and “characterized
by ambitious targets.”195 Though REC’s enjoy considerable support from African Governments and
can possibly play huge role eventually, in African political and economic integration.196 Though
more is expected from REC’s currently the performance of REC’s is unsatisfactory.197

For

example, East Africa Economic Community (EAC) long planned for economic and monetary
integration, but so far not implemented. This also affects the intended political integration.
In addition to the support of Members States, African Economic Community and other
stakeholders, AUBP has the objective to support REC’s as an important tool that can contribute for
the African integration.

Some Regional Economic Communities are moving for economic

integration, monetary and aiming for ultimate political integration is an important aspect of AUBP.
With a view to effectively coordinate cross border cooperation and integration agenda,
member States have agreed to enable AUBP make “comprehensive inventories of existing border
cooperation initiatives and agreements [….]”198 Assisting member States to enhance cross border
initiatives, cross border cooperation including preparation of appropriate legal instruments, border
commissions, cross border resource management.
The need to fight cross border crime is another area that demand cooperation of bordered
communities. As African Heads of States and Governments declared, ”the strengthening of crossborder cooperation in the area of the prevention and fight against terrorism and cross-border crime,
194
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PAPER, 2014/037 U.N. University UNU-WIDR, (2014) www.imvf.org/ficheiros/filewp2014-037_1.pdf
195
Trudi hartzenber, Regional integration in Africa, WORKING PAPER, (2011),
www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201114_e.pdf
196
Manone Regina Madyo, The Importance of Regional Economic Integration in Africa, MC DISSERATION,
University of South Africa, (2008) Unpublished uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream./handle/10500/2075/dissertation.pdf
197
Trudi Hartzenber supra note 130.
198
AUBP. Declaration on African Union Border Programme and The Modalities for the Pursuit and Acceleration of its
implementation. http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/aubp-dec-e.pdf (Accessed 4/16/16).
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including drug trafficking, and other cross border threats, such as piracy and other illicit acts on sea,
[…]”199
3. Capacity building, awareness creating and net working
Designing or encouraging the emergence of special border related education and
encouraging research programs is one of the strategies of AUBP. It includes “harnessing” existing
African skills and experiences with a view to develop indigenous knowledge.

200

To coordinate

existing experience and skill in border management, AUC under the auspicious of AUBP is
mandated to make inventory of experts and training institutions in Africa. Partnership, networking
and experience sharing among international, continental, and national institutions that deal with
border related issues are vital. Networking and partnership with EU, and United Nations, is
detrimental for experience sharing and resource mobilization.
African states have also agreed to develop institutions for border study programs. Border
related training is not only confined to civilian but training of immigration security and defense
personal will make immense contribution. Strengthening institutional capacity of AUBP by
recruiting additional personal and developing structure.
AUBP is mandated to popular itself among the African people. Local awareness of the
objectives of AUBP is vital for efficacy of border management. Though African leaders have
acclaimed the contribution of AUBP, the actual beneficiaries of the Program should understanding
the goals of AUBP and accept its mission and vision.

Local people both at the center and

borderland should know and accept neutrality and methodologies of AUBP. The best way to
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popularize AUBP in Africa is close working with the communities, religious leaders, and tribal
chiefs. AUBP’s agenda and goals are noble and, if successful, would benefit the whole continent,
but should not imposed on the local people. Translation of materials developed under the auspicious
of AUBP in various African languages and dissemination of the work and importance of AUBP in
mass media is another way of awareness creating. All actors, therefore, should know and accept
AU’s border program strategies and goals.
4. Implementation and the way forward
AUBP is an innovative African formulation. The main objectives of AU that are geared
toward integration of Africa are being steadily implemented under the auspicious of AUBP.
Political and economic integration of Africa will certainly root out colonial footsteps that have been
spoiling peaceful coexistence. Though AUBP has to go a long distance in attaining its goal of
border delimitation and demarcation, preliminary activities that have been implemented so far are
greatly appreciable and demonstrate AU’s dedication and ground works to achieve the vision of
ultimate political integration of African nations.
In the implementation of African Border Program every one in Africa is expected to
involve. AUBP boundary making is basically a bottom top approach. The most important
beneficiaries and actors are Member States. As Professor Asiwaju rightly remark, “ […] border
delimitation and demarcation under the AUBP cannot afforded to be the kind of top-down
operations used in the era of European imperialism and colonialism [….]”201 The border programs
are expected to be implemented at continental, regional, and national levels. The most important
beneficiaries and in worse cases the immediate victims are border resident. Involvement and
consultation of border residents and local administrations of both contesting States is vital to build
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confidence and trust of local people. Asiwaju attests this view stating,“ […] sensitivity to the
interest and rights of locally affected indigenous communities, […] consultation and collaboration
of national and sub national authorities each side [bordered states]”202 is essential. The important
consideration afforded by AUBP to local people makes the program very different from colonial
boundary making. This is a way to build an acceptable boundary that will bridge relationship in the
future when the barrier nature of border changes to point of contact.
AUBP, being an umbrella program, has been coordinating regional or national initiatives.
Fund raising, capacity development programs, and technical support that have been afforded by
AUBP are very crucial for the success of the regional and national endeavors. It is true that each
level has to exert its effort including fund raising and capacity building to the extend possible.
Though not uniform in all regions, and the level of financial and capacity hindrance is not identical,
REC’s are doing great in smoothing regional integration. Working for efficacy of free trade, free
movement of good and services, monetary integration, easing of avoiding custom barriers are some
of the important tasks being carried out by the REC’s.
Fulfillment of the vision of AU demands extra effort from Member States. The most crucial
step that Member States should expert is willingness to find out solution to address conflict of
interest that would spoil peaceful coexistence. Porous borders are the usual causes that vitiate good
neighborhood.

Member States of AU should honestly endeavor to define their respective

borderlines in a way acceptable to their people. National and regional politics often influence the
will and readiness to define borders.

It is also influenced by the divisive mechanisms that were

planted by the colonial powers and takes time to change that setting. Former colonial powers are
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still attempting to rule their former colonies stretching their hands from Europe indirectly under the
guise of economic or security assistance. Personal interest of selfish leader who indirectly guided
and backed up by the colonial powers may not be willing to settle boundary issues in a way address
the interest of Africa. This is another colonial evil that takes time to root out and African leaders
and the umbrella organization has to change all effects of colonialism and neocolonialism to find
out African solution for the African problem.
It is true that AU and other continental organs cannot compel or instruct Member States
either to define or demarcate their respective borders or accept the definition offered by AU, as it is
illegal being contrary to the principle of AU that respects sovereignty and independent existence of
Member States, AU has the responsibility to make follow up and venture to persuade unwilling
Member States to cooperate with their neighbors so that they should devise solution to their own
problem thereby create conducive environment to avoid border issues for the purposes of moving
to change borders from barrier to bridges.

There should be continuous interaction of bordered

people to resolve all border problems that may emerge.203 Border issues cannot be resolved
overnight. It takes time and should be tackled step by step. Therefore the work has to be planned,
implemented, and assessed periodically. Most importantly, Member States should organize a joint
border commission that can resolve emerging issues in give and take way.204 Unless states are
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willing to compromise for the ultimate benefit of their people in win-win bases, no one can
effectively settle issues.205 AUBP can play a great role by working to bring unwilling parties to the
negotiation table and assist them to resolve their own problem through mutual and constructive
dialogue.
So far AUBP has been doing vital businesses of AU. Without being impended by the
personnel and resource constraints, AUBP has exerted efforts to alleviate deep-rooted African
border problems. As a measure of awareness creation and capacity building objectives, AUBP has
conducted numerous regional sensitization workshops on the AUBP.206 Held international
symposium on management of land, river and lake boundaries in Maputo Mozambique (Dec. 2008),
conference on Maritime boundaries and the continental shelf in Accra, (Nov. 2009), Bamako
conference on cross border cooperation (Nov 3 – 4 2009) to discuss on drafting Convention on
Cross Border Cooperation, as well as national initiatives on bilateral and regional levels to promote
cross border cooperation. Each region took part in the workshop and got full awareness of the
businesses and goals of AUBP, the vision and mission of AU, the strategies and mechanisms of
effectuating the vision of ultimate political integration of Africa by tackling all barriers that may
hinder friendship, and peaceful coexistence in Africa.
For the purposes of planning, follow up and audit, AUBP has to know facts of African
borders. Given financial, technical and manpower constraints, AUBP cannot physically visit all
Post Conflict Demarcation of African Boundaries: The Cameroon-Nigeria Experience, in DELIMIATION AND
DEMARCATION IN AFRICA, GNERAL ISSUES AND CASES STUDIES (AUBP) 190 (2013).
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Cameroon-Nigeria Experience, in DELIMIATION AND DEMARCATION IN AFRICA, GNERAL ISSUES AND
CASES STUDIES (AUBP) 201 (2013). http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/au-2-en-2013-delim-a-demar-userguide.pdf
206
Kampala conference of 2008 for East Africa, Algiers Conference of October 2008 for North Africa, Ouagadougou
Conference e of 2009 for West Africa, Libreville Conference of May 2009 for central Africa, and Windhoek
conference of 2009 for Southern Africa.
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African borders or collect data from Member States. The easiest and cheapest method of collecting
African border information is by channeling Member States. To this end, AUBP has conducted
survey of African Boundaries. But suddenly only 32 of the 54 African States replied to the survey
that indicated only 35% of the African borders were actually demarcated in 2012. Since then AUBP
has been working to collect information for the rest of states.
The establishment of a specialized Unit that is in charge of implementation of AUBP under
the PSC and publication of resources books on African borders are significant in building capacity.
The books and other publications that are published under the auspicious of AUBP are useful tools
that can guide and assist boundary making. Theories and procedures of border making are briefly
stated in the books. In partnership with GIZ and resource mobilization for implementation of AU
programs AUBP has effectively leveled the playground to resolve African Border issues. The books
were products of thorough research and contain valuable insights of highly skilled international
professionals in the field of boundary making. It is thought that the books will successfully guide
boundary making from beginning to end. The processes, procedures, and technicalities of border
negotiation, treaty making, delimitation, demarcation, and maintenance of border are succinctly
outlined in the books. The books are useful tools of boundary making not only in Africa but can
guide boundary making anywhere around the world and can serve as reference materials in training
centers.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Pre-1998 Ethio - Eritrea Affinity and Boundary Arrangement
5.1. Introduction
The boundary between Ethiopia and Eritrea is a colonial “seed” that has been jeopardizing
close affinity and peaceful co-existence of the two intertwined people. It has not only separated the
brotherly people of Ethiopia and Eritrea, but also has been source of conflict and sown animosity
and hatred – incurable diseases. Put simply, if properly enforced, the elusive colonial boundary
between Ethiopia and Eritrea would distance the people of Ethiopia and Eritrea that have been
living together for thousands of years, interwoven in marriage, have common culture, profess the
same religion, and originated from the same historical route.1 Close affinity between Ethiopians
and Eritreans is not hard to appreciate, even to a stranger. One easily can comprehend the close
affinity just by spotting lifestyle or even physical features.2

Physical appearance and facial

features of Ethiopians and Eritreans prove “oneness” of the two brotherly people. It is equally hard
to differentiate an Ethiopian and an Eritrean on account of social or cultural life, language, and
ethno-historic background.3 It is, therefore, fair to question, “[…] how such closely related people

1

TEKESTE NEGASH & KJETIL TRONVOLL, BROTHERS AT WAR: MAKING SENSE OF THE
ETRITREAN-ETHIOPIAN WAR, 10(2000).
2
Hoyle attests close affinity of the two inter-related people stating, “The Eritrean highlanders, the Tigriyans were
culturally and linguistically related to the Tigreans of Tigray of Ethiopia, and these peoples even referred to each
other by a common name, the “Habesha”. See also Peggy A. Hoyle, The Eritrean National Identity: A case Study,
24 N.C.J. I.NT’L 7 COM. REG. 381, 381-416 (1998 – 1999). However, some Eritrean politicians tend to question
this fact by opting to side themselves with Egypt or other former colonial powers. For instance, Merhaw Hagos
Mesghina poses unrealistic conclusion stating, “Even according to ancient history, Eritrea and Ethiopia didn’t have
much in common as indicated by the different names that Eritrea was called by.” See Merhawi Hagos Mesghina,
Eritrea Under Fire: Synopsis of Eritrean History from Turkish Colonization to the present and the Genesis and
Contributing
Factors
to
the
Current
Conflict
between
Eritrea
and
Ethiopia,
WWW.dehal.org/conflict/aricles/merhawai.html. Accessed Jul.30, 2015:12:43 pm. Surprisingly, Mr. Mesghina,
takes Ethiopia as one of the colonizers of Eritrea. Id.
3
Tigrinya speaking people of Eritrea (the majority in Eritrea) and the people of Tigray Regional State of Ethiopia are
Semitic and originally migrated from South Arabia. It is hard to find out cultural or linguistic distinction, especially
among Ethiopian Tigreans and Eritrean highlanders. The two people are still brothers. They are intermingled in
marriage and other sort of social bond. The colonial boundary treaty was not demarcated and known to local
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could be considered a separate nation?”4 It is an obvious fact that the separation of Eritrean people
from their Ethiopian brothers was a colonial disease from which most African people have been
suffering. Colonial powers have deliberately planted a divisive seed that has created antagonism,
which in turn has been vitiating historic kinship.5
Appalling effects of the 1998 border war and wrong political judgment of inapt and selfish
leaders of Ethiopia and Eritrea have further complicated the situation. This chapter briefly explores
the relationship of Ethiopia and Eritrea from pre-colonial time to the moment of reunion and
cooperation until the boundary conflict in May1998. A closer look at historical kinship, and socioeconomic and political ties of the two brotherly people will help appreciate the nature of
boundaries and problems involving in boundary setting of the two nations.
5.2. Pre-Colonial Relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea
Ethiopia is the second most populous nation in Africa comprising numerous ethnic groups
with diverse languages and cultural background. Today’s Ethiopia is about ten times Eritrea and
comprises of nine regional states with the power of self-administration: Afar, Amhara,
Beneshangul/Gumuz, Gambella, Harari, Oromia, Southern Nations and Nationalities and Tigray

people. The only known natural demarcation was “Mereb River”. Even the “Mereb Melash” separation line
assumed by the local people as a kind of administrative boundary. Some Eritreans accept the overall similarity
between Tigreans and Eritrean highlanders but deny overall similarity between the people of Ethiopia and Eritrea.
According to Berhane Woldegabriel, Eritrean lowland was under the control of Baja State which was outside the
jurisdiction of Axumite Kingdom. See Berhane Woldegabriel, A War for National Unity, in LEENCO LATA,
(ed.). THE SEARCH FOR PEACE: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA (Proceedings of
Scholarly Conference on the Ethiopia and Eritrea Conflict Held in Oslo Norway, 5-6 July, 2006 31(2007).
4
As a result, Hoyle states that the international community shares Ethiopian community’s concern regarding
separation of Eritrea from Ethiopia. Id. The Ethiopian communities concern was impossibility of separation of
the two entwined people. Today there are so many instances in which a mother viewed as Eritrean and allowed to
stay there while children regarded as Ethiopians and either expelled to Ethiopia or simply followed their farther to
Ethiopia. During the war Ethiopia also expelled some people of Eritrean origin without their wish. Wrong political
judgment to separate naturally interlinked people may worry any neutral mind, let alone Ethiopian community.
5
For instance, Italy used ideological differences between Eritrean lowland Muslims by giving them special
treatment and sown hatred between Christians and Muslims.
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along with two chartered cities of Addis Ababa and Diredawa. Before secession in 1991 (de facto)
and 1993 (de jure) Eritrea was one of the provinces of Ethiopia. 6
Until separated by the Italian colonialism 1890, Eritrea was integral part of Abyssinian
kingdom. As Rubenson succinctly puts, “ There was no question locally about the sovereignty over
Midre Bahir, ‘the land on the sea [renamed Eritrea by Italy].’ This ancient Ethiopian provinces had
at least for one century […] been ruled as one or several sub provinces of Tigre.” 7 Currently Eritrea
comprises of nine ethnic groups, some either migrated from the current territories of Ethiopia or
have kinsmen in Ethiopia that still make close contact. The Eritrean highland region, which was
popularly captioned by Ethiopians as “ Mereb Melash” (the land of river Mereb) or (Kebessa) is
culturally, religiously, or linguistically very close to the people of northern Ethiopia. The people of
Kebessa region are Tigrinya speaking Orthodox Christians having no apparent distinction from
Tigreans in Ethiopia. Kebessa regions consist of Hamasaiaen, Seraye, and Akale Guzai were
integral part of Abyssinian Kingdom that vigorously battled to reintegrate with Ethiopia after
liberation of Eritrea from Italian occupation. In addition there are Kunama, Afar, Tigre and other
lowland residents, which are dominantly Muslims that were not substantially integrated with
highlanders before the Italian occupation. 8

6

See SEVEN RUBENSON, THE SURVIVAL OF ETHIOPIAN INDEPENDECE, 51(2003). Today Ethiopia
comprises of more than 80 ethnic groups that have their own language, culture but share enormous common
Ethiopian values. Most of the Eritrean ethnic groups have their own kinships in Ethiopia.
7
Rubenson supra note 6. See Negash and Tronvoll, supra note 1 at 6. See also RICHARD PANKHURST, THE
ETHIOPIAN BORDERLANDS, 101(1997). According to Professor Pankhurst, the ruler of the current territories
Eritrea was known as “Bahr Nagash” (the ruler of Sea) that was granted wider power under the charter granted by
King Zara Yacob. (Id). Northern part of the nation, especially the current territories of Eritrea was very important
tot the ancient Ethiopian empire. The northern highland was very important economically and important route for
international trade. The port of Massawa and Hergigo mainly used to export ivory, gold, and other produces of the
time. Id at 156. See also Kidanu Atinafu and Endalcachew Bayeh, The Etio-Eritrean Post war Stalement: An
assessment on the Causes & Prospects 96, 96 – 101 SCI. PG, (2015). Available at:
http://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.hss.20150302.15.pdf (Jan. 13/2016 5:35 PM).
8
ROBERTO MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ, THE BORDER DISPUTE BETWEEN ERITREA AND ETHIOPIA; LEGAL
CONSIDERATIONS 7(2011). According to Rodgiguez, “Most Christians (50% of the populations) live in the
highlands, and Sunni Muslims and adherents of traditional beliefs ( the other half of the population) live in the
lowland region.). Seyoum Yohannys, Eritrea-Ethiopia Arbitration: A ‘Cure’ Based on Neither Diagnosis nor
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The ethnic affinity of the people of Tigray region of Ethiopia is so strong to the Tigrinya
speaking highlanders of Eritrea. In the words of Negash and Tronvoll, “[A]s many scholars define
it, the Tigrinya in Eritrea and Tigreans in Ethiopia belong to the same ‘nationality’. […and]
Tigrinya speaking population (who straddle both Eritrea and Ethiopia) are one and the same
people.”9 (Emphasis mine). In addition to the linguistic and cultural affinity, the people of Tigray
region of Ethiopia and Eritrean highlanders are intertwined by marriage. The close familial
relationship between the former Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Melese Zenawi and the President of
Eritrea, Isias Afeworki, proves this fact. Both former “camaraderie” were cousins. It is common to
have members of a given family both in Ethiopia or Eritrean.10 The People of Tigray Regional
State of Ethiopia and Tigrinya speaking highlanders of Eritrea speak the same language, practice
almost identical religion and have common culture.

Almost 50% of Eritrean people speak

Tigrinya, a language along with Amharic derived from Ge’ez, which is also official language of
Tigray Regional State of Ethiopia. Majority of the Eritrean highland residents are members of
Coptic Christians while lowland residents of Eritrea are Muslims. These are also the two major
religions in the Tigray Regional State of Ethiopia. Both Tigray and Eritrean people are not friendly
to the followers of Protestant Christianity, albeit, no legal prohibition in Tigray Ethiopia. To a
politically neutral person, apart from difference in geographic location, there is no basic distinction
between the people of Tigray and Tigrinya speaking highlanders of Eritrea (the majority). This

Prognosis 6: 2 Miz. L. Rev. 163 - (2012).. See also Kjetil Tronvoll, Borders of Violence-Boundaries of Identity:
Demarcating the Eritrean Nation- State, 22:6 ISSN 1042, 1037 – 1060 (1999).
9
Negash and Tronvoll supra note 1 at 10. Id. at 8 see also Seyoum Yohannes, Eritrea-Ethiopia Arbitration: A Cure
neither Based on Diagnosis nor Prognosis 6 MIZAN L. REV. 168, 163-199 (2012
10
Kjetil Tronvoll, Borders of Violence – Boundaries of Identity: demarcating the Eritrea Nation-State, 22 ETHNIC
& RECIAL STUD. 1037, 1037 – 1060 (1999).
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similarity and frequent cross border interaction has produced a complex boundary setting that is
hard to draw a clear separating line.11
Majority of the Eritrean people and the people of northern Ethiopia, including Tigray and
Amhara, are from the same root – Semitic people who migrated from the South Arabia.12 Eritrea’s
strategic location and proximity to Asia and Europe had attracted migration of various categories
of people to the eastern Africa. Long before the emergence of powerful Kingdom of Axum, the
Sabaean people migrated to the northern Ethiopia and the current territories of Eritrea during first
millennium B.C.13 While some settled in the northern Ethiopia, the rest proceeded to the interior,
west and southwards. The immigrants, in some cases, pushed indigenous people to the unfavorable
territories like lowlands and deserts. Before arrival of the newcomer, there were Negriod,
indigenous people, now settled in the lowlands of western regions of Ethiopia and Eritrea.14 The
people of Kunama repeatedly pushed to the western low land villages that were not conducive for
the powerful immigrants to claim. As Professor Abbnik witnesses, “[…Kunama] were politically
marginalized and lived under domination. Much of their lands were gradually taken for
resettlement of other groups [….]15
The name “Ethiopia” was coined during Axumite Empire but not formally used as a name
of nation. According to legend, “Cush the son of Ham and the founder of the Axumite Kingdom”16

11

Yacob Haile Mariam who knows the two people very closely attests, “[…] there are no other two people who are
so irretrievably intertwined as Eritreans and Ethiopians [….] If there are any two people who should not be
separated, Eritreans and Ethiopians perhaps provide the best example. We are after all “ Habesh” historically
speaking.” See Yacob Haile Mariam, Dialogue between Eritreans and Ethiopians: An idea whose Time Has Come,
A paper presented at a conference organized by ESAT, October 25, 2015. Washington DC, United States.
12
W.M. FLINDERS PETRIE ET EL, THE BOOK OF HISTGORY, A BOOK OF ALL NATIONS FROM
EARSLIEST TIMES TO THE PRESENT 1915 (Tropical North Africa –IV Abyssinia, 2251(1915).
13
Yacob HaileMariam supra note 11.
14
NIAZ MULTAZA, THE PILLAGE OF SUSTAINABILITY IN ERITERA 1600 – 1990s 45(1998).
15
Jon Abbink, Creating Borders: Exploring the Impact of the Ethio-Eritrean War on the Local Population, 4 Africa
LVI, 452, 447 – 458 (2001).
16
Tsegaye Beru, Brief History of the Ethiopian Legal Systems – Past and Present , 41 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO 335,
335 – 388 (2013).
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named his son Ethiopis17– from which the name “Ethiopia” derived and formally substituted the
traditional name of Abyssinia. In the words of Flinders Petrie et al, “ From a son of Cush named
Ethiopis it received the name of Ethiopia, which it divided with Meroe at an earlier period; and it
appears to the present day in the official title of the Abyssinian ruler.”18 Thus, there is no doubt
that the name Abyssinia had encompassed the current territories of Eritrea and Ethiopia (the
Habesh or Habesha). Even today, some diaspora Ethiopians and Eritreans use the expression,
“Habesh” to connote an Ethiopian or Eritrean.19
Today major ethnic groups of Ethiopia are classed in the main ethnic category of Cushitic,
Semitic, Hermetic, Omotic.20 Cushitic group comprises several ethnic groups that are settled both
in Ethiopia and Eritrea. For instance, the Cushitic people of Afar reside both in Eritrea and
Ethiopia. The Amhara ethnic group, which mainly settled in the Amhara Regional States of
Ethiopia, and Tigreans are Semitic people having the same origin, as Semitic people of Eritrea.

17

The name Ethiopia was derived from the Greek word “burned face” Id.
Flinders Petrie et al supra note 12.
19
Multaza supra note 14. See also Yacob Haile Mariam supra note 11. In United States it is not uncommon to
confront a query: “Are you Habesh or Habesha?” The question often posed to a person having Habesh facial
features. If the person responds positively, then Amharic or Tigrinya communication continues. In some cases
second generation immigrants may speak both languages but they even understand either Amharic or Tigrinya. The
query whether a person is an Abyssinian or Habesha is a common strategy that is often used to differentiate an
Eritrean or an Ethiopian from “others”. Irving Kaplan, et al also portray the citizens of Abyssinian ( the Habesha)
See IRIVING KAPLAN ET AL, AREA HANDBOOK FOR ETHIOPIA 3(1971). One may also fairly query why
Ethiopian and Eritreans are called “Habesha” or “Habesh”? There are various interpretations of the term
“Habesha”. Some local Ethiopian and Eritrean people in some case use the term to mean non -“Ferenj.” In this
sense, all Ethiopians and Eritreans, being not “Ferenj” are “Habesha.” Still non-Semitic tribes can still denounce
the term, as it referred to mean Semitic people of northern Ethiopia and Semitic Eritrean people. See Magn Nyang,
The difference between being an Ethiopian and being Habesha, SUDAN TRIBUNE, Feb. 18, 2009. The noun
“Habesha” probably derived from the name of Arab coast Kingdom. It is said that the Kingdom of Axum “[… rose
as an offshoot of the Arab coast Kingdom of Habashat, about beginning of the Christian ear.” see Flinders Petrie et
al supra note 12. Thus, the name “Habesha” is very relevant to the Semitic speaking areas of Ethiopia and Eritrea.
It is an expression of “oneness” of interrelated Semitic people of Ethiopia and Eritrea. According to Sven
Rubenson Ottoman Turks called the island Massawa as “Habesh or Habeshtan.” See Rubeson supra note 6 at 30.
20
Both Ethiopia and Eritrea have distinct ethnic groups that are classed under Cushitic, Semitic, Hamitic or the
groups. Take, for example, the main ethnic group, Oromia, which is Cushitic which situated in Ethiopia and Kenya.
Eritrea has about 13 ethnic groups that either under Cushitic, Semitic, or Hamitic category. Similarly, Ethiopia
comprises of numerous ethnicities that may be classed in anyone main categories. Listing all ethnic groups of
Ethiopia and Eritrea is out of scope of this work. The main objective here is to show close affinity between major
Eritrean ethnic groups and ethnicities in the northern Ethiopian.
18

251

The official language of Axumite Empire was Ge’ez.21 It was a language from which the
current Semitic languages of Amharic and Tigrinya were derived. According to Flinders Petrie et
al, “A Semitic language eventually become the universal idiom, the Geez, which is now dead and
is used only in church services but represented by two daughter languages, the Amharish and the
Tigrish.” 22After fell of Axumite Empire in 7th century due to foreign invaders, especially Jewish
that lead by Judith, subjects Axumite Empire dispersed and Ge’ez was substituted by different
regional dialectics.23
Residents of coastal areas, especially the Red Sea lowlanders were subjected to frequent
invasion and occupation of foreign aggressors.24 Suppression by highlanders and foreign influence
has created cultural and religious differences. While highlanders remained followers of Ethiopian
Orthodox Church, lowlanders converted into Islam due to frequent invasion of Islamic jihadists
and occupation by Ottoman Turks.25 Orthodox Christianity remained as an official religion since
333 AD until Jewish occupation in 9th century and restored after restoration of Abyssinian power
in 13th century.26 As a result, Coptic Orthodox Christian remained as a dominant religion both in
Ethiopia and Eritrea. Vandoren explains the cultural and political dominance and the cause of fell
of Axumite Empire as follows:
Ethiopia evolved from Axum, a highly developed Christian slave owning kingdom. Axum
was located in the area now occupied by the northern Ethiopian province of Tigre and former
province of Eritrea. Nearly all the lands of Modern day Ethiopia were Axumite vassals.
21

Multaza supra note 14.
Flinders Petrie supra note 12.
23
Amharic and Tigrinya are offspring of Ge’ez,
24
Ottoman Turks and Egyptians were among common aggressors that occupied Eritrean lowlands before the arrival
of European colonizers in late 19th century.
25
According to Flinders Petrie et all, in 1527 Turks occupied Massawa and United with the Muslim prince of Harar,
Mohammed Grange who destroyed Axum to the grand. See Flinders Petrie et al supra note at 2254.
26
King Ezana of Axumite Kingdom was baptized by Frmentius, the apostle of the Abyssinians at the time. King
Ezana was so powerful who ruled not only the current territories of Eritrea and northern Ethiopia but large areas in
Southern Arabia. See Flinders Petrie supra note 12.at 2252. As regards Christianization of Axumite Empire see
PANKHURST supra note 7 at 21. According to Pankhurst, Hamasen and Saraye (Southern Eritrea districts)
adopted Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity at early time and considered the “paramountcy” of oldest church in Axum
(Tsion Maryam) in Axum. Id.
22
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Maintaining economic, political and cultural ties with Egypt, Persia, Arabia, Greece and
India. Axum reached its peak of development, between the 4th and 6th centuries A.D. The
decline of Axum triggered by the 7th century Muslim Arab conquest, marked the beginning of
a long period of conflict. 27

According to the folklore that is supported by the Bible28 Abyssinian kingship since Axumite
Empire had King Solomonic lineage.29 The then famous queen was inspired by the wisdom of
King Solomon and travelled to Jerusalem to visit the “wise king”. As a result of close personal
relationship with King Solomon, Queen Sheba was conceived and gave birth to King Minilik I.30
Ethiopian kings generally known as “King of Kings the Lion of Judah”, the name which conveys a
message that Abyssinia had several kings and the central king was regarded as above all the
regional kings (the king of kings). In the words of Lady Herbert, “The country known by the name
Abyssinia is governing by an Emperor, formerly calling himself “King of Kings; for his empire
extended from Kaffa which is close to the mountains of the moon […]’ ”31 Lady Herbert, thus,
proves the fact that boundaries of Abyssinian Emperors extend beyond northern Ethiopia to the
very long regions of Kaffa. The Kingdom of Axum had wider contours, which extended to the
South Arabia, south Egypt and north Sudan. At the time that Queen Shaba visited King Solomon,
her capital situated in South Arabia32, before it moved into the notorious ancient city of Axum in
which a new city of Axum built on the ruins of the old city.
It is an obvious fact that the current territories of Eritrea were part and parcel of
Abyssinia/Ethiopia under the rule of Abyssinian kings with no clearly set boundary.33
27

John W. Vandoren, Positivism and the Rule of Law, Formal System or Concealed Values: A case Study of The Ethiopian
Legal System, 3 J. TRANSNAT’L & POL’Y 167 - 168, 165 – 214 (1994) Pankhurst remarks, “The Kingdom [
Axum…]included the highlands north of the Marab river (which were subsequently to constitute the Country of the Bahr
Nagash, and much later present-day Eritrea). Id.
28
Bible, 1Kings 10 KJB
29
Flinders Petrie supra note 12. at 2252.
30
LADY HERBERT (Trans.), ABYSSINIA AND ITS APOSTLE, (1867)
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
It is not just ethnic lineage but geographic location proves that Eritrea was a component of Axumite Empire, as
boundaries of the Kingdom of Axum goes beyond territories of Eritrea in all directions. The port of Adulis and
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Administrative or ethnic boundaries depended on private land holding. The boundaries of northern
Tigrinya speaking group (currently majority in Eritrea) and the southern Tigrinya speaking group
(the current Tigray Regional State of Ethiopia) is very difficult to delineate, as the there was no
basic fact that distinguishes the two group of people apart from the elusive classification as north
and south that has no clearly cut point of separation. In the case of other ethnic groups like
Kunama, Afar, Saho, boundary setting was done on the basis of peripheries of ethnic groups
known by the landholding of the last person of the ethnic group or sometimes traditional method of
delineation of villages may be marked by natural features of land like rivers and mountains.
After his coronation in 1872, Emperor Yohannis continued to strengthen the unity between
Ethiopian regions was already started by Emperor Thewodros.34 Internal rivalry and foreign
aggression however, hampered this effort. Yohannis IV was Tigre and had no Tigrean rivalry both
in current territories of Eritrea or in the territories of Tigray. Even most of his southern or western
rivalries were either defeated or submitted to his administration.35 After short confrontation in
Lasta, Minilik II, the king of Shoa, submitted himself to Yohannis IV and pacified relationship by
arranging marriage of his daughter to Emperor Yohannis’s son. The Harar Prince also
acknowledged King Yohannis’s Emperorship of Abyssinia. Most international wars were fought in
current territories of Eritrea. The main reason was foreign interest in coastal regions, especially
commercial routes and ports. Turks and Egyptians were the major invaders that occupied northern

Massawa were used by the Axumite kingdom for its imports and export. The destruction of Adulis port by
invaders weakened the Kingdom and caused its ultimate demise in 7th century. According to Irving Kaplan et al,
the people of Tigray (north and south or in another way Eritrean and Ethiopian Tigre) were the “founders” of
Kingdom of Axum “some 2500 years ago.” See Kaplan et al supra note 19 at 5
34
There was little tie with the far south though some regional kings paid tribute to the King of Kings. However, most of the
Southern regions of Ethiopia stood at the side of their northern brothers when Italy attempted to colonize Ethiopia in 1896.
35
In a way consolidating his power, Tigre Kassa ( King of Kings Yohannis) defeated Gobeze, the governor of Lasta and
Gojam. See Flinders Petrie supra note 12 at 2256.
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and coastal areas of Eritrea. Egypt’s interest to move to the hinterlands was failed by defeat of
Egyptians by Emperor Yohannis at Gundet and Gura (both now in Eritrea).36
Ethiopian/Abyssinians never considered territories making up Eritrea as foreign land.
Unless it was beyond their power, Abyssinian kings used to defend Eritrean coastal regions against
foreign aggressors. For instance, King Yohannis’s notable General, Alula, as recent as 19th century
fought and restrained Italians who attempted to move to the hinterland but on account of the death
of Yohannis IV in fight with Mahdists of Sudan37, Ras Alula did not absolutely stop Italians who
reoccupied hinterlands of Eritrea.38 In five month’s time since death of Yohannis IV since March
10, 1889 Italy occupied substantial portion of current territories of Eritrea.
After death of Yohannis39, Minilik II of Shoa was crowned as King of Kings of
Abyssinia/Ethiopia, and was expected to defend all the territories making up Abyssinia. In some
peripheries, foreign occupiers were already settled for long time. Strategically, due to multifaceted
restraints, some occupiers left unchallenged as far as they stayed in the coastal areas. Fore
example, there were Turks or Egyptians in coastal areas of Red Sea, Massawa for long time. When
Egyptians crossed the tolerable level of the line, Yohannis IV fought them with great victory.40

36

Rubenson supra note 6 at 318 -329. See AFRICAN AMERICAN REGISGRY, Ethiopia Wins the Battle of
Gundet, ( Tue, 11/16/1875), www.aareqistry.org See also AGAI ERLIKH, THE CROSS AND THE RIVER:
ETHIOPIA, EGYPT, AND THE NILE 70(2002). See also Esayas Girmay, Ethiopia: The “Nile Factor” and
Pragmatic Opportunism in Egypt-Eritrea Relations, THE REPOTER (Oct. 4, 2014)
37
Mahdits were Dervishes (Sufi Muslims) who conquered Sudan and occupied Kassala after Egypt occupied by
Great Britain. After occupying Kassa Dervishes moved to the Ethiopian territory and fought with Yohannes IV
who lost his life in the battle. See W.B. Stern, The Treaty Background of the Italo-Ethiopian Disputes, 30 AM. J.
INT’L L. 190, 189 -203 (1936).
38
Minilik who enjoyed Italy’s support in his effort to reunify Harar in 1886 and strengthen his power against other
rivals in Ethiopia opposed Italia’s occupation of Massawa. Minilik thought it was under his sovereignty. This
appears contradictory to the spirits of Wichale (uccalli) treaty In Italy’s refusal to surrender Massawa, Minilik
sought the assistance of Queen Victoria which “proved to be unsuccessful.” In the mean time Italians appeared to
be peaceful and appeared to be friendly with a subtle motive of pacifying the relationship with Minilik. See Stern
supra note 37.Treaty Background of the Italio-Ethiopian Disputes, 30 AM. J. INT’L L. 190, 189 -203 (1936).
39
Yohannis IV was a Tigrinya speaking King of Kings who ruled Abyssinia for 18 years. Negash and Tronvoll supra
note 1 at 6
40
History of Eritrea, See www.eritrea.be/old/eritrea-history.htm.
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Numerous factors had enabled Italians to consolidate their occupation of Massawa and
surrounding areas. The most important factor was the competition to occupy Abyssinia against
another European rival – French (during the Scramble Africa). Internal political turmoil, like death
of Yohannis IV and competition to throne by multiple contenders was another cause that created
conducive ground to Italians. Minilik II needed Italian support to prevail other possible contenders
including Yohannis’s heirs.

Moreover, Minilik’s naïvely assumed that Italy’s occupation of

Kassala as advantage that repeatedly attacked the current territories of Eritrea. As a result, Italians
were able to quickly occupy western lowlands of Eritrea and further moved to the highlands.
Cognizant of internal politics, and shortcomings and interest of Minilik II to consolidate his power
towards South, Italians tricked him41 by offering gifts of guns that helped Minilik soldiers to fight
southern kings like the King Tona of Wolayta.
The thwarted treaty of Wichalle (also written as uccalli) often cited to prove Minilik’s
acceptance of Italy’s occupation of territories of Eritrea. 42 But he actually protested against Italy’s
occupation of Massawa and used all possible peaceful methods including appealing to Queen
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Robert Klonsky, Internaitonal Law Background in the Itlalo-Ethiopian Dispute, 1935 -1936, 5 NATIL B. J. 152,
151 -183 (1947). According to Klonsky,
Italy first appeared during a turbulent period of Ethiopian politics, shortly after John IV from the Tigre
seized the Ethiopian throne in January, 1872 which had reminded in dispute [….] In furtherance of a
secret pact with Minilik, King of Shoa, Italy supported the pretensions of Minilik over the heir of John.
The Italian candidate became Minilik II, Negus Negasti of Ethiopia in 1889 , and “then began a
systematic effort to acquire Ethiopia as a protectorate by Treaty arrangement with Minilik. See Id.
42
Id. at 153. According to Klonsky, the “ill –fated treaty was consummated on May 2, 1889 between Minilik II and
Count Antonelli, representative of Crispi, Prime Minister of Italy, whereby the Italian version reduced Ethiopia to
the level of a protectorate, with Italy to represent that Empire in its foreign affairs.” Id. It is rightly said that
history should be judged on facts of a time, but on the basis of current facts, Minlik’s agreement with Italians
appear shocking to give portion of a nation to an alien power. Several African traditional chiefs had sold land or
entered into treaty of protection, but it was unusual to deal with a colonial power to peacefully take substantial
portion of a nation cutting sea root in exchange of arms that would be used to force internal rivalries to submit
power. This often claimed as justification by some Eritrean people for separation from Ethiopia, but Eritrean
should note that actions and decisions of Minilik II was not the taking of their Ethiopian brothers. It is true that
Minilik was powerless given backward transpiration and hard geographic condition. This claim may easily be
challenged on account of defeat of Italians in Aduwa later and absence of minimal attempt to expel Italians from
Eritrea after death of Yohannis IV.
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Victoria’s mediation, which was unsuccessful.43 Minilik’s interest to consolidate his domestic
power by reunifying Southern, Western and Southern kingdoms and his reliance on Italy for arms
and economic assistance has blinded him not to fight Italians against occupation of Eritrea.
5.3. Creation of Italian Sphere of Interest
As it was the case in other parts of Africa, Italy established its sphere of influence in
Abyssinian soil through missionaries and under the guise of land transaction for commercial
shipping company.44 An Italian missionary called Fr. Giuseppe Sapeto had facilitated purchase of a
piece of land near the then small town of Assab from a local chief apparently for the Italian
national shipping company known as Rubattino Shipping Company.45

Later the Italian

government took over administration of land.46 Italian interest in Abyssinia was so intense after the
Berlin Conference. After taking direct administration of the land near Assab, Italy moved to
occupy Massawa. In order to avoid possible French occupation of Massawa, Great Britain favored
the Italian occupation. At the time Egypt was under control of Great Britain and there was no
major confrontation with Egyptians and Italy.47

43

Stern supra note 38 at 189 see also History of Eritrea supra note 32.
Purchasing land from naïve and ignorant local chief’s was the easiest way to step in to African nations with the
ultimate objective of occupying the whole nation. With a view to avoid the threat of occupation, during heydays of
the modernization of laws, Ethiopia prohibited ownership of immovable properties by non-Ethiopians. No
foreigner can own building in Ethiopia. As there is no private ownership of land in Ethiopia today, the prohibition
is relevant only to buildings. Nowadays, however, there is lenience with regard to foreigners having Ethiopian
blood. These are persons having foreign nationality but may be considered as Ethiopians for investment purpose as
Ethiopians. A person who was by birth Ethiopian but naturalized into another nationality, or person having some
kind of Ethiopian tie like children born to Ethiopian parents abroad and having foreign nationality and can buy
immovable properties in Ethiopia.
45
Stern supra note 38 at 189
46
According to Tekeste Negash opening of Suez Canal in 1869 arose the interest for Eastern African territories and
Italy acquired the port of Assab “which had been purchased by a shipping company in a tacit agreement with the
Savoy dynasty, was bought by the government in Rome in 1882.” See TEKSTE NEGASH, ERITEA AND
ETHIOPIA THE FEDERAL EXPERIENCE, 13(1997).
47
British encouraged and facilitated Italy’s occupation of Massawa fearing France would extend its holding from
French Somaliland. As Egyptians who occupied the coast after Ottoman Turks left were under control of British,
its preference of Italy over France made the occupation easier, but confronted with Ethiopian resistance. Id.
44
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But Italy’s attempt to further expand to the hinterland was confronted with a huge battle
with Ethiopians. At the moment Ras Alula was at high time, as a prominent general and
administrator of King Yohannis IV, who moved with his brigade to expel the steadily expanding
Italians. Alula’s forces defeated Italians at Dogali in 1887, which made the expansionist enemy to
retreat. However, Alula and his forces did not stay there to keep Italians at the periphery. In the
mean time, Yohannis IV confronted with Mahdists of Sudan in the Western front and lost his life.
Since his coronation, Yohannis IV never peacefully sat at his throne. He spent most of his
emperorship by repelling foreign invaders (Egyptians and Italian or Mahdists) or restoring internal
union battling with regional rivalries like Minilik II who later submitted. Minilik II, however, did
not abandon the ambition to get the power of king of kings. He had been dealing with Italians for
arms ceding territories.48 After death of Yohannis IV, Ras Allula apparently left alone. Though he
defeated Italians at Dogali in 1887 and made them to retreat, he moved to Tigray leaving the
periphery unguarded.

5.4. Colonization of Eritrea as a Prelude to Occupy Ethiopia
Emperor Yohannis’s death coupled with Alula’s move to Tigray had created a conducive
situation for Italians who already did not go far waiting for a best moment to come back. After
Yohannis’s death Italians came back from peripheries and occupied substantial portion of current
territories Eritrea.49 Moreover, internal power struggle created another best opportunity to Italians.
Italians had cheated Minilik promising to work together and enable him get the title of
emperorship. In 1889 Minilik II of Shoa was coroneted as King of Kings of Abyssinia. In the
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“ As early as 1887, Minilik, the king of Shoa, had expressed readiness to negotiate with the Italians for the supply
of arms in the exchange for cession of territory, if this would ensure his speedy accession to power [….]” Id at 13.
49
Italians realized the attitude of the lowland Eritreans who were tired of Eritrean highlanders and Ethiopians who
occasionally plundered their cattle. Italians thus continued occupying territories where they welcomed in order to
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mean time, Italians quickly moved to the highlands of Eritrea occupied Karen and then Asmara in
July 1889.
Italy occupied territories it could possibly consolidate its power and named it
“Erythraea.”50 The name “Eritrea” was derived from the Greek term called Erythraea, which
literally means red.51 Thus, the Biblical terminology of Erythraean Sea Red Sea.52 As a result, one
author surmises, “ Eritrea, however, existed as a historical fiction created by the Italians in the late
ninetieth century.” 53
Italy used variety of deceptive mechanisms to silence Minilik II against Eritrea’s
occupation.54 Numerous ostensive peace, friendship, and cooperation treaties were signed.55 After
establishing its power in current territories of Eritrea, Italy concluded an infamous treaty with
Minilik II at Wichalle (some times called Uccalli, but herein after we will use only Wichalle) with
intention to extend its power to other territories of Ethiopia.56 The most important aspect of this
treaty was Minilik’s formal acceptance of occupation of Eritrea. It is true that Minilik II by
determining boundaries beyond which Italy cannot claim had produced an appearance of legality

restrain Eritrean highlanders and Ethiopians from raiding their cattle. According to Tekeste Negash, “By the end of
1888, the Italians had established contacts with the Tigre, Hababa and Beni Amer leaders.” See Id.
50
Negash and Tronvoll supra note 1 at 5.
51
The noun “Erithraean Sea” had been in use long before the birth of Christianity. For instance, Agatharchides, a
Greek historian and geographer who lived in 169 BC authored a book entitled, “On the Erithraean Sea” in which
the limits of the boundaries of Saudi Arabia was described. See http://www.bible.ca/archeology/bible-archeologyexodus-red-sea-agatharchides-of-cnidus-on-the-erythraean-sea-169bc.htm
52
See Exodus 10:19, Acts 7:36, The Amharic version still uses the expression “Eritrean Sea” while the contemporary
English versions changed it into “Red Sea”. Some even doubt the meaning of “Red Sea”, stating that the original
meaning of the Sea of Reeds, which is derived from common reeds ( salt grass around the sea) For closer
assessment of the origin of Erythrean Sea or Red Sea or Reed Sea, see, William F. Tanner, Did Israel Cross Red
Sea?, 50 FSCF 211 -215 (1998), available at http://www.asa3.org/ASA/PSCF/1998/PSCF9-98Tanner.html
53
Robert Eale Woolbert, The Future of Ethiopia, 20 FOREIGN AFF546, 537 – 551 (1941 – 1942).
54
It was assumed that the Wichalle Treaty would create perpetual peace and friendship between Ethiopia and Italy
but the Italy’s motive was far from Minilik’s thought. Italy attempted to peacefully occupy the whole Ethiopia
under the guise of assistance in foreign relationship was apparently.
55
The Treaty of October 20, 1887, a treaty of friendship and alliance, In Art. 2 of the Treaty Italy, among other things
declared not to occupy Ethiopia’s territory. This treaty later including in Wichale Treaty of 1889. Stern supra note
38. See also History of Eritrea supra note 32.
56
The Italians offered Minilik 30,000 Musket rifles and 28 cannons and also loan, See Ethiopian Foreign Policy
(Jan. 30, 2014) ,www.ethiopian foreingpolicy.com.
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to Italy’s occupation of territories hitherto Ethiopian kings had defended for centuries apart from
some coastal spots that used for dockyard for commercial ships and the medieval Ethiopian port of
Massawa.
Minilik’s apparent acceptance of the occupation of Eritrean territories by Italy was not
actually free from doubt. First, Minilik protested against Italy’s occupation of Massawa and
hinterlands57, albeit he enjoyed overwhelming Italian support against his rivals including Yohannis
IV.58 In Italy’s refusal, Minilik sought the mediation of Queen Victoria, which “proved to be
unsuccessful.”59 In addition to the deceits and apparent help Minilik had enjoyed considerable
financial and arms gift that was crucial for consolidation of Minilik’s power to continue
reunification of other kingdoms. Italy had also intention to weaken the power of Yohannis IV and
support Minilik to acquire Emperorship with the objective of occupying the whole Abyssinia
peacefully. The other was Italy’s superiority and the assumption of future backup in case of
internal and external threat, presumably, had silenced Minilik to accept the treaty. Furthermore,
previous silence to contend of occupation of Massawa by Ottoman Turkey and some villages like
Bogos by Egyptians had created an impression that occupation of border territories was not
threatening.60
The Treaty of Wichale was concluded after Minilik’s coronation as Negus Negest (King of
Kings) of Abyssinia/Ethiopia.61 The Treaty included important pillars of the Treaty of 1887 that
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According to Stern when Ethiopians were “preoccupied with other affairs, the Italians occupied Massawa and
Beilul. They soon advanced their posts into the hinterland. In a letter to Queen Victories, Minilik protested against
the Italian invasion [….]” See Stern supra note at 190.
58
For instance, Minilik was supported by Italy when he conquered and restored Harar to the Abyssinian. See Stern
supra note 38.
59
Id.
60
Ottoman Turks had occupied Massawa for long period. It confined to the port collecting fees. This presumably
created an impression that their presence at the Port of Massawa was not a threat.
61
The Treaty of Wichale is very important in the history of colonial treaties. First it practically proved deceptive
practices of colonial powers and its abandonment after the colonial power was defeated by the native people whose
sovereignty might have been taken under the guise of deceitful treaty terms.
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was concluded between Minilik II and Italy before his coronation.62 The Treaty of Wichale was
written in Italian and Amharic versions. Art. III of the Treaty of Wichale had provisions to
establish frontier commission that assumed to delimit and demarcate boundaries between Ethiopia
and the occupied territories that later named as Erythraea. The treaty set boundaries of Ethiopia “to
run south of Arafali, Halai and Asmara.”63 It did not only provide Italy’s extraterritorial
jurisdiction over Ethiopia, but proclaimed “the creation of monetary union between Italian colonies
and Ethiopia.64 However, Article 17 of the Treaty rendered the rest of the terms meaningless as it
put Ethiopia under Italian protectorate.65 The Amharic and Italian versions of the treaty were not
congruent. It simply offered Minilik the option to seek Italy’s assistance if needed. Then after Italy
declared to the other European powers that Ethiopia was under its protectorate and any foreign
government wishing to deal with Ethiopia could do so only by channeling Italy.66
Realizing facts of the deceptive wordings of the Treaty of Wichalle, Minilik attempted to
have the treaty wordings to be fixed, but at vain. Italy, rather attempted to appease him by bribing
through ammunition, which this time did not silence Minilik II.67 After wards Minilik II repudiated
the treaty thereby declining any kind of contact with Italy.68 Italians moved to occupy Ethiopia by
force. Minilik II deployed his people and troops to the north Ethiopia and fought the invading
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This was a treaty of friendship and alliance. In this treaty the Minilik II and Italy promised to support each other
(Art. 2 of the Treaty). Italy promised arms to Minilik who promised not to turn the arms against Italy (Art. 5).
Most importantly to Minilik II, Italy promised not annex any Ethiopian territory. See Stern supra note 38.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
This means, “ His Majesty the King of Kings of Ethiopia consents to make use of the Italian Government for any
negotiation which he may enter into which other Powers or Governments.” Id.
66
Italian version of the Treaty reads “Sua maesta il Re dei Re d’Etiopia consente di servirsi del Governo di Sua
Maesta il Re d’Italia per tutte le trattazioni di affair che avesse con alter Potenze e Governi.” Id at 191. Italy
telegrammed thirteen leading powers about Art. 17 of the Wuchale Treaty. Id.
67
Italy sent 2,000,000 cartridges that finally served to fight Italians at Aduwa. Id.
68
After Italy refused to fix the deceptive provision demanding direct negotiation, Minilik apparently sent a telegram
stating boundaries of Ethiopia. This telegram proves Minilik’s takings of Ethiopian territories. He stated that
Ethiopia’s territories “ran from south of Arafali on the Read Sea eastward through territories which is today Eritrea
and through large part of Sudan to Lake Rudolf in South.” Id at 192. In the east it goes to Ogaden and parts of
Djibouti. Id. Thus, Miniik’s Ethiopia was large enough than today’s Ethiopia.
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forces in Aduwa in 1896. Though Minilik’s forces were tired walking to the northern Ethiopia
from Addis Ababa by the help of people of Tigray and the best geographic condition that was
conducive for defense, his forces humiliated Italians army making history.69
After defeating Italy, however, Minilik forces did not move to the extent of freeing the
previously occupied territories of Eritrea. Given lack of logistics, ammunition, backward
transportation and difficult geographic condition, it was hard to Minilik II pursue towards Eritrea.
Minilik’s fighters were already exhausted by the fight and long journey from Addis Ababa. Some
Eritrean villages, especially, Muslims supported Italy on Ethiopia’s conservative religious
grounds.70
Italy ultimately opted for peaceful resolution by renegotiating with emperor Minilik II. On
October 26, 1896 a peace treaty was signed in Addis Ababa thereby formally annulling the whole
treaty of Wichalle.71 At this treaty Italy recognized Ethiopia’s sovereign and independent
existence.

5.5. “Boundary Treaties”
After battle of Adwa (also known as Aduwa), apparently, as a step for peaceful existence,
Italy sought delineation of boundaries between Ethiopia and Eritrea.72 Accordingly, in addition to
the peace treat of October 1896, three successive boundary treaties were concluded in 1900, 1902
and 1908. These were the treaties that Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) was
authorized to delimit and demarcated boundary between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Brief overview of
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Minilik’s forces killed 4600 Italian army and captured 2000. Id at 193, see also Negash supra note 46 at 14.
Eritrean highlanders and most Ethiopians were followers of Ethiopian Orthodox Church that had suppressed the Muslim
minority. In fear of cooperation between Orthodox brothers Muslims favored Italians. Thus, any further move to wipe out
Italians from Eritrea may not be easy to Minilik even if his forces were not already exhausted. Fighting on Tigray land was easy
and
favorable as Tigreans were absolute supporters of the Emperor.
71
It was not only the contentious provision Art. 17 but also the October 1896 treaty was discarded. Id at 193.
72
Art. III of the Addis Ababa Peace Treaty of October 1896.
70

262

each of the treaties presented in the following sections. Controversies and point of contention as a
result of wordings of the treaties and associated problems will dealt in the next chapter.
5.5.1. 1900 Treaty
The 1900 treaty was concluded in the aftermath of Italy’s defeat at the battle of Adwa. Italy
apparently lost its hope of occupying the whole country and set to secure a portion of Ethiopian
territory that it captioned as Erythraea. As has been pointed out elsewhere, the validity and
fairness historical actions have to be gauged on the basis of facts prevailing at a time, (application
of the doctrine of contemporaneity), but the current generation may query why the Ethiopian king
negotiated with Italy to legally and freely surrender a territory that had been under the sovereignty
of Ethiopia for thousands of years. Given legality of coercive occupation of African territories,
especially after the notorious Berlin Conference and coercive expansionist policies of Italy,
Minilik II had to be assured by confining Italians at a given point. It is true that Ethiopia won the
war with Italy that had superior military hardware and highly trained military personnel, but that
victory by itself could not guarantee that Italians would be completely restrained. Repeated Italian
inducement, and Minilik II’s desire to reintegrate the southern kingdoms were some of the causes
that dictated Minilik II to accept Italy’s offer to establish a borderline that Italians could not further
claim.
The 1900 treaty was very significant as it attempted to define boundaries of substantial
portion of central and western regions of Ethiopia and Eritrea. This treaty is also vital as it dealt
with the localities at which the 1998 dispute arose. However, the confusion arising from 1900 and
subsequent treaties has caused unending conflict. The treaty was signed on July 10, 1900 in Addis
Ababa, which is far away from the border areas. Either the treaty or accompanying statement of
signatories does not reveal the reason for setting boundaries at stated locations. Apart from few
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squares of land that were purchased from tribal chiefs near Assab under the guise of commercial
shipping company, the rest of territories were taken by force. Turning back to 1900 Treaty, one
may also questioned that why Italy chose a particular land to be an end of its Eritrean territory?
The plan to set boundary was totally Italian initiative that freely determined the point of separation.
It is true that Italy was defeated and signed a peace treaty in October 1896, but no rationale was
justified to draw the boundary at a point.
Moreover, either the treaty, accompanying statement of statesmen, or literature in the field
does not disclose whether pre-negotiation survey was conducted. Given communication and
transportation restraints at the time, it was hard for Ethiopian leaders to know the details of local
geography and ethnographic facts before setting the boundary. The colonial power, on the other
hand, was in a better position to know facts on the ground, but had a hidden motive for further
expansion to acquire more territories by any means, if not possible to occupy the whole Ethiopia.
It is doubtful to regard the 1900 treaty as “treaties” in true sense. It was a one-page “note”73
having simply two provisions. While Art. I of the treaty stipulates the supposed boundary spots,
Art. II declares obligation on Italy not to cede or transfer the territories bounded by said boundary
points to any power.74 Thus, only a single provision was meant to set boundary line proper.
Mentioning only names of rivers as boundary line, the treaty was excessively vague. Art. I of the
treaty states, “The line Tomat-Todluc-Mareb-Belesa-Muna, traced on the map annexed, is
recognized by the two contracting Parties as the boundary between Erythrea and Ethiopia.” Tomat
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Professor Larebo calls the treaties as “notes.” See Haile M. Larebo, Colonial Treaties in the Context of the Current EthioEritrean Border Dispute and Settlement, Paper presented to the 14th INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF ETHIOPIAN
STUDIES, Addis Ababa, November 6 – 10, 2000. The 1902 treaties itself has applied the term, “note” to mean the treaty. See ¶
three of Art. II of 1902 which states, “ […]His majesty Edward VII, king of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and of the
British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and his successors, have signed the present note […]”
74
It is not clear why Minilik II cautioned Italy not to transfer the territory to another power. It is not lease in which
case the territory to be returned back to Ethiopia. But is it possible to read Minilik’s intention. Italy could possess
the territories as far as it needed, but if Italy no more needed them the territories should be returned back to
Ethiopia.
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and Todluc are not nearby locations. Tomat is located on the treaty map at very west, which
borders Sudan, whereas Todluc was at very north, and the other boundary rivers are in the central
regions. The treaty does not mention how the boundary line to be drawn. That is, whether the spots
mentioned in the treaties to be linked by straight-line or the actual borderline to be drawn on the
basis of individual landholding of residents or ethnic and other facts on the ground to be
considered.
The treaty of 1900 was not only arbitrary and unconscionable, (Ethiopia surrendered its
territories for no consideration and boundaries were set without survey of facts on the ground) but
also influenced by the wishes of Italy.75 At this time, Minilk II was already aware of dishonest
character Italy.76 An inquisitive mind may also query why Italy moved to set a point of separation
between its people while Italy did not abandon its expansionist policy? It may be taken that
boundary setting was simply a deceitful act that meant to pacify Minilik II to subtly submit the
whole territories. Italy knew that the boundary was a temporary quelling practice, as its ultimate
goal was to colonize the whole Ethiopia. This fact was proved by the 1935 invasion and
incorporation of the whole Ethiopian territories to the Italian East Africa colonies.
The other reason for arbitrariness of Ethio-Eritrean boundary was ignorance of contracting
parties to consider ethnographic and geographic facts on the ground. Given absence of quick
transportation, modern communication channel, and distance from urban centers at the time,
contracting parties supposedly relied on information supplied by third parties. Consequently, we
have today an elusive treaty that remained hard, if not impossible to execute, as facts on the ground
and treaty wordings could not match or facts referred in the treaty or their naming appears wrong
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Unilateral drawing of maps and applying a straight line, which has planted confusion and animosity among the
neighboring ethnic groups and the two bordered nations. It was the effects of expansionist dishonest policies of
Italy.
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or non-existing. As Tomat-Todluc issue was resolved by the 1902 treaty, “Mereb – Belesa –
Muna” is still outstanding and has been source of conflict. Non-existent river or wrong junctions
were invoked by the Parties and unacceptable and impracticable decision was passed. Italy had
intentionally set a vague boundary with a view to effectuate its expansionist policy, assuming a
clear boundary would make some kind of restraint on her long run motives of stretching its long
hands to the Ethiopian territories.
The 1900 treaty was backed by the treaty map, which further complicates the situation.
Subsequent attempts by Italy to fill the treaty lacunae have further inflicted Ethiopian interest, as
Italy repeatedly draw boundary map that influenced EEBC to pursue a path designed by Italy.
Italian agencies or cartographers unilaterally mapped border areas.77 This added unsolvable
complexity that staled all efforts of peaceful settlement of Eritrea-Ethiopia boundary issue.
The next spots of boundary were defined by river route. The straight line connects Tekezze
river with Mereb river at Mai Ambessa. The border then follows Mereb River in the central
highlands.78

“When the Mareb joins on its right side by Belessa river, the border follows

Belessa”79 Though modified by the 1902 Treaty, the 1900 Treaty still covers substantial portion of
the disputed boundaries.80
5.5. 2. 1902 Treaty
The 1902 Treaty was a tripartite agreement that was concluded between Great Britain on
behalf of Anglo Egyptian Sudan, Italy and Ethiopia. The 1902 Treaty was a fruit of conspiracy
between Great Britain and Italy for peaceful taking of Ethiopian territory under the guise of treaty.
76

A clear boundary would stagnate expansionist move or the Ethiopian king might not sign the treaty if all the
contours of territory lines were known.
77
Robdriguez supra note 8 at abstract.
78
Jean _Louis Peninou, The Ethiopian – Eritrean Border Conflict, IBRU OUNDARY AND SECURITY BULLETIN
46, 46 – 50 (1998).
79
Id.
80
It covered about 1/3 of the boundaries between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
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Both great powers made a secret arrangement to place the Kunama into Eritrean territory.
Apparently it was meant to set meeting point of three States: Ethiopia, Eritrea and Anglo Egyptian
Sudan. The confusion dwelling in 1902 treaty is hard to cure. It was the source of most of the
Ethio-Eritrean boundary conflict. First, it did not actually set borderlands that regarded as Kunama
territories, and the other was confusing nomenclature of River Maiteb. The 1902 Treaty has two
provisions that basically meant to annex Kunama territories to Italian colony of Eritrea. The 1902
Treaty declares:
Commencing from the junction of the Kbur Um Hagar with the Setit, the new frontier
follows this river to its junction with the Maieteb, following the latter’s course so as to
leave Mount Ala Tacura to Erythrea, and joins the Mareb at its junction with the Mai
Ambessa.
The line from the junction of the Setit and Maieteb to the junction of the Mareb and Mai
Ambessa shall be delimited by Italian and Ethiopian Delegates, so that the Cunama tribe
belong to Erythrea.81 (Emphasis added).

As shown in Map 2 that was submitted to the EEBC by the parties, after few miles from
Kbur Um Hagar through courses Setit river there is a river that flows to the northwards known as
Maieteb. As the 1902 Treaty makes a juncture of Sitit River and Maieteb then proceeds to the
confluence of Mai Ambessa to the northeast, and then follow river courses of Mereb in accordance
with 1900 treaty. Ethiopia claims that paragraph I of the 1902 treaty mentions about the junction of
the Maiteb that flows up ward in western region and the boundary line follows Maiteb and at the
end of Maiteb the boundary goes by straight line to Mai Ambessa which for sure puts Badme on
Ethiopian side. To the worse, an old map shows a stream known as Maiten or in some cases
spelled as “Meeteb” long away from the boundary line that Ethiopia claims.82 In the Map, Maieteb
can be spotted at least in three locations. Each party takes a location that supposedly affords more
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Art. I of 1902 Treaty Between Ethiopia, United Kingdom and Italy for the Delimitation of the Frontiers between
Ethiopia and Eritrea and The Sudan. 191 C.T.S. 180 XCV B.S.S.P. 469 (Eng. It)
82
At the time of the treaty most of the claimed territories were vacant and naming supposedly not settled or it may
also be translation problem or a mere ignorance or may also deliberate action of colonial Italy with the motives of
further expansion.
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territory. While Ethiopia chose the first Maieteb not far from Sudanese border, Eritrea opted
Maieten in the very southeast in the central section, which locates Badme to Eritrea. No one
claimed Meeteb that was in the middle.
The other ambiguity lies on the question of leaving Kunama (some times written as
Cunama) to the Eritrean side. As pointed out above, Kunama continuously relinquished their
territories and had been moving to unfavorable desert regions. Therefore, delineation of clear
territories of Kunama land is hared unless through on spot study is conducted. Cognizant of this
problem, contracting parties pledged to determine territories of Kunama on the basis site visit but
no further action was taken. Thus, it is possible to surmise that delimitation work of 1902 Treaty
was not complete. Moreover, Kunama’s were never been evacuated, as it was required in the
treaty.83 Now we have Kunama’s on Ethiopian side of the border, and also on the Eritrean
Kunama. To sum up, unless Ethiopia and Eritrea renegotiate with a view to clearly delineate an
exact line of separation in accordance with facts on the ground and accepted practice of local
people, no acceptable boundary line may be drawn.
5.5.3. 1908 Treaty
The 1908 Treaty delineates the Eastern regions. It starts from the boundary set by the 1900
treaty and goes to eastwards up to the territory of Djibouti.
From the most easterly point of the frontier established between the colony of Eritrea and
the Tigre by the convention of 10th July 1900 the boundary proceeds in a south easterly
direction, parallel to and at a distance of 60 kilometers from the coast, until it joint the
frontier of the French possessions of Somalia.
The two governments undertake to fix the above-mentioned frontier-line on the spot by
common accord and as soon as possible, adapting it to the nature and variation of the
ground.
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Id. at 191.
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The two governments undertake to establish by common accord and as soon as possible the
respective dependency of the limitrophe tribes on the frontiers on the basis of their
traditional and usual residence. 84

The first paragraph of the 1908 Treaty sets out the Eastern boundary. It starts from the eastern end
of 1900 treaty line. It goes then to the southeasterly direction within the 60 kilometers gap until the
line reaches to the French Somali (now Djibouti). As usual no rationale was apparent for deciding
the boundary to be with 60 Kms limit. This plausibly arises a speculation that Italy sought to make
Ethiopia stay away from sea route. The two contracting parties agreed to make the actual boundary
on the ground but no action was taken so far. The 1908 Treaty purports to give room for
consideration of geographic factors like establishing common accord regarding borderland tribe
(limitrophe tribe) in setting frontier that aligns with their tradition and usual residence.

5.6. Ethio-Eritean Boundary (1935 – 1991)
5.6.1. Annexation of Ethiopia to Italian East Africa Colonies
In the Wake of WWII, in 1935, fascist Italy invaded Ethiopia disregarding all the prior
treaties including the October 1896 Peace Treaty, and boundary treaties of 1900, 1902, and 1908
that were concluded with a view to create friendship and peace by setting defined boundary lines.85
Italy’s invasion was also contrary to the international law as embodied in the Convenient of
League of Nations in which both Ethiopia and Italy were signatories.86 The Italian invasion of
Ethiopia and the invasion of Manchuria by Japan demonstrated the failure of League of Nations.
Italy deployed all its available resources including modern fighter jet on the people largely
untrained and armed with traditional tool like spear and some old guns that were acquired from
Italy. Italy has used prohibited poisonous gas to disperse courageous Ethiopian fighters.
84
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The then Ethiopian king, Emperor Haile Selassie fled Europe through Djibouti with a view
to advocate Italy’s invasion of as a member of League of Nations contrary to the provisions of the
Covenant of League of Nations.87 The League, however, failed to enforce Art. 11 of the Covenant
of League of Nations that required collective action against invasion on Member States.88 Emperor
Haile Selassie stayed in Great Britain while patriotic Ethiopians guerrilla fighters were
courageously fighting the invaders. After Italy occupied Addis Ababa, there was no widespread
direct confrontation, but patriotic guerrilla movement that was spread all over the country did not
give time to peacefully operate all over the country.89
However, as there was no direct confrontation with the invaders, the colonial power was
able to incorporate Ethiopia into the Italian East Africa Colonies. Within five years of occupation
of Ethiopia, Italy effectively altered Ethio-Eritrean boundary lines thereby mingling both nations
again under a single political authority - Italy. Italy redrew a new colonial map that annexed a
large portion of territory from Ethiopia to Eritrea. This map has also influenced EEBC to incline to
the Eritrean side of argument. Richard Cornwell sums:
It appears that the Italian colonial map issued in 1934, may have exaggerated the
extent of Eritrean territory with a view to providing Mussolini with the excuse for
an assault on Ethiopia. It has therefore been rejected by some advocates of
Ethiopia’s case, who also point out the difficulty of using the imprecise treaties
signed at the turn of the century. 90
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See Art. 10 The Covenant of League of Nations
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The Fascist Italian occupation has not only rendered colonial treaties and boundaries they
supposed to create null and void, but also abolished international and administrative boundaries of
Ethiopia. Large territories of current Tigray State of Ethiopia and the northern portion of territories
of Afar Regional State were annexed to Eritrea. Internal administrative boundaries of Ethiopia
were also redrawn into four regions. The present territories of Southern Ethiopia, Gambella and
Oromia regions were lumped together and captioned as “Gala –Sidamo”. The Harer Region, Shoa,
and Amhara were other regional states that were designed by Italian colonial power. Thus, during
the short-lived five years of Italian occupation, there was no question of international boundary
between Ethiopia and Italy.
After occupying all the Ethiopian territories, during WWII, Italy proceeded to annex
British Somaliland, which brought WWII to the Horn of Africa by initiating Great Britain to take
action against fascist Italy. With assistance of Great Britain, Emperor Haile Selassie landed in
Sudan and successfully coordinated the ongoing patriotic movement. Great Britain aligned with
the already battling Ethiopian guerrilla forces under the leadership of Emperor Haile Selassie.
Haile Selassie seized the opportunity to liberate Ethiopia by effectively leading patriotic forces
with British fighter jets dropping bombs on the Italians who surrendered shortly in the northern
Eritrea. Emperor Haile Selassie also attempted to coordinate Eritreans who had been fighting on
behalf of Italy by dropping leaflets and sending messages to align with Ethiopian and British
forces to turn their arms to the colonial power and stand on behalf of their Ethiopian brothers and
liberate Ethiopia. In April 1941 Eritrea was liberated and within a month, in May 1941 the whole
Ethiopia got freedom.91
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5.6.2. British Trusteeship and Eritrea’s Federation to Ethiopia
While Emperor Haile Selassie I was back to power and took administration of Ethiopia,
British Military Administration (BMA) continued occupation of Eritrea as caretaking government
for 10 years. Haile Selassies’s repeated attempt to reintegrate Eritrea with Ethiopia was not
accepted.92 After defeating Italian colonizers, Great Britain’s cooperative spirit was changed in a
way harming Ethiopia’s interest for regaining Eritrea and territorial integrity. This can be justified
by the initiation and support that BMA lent to anti unity movements in Eritrea. For instance, BMA
manifestly challenged “Mahber Fikiri Hager”, which was pro-unionist party by organizing rival
organs that oppose unification agenda of Unionist Party (hereinafter UP).93 For many Ethiopians
and pro-unionist Tigrinya speaking Eritreans BMA’s position was hard to accept.
Great Britain, however, considered Eritrea94 as an enemy territory and stayed there until the
fate of Eritrea was legally determined by the Allied powers. The changing nature of the wind of
colonization, and the emerging international commitment that prohibits occupation has dictated
BMA not to legally claim occupation of Eritrea as an enemy territory. Since League of Nations,
legality the policy of annexation of enemy territory has been changed. The only legal possibility to
occupy enemy territory is to hold it until national actors are able to take over power. Thus, the
only legal possibility to hold an enemy territory was in the form of trusteeship.
During the period of British trusteeship, there was no boundary change, nether boundary
issue. The colonial boundary was elusive; it was not only fully delimited, but it was not
demarcated. Therefore, borderland resident did not know the existence of boundary line. The
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On his first official visit to Eritrea in October 1952 Emperor Haile Selassie I disclosed his government’s relentless
effort to reintegrate Eritrea with Ethiopia even before the end of WWII. The Emperor disclosed how he helped
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abroad. See Negash supra note 46 at 78.
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supposed boundary line was simply remained on the paper, not known to the local people – the
local people were not aware of what Italy was doing and never cared about boundary line, as
border was not walled or changed social interaction. Put simply, to the local people there was no
boundary issue, as there was no change on the ground. There was no pillar, beacon, or boundary
wall. To ordinary people political separation was nothing, as it did not restrain socio-economic
interaction among people. There were Ethiopian monasteries in the main land of Eritrea that
Ethiopian people travelled without noticing emerging boundary. Debre Bazen and Debre Maryam
monasteries are live memoires proving the true affinity of Eritreans and Ethiopians.95 Thus, in
terms of political administration for the past 50 years the supposed boundary separated Eritreans
from their Ethiopian brothers, but social relationship was not absolutely bared:

Economic

transactions, intermarriage, religious services, market transactions continued.
During British Military Administration (BMA), in Eritrea socio-political situation was not
settled. There were numerous conflicting moves and competing interests. The diplomatic
wrangling between Ethiopian government and British administration, involvement of interest of
Allied Forces, direct and indirect interference of Italy to regain and perpetuate its influence in
Eritrea96, the battle to reunion Eritrea with Ethiopia (especially by the members of UP), or divide
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According to Tekeste Negash, “[…] the BMA’s treatment of Eritrea and its subjects as belonging to Italy had
complicated relations between the UP and the BMA.” Id.
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end of Italian colonial administration. In 1944 about 100,000 Eritreans were living in Ethiopia considering
themselves as Eritreans. See Negash supra note 46 at 55. This is not surprising as an Eritrean (Lorenzo Teazaz)
was the most important advocate for Ethiopia before League of Nations together with Empower Haile Selassie.
Later after independence of Ethiopia Lorenzo Teazaz served as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia. Moreover,
about 1500 Eritreans battled Italian colonizers together with their Ethiopian brothers. Id at 50) Furthermore, the
two Eritrean heroes Abraha Deboch and Mogos Asgedom attempted to assassinate Rodolfo Graziani in Addis
Ababa while Graziani planned to celebrate birth of an Italian royal baby: the prince of Naples. See Aregawi Berhe,
Revisiting Resistance in Italian –Occupied Ethiopia: The Patriots Movement (1936 – 1941) and the redefinition of
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trusteeship. (Id. at 50). Moreover, the Italian Community in Eritrea (RIE and CAS) formed pro Italian party by
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Eritrea between Ethiopia and Anglo Egyptian Sudan (British later move), or the move for creation
of independent Eritrea. Until these issues fairly decided, boundary question was not important.
Professor Tekeste Negash remarks, “[…] the BMA officers did not believe that Eritrea was
culturally homogenous and already had vague notions as to how to dispose of the colony at the
opportune moment.”97 As a result, the British Military Administration favored Eritrea’s separation
rather than union with Ethiopia.98 This was a real challenge to the Unionist Party (Mahber Fikri
Hager) that aggressively worked for unconditional union with Ethiopia. With a view to tackle the
insistent move of UP to reunion with Ethiopia, BMA, exerted variety of initiatives that aimed at
counteracting UP. First BMA initiated formation of competing parties, which demanded
independence of Eritrea. The Eritrean Party for Eritrea, and Muslim League were formed to
challenge unionist agenda of UP. When this strategy failed because of UP’s continued strength and
support even from prominent personalities from Muslim community,99 BMA attempted to split
Eritrea into Ethiopia and Sudan.
Residents of Eritrean western and lowland regions were predominately Muslims and
nomads. These were areas where expansionist or religion-backed wars were repeatedly fought.
Due to logistic problems, even Ethiopian fighters raided their cattle,100 which prompted lowlanders
to support Italian occupation. Moreover, Ethiopian and Eritrean highlanders repeatedly invaded
lowlands in search for food, cattle, crops, and slaves.101 On top this external invaders like

transforming former Italian colonial soldiers Association into political party whose explicit program was to put
Eritrean under Italian trusteeship. In addition to these manipulations, Italy continued distribution of funds. (Id. at
51)
97
Id. at 39.
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Id. at 40
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For instance, Muslim League’s prominent figure, Said Baker al Morgani defected to UP adversely affected ML and
BMA’s counter action plan. See Negash supra note 46 at 53.
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Negash & Tronvoll supra note 1 at 4. For instance, King Ezana’s brothers Saizana and Adefan invaded Beja’s
who rebelled King Ezana of Axum and raided 3112 heads of cattle, 6224 sheep. See Pankhurst supra note 26 at
26.
101
Id. at 5.
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Egyptians, Turks, and jihadist movement had spread their own culture and ideology, which has
distanced lowlanders from their highland brothers. Thus, residents of lowland regions had no good
relationship even with their Eritrean kinsmen who were members of Ethiopian Orthodox
Christians and have huge resemblance to Ethiopians. Italian colonial power seized this divisive
opportunity and gave more freedom to Muslims and protected their resources and their interest.
This has nurtured sense of difference, but actually, Muslims and residents of lowland territories
were not different from their hinterland brothers.
UP’s strong and persistent battle for union with Ethiopia,102 had forced BMA partially to
accept the objectives of UP by integrating some of the strategically important vicinities with
Ethiopia and to annex western lowland regions with Anglo Egyptian Sudan.103 Great Britain’s
supposed split of Eritrea was largely based on cultural and religious affinity with neighboring
people.104
In February 1947 Italy concluded numerous treaties called “Treaty of peace” with the
winners of WWII and associated nations. Ethiopia was also party among associates of allied
Forces. The Treaty of Peace, specifically, delineated European boundaries of Italy with the Allied
Forces. With regard to Italian Africa colonies, Italy agreed to abandon all rights it had in Africa.
Thus, Italian rights and privileges created in Africa were absolutely voided. Art. 23 of the Peace
Treaty states, “Italy renounces all right and title to the Italian territorial possessions in Africa, i.e.
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Unionist Party (UP) was very organized and vigorously worked for political union with Ethiopia. It celebrated
Emperor Haile Selassie I’s birth day and celebrated Ethiopian independence date and prayed in the church for unity
of Ethiopia and Eritrea again. UP had uncompromising Youth League. It has also Women’s League. UP repeatedly
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Asmara residents. See Negash supra note 46 at 42.
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of splitting Eritrea was failed at the last minutes of U.N. deliberation Details are mentioned in 5.6.3.
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Libya, Eritrea and Italian Somaliland.” (Art. 23(1)). Thus, Italy has legally abandoned its rights
and privileges that were created in consecutive boundaries treaties with Ethiopia.
Though Italy legally renounced any right in Eritrea, its laws, Institutions, and Italian
community in Eritrea continued irritating the society of Mahber Fikiri Hager. Frequent strike and
violent demonstration that was exerted by the activities demanding immediate and unconditional
union with Ethiopia dictated Allied Forces decided to dispose Eritrea from care taking
administration.105 The allied forces set up an Enquiry Commission to assess the interest of Eritrean
people either to unite with Ethiopia or get independence. Majority of the Tigrinya speaking
highlanders chose for unconditional union with Ethiopia while lowlanders opted for Eritrea’s
independence.106 But the Enquiry Commission could not decide as interest of Eritreans and Allied
Forces was divided. The division of interest of Eritreans was largely based on religious grounds,
preconceived Italian divisive politics, and the interest of BMA, which did not favor Eritrea’s
reunion with Ethiopia. The Muslim population in western regions and lowlanders feared
suppression by Christian highlanders in collaboration with Ethiopia, in which Orthodox
Christianity was government religion and the Ethiopian Orthodox Church was granted one third of
land in Ethiopia. When the Enquiry Commission of the Allied Forces failed to reach at a binding
decision, the fate of Eritrea was passed onto United Nations General Assembly in 1948.107
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Up was tired of indirect control of Italy even after its political administration was removed by the British Forces.
During BMA, Eritrea was governed by the Italian law, Italian bureaucracy, and Italian system. According to
Tekeste Negash, “ […] UP saw little difference between Italian colonial administration and that BMA.” This
triggered frequent strike and demonstration. See Negash supra note 104.
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5.6.3. Reintegration of Eritrea with Ethiopia
5.6.3.1. U.N. mandated Federation
In 1949, in accordance with the recommendation of allied forces, the United Nations
General Assembly deliberated on ways of disposing Eritrea from trusteeship. The BMA interest to
split Eritrea into Ethiopia and Anglo Egyptian Sudan again dominated the deliberation.108 Not only
Great Britain, but also Italy and Ethiopia have voted for annexation of highland Eritrea and
Danakil regions to Ethiopia and western lowland regions to Sudan. This plan thought to solve
Ethiopia’s pressing quest for sea access, as it allocates both the port of Massawa and Assab to
Ethiopia. However, annexation of Western Regions to Sudan could not win a required vote. As a
result the whole proposal was failed. At this time Italy changed its stance and vigorously “[…]
campaigned for complete and immediate independence of Eritrea.”109 The General Assembly was
about to postpone disposition of Eritrea for the next General Assembly, but due to Great Britain
and Ethiopia’s opposition, the General Assembly set up an Enquiry Commission to assesse facts
on the ground with a view to reconsider taking the interest of people of Eritrea.
The Enquiry Commission conducted a thorough scrutiny to devise a realistic proposal that
would best satisfy interest of the people of Eritrea.

The Commission, however, could not reach

consensus in its finding. It came up with three different proposals: for complete political union
with Ethiopia, federation of two countries, and independence after 10 more years of trusteeship
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under United Nations.110 Three of the five member of the Enquiry Commission proposed Eritrea’s
integration with Ethiopia (one for unconditional political union and two members for federation
with Ethiopia) while other members (the minority) recommended for independence of Eritrea after
10 more years of trusteeship.111
United Nations General Assembly ignored the minority view, accepting the majority
suggestion to integrate Eritrea with Ethiopia in federation.112

In other words, the General

Assembly federated Eritrea with Ethiopia under the sovereignty of Ethiopian emperor as an
autonomous constituent unit having its own local government.113 The decision to federate Eritrea
with Ethiopia was formalized by the resolution of United Nations General Assembly (Resolution
390 (V)A of 1950). A Memorandum of United States Department of States indicates the
significance of federation and the role played by United States as follows:
The resolution recognizes that the disposal of Eritrea should be based on its close political
and economic association with Ethiopia and assures the inhabitants of Eritrea of the fullest
respect and safeguards for their institution, traditions, religions and languages, as well as
the widest possible measures of self-government. At the same time the resolution respects
the constitutions, institutions, traditions and the international status and identity of the
Empire of Ethiopia.114

On the basis of current and historic affinity between the people of Ethiopia and Eritrea,
United States believed that federating Eritrea with Ethiopia would best satisfy the interest of the
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people of Ethiopia and Eritrea and enhance welfare of the two nations.115 Accordingly, after facts
on the ground were assessed by the United Nations mandated Commission, United States
sponsored a resolution for federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia.
In September 15, 1952 Eritrea was formally federated to Ethiopia having its own
autonomous legislature, executive and judiciary.116 Eritrea at the time had two dominant political
parties. The Union Party that was largely represented by highland residents (Kabessa region) that
speak, Tigrinya and largely members of Ethiopian Orthodox Church.117 The Unionist Party, as the
name suggests, was pro-Ethiopian and had advocated for unconditional and complete political
union with Ethiopia.118 The Muslim League represented lowlanders, on the contrary, repeatedly
endeavored to distance Eritrea from Ethiopia or integrate with eastern Sudan.119
A month after federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia, Emperor Haile Selassie visited Eritrea
thereby formally abolishing colonial boundary. Emperor Haile Selassie made an historic speech on
the supposed colonial boundary that had separated Ethiopia and Eritrea. After thanking Almighty
God for reuniting Ethiopia and Eritrea the King proclaimed: “ …The Mareb no longer as from
today has the role of separating brothers.”120(Emphasis added).
After Eritrea’s reintegration with Ethiopia by the UN mandated federation, Sheik Ali
Redai, a member of Muslim League (ML), was appointed President of Constitutional Assembly
115
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whereas, Mr. Tedla Bairu, the head of Unionist Party, was appointed as chief executive officer of
Eritrea. Political wrangling, suspicion, fear of complete reunion with Ethiopia was continued
among the parties.121 Lack of good governance, mismanagement, favoritism, budgetary deficiency
to meet the needs of “overcrowded bureaucracy”, and alleged internal and external interference
“widened” the gap between Unionist party and Muslim League.122 In the words of Professor
Tekeste Negash, “ For the majority of the people federation marked a deterioration of their
economic conditions rather than an improvement.”123 Members of Muslim League argued that
federal institutions in Eritrea were filled only with Ethiopians.124 Moreover, the Muslim League
repeatedly blamed the executive chief for plotting with Ethiopia to abolish the federation and make
Eritrea an Ethiopian province.125
After nine months of the formation of the Federation, leaders of ML in the Western Region
expressed their stand stating that in the event of union with Ethiopia to campaign for formation of
a new state including “Western Province of Eritrea and Eastern Province of Sudan.”126 Due to
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persistent opposition of ML and some Christian Eritreans either explicitly or implicitly coupled
with inexperience in implantation of federalism, lack of good governance, undemocratic
administration, weakness of the chief executive, prevailing authoritarianism, and domination of
powerful Unionist Party together with budgetary deficiency and possibly to avoid the influence of
opposition party and foreign interference, the federation virtually weakened.127 UP from the outset
had the agenda of unconditional union with their Ethiopian kinsmen that were irrationally
separated by the Italian colonial power. Understanding of the meaning and consequences of
federation both by the Ethiopia and Unionist party gave rise to the ignorance of the repeatedly plea
of ML for observance of the United Nations Resolution and the Eritrean Constitution. Finally the
Muslim League and other parties petitioned to the UN pointing violation of the federation
arrangement, which further intensified the suppression of dissent in Eritrea.128
5.6.3.2. Abolition of Federation and Complete Merger with Ethiopia
The actual working of Eritrean federation not only demonstrated troubled relationship
among dominant political parities, the Federal Council, and the Emperor, but also it has revived
sectorial gap among the Coptic Christians and Muslim Eritreans.129 Peaceful petition by the ML to
the Emperor,130 the foreign consuls, and UN did not return any good solution. Consequently, early
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The prominent supporter of federation, Abraha Tessema witnessed that Eritreans did not dislike Ethiopians on
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1960’s exhibited wide spread demonstration, rebellion and exile.131 Numerous factors have
contributed for the frustrated relationship among the political actors that ultimately caused demise
of the federation. First, the very agenda of UP has lion’s share for the complete political union
between Ethiopia and Eritrea disregarding the Federal Act or the Eritrean Constitution. Complete
integration with Ethiopia was the preconceived political agenda of UP that was never abandoned
even after UN Resolution. Until that goal was achieved, UP considered the rest of the work
including federation as a prelude to the ultimate integration. In the words of Professor Tekeste
Negash, “ […] the majority of the Unionist activists saw federation as a temporary hindrance to
complete union with the motherland or as a plot by Ethiopian enemies to weaken the country.”132
The programs and goals of UP reflected the wishes of the people of Eritrean highland regions,
which were largely Christians who believed that Italy had separated them from their Ethiopian
kinsmen.133 Thus, any means that would take them to the complete integration with Ethiopia
assumed a vehicle taking them to the desired goal.
Second, inexperience and unfamiliarity with the working, principles and effects of
federation both by Ethiopia and the Eritrean government led to the failure of the federal system.134
Both “the Emperor and his representative professed to see little difference between federation and
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In practice, cultural and sectorial influence made the actual working of Eritrean federation hard to implement. In
the words of Prfessor Tekeste Negash, “[…] the Eritrean Christians found it very difficult to translate the federal
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complete union.”135 The two distinct systems, federation and unitary, were wrongly perceived
synonymous by the Emperor and his representatives.136 ML members repeatedly cried that the
executive chief and his departments had simply respected orders of the Emperor in lieu of the
Eritrean Constitution. This was not surprising as the executive chief was one of personalities who
“had campaigned for speedy and complete absorption of Eritrea by Ethiopia.”137
On top of this, lack of good governance, dictatorship of the executive chief, and lack of
commitment to respect and enforce the Eritrean Constitution compelled ML leaders to look for
alternative means to redress repeated failure of the Eritrean Assembly to protect the interest of
Muslim Eritreans by working to maintain the federation.138

There was a kind of subtle

discrimination apparently targeting Muslims. One simple justification was the “exclusion of
Muslims from vital departments.”139 Due to authoritarianism of the executive chief and wide
spread nepotism, Muslim Eritreans experienced hard time and considered as second-class citizens
in their own country.
The appointment of Asfaha WoldeMikael in effect intermingled the power of chief
executive and deputy representative of federal council.140 After resignation of Tedla Bairu, the
Assembly elected Asfaha Woldemikael who had been serving as a deputy representative of Federal
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system. While the unionist party worked for ultimate complete integration with Ethiopia, the Ethiopian
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A speech from the Throne Delivered by the Representative of H.I. M to the Eritrean Assembly, April 27, 1953,
RDC/BOX 1 ACC. No. 14002/EA/ADM Eritrean Assembly Minutes No. 144, Monday 27th April 1953 in Answar
Seid Suleiman, Imagining the Nation: Assessing the Role and Function of the Eritrean Assembly in the Eritrean –
Ethiopian Federation (1952 – 1962) 77 (2013) (Masters Thesis Leiden University, Netherlands Unpublished). See
also Negash supra note 46 at 90.
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Id at 93. See also Answar Seid Suleiman, Imagining the Nation: Assessing the Role and Function of the Eritrean
Assembly in the Eritrean – Ethiopian Federation (1952 – 1962) 77 (2013) (Masters Thesis Leiden University,
Netherlands Unpublished).
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Negash supra note 46 at 90.
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Abraha Tessema, a political dissent views Tedila Bairu, “[…] as merely the stooge of the Emperor.” Id. at 87.
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Id. at 125. There was widespread discrimination among Muslims and Christians. Muslims for instance, were denied with
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council. In 1957 by the approval of the representative federal agent, Andergachew Messai, Asfaha
formally started working in both offices contrary to the Eritrean Constitution.141 This indicates
prevalence of conflict of interest between the interest of monarchy and the interest of Eritrean
government, which weakened the federation. Moreover, during Asfaha’s election the Emperor’s
Consul General stressed that it was not possible to draw a hard line between “Federalist” and
“Unionist”.142 To the surprise of ML, Asfaha Woldemikael, at the beginning of his term proposed
for abolition of Eritrean flag, substitution of Eritrean Seal with that of the Emperor and making
Amharic as the official language. The bill amending the Eritrean Constitution was adopted in
1958.143
The sectarian attitude of Muslim League had some impact in the deterioration and ultimate
demise of the federation. While UP generally worked and assumed as unionist ML invoked
federation because they were “always on the brink of breaking away from Eritrea and Ethiopia.”144
In 1953 where maladministration, nepotism and authoritarianism at high time, ML considered all
non-Muslim Eritreans favoring decisions and actions of the executive chief and the federal council.
The “fight” between ML and UP which was primarily based on ideology rather than national
interest, had its share for the ultimate failure of the federation.
Finally, after commencement of the session of second Assembly, political condition for
efficacy of the federation was steadily changed, as barriers for complete political integration were
weakened. The number of UP was increased in the Assembly, a unionist president and executive
chief easily silenced ML and other federalist elements. Representatives of ML and supporters of
federation appealed to the UN, as the repeated petition to the Ethiopian Emperor did not change
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facts on the ground.145 In the eve of complete disregard of the Eritrean Constitution, members of
ML who were in exile, supported by Egypt set up an armed opposition forming Eritrean Liberation
Front (ELF) in Cairo, Egypt.146
In May 1960 the Eritrean Assembly formally started dismantling the Constitution by
changing federalist titles in a way revealing the State of Eritrea was formally marching toward one
of the provinces of Ethiopia. Accordingly the title of chief executive was changed to chief
administer, whereas the title of the Government was renamed as administration.147 The UP
dominated Assembly easily approved constitutional change.148

Disregarding several student,

opposition, civilian protests and demonstration against the move to abolish the Eritrean federation,
the Eritrean Assembly unanimously voted to dissolve the federation thereby making Eritrea 14th
administrative province of Ethiopia.149
5.6.4. Downfall of the Monarchy and Military Regimes: Independence of Eritrea
In early 1960s the ongoing rebellion against the government in Eritrea was intensified
under the leadership and coordination of ELF. It was further fueled in early 1970s, as a result of
political turmoil due to Students’ Movement against the monarchial regime. The ultimate removal
of the monarchy by the military that usurped fruits of the Student Movement,150and the resultant
political and social destabilization afforded a fertile ground to the liberation movement in Eritrea.
144

Id. at 91
One of the petitioners, Omar Kadi, after returning home from United States was charged and arrested. This
intensified widespread demonstration and protest.
146
See Hussien M. Adam, Eritrea, Somalia, Somaliland and the Horn of Africa, in AMARE TEKLE (ed.),
ERITREA AND ETHIOPIA, FROM CONFLICT TO COOPERATION 145, 139 - 168(1994)
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Negash supra note 46 at 135.
148
43 deputies voted for the constitutional change with 1absetention and no opposition. Id.
149
As prominent figure of the ML either exiled or jailed, on November 15, 1962 the UP dominated Assembly
abolished the federation in procedural correct way. See. Id. at 138.
150
See Merera Gudina, Party Politics, political polarization and the Future of Ethiopian Democracy, A paper
presented at the International Conference on African Dev’t , Center for African Dev’t Pol’y Res. WMU, 8/2007.
http://scholarworks.wmich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1119&context=africancenter_icad_archive See Selassie
supra note 113 at 106.
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The 1974 Ethiopian Revolution had generated wide opposition movements and stimulated
formation of numerous political parties.151

There was rampant extra-judicial killings and

expropriation of personal properties including land and private buildings.152 Activists of political
parties, especially member of EPRP were hunted by the military regime and summarily executed.
The military that unexpectedly removed the monarchy and took power did not tolerate dissent of
any kind. In fear of summary execution under the infamous campaign of Red Terror, members
opposition groups, especially activists of EPRP either exiled or took part in armed struggle against
the military regime.
Political instability, sense of insecurity and fear had motivated not only secessionist
movements like ELF and other domestic rebellion groups, but also inspired external forces that had
been looking for best moment to disintegrate Ethiopia. Somalia invaded Ethiopia with the
aspiration to create a Greater Somalia by ceding certain territories that were occupied by ethnic
Somalis.
Domestic political turbulence and external invasion had further strengthened ELF, which
was already well organized, by the ideological and logistic backing from Arab nations.153
Consequently, ELF quickly swelled by the influx of people marching in all directions in fear and
opposition of aggressive military actions looking for safe haven or possibly involve in fight against
the military regime. As a result, the Front was able to liberate western lowland territories, and
afforded shelter and training to the fleeing opposition party members, former officials, students
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Student and intellectual centered political organization known as Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Party (
EPRP) was the most prominent one that started armed struggle in the cities and later conventional war in certain
Amhara and Tigray peripheries, Ethiopian Democratic Unity (EDU) MEISION, SEDED etc. Id.
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Losing all they had, property owners left with limited options. Prolonged detention with the possibility of
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also paved a way to get into safe haven in exile.
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Apart from Egypt and Saudi Arabia that supported ELF in the heydays of ELF several neighboring States such as
Somalia, Sudan and Yemen assisted ELF in its fight against Ethiopia. According to Hussien Adam, Yeman
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and intellectual who risked their life. It was at this time that students and intellectuals of Tigray
province joined EPLF to get military training and logistic support. As Shumet Sishagn witnesses,
“The first group of TPLF fighters were trained in and launched from Eritrea. [EPLF] commanders
initially played a prominent role in assuring the viability of the fledging insurgency.”154
In early1970s, due to internal conflict, ELF was split into factions from, in which a strong
group known as Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) was formed.155 The friction initially
arose on account of ideological grounds, as ELF was primarily dominated by the former ML
activities, which were largely Muslims.156 ELF did not fully trust Christian highlanders including
President Isias Afworki. This caused hostility, which led to the demise of ELF in 1981. Though
dominant actors of EPLF, including the Isias Afwerki were Christians; unlike ELF, EPLF was a
secular liberation front, which ended Islamic inspiration of ELF. It then quickly gained ground in
the northern Eritrea. After seven years of internal fighting, EPLF completely drove ELF from
Eritrean territories and mobilized all its resource to fight against the military regime. TPLF’s
assistance in fight against ELF was incredible. The cold war afforded a good moral and material
support that tremendously empowered EPLF. The collaboration and powerful assistance of TPLF
had further strengthened EPLF to liberate substantial territories of Eritrea from the Ethiopian

transported U.S.S.R arms through Sudan to Eritrea and Somalia provided passport to the rebels. See Adam supra
note 147 at 146.
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Shumet Sishagn, Book Review (Brothers at War: Making Sense of the Eritrean – Ethiopian War by Tekeste
Negash and Kjetill Tronvoll (2000)) 7:3 NOR.EAS. AFR. STU.212-214 (2000). See also Selassie supra note 157
at 104
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Kjetil Tronvoll, Borders of Violence-Boundaries of Identity: Demarcating the Eritrean Nation- State, 22:6 ISSN
1043, 1037 – 1060 (1999). See als Girma W. Senbet, Perspectives on the Eritrean-Ethiopia Relations and
Outcomes, ETHIOMEDIA.COM (NOV. 1 2003).
156
ELF initially took Islam as a tool for mobilization of resources and agenda for struggle against domination by
Christian Ethiopia. Fighting on religious causes helped ELF to have aid from Iraq, Syria and other Muslim
nations. This historical backing for the formation of ELF was the major cause for friction with highland
Christians who later formed EPLF. See Kalewongel Minale Gadamu, Ethiopia and Eritrea: The Quest for Peace
and Normalization 35(2007) M. Phil THESIS University of Tormso, Norway, (UNPUBLISHED).
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military.157 As Shumet Sihsagn succinctly puts, “ […] EPLF won not only a potentially valuable
military ally, but also unwavering supporter of Eritrean independence.”158
During heydays of TPLF, ELF claimed substantial portion of northern Tigray, far beyond
Badme, belonged to Eritrea and established its militia administration, but TPLF silently allowed
the move with a view to get training and logistic support.159 During fight between ELF and EPLF,
TPLF assisted EPLF, as it was much closer to EPLF than ELF in terms of religion and blood and
cultural affinity. After defeat of ELF by the joint effort of TPLF and EPLF, TPLF got ground to
administer the borderland territories that were held by ELF. But later EPLF also posed boundary
issue and demanded delineation, though it did not force TPLF to surrender the localities. TPLF
convincingly argued that it lacked authority and appropriate documents to prove location of the
true boundary line.160 Both TPLF and EPLF agreed to deal with the boundary issue after liberation
thereby leaving boundary issue dormant.
Despite logistic and training support afforded to TPLF, especially in the early days, and
TPLF’s support in fighting along EPLF when EPLF was in dire need for military help in 1983
during Red Star Campaign,161 later tension and confrontations reigned. Ideological difference, the
issue of self-determination, differences in military tactics162, disparity in treatment of prisoners of
war, et cetra are some of the grounds that made both parties to go in their own way. But in 1988
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when the possibility of overthrowing appearing known, TPLF and EPLF reestablished their
military alliance by four days negotiation in Khartoum, Sudan.163
Finally, as a result of famine, repression of military regime, and shortage of military
supplies coupled with collapse of U.S.S.R, deteriorated the fighting capacity and determination of
the military regime. On the contrary, EPLF and TPLF won abundant external and internal support,
controlled substantial territories and weakened fighting ability of Dergue, which led Mengistu
regime to fall. After Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam flew Zimbabwe for safe haven, the Ethiopian
army in Eritrea lost hope and fled to Sudan and the Eritrean fighters were able to walk into Asmara
while TPLF marched into Addis Ababa and quickly occupied the whole Ethiopia.
At the end of May 1991 Eritrea was completely liberated and EPLF took administration
thereby heralding de facto independence. After two years of transition, as a part of formalizing
Eritrea’s independence, a referendum was held that Eritreans overwhelmingly supported separation
from Ethiopia. After de jure independence in May 24, 1993, EPLF was renamed as Peoples’ Front
for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ).
But TPLF remained as a governing party in Tigray Regional States of Ethiopia though
Tigray constituted as a federal State of Ethiopia, and a member of the coalition of Ethiopian
Peoples’ Revolutionary Front (EPRDF). In early 1980s, due to apparent close collaboration
between the Eritrean and Ethiopian parties most Ethiopians could not comprehend the basic
distinction between TPLF and EPLF. Ideological differences and border issues between EPLF and
TPLF was not publicly known and remained dormant.164
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After de facto independence of Eritrea, cooperation between Tigreans all over Ethiopia and
Eritreans, either residing in Ethiopia or in Eritrea was so great. All barriers, apart from regular
checkpoints at the border, were removed that enabled free movement of goods and people. Some
Eritreans or people of Eritrean origin had abused the privilege of free movement. For instance,
fraudulent Eritrean traders used Ethiopian market to dump their duty free imports.165 It was
believed that the TPLF dominated Ethiopian government facilitated venues for Eritreans in
Ethiopia to take part in the referendum, and Ethiopia was first nation to recognize Eritrea’s
independence even before the formal declaration of Eritrean independence.
With a view to create a smooth relationship that may ultimately lead into economic
integration and political unity, the government of Ethiopia and Eritrea concluded numerous
friendship agreements. Both states had agreed to cooperate in “trade and commerce, health,
education, tourism, environment, finance, science, foreign affairs and defense.”166 Further, the two
States agreed to “harmonize exchange rate policies,”167 free movement of goods including reexporting goods imported another countries.168 Re-exporting Ethiopian goods to another country
was prohibited. The two countries agreed to use Ethiopian currency (Birr), until Eritrea issues its
own currency. The economic agreements, however, did not bear desired fruits, owing lack of
institutional mechanisms to implement.
In contravention of the Friendship and Cooperation agreement, Eritrea started exporting
Ethiopian coffee, which ranked Eritrea the 13th coffee exporter in the world though it did not have
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coffee plant. Moreover, Eritrea issued its own currency without knowledge of Ethiopia
disregarding provisions of Friendship and Cooperation Agreement, and sought sought Eritrean
currency, Nakfa and the Ethiopian currency, the Birr, simultaneously to circulate in both
countries.169 On top of this, there was disagreement on Port fee and price of oil that Ethiopia used
to import from Assa refinery.
This motivated Ethiopia to look for other options. With a view protect its economy,
Ethiopia changed its own currency note which rendered Birr notes in Eritrea void and required all
transaction with Eritrea above 2000 Birr to be effected in Letter of Credit that can only be opened
in hard currency like any third nation. This was strange to Eritrea.
In 1997 Ethiopia pursued a rebellion group called Afar Revolutionary Democratic United
Front (ARDUF) and stationed at the elusive border. The rebellion group sheltered in Eritrea and
had been creating havoc in Afar Regional State in Ethiopia. Eritrea was upset by unilateral action
of the Ethiopian military, and demanded explanation and demarcation of the whole disputed
boundary. Both States have agreed to demarcate all the disputed boundaries and set up a joint
boundary commission.

The Joint Border Commission, in turn, constituted a technical Sub

Committee that would actually work the demarcation process under the supervision and guidance
of the Joint Border Committee.
In the mean time, the Tigray Regional State had produced a regional map that included
contested localities on Tigray side of Ethiopia. The Tigray map changed the old map by including
disputed territories. It is not clear why Tigray has incorporated contested territory and released the
map before the contested regions were not demarcated as it was agreed during the armed struggle
between TPLF and EPLF in 1988.

169

See Gedamu supra note 157.

291

Surprisingly, while the Eritrean members of Joint Border Commission were in Addis
Ababa to conduct a regular meeting, Eritrea moved its military personnel to the territories that
were under Ethiopian administration. A group of military personnel that were fully armed
attempted to enter into Badme. The militia at the checkpoint required the Group to disarm. An
argument arose and each side fired on another. From both sides life was lost, but from the Eritrean
side a senior military officer was killed.170
In summary, the people of Ethiopia and Eritrea are essentially “one” and inseparable.
President Isias Afeworki admits this fact stating, “ [W]e cannot change the geographical and
historical links that bind the peoples of the two countries.”171 The elusive Ethio-Eritrea boundary is
a colonial creation, which has separated the inseparable people. The boundary was not only
elusive, but was unilaterally altered by the Fascist Italy in 1935. The local people were not aware
of the boundary treaties, neither the supposed boundary lines, as the boundary was not demarcated
on the ground. Due to historic commingling of the two brotherly people it is not easy to set a clear
separating line, as people had been moving in search for conducive environment. Unless
renegotiated and an acceptable boundary line is drawn, any attempt to enforce colonial boundary
line, in accordance with illusive boundary treaties, would continue to be futile. Bilateral dialogue
and honest negotiation would also tackle socio-economic causes that trigger boundary issue as
bargaining leverage.

170
171
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CHAPTER SIX
Ethiopia-Eritrea Border Conflict and Arbitration
6.1. Outbreak of “Border Conflict”
The sudden outbreak of Ethio-Eritrea violent border conflict has puzzled everyone,
including citizens of the former friendly and interdependent nations, neighboring states, and the
international community.1 The two former allies,2 Eritrean Peoples’ Liberation Front (hereinafter
EPLF), renamed as Peoples’ Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) and Tigray Peoples’
Liberation Front (hereinafter TPLF), a core member in the coalition of Ethiopian Peoples
Democratic Front (EPRDF) turned to be ruling parties after downfall of despotic communist
regime (Dergue), had apparently magnificent relationship that was hailed by some as exemplary
for peaceful co-existence in Africa.3 TPLF, had supported Eritrea’s quest for independence.

1

The late Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi was surprised by Eritrea’s unexpected military provocation and
later invasion. After the invasion, Meles attempted to reach President Isaias Afwerki, by phone but at vain. See Jon
Abbink,Briefing Eritrea-Ethiopia Border, 97 AFRICA AFFAIRS 551, 551-565 (1998); TEKESTE NEGASH &
KJETIL TRONVOLL, BROTHERS AT WAR, MAKING SENSE OF THE ERITREAN –ETHIOPIAN WAR,
1(2000). See also Kevin Hamilton, Beyond the Border War: The Ethio-Eritrean Conflict and International
Mediation Efforts, 11 J. PUB. & INT’L AFFAIRS- PRINCETON 114, 113 – 136 ((2000) Available at;
https://www.princeton.edu/jpia/past-issues-1/2000/7.pdf. (accessed 03/23/16 8:28 PM); Nejib Jibril, The Binding
Dilemma: From Bakassi to Badme – Making States Comply with Territorial Decisions of International Judicial
Bodies, 19:3 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 640, 633 -675 (2003). See also Sally Healy and martin Plaut, Briefing Paper:
Ethiopia and Eritrea: Allergic to Persuasion, CHATHAM HOUSE, AFRICA PROGRAM AFP BP 07/01 (
January 2007).
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The Eritrean liberation group had assisted TPLF during early years of its foundation and in turn until 1985 TPLF
fought in Eritrea on behalf of ELPF against the Communist Regime. It is generally admitted that TPLF fighters
saved the EPLF from a possible demise in Sahle region where the Ethiopian military force was fighting with vigor.
See Seyoum Yohannes, Eritrea-Ethiopia Arbitration: A Cure neither Based on Diagnosis nor Prognosis 6 MIZAN
L. REV. 172, 163-199 (2012). See also Redie Bereketeab, Inter-State Conflicts in the Horn of Africa, HORN OF
AFRICA JOURNAL 2 (2011), http://afrikansarvi.fi/issue2/25-artikkeli/62-inter-state-conflicts-in-the-horn-ofafrica accessed 03/23/16 4:57 PM).In Early 1990s some Ethiopians view both EPLF and TPLF as two sides of the
same coin. See Leenco Lata, The Ethiopia-Eritrea War, 30:97 REVIEW OF AFRICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY
369, 369 - 388 (2003).
3
Abebe T. Kahsay, Ethiopia’s Sovereign Right of Access to the Sea under International Law, (Jan. 01, 2007), (LL.M
Thesis,
School
of
Law,
University
of
Georgia,
(Unpublished)),
Available
at
http://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1078&context=stu_llm Leenco Lata remarks that
Eritrean rules were seen behaving like co-rulers of Ethiopia.
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Moreover, Ethiopia was the first country to recognize Eritrea’s independence even before formal
declaration by the very State of Eritrea.4
In a situation where there was no explicit hostility, nor noticeable tension, it was hard to
“believe” the news heralding sudden armed confrontation among the ‘allies,” as no assertive mind
could fairly envision a destructive war to erupt in apparently peaceful setting. The then Ethiopian
Prime Minister Meles Zenawi remarks:
I really can’t make head or tail of this puzzling development. In fact I may have my own
guesses but they cannot be satisfactory. As you all know there were certain
misunderstandings between the two governments arising from measures taken after changes
in currency on both sides. These were more or less certain misunderstandings even before this
change, but it is very difficult for me to believe that the composite effect of all this would
draw us into open conflict. This is why I still maintain I have no satisfactory answer for this
baffling question.5

Both nations were victims of the longest civil war in Africa that had claimed lives of tens of
thousands citizens, and rendered the two nations among the poorest in all measures of development
indicators. Given unhealed wounds of the civil war, it is inconceivable to go back into war, at least
before exhausting all possibilities of peaceful resolution of disputes.6 Invoking an “ill-managed
military skirmish”7 that happened as a result of the provocation of the armed Eritrean military

4

Ethiopia formally accepted Eritrea’s independence even before Eritrea formally declared its independence. Some
Ethiopians blame EPRDF/TPLF for its failure to protects Ethiopia’s interest by facilitating the Eritrean secession.
(See Negash and Tronvoll, supra note 1 at 44). There was high public discourse that the inclusion of Art. 39 of the
Constitution, which stipulates the right to secession was intended to legalize the Eritrean secession.
5
ETV Amharic Program May 21, 1998; See also BBC Monitoring May 22, 1998 quoted in Martin Plaut,
Background to War from Friends to Foes, available at, http://www.ascleiden.nl/Pdf/paper1108459195.pdf ( last
accessed 02/25/16 10:38 AM). See also Negash and Tronvoll who attest, “ The major Eritrean offensive came as a
surprise to Ethiopian authorities in both Mekelle and Addis Ababa.” Id at 1.
6
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personnel8 at the town of Badme, a territory administrated by Tigray Region of Ethiopia, Eritrea
deployed its combat battalion that was armed with tanks and heavy gunship “[launching] an
offensive on several fronts in order to retake what they claimed to be Eritrean territories controlled
by Ethiopia.”9 Ethiopia never expected armed confrontation with Eritrea, and demilitarized the
shared border – apart from the local police that were armed with light weapons – there was no
Ethiopian defense force in the vicinity. Consequently, the Eritrean army easily crossed the border
and occupied Badme and its environs.10
Ethiopia labeled the Eritrean move as a blatant aggression and demanded immediate and
unconditional withdrawal from all the occupied territories.11 In the mean time, Ethiopia moved its
forces from other parts of the country and attempted to recapture the occupied territories, but it
could not succeed, especially in the Western and Central regions, as Eritrean troops had already
held major strategic positions, though Ethiopian troops got impressive successes, and restrained
further move of Eritrean troops in the Eastern front. The Ethiopian Air Force bombed the Eritrean
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and Martin Plaut, The Ethiopian and Eritrea, Allergic to Persuasion, CHAT AM HOUSE Africa Program 3
(2007). According to Negash and Tronvoll, the incursion from the Eritrean side was deliberate. (Negash and
Tronvoll, supra note 1) “ […] the Eritrean government had expected such a reaction […] and had made military
preparation accordingly.” Id.
9
Id.
10
Surprised by the unexpected but dangerous move of Eritrean military the then Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Meles
Zanawi, attempted to reach President Isias Afework on phone but at vain. President Isia’s provocative act went
well as planned and after arranging military occupation, he went abroad for tour. After failure of communication
with President Isias Afeworki, the Ethiopian Prime Minister was forced to present the matter to the Ethiopian
Parliament that declared war and ordered Ethiopian defense force to defend the country from Eritrean aggression.
See Hayat Adem, Ethiopia- Eritrea: The Two Victimized Farmers, JULY 18, 2015, Available at AWAT.COM
accessed 03/09/16 at 7:19: PM
11
Khadiagala supra note 6 at 39. The Ethio-Eritrean Claims Commission clearly labeled the Eritrean act as
aggression, contrary to the U.N Charter. See Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, Partial Award, Jus Ad Bellum –
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Security Council and Organization of African Union did not expressly termed it as aggression; but OAU’s factfinding ambassadorial Committee concluded stating, “ We have reached the conclusion that Badme town and its
environs were administration by the Ethiopian authorities before May 12, 1998.” ALLAFRICA.COM OAU’s
Facilitation and Eritrea’s Response, http://allafrica.com/stories/199808170040.html (Aug 17, 1998).
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Air Force base in Asmara and the Eritrean jets responded by dropping cluster bombs on the
civilian area and on an elementary school in Mekalle killing a number of Ayder Elementary School
children, their parents and teachers.12
After occupying strategic locations and building “impenetrable” trenches, Eritrea offered
for negotiation to resolve the apparent border dispute. Eritrea had applied the same tactics in
Greater Hanish Island by occupying the Island and then offered for negation.13 Within short period
of its existence, the State of Eritrea has exhibited the policy of “occupy and negotiate” in almost all
provocative wars that it launched with the neighboring State.14 Jon Abbink attests the “occupy”
and “negotiate” policy of Eritrea stating, “[Eritrea] first create[s] military facts on the ground and
then call[s] for neutral third party [to] unconditional face to face negotiation.”15 While the
Ethiopian conflict was outstanding, Eritrea occupied border territories of Djibouti, though it
consistently denied occupation of Djiboutian territory.16 Eritrea had also border issues with Sudan
though it did not move to the existent of occupation.17 As the Institute of Security Studies notes, “
Eritrea doe not have good relations with any of its neighbours.”18 According to Tronvoll, “All
these countries have during the post-independence period accused Eritrea of initiating armed

12

Eritrea took the responsibility for dropping cluster bombs on Ayder school stating it was mistake, but the repeated
action of bombing at the same school contradicts with the apology. The second bombing targeted parents and local
people who were attempting to help those injured and evacuating others. The fictitious apology was meant to
mislead the international community purporting it to be a sudden happing. The deliberate repeated action cannot be
an accident or poor skill. Yohannes Woldegebriela, Time to serve Justice for Poor Victims, ADDIS FORTUNE,
Vol. 14 No. 719 ( Jan 19, 2014) Available at http://addisfortune.net/columns/time-to-serve-justice-for-poorvictims/ Negash and Tronvoll, Brothers at war P. 1.
13
Daniel J. Dzurek, Eritrea- Dispute Over the Hanish Islands, IBRU BOUNDARY AND SECURITY BULLETIN
70 – 77 (1996).
14
Woldegebriel supra note 12.
15
Abbink, supra note 1 at 563
16
It appears that Eritrea considers it has a right to take law by its own hand against any sovereign nation when it
thinks a neighboring state held a territory that appeared to belong to Eritrea. Eritrea gives no room first to peaceful
dispute resolution so that the other party prove its title on the territory. It is a public secret that Eritrea captured and
killed Djiboutian troops and has been occupying its territories. See AAAS, Djibouti and Eritrea Cross Border
Conflict: 2008, Mar 11, 2015, available at, www.aaas.org/report/dkibouti-and-eritrea-cross-border-conflict-2008
17
Kjetil Tronvoll, Borders of Violence – boundaries of identity: demarcating the Eritrean nation-state, 22 ETHNIC
AND RACIAL STUDIES 1037, 1037 – 1060 (1999).
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incursions and border violations, and of exhibiting an expansionist and aggressive foreign
policy.”19
So far Eritrea has attempted to police neighboring States without giving a room for
amicable solution to its perceived “violations.” Aggressive and invasive character of Eritrea is
apparent in President Afeworki illustration, “If […] my neighbor destroys my fence and there is
nothing I can obtain by taking him to the magistrate, then I will be obliged to destroy his fence.”20
(Emphasis mine.) How Mr. Afeworki can speculate what a magistrate would judge to take his
own action of policing? It is a basic rule of due process that an alleged “wrongdoer” has to be
afforded with a chance to be heard. Needless to say, if an allegation is lodged before a magistrate,
s/he will investigate whether the accused has committed the alleged “violation” and declare a
possible remedy, but President Afeworki’s rule of self-help is contrary to the established principles
of justice.
The fallacy of President Afeworki’s statement was exhibited in Eritrea/Yemen dispute over
the Greater Hanish Island.21 The President wrongly perceived that the Island belonged to Eritrea
and invaded it before attempting peaceful resolution. The “occupy and negotiate” policy had
worked in Hanish Island though Yemen initially insisted Eritrea’s unilateral withdrawal as a
precondition for negotiation, but later consented to judicial settlement while Eritrea occupied the
Island by expelling Yemeni residents.22 The Eritrean claim was unjustified, and it was held that the
Island belonged to Yemen.

18

Berouk Mesfin, The Eritrea – Djibouti border dispute, ISS SITAUTION REPORT, (Sep. 15, 2008), Available at:
https://www.africaportal.org/dspace/articles/eritrea-djibouti-border-dispute (last accessed 03/03/16).
19
Tronovoll supra note 17.
20
Id. at 1046.
21
See Permanent Court of Arbitration, Eritrea/Yemen Award of Arbitration Tribunal in the First Stage of Proceeding
dispute Available at, http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1160.
22
Dzurek, supra note 13.
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Before the Hanish Island case was resolved, Eritrea invaded territories that were under
Ethiopian administration for centuries and demanded negotiation.23

Ethiopia, however,

consistently rejected any form of negotiation before Eritrea withdrew from the entire occupied
territories and maintain status quo ante bellum.24
Numerous international actors had attempted to mediate the conflict before it reached into a
full-fledged war. United States and Rwanda came up with a novel mediation proposal that had
influenced and dominated subsequent mediation efforts.25 United States and Rwanda, expressing
themselves as friends of Ethiopia and Eritrea, proposed a four-point Peace Plan.26 Status quo ante
bellum was the most important component of the Plan. Ethiopia immediately accepted the Peace
Plan, but Eritrea declined refusing to withdraw its troops from the occupied territories asserting its
forces had “… only retook [the] land that was already theirs and could not retreat from it.”27 An
assertion of Eritrean president reveals Eritrea’s determination to stay at the occupied territories
despite international actors insistence or Ethiopia’s demand as a pre-condition for negotiation.
President Isias Afeworki wrongly declared:
Insisting on pulling out of Badme may be likened to insisting that the sun [will] not rise in
the morning. […] It is unthinkable. It’s like telling the government in this country to migrate
somewhere else with its own people and leave this land its sovereign territory to someone
23

On Dec. 19, 2005 the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission declared that Eritrea “ […] violated Article 2 of the
Charter of the United Nations by resorting to armed force on May 12th, 1998 and the immediately following days
by attacking and occupying the town of Badme, then under peaceful administration by the Claimant [Ethiopia], as
well as other territories in the Claimant’s Tahtay Adiabo and Laclay Adiabo Weredas.” EECC, Partial Award,
Jus Ad Bellium – Ethiopia’s Claims 1-8 (2005), Available at http://www. Pca.org/upoad/files/FINAL%20JAB.pdf
(Last accessed Jun 8, 2015).
24
The then Ethiopian Foreign Minister formally demanded Eritrea’s unconditional withdrawal from the occupied
territories before consideration of negotiation (Id).
25
Djibouti, Libya, Egypt, Uganda showed interest to mediate the conflict. The then Libyan leader Colonel Gadafi
promised to send troops to disputed territories. Most mediation proposals reflected national interests of the
proposing States. See Hamilton supra note 1 at 127.
26
The first plan was a general one demanding both Ethiopia and Eritrea to agree on peaceful dispute resolution. Next,
to agree on deployment of observers at Badme to oversee Eritrea’s withdrawal from territories occupied after May
6, 1998. Thirdly, the two countries reach into agreement for binding delimitation and demarcation agreement and
lastly to demilitarize the border region immediately. Id. at 45
27
Abbink supra note 1 at 554. In short period of its sovereign existence, Eritrea displayed the policy of occupy and
negotiate policy. This weird policy does not offer priority to peaceful resolution.
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else who is threatening to use force. Morally it’s not acceptable. Physically it’s never going to
happen.28

President Afeworki’s words reveal Eritrea’s firm-stand that it would not willingly withdrew
from the occupied territories, but the international community did not stop attempting to convince
both States to come to the negotiation table. While the then African Organization, OAU, IGAD,
and other neighboring nations and international personalities were attempting to convince Eritrea
to accept the United States – Rwanda Peace Plan, both of the countries “ […] pursued a massive
buildup of force on the border [….]”29 In the mean time, both States deported huge number of
civilian population under the guise of threat to national security.30
In early November 1998, OAU offered a “Framework Agreement” which was more
elaborate, but in effect coincides with the United States/Rwanda Peace Plan, and later issued
Modalities of implementation, and Technical Arrangement.31 The Framework Agreement required
Eritrea to withdraw its troops from Badme and its environs, which was unacceptable to Eritrea.32
In Eritrea’s defiance to keep status quo ante bellum, and Ethiopia’s rejection to negotiate before
Eritrea withdrew from the “occupied territories”, in early February 1999 a devastating war broke

28

President Isias Afwerki’s interview at EriTV, 8 July 1998 and BBC News, 1 June 1998, Tronvoll, supra note 17 at
1040.
29
Khadiagala, supra note 6.
30
According to Gystuen & Tronvoll, Eritrea deported 70,000 Ethiopians , and Ethiopia deported 75000 Eritreans or
persons alleged voted for the Eritrean independence. See Gro Nutuen and Kjetil Tronvoll, 26 The EritreanEthiopian Peace Agreement:
Exploring the Limits of Law, NORDISK TIDSSKRIFT FOR
MENNESKERETTIGHETTER 19 2008. See also Khadiagala, supra note 6 at 49.
31
MODALITIES FOR IMPELEMENTAITON OF THE OAU FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT ON THE
SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE BETWEEN ETHIOPIA & ERITREA, 12 JULY 1999, and TECHNICAL
ARRANGEMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OAU FRAMWORK AGREEMENT & ITS
MODALITES, Appendix 13, Negash & Tronvoll, supra not 1 at 142.
32
Recommendation 3 of Framework Agreement, Negash & Tronvoll, supra not 4 Appendix 7 at 122. Eritrea rather
raises serious of questions that appear in context counter response to the Framework Agreement. Questions like
justification for Eritreans redeployment to the position before May 6, 1998, “whose redeployment is it?” and so
forth see Appendix 8, Negash & Tronvoll, supra note 1. Appendix 8 regarding Points of Clarification Raised by
Eritrea On the OAU Framework Agreement. See Negash & Tronvoll, supra not 1 at 125.
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out and Ethiopia was able to secure Badme – the flash point of dispute and its environs.33 After
suffering an unexpected defeat at Badme, the next day Eritrea declared acceptance of OAU
“Framework Agreement.”34 However, it was not a genuine acceptance; it was simply tactical
game, as Eritrea refused to surrender villages that were not yet liberated by Ethiopia.
Eritrea disregarded Ethiopia’s plea for complete maintenance of status quo ante bellum in
all occupied regions but also defied OAU’s Framework Agreement.35 As the Framework
Agreement required Eritrea to withdraw from “Badme and its environs” Eritrea played a word
game and asserted that the Framework Agreement did not require withdrawal from other territories
that were occupied after May 6, 1998. This was non-sense to Ethiopia, as its forces had already
liberated Badme making huge sacrifice. At this point, technically, both States have accepted the
Peace Framework, but Ethiopia refused to sign ceasefire asserting Eritrea’s reluctance to withdraw
its troops from the remaining occupied territories.36
In response to the Ethiopia’s full-scale war in all directions to liberate the rest of the
occupied villages, the Security Council passed a resolution forcing both States to accept ceasefire
and withdraw troops from all the contested territories.37 This was the moment that Eritrea was
losing ground, and immediately accepted the resolution, but Ethiopia declined to abide by the
Security Council Resolution, claiming it had already paid enormous human and economic costs

33

Eritrea’s unexpected defeat at Badme surprised even Eritreans who claimed Ethiopia’s human wave that
overwhelmed and overpowered Eritrean defense force that were holding a well dug trench, in which dead Eritrean
troops were buried. See Hamilton supra note 1 at 118.
34
Though Eritrea expressed its acceptance of Framework Agreement, it took provisions selectively. It stated that the
Framework required redeployment from Badme and environs and Eritrea no more in the stated area and required
demarcation while occupying other areas. Ethiopian foreign minister released a press Release claiming that
Eritrea’s acceptance was not honest and play of game.
35
Fiona Lortan, The Ethiopia-Eritrea Conflict: A Fragile Peace, 9:4 AFRICAN SECURITY REVIEW 2 (2000).
36
Id at 1.
37
S.C. Res.1297 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1297 ((May 12, 2000) The Resolutions required both Ethiopia and Eritrea to stop
war and withdrew their troops from the disputed territories.
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due to Eritrea’s defiance to keep status quo ante bellum.38 The Security Council, however,
imposed arms embargo on both of the States.39 In short span of time Ethiopia liberated all the
occupied territories, and entered deep into Eritrea beyond the contested territories and seized
strategic hills for the purpose of defense.40
6.2. The Algiers Peace Agreement
After liberating all the territories that were occupied after May 6, 1998 incidence, and
maintaining defensive position, Ethiopia announced accomplishment of its military objectives and
demanded international guarantee to accept ceasefire and withdraw its troops from uncontested
territories of Eritrea.41 Eritrea, in turn, refused to accept ceasefire, it had been demanding while
occupying Ethiopian territories, conditioning Ethiopia’s withdrawal from its territories that were
occupied in June 2000. However, bearing the brunt of war, enduring pressing issues of huge
displaced and deported citizens, suffering from economic effects of the prolonged war, and due to
continued pressure from international actors, Eritrea consented to ceasefire, thereby signing a
peace agreement known as “Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities” on June 18, 2000 in Algiers,
Algeria.42

38

Eritrea in its turn blamed Ethiopia claiming that its intent was territorial expansion. Stating that “Ethiopia’s Intent
on Waging War: Peace was Never on its Agenda.” It further stated that “Eritrea’s acceptance of the OAU
framework has now exposed Ethiopia’s bluff.” Press Statement of 2march 2, 1999 from the Eritrean Foreign
Ministry Accepting the OAU Framework Agreement & Explaining the Continuation of the War. Appendix 10,
Negash and Tronvoll, supra note 1 at 133.
39
S.C. Res.1298 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1298 ((May 17, 2000)
40
Lortan supra note 35 at 5. See also Kievan E. Uchehara Understating African Relationship: The Case of Eritrea –
Ethiopia Border Dispute, &:1 INT’L J. OF SOC. INQUIREY 66, 63 – 78 (2014).
41
Id. at 6
42
AGREEMENT ON CESSATION OF HOSTILTIES BETWEEN THE GOVENEMT OF THE FEDERAL
DEMOCTRACIT REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF ERIREA, JUNE
18, 2000, ALGIERS, ALGERIA. The most important aspect of this agreement was deployment of observation
mission and coordination commission to facilitate and facilitate implementation of peace agreement, and
establishment of buffer zone of 25 Kms within Eritrean territory and repatriation of troops of both States. See also
Uchehara supra note 40 at 68.
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The then President of Algeria, who was chairman of OAU at the time, played a great role in
overall negotiation process. The Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities had leveled ground for
conclusion of subsequent agreements. Cessation of Hostility was built on three pillars:43 First,
Parties have agreed to resolve dispute peacefully in accordance with the principles of OAU
Charter. Second, they have consented to reject use of force as a solution to resolve dispute. Lastly,
the Parties have expressed their commitment to respect borders existing at independence in
accordance with the 1964 Cairo Resolution. This means the Parties will respect colonial
boundaries as delimited by the colonial treaties.44
By signing the Agreement on Cessation on Hostilities the Parties have reaffirmed
acceptance of OAU’s Framework Agreement and Modalities for its implementation, which were
endorsed by the Assembly of Heads of State and Governments in 35 Session of OAU that was held
in Algiers, Algeria from 12 -14 July 1999.45
Parties have agreed to immediately cease hostilities just after signing the Agreement on
Cessation of Hostiles, which set a 25 Kilometers buffer zone within Eritrean territory (Art. 12).
While Eritrean civilians could resettle in the buffer zone, its armed forces were not allowed to
enter into the buffer zone. To monitor implementation of the Agreement and delimitation and
demarcation process both parties agreed for deployment of Peace Keeping Mission. The Peace
Keeping Mission was mandated to monitor: “cessation of hostilities”, redeployment of Ethiopian
troops from Eritrean territories that were occupied for defensive strategy, “observance of security
commitments agreed by both Parties”, and the respect of buffer zone from military incursion.

46

In accordance with Art. 5 of the Agreement, the mandate of Peacekeeping Mission suspected to

43

Id.
Id.
45
Id. at Preamble.
46
AGREEMENT CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES supra note 42 Art. 14(b).
44
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end after boundaries of two States delimited and demarcated completely. The Framework
Agreement provided 6 months time frame for completion of delimitation and demarcation. This
timeframe work was too short even to understand the complex boundary setting.
The Algiers Agreement was concluded at a moment that Ethiopia held a strong position
removing Eritrean troops from all the invaded territories, but Ethiopia did not require modification
on the initial OAU Framework Agreement. The only temporary advantage that was claimed by the
Ethiopian negotiators was impeding Eritrea to sit for negotiation and the formation of Temporary
Security Zone inside Eritrea. The Algiers Agreement cemented the permanence and full
implementation of the cessation of military hostilities.
The Algiers Agreement heralded formation of arbitration tribunals under the auspices of
Permanent Court of Arbitration.47 The important task of delineating boundary was entrusted to
Eritrea--Ethiopia Boundary Commission (hereinafter EEBC) while deciding on immediate effects
of war and declaring compensation was the power of Eritrea - Ethiopia Claims Commission
(herein after EECC). It was empowered to decide on the compensation to be awarded to redress the
loss that the two nations have suffered as a result of the conflict.
As this study primarily is concerned with problems associated with boundary delineation,
borderline, EECC’s venture appears out of context. EEBC was manned by five reputed
international lawyers and assisted by experts having wide range of experience in setting
international boundary delineation. Both states had appointed arbitrators of their choice while the
United Nations chose the chairperson. The Commission set its internal procedure accordance with
Permanent Court of Arbitration.

47

Agreement Between the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of the
State of Eritrea (Peace Agreement,) Ethi-Eri, Dec, 12, 2000, 40 I.L.M. 260 (2001). See also Jibril supra note 2.
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6.2.1. Legal Authority to Arbitrate: The Governing Law
Determination of governing law, procedures to be followed, and the scope of power of
arbitrators is very important in international arbitration.48 In accordance with Art. 4(2) of the
Algiers Agreement, EEBC was conferred with authority to settle the boundary dispute in
accordance with pertinent colonial treaties of 1900, 1902, 1908, and applicable international
law.49 The Algiers Agreement expressly excluded the equitable doctrine of ex aequo et bono,50 and
has stamped finality and absolute binding nature of the decision.51 Before dealing with the arbitral
disposition, brief assessment of laws that have been applied by EEBC is pertinent.
6.2.1.1. Colonial Treaties
As pinpointed in the foregoing chapter, three colonial treaties were concluded to legally
separate Eritrea from Ethiopia. After defeated in the battle of Adwa Italy concluded peace and
friendship treaty with Minilik II that followed by three successive boundary treaties. In modern
sense it is hard to take the colonial “treaties” of single provision or combination of names of
seasonal rivers that were linked by hyphen as treaties. The “notes” were not only elusive and hard
to implement, but also repeatedly ignored by the dominant party- Italy. The Ethiopian people
doubt and often question EPRDF’s commitment to resolve boundary dispute in accordance with
the defunct colonial treaties. Thus, it is imperative to assess the validity and consequences of
colonial treaties of 1900, 1902, and 1902.
48

In accordance with Art. 4(11) of the Algiers Agreement, EEBC adopted its own procedures under the auspices of
1992 Permanent Court of Arbitration Option Rules for Arbitrating Disputes Between Two States. Accordingly, the
Parties were required to submit their case simultaneously and all decisions made by majority vote.
49
Ross Hebert, The End of the Eritrean Exception? SOUTH AFRICA INSTITUE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
COUNTRY REPORT No. 8 2(2002). In the 1902 Treaty, Great Britain was also involved as former colony, Sudan,
which bordered Eritrea and Ethiopia.
50
The reason why Ethiopia consented to exclude the equitable doctrine of ex aequo et bono is not clear. The most
important reason that Ethiopia tries to justify for reconsideration of the award was demarcation on the basis of
delimitation would create harsh consequences by dividing family and ethnic groups. The equitable doctrine would
have empowered the EEBC to regard geographic and geo-ethnic considerations.

304

6.2.1.1.1. Legal Status of Colonial Treaties: Were the colonial treaties valid and
enforceable?
It is true that most colonial African treaties were shame and never coincided with facts on
the ground, but the Ethiopian case was very different. First, the treaties were presented for
signature after Ethiopia reversed Italian aggression by humiliating the colonial power. The war
was a result of a deceptive treaty that attempted to make Ethiopia under Italian protectorate.52
There no doubt that the Ethiopian signatories were fully aware of the fact that Italian colonial
agents could not be trusted and an offer for treaty often backed by some kind of subtle motive.
The other peculiar characteristic of colonial treaties with respect to Ethiopia was the fact that Italy
invaded Ethiopia disregarding the shame treaties and redrew a new boundary line.53 In 1935 Italy
invaded Ethiopia and mingled Ethiopian territories with Italian East African Empire. After five
years of resistance movement, at the end of WWII, all the territories that were occupied by Italy
were liberated. Moreover, in 1947 by the Paris Peace Treaty, Italy expressly renounced any right,
claim or influence it had created in Ethiopia.54
This has effectively nullified the colonial treaties and vitiated the supposed boundary lines.
After ten years of British trusteeship, Eritrea was reunited with Ethiopia by the U.N. mandated
federation. In October 4, 1950 Haile Selassie I formally annulled the supposed boundary line

51

Algiers Agreement Art. 5 (17).
The Italian version of Art. 17 of the Wuchale Treaty did not match with the Amharic version of the same treaty.
While the Amharic version afforded option to Ethiopia to have Italian assistance whenever needed, the Italian
version stated that Ethiopia could only make foreign relationship through Italy. This practically makes Ethiopia
under Italian protectorate. As result, Italy informed European powers that they could not directly contact with
Ethiopia. For details see W.B. Stern, The Treaty Background of the Italo-Ethiopian Dispute, 30 AM. J. INT’L L.
191, 189 – 203 ( 1936).
53
Regarding history of Ethio-Eritrean boundary, see Negussay Ayele, On Ethiopia’s Legitimate Claim to its Natural
Seashores, ETHIOMEDIA.COM, (Sep. 26, 2000) Available at
http://www.ethiopians.com/Views/Negussay_NaturalSeaShores.htm (accessed 03/23/16).
52
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between Ethiopia and Eritrea declaring, “Mereb river no more separate brothers,” thereby formally
declared colonial the treaties and the boundary line the treaties supposed to create null and void.
Later in 1962 the Eritrean federation was abolished and Eritrea become one of the provinces of
Ethiopia. The Eritrean Assembly by following a legally correct procedure, voted for abolition of
the federation. Abolition of the federation was in line with initial goals of the Unionist Party that
had the agenda of mingling Eritrea with Ethiopian. After downfall of the monarchial regime, the
Communist military government redrew Eritrean boundary by splitting Eritrea into two: Special
Autonomous Region of Eritrea and Assab Administrative region.
After all these changes in the Eritrean boundary setting why Ethiopian authorities
consented to abide by the defunct colonial treaties to redefine the Ethio-Eritrean boundary?
Nowhere in the EEBC’s delimitation decision Ethiopia challenged the validity and enforceability
of illusive colonial treaties that were trashed away by the colonial power itself.55 The treaties may
support Eritrea’s claim at the Ethiopian cost. The Ethiopian silence on invalidity of colonial
treaties and consent to respect long abandoned and illusive colonial boundary line is puzzling.
As pointed out in the foregoing chapters, EPLF requested TPLF for delineation of
boundaries on the basis of colonial treaties, but TPLF postponed it. After 1998 United States and
Rwanda suggested boundary dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea to be resolved in accordance
with the colonial treaties and principles of international law. OAU’s Framework Agreement also
makes the same reference. As pointed out in the foregoing chapters, accepting colonial boundaries

54

Section VII ( Articles 33 – 38) of the Paris Peace Treaty of February 1947 that was concluded between Italy and
Allied powers and associates like Ethiopia spells out rights of Ethiopia vis-à-vis colonial Italy. Accordingly, Italy
renounced “all claims to special interests or influence in Ethiopia.” (Art. 34).
55
It is submitted that this study does not challenge Eritrea’s independence, as it is the choice of people of Eritrea. The
author does not agree with any coercive act triggering to vitiate the choice of Eritrean people. As a result of
erroneous political decision the people of Ethiopia and Eritrea had paid unnecessary cost that has been inflicting
pain. The current generation has to work to mitigate the effect of old wrongs and pave a way for future fraternity of
the people. It is equally submitted that Ethiopia’s interest has to be protected. Any attempt to gain at the expense of
the other cannot create a lasting peace.
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as it was on the actual date of independence was one of the core principles of OAU that was
specifically affirmed by the Cairo Resolution of 1964. The United States/Rwanda proposal for
maintaining status quo ante bellum was important condition for peace negotiation, which aligned
with the Ethiopia’s quest, but Ethiopia unconditionally accepted the Peace Plan, and OAU’s
Framework Agreement that mirrored United States/Rwanda Peace Plan without challenging the
reference to the colonial treaties. Further Modalities for implementation of the Framework
Agreement and Technical Arrangement also state colonial treaties as authorities for setting EthioEritrean boundary. 56
The clarification question on Technical Arrangement posed by Ethiopia reflects Ethiopia’s
interest to abide by the colonial treaties as binding law governing Ethiopian Eritrean boundary line.
The question specifically queries the reason for omission of expression “pertinent colonial treaties
and international law.”57 Eritrea, on the other hand, appeared to be not sure of Ethiopia’s
acceptance of the colonial treaties. This can be inferred from the Eritrea’s question forwarded to
OAU. The fifth question that was submitted to OAU states:
5. Regarding colonial treaties
• Has the OAU ascertained that both sides recognize and respect the colonial boundary
between the two countries as defined by the established colonial treaties?
• If this is the case, can this be affirmed through an agreement between the two Parties?
• What is the meaning of the clause “international law applicable to the colonial treaties?”
What is the precise interpretation of the OAU and UN Charters concerning colonial
treaties?58
56

Art. 11 of OAU’s Technical Arrangement states, “The delimitation and demarcation process will be done on the
basis of pertinent colonial treaties and applicable international law.” (Emphasis mine). Paragraph V of the
Preamble of the Technical arrangement refers to the 1964 Cairo Declaration regarding determination of African
colonial boundaries. Article 4 of the Algiers Agreement specifically states the three colonial treaties and pertinent
international law to resolve the boundary conflict.
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY ETHIOPIA TO THE OAU FOR CLARRIFICATION OF THE TECHNICAL
ARRANGEMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OAU FRAMWORK AGREEMENT & ITS
MODALITES, APPENDIX 15, Negash and Tronvoll, supra note 1 at151.
58
Points of Clarification Raised by Eritrea on the OAU Framework Agreement that was handed over to the Secretary
General of OAU during the meeting with the President of Eritrea in Asmara on 12 December 1998 as a follow –up
to the Ouagadougou Meeting, 6- 7 November 1998) Negash and Tronvoll, supra note 1 Appendix 8 at 125.
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Reference to the colonial boundary and elusive colonial treaties undoubtedly affords undue
advantage to Eritrea. Italy had expansionist motive as it’s guiding policy was taking more land and
additional territories, if not possible to occupy the whole Ethiopia. Italy induced the Ethiopian king
by offering arms, or gifts of money to sign elusive treaties to get more territories though the
treaties and the boundary lines that the treaties meant to create were unknown to the local people,
as the boundary line was not set on the ground. Thus, though elusive the treaties did not set the
actual boundary line on the ground colonial treaties believed to afford more territories to Eritrea.59
In this scenario President Isias Afeworki’s move to ascertain the intention of Ethiopia was well
calculated.
Despite Ethiopia’s unchallenged acceptance of colonial treaties, ascertainment of legality
and enforceability of the treaties appears and the legal status of colonial boundaries is vital for
feature peace negotiation and settlement of boundary line. In the preceding section we will briefly
assess the validity and binding nature of the colonial treaties in line with accepted practices of
international law.
6.2.1.2. Assessing Validity of Colonial Treaties in Light of Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties
In contemporary world, Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties of 1969 (hereinafter
VCLT) sets forth rules governing validity and enforceability of treaties. As a rule all written
treaties are presumably valid and enforceable.60 Contracting States, however, are free to attach any
condition or additional formality for validity and enforceability of treaties. Ratification,
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Eritrea had been arguing that Ethio-Eritrea boundary was clearly define by the colonial treaties. In reality, however,
colonial treaties were not only elusive substantial portion of the boundary was not fully delimited and totally not
demarcated. ( Malcolm N Shaw, Title control, and Closure? The experience of the Eritrean- Ethiopia Boundary
Commission, 56 ICLQ 756, 755 – 796 (2007)
60
Art. 2(1)(a) Vienna Convention on Law of Treaty requires only writing as a formality requirement. Thus, oral
agreements between states cannot be termed as treaty.
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registration and depository are important procedural requirements of treaty that may affect the
validity & enforceability of treaties. For instance, in accordance with Art. 102 of VCLT, all
contemporary treaties shall be registered in the U.N. registry, but unregistered treaty is not invalid.
However, a non-registered treaty cannot be enforced in international courts.
VCLT, of 1969 sets out rules regarding vices that can vitiate the validity and enforceability
treaties.61 The vices that can taint enforceability of treaties are almost similar to vice that can
render ordinary contracts defective and voidable. In almost all legal systems, error, duress, fraud,
or illegality make contracts void or voidable depending upon the nature of vice.62 Thus, rules
governing validity and enforceability of contracts, mutatis mutandis, are applicable to treaties.
Some authors label this comparable effect of vices on treaties as contractualization of treaty.63
Thus, as do defective contracts, a defective treaty may be void or voidable depending up on the
nature of vice. Art. 48 of VCLT declare a treaty tainted by error may be invalidated at the request
of party who consented erroneously. Art. 49 of VCLT sets forth the effect of fraud on treaties. The
effect of fraud on treaties and contracts is identical – the treaty or the contract may be invalidated
at the option of the victim of fraud. Unlike contracts, a treaty may be invalidated on account of
corruption. Corruption may induce a representative to enter into unfair treaty or may induce
conclusion of a treaty otherwise the representative may not consent. Corruption, of course may fall
under category of fraud. Thus, a treaty tainted by corruption may be invalidated at the request of
the victim of corrupt practices.64
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See Articles 48 – 53 of VIENNA CONVENITON ON LAW OF TREATY, available at
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201155/volume-1155-I-18232-English.pdf
62
See Lantera Nadew Anebo, Void Agreements and Voidable Contracts: The Need to Elucidate Ambiguities of their
Effect, 2:1 MIZAN L. REV. 91 -109 (2008).
63
U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, Austria, DOC A/CONF: 39/C.1/SR.40 March (26 - May 24,
1968 ) Available, http://legal.un.org/diplomaticconferences/lawoftreaties-1969/vol/english/1st_sess.pdf
64
U.N. Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties Art. 50 May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N. T.S. 331
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Art. 51 declare the effect of duress on treaties. In treaties coercion may take two forms.
One a representative of nation may be personally coerced to enter into treaty or a nation may be
coerced to conclude a treaty under threat of war. Unlike ordinary contracts, a treaty stained by
coercion cannot produce any legal effect (void ab initio). In a way similar to illegality of contracts,
a treaty that is contrary to jus cogens may be void (Art. 53 of VCLT).
Akin to vices, the effect of breach on contracts mutatis mutandis applicable to treaties.
Breach entitles the other party to cancel a treaty. In ordinary contract, if the contract canceled,
parties should be restituted to the position they were, as if the contract never been concluded. In
some case restitution may not be possible or cancellation may affect the interest of third parties in
good faith. In such a case, the act should remain valid.
Italo - Ethiopian treaty of early 19th century appears stained with variety of vices. First, the
treaties were vitiated by deceit. After being defeated in battle of Aduwa, Italy approached Minilik
II to conclude a boundary treaty with a view to create a lasting peace. But in fact this was not the
true intent of Italy. Italy never intended to live as a good neighbor with Ethiopia. Concealing its
expansionist motives Italy repeatedly cheated Emperor Minilik II by offering arms and money.65
Take, for instance, the 1902 Treaty that was conclude between Italy, British and Ethiopia. Before
conclusion of the treaty on May 15, 1902, in November 2014, Great Britain and Italy concluded a
secret arrangement to take Kunama territories of Ethiopia. Hiding the true intent, the great powers
conspired to cheat Minilik II under the guise of negotiation.66 This proves how colonial treaties
were tainted by fraud. The Wuchale Treaty was also another fraudulent act that ultimately took
65

In 1887 even when Minilik II was not coroneted as king of kings, Italy promised it would not take any Ethiopian
territory (Art. 3 of the October 20, 1870 Treaty of Friendship and Alliance) and the boundary between Ethiopia and
Italian colony of Eritrea lied south of Asmara which was in very north to the present boundary. See.Stern, supra
note 52 at 190
66
See EEBC para 5.32. On November 22, 1901 Great Britain and Italian agents deliberated to “work together to
obtain from Emperor Menelik in return for extension of the Abyssinian boundary, a zone of territory to the east of
the Toduluc- Maiteb line, which will give to Erythrea the whole of the Kunama tribe up to the Mareb.” (Id ).
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lives of several Italians. As pointed out elsewhere, though Minilik II reversed invasion by winning
Italy in the battle of Aduwa, there was no guarantee that Italy might not come back. Had Minilik II
refused to accept the offer for boundary treaty, Italy would have used force and taken more
territory or would have occupied the whole territory. Therefore, in fear of implied and possible
war, Minilik II had to sign on the boundary treaty. Thus, there was element of coercion. However,
there was no apparent ground to prove it with a view to invoke violation of erga omens.
A close look at the pertinent treaties reveals the most important factor that has vitiated
colonial treaties was breach by the dominant party- Italy. Italy utterly ignored the treaty by
invading Ethiopia thereby occupying the whole Ethiopian territory. In 1935 Italy mingled Ethiopia
with its East Africa colonies - Eritrea and Italian Somaliland. In 1941 Ethiopia regained its
independence after Ethiopian patriots in support of Great Britain defeated Italy. Thus, as a result of
fundamental breach colonial treaties were rendered dead. In 1950 Haile Selassie I formally
declared the treaty and the boundary null and void by stating “Mereb no more separate
brothers.”67 (Emphasis added). As Conforti and Labella, succinctly put, “ if a state formally
denounces a treaty, it brings out certainly and definitely the fact that in its view the treaty is not
applicable or no longer applicable as a result of its being invalid or terminated.”68 Therefore, it is
fair to label the colonial treaties were dead by the Italian invasion and Ethiopia’s declaration of
invalidity.69
However, during negotiation effort in 1998 OAU, United States and Rwanda pointed to the
colonial treaties as guiding authorities in defining the Ethio-Eritrean boundary. For a reason not
explicit, the Ethiopian government did not challenge the move to revive the already dead colonial
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Within a month of issuing an order declaring nullity of colonial treaties, Emperor Haile Selassie declared the
statement while crossing Mereb to visit Eritrea on Octber 4, 1952.
68
Benedetto Conforti and Angelo Labella, Invalidity and Termination of treaties: The Role of National Courts, 1
EUR.J. INT’L LAW 505, 44-66 (1990).
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treaties.70 In some cases Ethiopia expressly demanded colonial treaties to be mentioned as
governing laws. As pointed out above, Eritrea was not sure that Ethiopia would agree to be bound
by the colonial treaties and expressly requested OAU regarding Ethiopian view of the treaties.
Ultimately after winning the war, and losing tens thousands of Ethiopians, Ethiopia agreed to be
bound by the colonial treaties of early 19th century that obviously favored expansionist Italy. Now,
therefore, it is hard, if not impossible, to challenge the binding effect of old treaties, as the dead
treaties have revived by Algiers Agreement.
6.2.1.3.

Effects of Nullity of Colonial Treaties on the Boundary Line.
Nullity of the colonial treaties is not doubtful; but the question is whether the treaties were

executed or the actual borderline was created as a result of the treaties. As it is succinctly stated in
the earlier chapters of this Dissertation, boundary making involves two major stages: Delimitation
and demarcation. Accomplishment of these two vital steps of boundary crystalizes the boundary
line and signals execution of treaty. After creation of the boundary line, the treaties assumed
accomplished their purpose, and may only be resorted to ascertain boundary line in case of
confusion or conflict. Therefore, if we take the Ethio-Eritrean boundary was actually drawn by the
colonial treaties, subsequent nullity of the treaties will have no effect. In Eritrea/Yemen Case, it
was declared that boundary treaties confer title to the territory and “ […] establish an objective
territorial regime valid erga omnes.”71 As pointed out in Libya/Chad Case, boundary treaties
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Order No. 6, 1952, see EEBC para 2.10 which states, “On 11 September 1952, Ethiopia declared null and void the
Treaties of 1900, 1902 and 1908.”
70
The treaties were invalid as a result of unilateral action of Italy. By ignoring the “Treaties” Italy invaded Ethiopia
in 1935 and occupied for 5 years mingling both Ethiopia and Eritrea. Then at the end of the WWII, UN recognized
Ethiopia’s right to sea by federating Eritrea to Ethiopia. Thus, the colonial treaties were modified by the later UN
Resolution. See Nigussay Ayele supra note 53. Professor Ayele asserts obsolescence of colonial treaties as a result
of Italian invasion of 1935 and subsequent merger of the two countries. See also Kehsay Supra note 3.
71
Shaw supra note 59 at 761.
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create a borderline that “[…] will continue even if the treaty in question itself ceases to apply.”72
This postulation accords with the principle of stability of boundary line.73 Therefore, once a
boundary is created, it should remain in tact and should be clearly marked on the ground to avoid
confusion and conflict. In case of boundary conflict, boundary treaties are the most important
evidences justifying an exact location of boundary.74 The principle of stability of boundary is
applicable only when an actual boundary line is created. It is doubtful whether the colonial treaties
had actual created Ethio-Ethiopian boundary line. The supposed boundary line substantially not
delimited and totally not demarcated.
6.2.1. 4. Conflicting Views in Setting Boundary Line in Each Sector: The EEBC Dilemma
This Section presents a brief overview of problems associated with EEBC’s delimitation
and demarcation decision. EEBC endeavored to fill treaty lacunae by constructing treaty wordings
and resorting to external sources like colonial reports, notes, private memorandums, and non-treaty
maps, which further complicated boundary-making process. Even though confronted with
numerous conflicting situations, EEBC never attempted to ascertain facts on the ground. As a
result, the supposed boundary remained elusive and unacceptable. Moreover, the delimitation
decision left certain areas and facts to be considered during actual physical demarcation stage, but
never fulfilled due to non-cooperation of the Parties. Consequently, by ignoring its promises for
actual boundary making during physical demarcation, EEBC declared virtual demarcation with a
view to end its mandate. The purpose of this Section is not to define a correct boundary line, but to
show problems associated with colonial treaties and EEB’s decision with a view to stress the need
for dialogue to draw an acceptable boundary line.
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Id. See also CASE CONCERNING THE TERRITORIAL DISPUTE, LIBYA ARAB JAMAHIRYA/CHAD,
(FEB.3, 1994), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/83/6897.pdf
73
Shaw supra note 59.
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6.2.1.4.1. The Western Sector
The western sector of Ethio-Eritrean boundary was delineated twice. First, the 1900 Treaty
initially set the Western boundary line to commence from Tomat at the juncture of Setit river and
Anglo Egyptians Sudan boarder moving upwards to Todluc at the very north, then to Mai Ambessa
and Mereb river. Had this treaty were not modified, there would be no issue on “Badme” – the
flash point of 1998 destructive war. But Great Britain and Italy made a secret arrangement in
Rome to take more Ethiopian territory.75 This secret plan had resulted in alteration of the 1900
Treaty in the Western Sector. The 1902 was a tripartite treaty which defined boundaries of Sudan,
Ethiopia and Eritrea. The modified treaty states the Western Terminus to commence from Um
Hager (some times “Hajer”), later maps and other documents state the starting point Khor Royan, a
river that joins Setit at the Sudan border.76 The boundary then runs eastward following river course
of Setit. After short distance of 20 Km, there was a river called “Maiteb” that exactly matches the
treaty river that appears commencing from Setit river flowing northwards deep into the Eritrean
territory. If this appears the a treaty river called “Maiteb”, as Ethiopia claims, then the next point
of connection will be Mai Ambessa that can be connected by a straight line.77 This position is so
clear and undoubtedly places “Badme” sometimes referred as “Yirga Triangle” and its environs
within Ethiopian territory. Two Italian maps and 1923 Ethiopian map substantiate this claim.
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Id.
On November 22, 1901 Great Britain and Italy concluded a confidential arrangement to “work together in concert
to obtain from Emperor Minilik in return for this extension of the Abyssinian boundary, a zone of territory to the
east of the Todluc Maiteb line, which will give to Erythrea the whole of the Kunama tribe up to the Mareb.” See,
EEBC Decision Regarding Delimitation of the Border between Eritrea and Ethiopia, 2002 iLM 1057 UN
Documents S/2002/423, (Apr. 15, 2002) para. 5.32
76
Id. (point 1) at para 5.07. Adjustment of boundary line from Um Hager to Royan was made by the agreement of
February 18, 1903. Id. at para 5.9. “This agreement was confirmed by a further Sudan – Eritrea agreement of
February 1, 1916. Id. at Para 5.10. Ethiopia accepted this agreement in 1972 by exchange of note of July 18, 1972.
; Id. at para 5.11 at 59.
77
In absence of contrary stipulation, connecting boundary points by a straight line is an accepted international
experience. As there is no treaty declaration how to connect the Ethiopia Eritrean boundary points, it is legal to
draw a straight line between boundary points.
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This line of interpretation, though literally based on 1902 Treaty wordings, was not
acceptable to Eritrea, as it relied on Italian manipulative and expansionist conducts that were
manifested in several colonial documents including numerous maps that were unilaterally drawn
by Italian cartographers and Italian agencies.78 In addition to the colonial maps, Eritrea presented
several colonial reports, comments, notes, and telegrams that were unknown to Ethiopia.79 On
Ethiopian side, due to poor archival preservation and destruction of monarchial institutions by Italy
during the five years of occupation no document that could assist treaty interpretation was found.
To determine the sovereignty over location Badme, resolution of conflicting views arising
from 1902 is imperative. The important conflict arising from 1902 Treaty was diverging locations
and varied expressions of River “Maiteb.” The Amharic version of 1902 Treaty captions River
“Maiteb,” as “Maiten.”80 Eritrea seizes this confusion, and argues that the treaty river that links the
boundary line to Mai Ambessa was not actually “Maiteb,” but “ Mai Tenne” which is located at the
very easterly south near Tomsa. As pointed out in the preceding chapter, the 1902 Treaty is the
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de Chaurand map of 1894, Mai Daro map ( the map that was referred by the report of the Italian negotiator, Major
Ciccodicola May 16 and June 28, 1902), a sketch Map between Great Britain and Ethiopia defining Anglo
Egyptian Sudan and Ethiopian border which of courses applied the an identical caption to the River “Maiteb” ( Id.
para 5.18), the map of Anglo Egyptian Sudan of 1901 the so called Talbot-Colli map, the 1904 Italian Carta
Dimostrativa (sometimes called Prinetti map) which doubts the Ethiopian assertion of “Maiteb” at point 3,
“Ombrega” sheet of the Carta Dimostrativa produced by te Istituto Geografico Militare in 1903, Gubernatorial
Decree 1903, Comando del Corpe di Stato Maggiore map of 1904, Checchi map 1904 ( para 5.57), Miani map of
1905 ( para 5.58), Martini reports of 1906, the only map that was drawn by an Italian institute but supported
Ethiopian position. See Id. Para 5.58), Martinin report of 1907, Italian map of 1907 ( para 5.63, Concessions map of
1909, Pizzolato report of 1929, Zolit report of 1929 (Id. para 5. 68, Denti di pirjano report of 1932 (Id. para 5.75).
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Major Ciccodicola’s report of May 16, 1902 that referred to the Mai Daro sketch was accepted by EEBC and later
one referred just like treaty map. EEBC termed this sketch as a map convincing that the Ethiopian line of “Maiteb”
at point 3 argument was wrong. Eritrea produced several reports that Major Ciccodicola to colonial governor of
Eritrea and several reports and suggestions that the Eritrean governor, Martini, telegrammed to Italy were produced
as evidences as proof for treaty location of the river “Maiteb” or misunderstanding regarding the name or location of
river “Maiteb”.
80
No one exactly knows the source of confusion. The only possible justification can be unfamiliarity of the
geography of the area either by the Ethiopian government and colonial powers. It is hard to prove an exact name
and location. Different names of rivers used at different locations. Take, for instance, the case of Setit river. At the
Sudanese border river is captioned as Setit where at the center it is known as Sitona where the very South is
Tekeze.
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most confusing treaty as it uses the name of a river called “Maiteb” which, inexplicably, attributed
to numerous tributaries in varied nomenclature.
The first treaty river that was captioned as “Maiteb” is located at the very west at the
juncture of Setit river. Through the river course of Setit, “the new frontier follows [Setit] river its
junction with Maiteb.”81 A river known as “Mai Tenne” is located 87 km further east than the
western “Maiteb”. The Mai Daro sketch that Ciccodicola attached to this report states “Maiteb” as
“Meeteb” adding another confusion. EEBC remarks, “ The fact that Mai Daro map spelled the
river as “Meeteb” does not appear to the Commission to affect the situation, for Ciccodicola
appears to have equated “Maiteb” with “Meeteb.”82 While Ethiopia claims that the very western
“Maiteb” was the river mentioned in the 1902 Treaty, Eritrea initially argued that it was “Mai
Tenne” from which the boundary line connected by a straight line to Mai Ambessa and then
follows Mereb River courses to the easterly direction.
But later Eritrea changed this stance and asserted that the boundary line runs from Setit
Tomsa (at point 6) to Mai Ambessa. Eritrea also “ […] suggested that the original Treaty reference
to the “Maietb” was actually to the Sittona (Point 4).” Several other earlier or later maps have also
used different nomenclature. De Chaurand Map of 1894, an Italian geographer, applies the name
Maitebbe–Meeteb while the later map of Mai Daro states “Meeeteb” but all at different locations.
EEBC gave unnecessary authentication to the unilateral sketch that was referred by reports
of the Italian negotiator, Major Ciccodicola, to Martine, the governor of Eritrea and latter’s report
to the Italian legislator. Moreover, EEBC attested that Mai Daro sketch was known to Minilik II
during negotiation. This assertion raises questions on Ethiopian side. First, it is simply a unilateral
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Art. I(II) of 1902 Treaty. The Amharic version of the 1902 Treaty states “Maiten” while the English version of the
treaty calls it “Maiteb”.
82
See Id. paras 5.22 and 5.23 EEBC p. 63. The Commission took Ciccodicola’s remarks as authority that revealed
the intention of negotiators. (Id. para 5.23)
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report that was known to Ethiopia. Second, if Minilik II had accepted it, why not the sketch was
not attached to the treaty? Finally, how EEBC accepts unilateral statements of Italian authorities as
proof for common intention of Parties? It appears contrary to the general principles of law of
evidence to accept a document written by a party unilaterally as evidence in favor of the writer.83
As this fact cannot be disproved by Ethiopia, it appears unfair. This makes EEBC’s decision
unrealistic which will remain as a stabling block for future peaceful coexistence and good
neighborhood of the two brotherly nations of Ethiopia and Eritrea. EEBC’s biased stand regarding
Ethiopian claim can be read from the expression it mentioned in para 5.65. In this case Ethiopia
presented a map of 1923, which depicted Setit – Mareb link as running from western Maiteb to
Mai Ambessa exactly as Ethiopia claims. EEBC stated this map as “the so called Haile Selassie
map” of 1923. Why “the so called” expression which never been so even in the case of private,
reports, or comments?
Professor Abbnic surmises that the takings of both Ethiopia and Eritrea are wrong. To
Professor Abbink a real Maiteb would be the one that reflects local facts. In the words of Abbink:
Eritrea pretentiously claimed that the ‘Maiten’ stream, due east, was the “Maieteb” of the
1902 Treaty (see EEBC 2002:14). Ethiopia, equally pretentiously, claimed that the ‘real’
Maiteb was located far in the west, about 20 Kms. east of the town of Umm Hager. The
names were indeed on the old maps (there are at least three ‘Maitbs’ or Meetebs), but both
claims were wrong. Looking at the available maps and the confusion on geographical names,
the question of deciding on where the ‘real’ Maiteb is located is up to a certain extent
arbitrary. There was no compelling logic in the extant documents for the Commission to
follow. This fact made it all the more important look at actualities, feelings of belong of the
local population, affectivities, etc. that evolved in the last 50 years especially since the end of
Italian occupation in 1941.84

83

As Eritrea now stands at the shoes of Italy invoking all the privileges Italy had at the moment, citation of
documents unilaterally written and archived by Italy should not be accepted in a way favoring Eritrea.
84
Jon Abbink, Badme and The Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict: Back To Square One?, ETHIOMEDIA.COM, FEB
2003. Professor Abbink surmises that EEBC could have made an acceptable decision if it considered ethno
geographic facts on the ground. The decision even created a worse scenario by spoiling the already established
boundary. EEBC could have gone beyond the confusing treaty following the “applicable international law ” to
ascertain the true meaning. For a reason not clear enough the Commission opted to follow the Italian assertion. In
the words of Abbink, “ Remarkably, the Commission incomprehensibly took over the Tomsa point from the
Italians, who had unilaterally claimed it in the 1930s.” Id.
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To Ethiopia, the Eritrean line of argument is absolutely wrong. The beginning from the
Sudanese border is not hard to comprehend and there is no disparity, at least, until the beginning of
the “Maieteb” that Ethiopia argues for. By ignoring the “Maieteb” that could be seen after 20 Kms
from the Sudanese border, Eritrea simply followed lines of Setit river to the Tomsa point to the
south wards. Eritrea stood at Italian expansionist position of 1930s – an expansionist position that
Italy attempted to justify its expansionist stance before moving to occupy the whole Ethiopian
territory.85 EEBC was influenced by the bulk of colonial archives that Italy unilaterally produced
and opted to follow the Eritrean line of argument rather than making neutral investigation to know
the real treaty junction that contractants referred to Maieteb. Conflicting spots that may be viewed
as treaty junction could have been cured with though investigation of facts on the ground. Study of
historical facts and changes that took place since conclusion of the treaty would fairly indicate a
possible boundary point.
The other problem related to 1902 Treaty was allocation of Kunama tribe to Eritrea. As
has been mentioned elsewhere in this work, Kunama are indigenous people that were repeatedly
vacated from their land after arrival of Semitic people from South Arabia. Kunama had been
repeatedly moving to the uninhabitable territories that powerful people would not claim. Denti di
Pirjano report of 1932 proves this assertion. The report describs Mai Ten in some detail and
indicates finding of “ […] the ruins of a destroyed [K]unama village at a point which would appear
to lie east of the Eritrean claim line. While clearly evidencing the absence there of [K]unama at
that time, it does suggest that [K]unama had lived there earlier.”86 The 1902 treaty had objective of

85

Id. As Gbenga Oduntan rightly remarks, “ Italian colonial policy and maneuvers was one of the duplicity and
gradual encroachment.” See
GBENGA ODUNTAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BOUNDARY
DISPUTES IN AFRICA 187(2015).
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Id. at para 5.76
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allocating Kunama that had an elusive and unsettled borderline, to Eritrea.87 As a result,
delimitation of Kunama land was postponed but never done.88 This has impact on the reasoning of
the EEBC that appears to be Eritrean legal team brief in which EEBC justified to move the treaty
“Maiteb” to the Sittona under the guise of nomenclature of “Meeteb”.
EEBC came across three Italian maps that coincided with the Ethiopian map of 1923,
which affirmed the Ethiopian claim i.e. correctness of the western Maiteb, it did not give any
weight.89 Moreover, EEBC repeatedly expressed that Ethiopia did not object colonial actions,
suggestions, and unilateral maps of Italy.90 Fairly thinking Ethiopia had no possibility to know
unilateral actions (reports, memos, maps, suggestions, comments of Eritrean governors) and
intentions of Italy or its agencies operating from Eritrea. Moreover, EEBC did not consider
Ethiopia’s situation at the time. Was Ethiopia’s silence for unpublished thoughts deemed as
acceptance?
In 1920s, when Ethiopian governors increasingly become conscious about Italian
manipulations, Ethiopia asserted and fought any military or private intrusion into the territories in
Yirga Triangle or territories that EEBC ceded to Eritrea as a result treaty interpretation.91 As
pointed out in paragraph 5.74 of EEBC’s delimitation decision, Ethiopian Minister of Foreign
Affairs formally requested Eritrean authorities to stop illegal intrusion to Adiabo that killed
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This is implicit in Garasellassie’s letter that was addressed to Maritin, Eritrean governor in which he expressed his
view regarding Kunama land. According to Garasellassie, “Cunama is a name that we generally apply to all of the
Baria villages.”87 Baria is a tribe to the very north in Eritrea. May be Garasellassie took Kunama land was far way
from the actual Kunama land.
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As clearly expressed in para. 5.34 EEBC reference to Kunama tribe involves two prong action. One determination
of boundaries of Kunama which is not easy then determining boundaries of Ethiopia and Eritrea. If the first step
skipped or cannot be done, the next stage also fails.
89
EEBC remarked, “It has noted that three early Italian maps how the Ethiopian claim line, as does not Ethiopian
map of 1923.” ( EEBC supra note 69, Para 5.88)
90
Id. at para 5.88 in which EEBC remarked “ There is no record of any timely Ethiopian objection to these maps.”
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As EEBC pointed out, Ethiopia did not fully administer or claimed its authority over the whole territory until
western Maiteb. ( See Id. at para 5.93 – 5.95 EEBC also pointed out that Ethiopia exercised its authority only 1/5
of the claimed territory. Given economic development, communication and technological backwardness, it was not
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Ethiopian citizens at Mai Tani.92 In 1931 – 1932 there was incident in area of Mochiti, which is in
Yirga Traiangle that EEBC views within Eritrea’s claim line.93 At the time, Ethiopia sought
Eritrean authorities to withdraw from Mochiti and Gongoma.94 Also sporadic friction happened at
Acqua Morchiti.95 In 1920’s Ethiopians repeatedly requested for demarcation of the border that
fell into deaf ears.96 These clashes, and requests to cease and decease “illegal intrusion” proves
Ethiopia’s rejection of Italy’s move.
Most importantly, EEBC has failed to say a word on effect of 1935 Italian invasion and
nullity of earlier treaties and redrawing internal administrative boundary line. Italy after occupying
Ethiopia, it mingled its East African colonies. In this situation should it be fair to refer to the failed
colonial treaties and elusive boundary lines it sought to draw?
6.2.1.4.2.

The Central Sector

The 1900 Treaty covers the Central Sector starting from the last end of Western Sector at
Mai Ambessa. It is noticeable that the 1902 Treaty has modified the first part of the 1900 Treaty.
In this Section we will briefly deal with the supposed boundary line in between Mai Ambessa,
Mareb, Belesa and Muna until it is linked by the 1908 Treaty of Eastern Sector. Central Sector,
like the Western Sector of the borderline, is a contentious boundary regime.
As pointed out in the foregoing Chapters, the 1900 Treaty was a note of one page in which
only a single provision meant to define Central Sector of Ethio-Eritrean boundary. The single
provision merely mentions supposed boundary rivers.

Thus the Central boundary line was

easy to reach all its territories. Italy was advanced at the time and had all possibilities to patrol and control all
territories including Ethiopia. ( Id. at para 5.93).
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Id. at Para 5.74.
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Id. at Para 5.76.
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Id.
95
Id.at para 5.94.
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See Id. at paras 5.66, Para 5.72
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assumed to follow “Mareb”, “Belessa”, and end at the juncture of “Muna”.97 While “Mareb” starts
at the conjunction of Mai Ambessa, the end of supposed river course of Muna is a perplexing task
– there was river called Muna in the vicinity. In Irob regions, for example, the boundary line
marked by River Muna has been strongly condemned, as the local people do not know a river
called “Muna.” It is either non-existent or captioned by another name.

The traditional

administrative boundary between territories currently making Eritrea and Tigray was River Mereb.
Territories beyond River Mereb captioned as Medri Bahir (a name used by Abyssinians before
Italian colonization). The original version of 1900 Treaty appears to reflect the traditional
territories of Medire Bahir. As a result, during setting boundaries of Eritrea, Emperor Minilik II
sought the boundary line to be deep north in Eritrea’s territory, but Italy offered a gift of 5,000,000
that silenced the Emperor to accept the boundary line at Mareb, Belessa and Muna water courses.98
Central boundary line is marked by river course of Mai Ambessa, Mareb, and Belesa. “The
identity and courses of Mareb, the location of its confluence with the Mai Ambessa, and the
location of its confluence with the Belesa, are all agreed by the Parties.”99 This is a de facto
(traditional administrative) boundary between Agame district of Tigray and Acchale Guzai district
of the former Medire Bahir (renamed as Eritrea by Italy). As a result of long recognition of Mareb,
Belesa as Boundary Rivers, there is no apparent dispute in this part of the Central Sector.
As pinpointed above, the most important problem of Central Section of Ethio-Eritrean boundary is
“nomenclature for various stretches of relevant waterways, in particular the Belesa and the
Muna.”100 The changing nomenclature coupled with scanty maps that were based on limited
geographic information and documentary references compounded the problem. The 1900 Treaty

97

This coincides with provisional boundary agreement that was entered for building peace after the battle of Adwa.
Article IV of the Peace Agreement of October 1896 states “ […] provisional frontier, determined by the courses of
the Mareb, Belesa, and Mouna Rivers.” (Id. at para 4.6.).
98
Id. at Para 4.7.
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defines boundary line to follow watercourses of Belesa-Muna but identification of an intended
watercourse that may be considered as boundary lines is an uphill task. Settlement of the intended
watercourse that may be taken as Belesa will definitely help resolve the dispute. Resolution of the
issue involving an actual watercourse of Belesa and identifying a river captioned as Muna are
crucial to delimit boundaries of central sector. It will not only resolves sovereignty over Badme but
also would resolves Irob issue.
The Treaty Map shows Belesa flowing to easterly direction.101 It also shows the two
unnamed small rivers that flow to the direction of the river Belesa; one flowing from south toward
Belsa while the other one from east. Despite the map that shows no tributary flowing from north to
Belesa, in fact there are several tributaries flowing from northeast to Belesa.102 The other
complexity is modern maps depict two rivers that may be viewed as Belesa.103 Each party chose a
river that supports its claim. EEBC captioned these rivers as: Belesa A, Belesa B and Belesa C.
Modern maps also show several unnamed small rivers flowing northwards to Belesa from south.
Eritrea claims Belesa B as a tributary to actual Belesa (Belesa A as designated by EEBC).
Ethiopia, however, strongly argues that Belesa A is the tributary of actual Belesa ( i.e. Belesa B).
EEBC has accepted Ethiopia’s assertion.(Para 4.22). Thus, Belesa A is southern tributary of the
actual Belesa (Designated by EEBC as Belesa B) (para 4.18) As described in paragraph 4.23 the
treaty map shows a small tributary to Belesa B, which was not named in the treaty map or de
chaurands’ map. Ethiopia “identifies” this tributary as Sur. ( Para 4.23) EEBC designates as Belesa
C. Later EEBC took this tributary as “[…] continuation of the boundary line [….]” (Para 4.23).
Though the treaty map is silent, modern maps depict several tributaries to Belesa C. The treaty
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map instead goes overland to River Muna. However, EEBC decided, “[…] Treaty Boundary
follows the line of the most southerly of the small tributaries of the Belesa C. On modern mapping,
the tributary has its source close to the modern town of Zalambessa.” 104
The next issue relates to location and identity of River Muna. Both contending Parties
agree the fact that the treaty reference to “[…] the boundary line in this sector […] cannot be
literally correct.” (Para 4.25).

The most perplexing problem with regard to River Muna is

disagreement by the Parties regarding identity of the very river – Muna (Para 4.26). While the
treaty map refers to Mai Muna and de Chaurand map captions it as Maj Mena which flow East
South arising from south of Barachit until it reaches Endeli and Ragali (Para 4.27).
As the Treaty Map either omits or “contains inconsistent indications,” 105 Ethiopia views a
river designated as Mai Muna as Endeli and the river depicted in the Treaty Map as Mai Muna as
BerBero Gedo (Para 4.28). As a result of the dilemma, EEBC has used both of the names of the
river suggested by Ethiopia and Eritrea simultaneously. Ethiopia proves persistent confusion over
river “Muna” in 1900 Treaty as follows:
(i)

(ii)

(iii)

Ciccodicola, the principal Italian negotiator, recorded in 1903 that “the Endeli, a
tributary of the Muna, [had ben] designated to him[i.e., Emperor Menelik] as waters
of the Muna, “ and that it was on that basis that the Emperor had signed the 1900
Treaty;
In January 1904 the Italian Governor of Eritrea noted in his diary that “[o]ur mistake
is to have confused it [the Muna] with the Endeli, “a confusion which Ethiopia
suggests shows that the Parties intended the boundary to follow the northernmost
branch of the Endeli system, thereby leaving the Irob district to Ethiopia.
The Italian Boundary Commission of 1904 […] was unable to find a river clearly
identified as the “Muna.” […] expressed considerable uncertainty in its attempt to
identify the Berbero Gado as the river corresponding to the “Muna”106

Consequently, Ethiopia strongly argues that Irob woreda as part of Agame, but Eritrea denies.107
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Ethiopia’s assertion is based on facts on the ground. At a location designated as Muna actually we
have Endelli. The river course marked on the map is actually Berbero Gedo. Eritrea, however,
stick to the wording of colonial treaty or unilateral maps. To Eritrea a river identified on the map
as “T mai Muna” with its head water south of Barachit, constituted the boundary and that there
was a river with the name in the place so that this river was the boundary.”108 EEBC preferred to
the Eritrean line of argument, which disregards facts on the ground and adjudged taking literal
wordings of treaty. It concluded, “Parties had agreed to a treaty which referred to the Muna and
that the treaty map showed a boundary line following a river designated as Muna, following from
south of Barachit running generally east toward to Salt Lake.”109
The last issue that EEBC decided on regarding Central Sector was is the eastern terminal
point. As usual there was disagreement on this point. Eritrea argues, “Muna ends at the confluence
with the Endeli (located at the village of Massolae, at point 27 (para 4.45). Eritrea further asserts
that Endeli turns northeast and becomes Ragali in which the river continues southeast to Djibouti.
(para 4.45). Surprisingly, the 1900 Treaty or the accompanying map, nor the 1908 treaties does not
clearly reveal the terminal point at Massolae. In fact, Massole is located within 60 kms distance as
stated in 1908 Treaty but both River Muna and the boundary line extends beyond Massolae. (para.
4.47). Thus, Massolae’s apparent location within 60 Km scope cannot be a ground to conclude
Central Sectors ends at Massolae. Ethiopia, however, argues that the river that may be termed as
‘Muna’ continues to the town of Ragali and then the terminal point lies. Therefore, EEBC did not
accept Eritrea’s line of argument regarding the end of 1900 Treaty and the beginning of 1908
Treaty, as the Treaty map depicts that the river captioned as Muna continued toward eastward and
terminated at Salt Lake. (4.49). Taking note of contemporary situation and based on 1900 Treaty
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and accompanying map EEBC decides that boundary line “follows Ragali at point 29 until reaches
its terminus at the Salt Lake.”110
6.2.1.4.3. The Eastern Sector
The 1908 Treaty sets the Eastern Sector of Ethio-Eritrean boundary. The Eastern Sector
runs, “ From the most easterly point of the frontier established […] by the Treaty of the 10th July,
1900, the boundary continues south-east, parallel to and at a distance of 60 kilometers from the
coast [.…]”111 The Treaty of 1908 has deprived Ethiopia’s historical access to sea. It may be
surprising to know that Emperor Minilik II had suggested the 60 Km from coast “formula” to serve
as “modus vivendi” to set the eastern sector of Ethio-Eritrean boundary.112 It is plausibly wrong to
suggest that Minilik II deliberately acted in a way affecting Ethiopia’s interest. It is true Ethiopia
needs sea access and there is no reason to give away its land without any consideration. On
Ethiopian side there is still unsettled issue: why Minilik II had negotiated to give Ethiopia’s right
of sea access way? The 1908 treaty does not supply any rationale for setting the boundary line at
the stated spot and all other justifications may be speculations. Among the various intelligent
guesses, Italian subtle influence will take forefront. As a result of this treaty Ethiopia has been
paying unnecessary cost.113
The 1908 Treaty has some special features that were not stipulated in prior boundary
treaties. First, unlike the prior treaties, the 1908 Treaty applies geometric boundary delineation
method. As we have observed above, both 1900 and 1902 Treaties apply natural boundary making
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methods by using rivers, mountains or lakes, but 1908 treaty declares mathematical rule for
delineating easterly boundary. Second, unlike prior boundary treaties, the 1908 Treaty is not a
treaty of single provision – it has six provisions. Thirdly, the 1908 Treaty makes consideration of
geographic facts on the ground and attempts to keep socio-economic relationship among the
borderland residents from both sides. Thus, the 1908 Treaty not only makes boundary line, but also
declares rules that meant to regulate continuity of historical relationships among the borderland
people that were split by the artificial borderline. It also stipulates mechanisms of dispute
resolution.
The Eastern Sector of Ethio-Eritrean boundary commences from the end of the Central
Sector – that is Salt Lake and ends at the northwestern end of the Djibouti border. Eritrea argues
that the 1908 treaty has clearly set boundary and demanded only demarcation in accordance with
the modus vivendi. However, EEBC did not accept this assertion stating that there were several
issues that need to be settled before the actual demarcation. First, as the boundary measurement
has to start from coast, a spot that may be taken as coast has to be settled. Second, an exact point
at which the boundary line terminates has to be agreed or decided. Finally, the supposed boundary
line was not demarcated for long time and the delimitation is not complete in accordance to the
wordings of the treaty that require consideration of facts on the ground.
The term “Coast” may be asserted to include islands in which case the boundary line may
be set at the Red Sea but Ethiopia “[…] abandoned its conception of the coast as including islands
and submitted in its concluding argument [….]”114 Thus, the term “Coast” has to be understood “
the continent itself.”115 This aligns with the Eritrea’s position. EEBC has decided to implement the

should not be crossed. Given limited international transaction and foreign interaction, it may be possible to
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Eastern Sector by taking satellite image of the coastline of Eritrea and then computing up to 60 Km
inland.116
With Regard to the Eastern Sector EEBC did not accept Parties contention of subsequent
acts that could potentially modify the treaty boundary. Almost all of the Eritrea’s contentions fell
within the scope of geometric boundary delineation. The calculation of the mathematical boundary
begins from the coast to point 31 and it proceeds in the same way until reaches to the western edge
of Ethio-Djibouti boundary at point 41.
In conclusion, EEBC has heavily relied on the unilateral Italian maps, colonial reports,
comments and memos to ascertain elusive treaty wordings, confusing and unavailable or changing
river designations. Ethiopia persistently argued against undue reliance on colonial reports, memos
or unilateral maps that did not coincide with treaty wordings, especially in the Western Sector.
While the 1902 Treaty expresses the boundary follows river “Maiteb” at the juncture of Setit,
EEBC considered unilateral Italian maps and other personal notes, like Ciccordicola’s report, and
memorandums of Martine, the then governor of Eritrea, regarding Western Sector and to find out
intention of parties. The maps, reports or memos or comments may reflect Italy’s intention but not
necessarily common thoughts of the Parties. Similarly in the Central Sector various tributaries
were not considered in the treaty and EEBC troubled to find out a river that may taken as Belessa.
Though EEBC took a mid way approach to decide the treaty river Belesa B which flows to
unavailable or a wrong river called Muna.
These confusions led to the delimitation of unacceptable boundary line that has staled
demarcation or led EEBC to get out of the case at the back door by declaring the most confusing
and unintended demarcation – virtual demarcation. There are several issues that were pending to
be decided during actual physical demarcation. For instance EEBC remarked, “ the Commission
116
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holds that the determination of the boundary within rivers must be deferred until the demarcation
stage.”117 With regard to the specification of coordinates at the Eastern Sector EEBC again
concludes, “All coordinates will be recalculated and made more precise during the demarcation as
the Commission acquires the additional necessary information.”118 A commentator familiar with
Ethio-Eritrean situation remarks, “[…] in view of highly relevant social and historical aspects of
the boundary issue, the EEBC decision is not the best that could have been made, and may in fact
have perpetuated the conflict between the two countries.”119 EEBC’s decision has not met the goal
of Algiers Agreement. It has not normalized relationship; we have still antagonism, fear, and
threat of armed confrontation. Jon Abbink concludes, “[…] it seems that there are flaws in
[EEBC’s] judgment.”120 He further notes, “Some claim that the EEBC missed a great opportunity
to bring the resolution of the conflict a decisive step forward.”121 Others, however, view that given
the mandate envisaged in Algiers Agreement, EEBC did “ […] best that could be made on the
basis of the pertinent colonial treaties and applicable international law.”122 Whatever the
justification be, in reality, the Ethio-Eritrea issue is not solved yet; the key to unlock the deadlock
at the hand of the both nations.
6.2.1.1.2

Applicable International Law

In addition to the three colonial treaties, EEBC was authorized by the Parties to consider
the “applicable international law”. The Algiers Agreement has no provision defining the meaning
and scope of “Applicable International Law,” but Ethiopia later, in the midst of hearing
unsuccessfully attempted to limit the scope of “Applicable International Law” to the interpretation
117
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of treaties.

EEBC, however, did not accept this contention. EEBC afforded an expanded

connotation to the notion as defined in Botswana/Namibia Case.

123

In this Case, Contesting

Parties requested ICJ to determine the dispute in accordance with Anglo – German Treaty of July
1890 and the rules of and principles of international law. The Court, however, declared that the
meaning of principles of international law was not merely confined to interpretation of treaty
wordings. Similarly, EEBC concluded that the expression, “Applicable International Law” meant
rules of international law applicable to resolve border dispute “[…] in particular, the rules relating
to the effect of conduct of the parties.”124 It includes, all doctrines, practices, conventions,
customary laws and international law precedents.
Though EEBC was expressly barred from application of ex aequo et bono (what it thinks
merely “just and fair”) or cannot simply be guided by its conscience, the belief and understanding
of a member had huge impact in resolving dispute. Confronted with dilemma, in several instance
the arbitrators resorted to their belief, stating “the Commission believes.…” The exclusion of the
doctrine of “ex aequo et bono” actually was not helpful, as it justified EEBC to turn blind eyes
whatever injustice happens due the supposed boundary line. EEBC’s boundary line would divide
family, ethnic groups that have been living together from the time immemorial. Take, for instance,
the case of Irob people who have decided to fight EEBC’s delimitation decision that would divide
them.
Generally, under the authority of “applicable international law” EEBC was not confined to
the rules of interpretation of treaty provisions, but was empowered to apply both substantive and
procedural law doctrines of international law, including but not limited to, the accepted
international principles of international law like, principles of estoppel, the notion of critical date,
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principles of determining boundaries following rivers,125 the doctrine of uti possidetis,
international precedents, the rule of effectivity, the doctrine of contemporaneity, and subsequent
conduct of parties and so forth.
As both Parties do not contest regarding the coverage the three colonial treaties cover the
whole boundary between Ethiopia and Eritrea, EEBC rightly gave priority to the colonial treaties
before resorting to international law. An applicable international law may come into play only
when the treaties fail to draw a clear boundary line. Put simply, resort international law may be
made only to fill treaty lacunae, or facts on the ground or the borderline was changed by the
subsequent act of parities. Thus, “[…] relevant treaties had to be examined first, and only then
would recourse be made to the rules of general international in order to see if provisions of the
treaties needed to be modified.”126 When words or phrases in the treaties appear vague or hold
varied meaning, EEBC had authority to ascertain the meaning of treaty wordings by assessing the
intention of parties in accordance with the principles of international law.
In accordance with ordinary rules of interpretation, if literal interpretation of words,
phrases or statements is not helpful to ascertain meaning, the tribunal may assess common
intention of parties at the time of conclusion of treaty. The tribunal will not simply search for
intention of one of the parties to a treaty, as it may lead into a wrong conclusion, as the intention or
assertion of one party may not necessarily be acceptable to the other party. It may be easy to find
out of the motives of one of the parties, but it cannot prove common intent. Needless to say,
assessment of intention of one the Parties to the treaty is contrary to the accepted rules of
interpretation of laws and would lead into a wrong conclusion.
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In accordance with the international law doctrine of contemporaneity, treaties should be
interpreted “ […] by reference to the circumstances prevailing when the treaty was concluded.”127
Socio-economic facts, names, meaning of words, outlooks and so forth prevailing at the time of
conclusion of treaty should be taken into account. For example, most Ethiopians, at present
question why Emperor Minlik II consented to the biased colonial treaties, or concluded treaties
with Italy to separate Ethiopian territories? A response to these questions if based on current facts
would lead into condemnation. To respond correctly, we have to put ourselves into early 19th
century Ethiopia and assess the overwhelming pressure from European side on largely unexposed
African tribal chiefs. Similarly, “ The determination of the meaning and effect of a geographical
names used in a treaty, whether of a palace or of a rive, depends upon the contemporary
understating of the location to which that name related at the time of the treaty.”128
A treaty may be modified by express words or by subsequent conduct of parties or one of
the parties with implied or express approval of the other party. Assessment of subsequent conduct
of parities is vital as it may amend the treaty provisions by conduct ascertainable to both parties.
Silence of a party, where an overt act that is contrary to the treaty took place, may be taken as
implied approval. As EEBC has quoted from Permanent Court of International Justice, in assessing
subsequent conduct the most important consideration is, “ […] whether the Parties by their conduct
have altered or impaired their rights.”129 In Ethiopia and Eritrea case, numerous subsequent
conduct that had huge impact on the colonial treaties may be cited. The Italian invasion of 1935
was the most notorious one that has trashed all of the treaties. Moreover, the treaties were not
known to the local people and previously unoccupied regions like Badme were settled by the local
people who never assumed the territory belonged to some one else. After Eritrea’s federation to
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Ethiopia, the treaties were formally rendered null and void, which was not opposed by the Eritrean
parliament.130
Subsequent contrary conduct by one of the party’s can be taken as variation of the terms of
treaty if the other party takes no action. Even the case of Badme is disputable, assuming it was on
the Eritrean side, in 1950 Ras Mengesha of Tigray developed Badme plains for commercial
agriculture and agricultural workers and laborers settled therein without any objections from,
Eritreans parties or any organ acting on behalf of Eritrea. This may be taken as an instance of
modification of treaty provision by one of the parties. As summed by ICJ in Temple Case if
subsequent conduct of a party “[…] which it was reasonable to expect that the other would
expressly have rejected if it had disagreed with it, the Court concluded that the later was estopped
or precluded from challenging the validity and effect of the conduct of the first.”131 The arbitration
agreement between Egypt and Israel often referred, as Taba Case132 is another situation illustrating
variation of treaty by subsequent conduct. In this case pillars were erected at a spot contrary from
treaty wordings but for a long period there was no objection. This was taken as tacit acceptance
and parties later estopped from challenging the variation.
EEBC has also considered effectivite’s, actual display of sovereignty, as a ground that may
alter treaty provisions. For determination of actual display of sovereignty determination of critical
date is vital. In the case of Ethiopian and Eritrean boundary, the question is the critical date in
which Italy took sovereignty over the territories delineated by the colonial treaties. If signature on
boundary treaty creates boundary line irrespective of demarcation, it may be taken colonial treaties
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had already created in Addis Ababa. This assertion may not necessarily true in all circumstances.
Sometimes, enforcement of treaties may be attached with some conditions of important procedural
requirement. Take, for instance, the need for ratification or registration of treaties for its finality. In
these cases, a treaty cannot automatically create boundary line until the stated condition is met or
procedural requirement’s satisfied.
Colonial treaties that supposed to define Ethio-Eritrean boundary, were not only vague but
were also incomplete. In numerous instances the treaties deferred boundary making to later date
for consideration of local facts, which was never done until EEBC’s decision in April, 2002.133 For
instance, EEBC summed that “[…] each of these boundaries was, to varying degrees, not fully
delimited.”134 The boundary was not only fully and clearly delimited, but also totally not
132
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demarcated. It was with this understanding that EEBC was conferred with the authority to delimit
and demarcate the boundary. However, any argument that claims total absence of borderline
between Ethiopia and Eritrea cannot hold water. As each region in Ethiopia has its known
boundary line, there is a clear line of separation that has been accepted to borderland residents.
This is a clear and undisputable boundary line but colonial treaties have distorted it.135
As repeatedly pinpointed, the Ethio-Eritrean colonial treaties were concluded in Addis
Ababa, but nothing was done on the actual border until the eve of WWII in 1935 in which Italy
occupied the whole Ethiopian territories including territories stated in the colonial treaties. EEBC
concluded that colonial treaties were crystalized in 1935 when Italy invaded the whole Ethiopia
and actually took control of the whole Ethiopian territories.
Determination of the critical date is very important in international boundary making. In
the case African States that liberated from colonial yoke, a critical date for determination of
boundary is the date of independence.136 OAU’s Framework Agreement, and the Algiers
Agreement pointed to the Cairo Resolution of 1964 for determination of boundary. In Eritrean
case, the situation is very complicated. After Eritrea was liberated from Italian occupation it was
held under British trusteeship for ten years until 1952 and later Eritrea federated to Ethiopia and
Haile Selassie declared that Mereb no more separate brothers and the traditional boundary (Mereb)
was changed into internal boundary. After Eritrea’s reunion with Ethiopia in 1962 boundary issue
was totally dead and all Ethiopian territories were mingled. Internal administrative boundaries
were redrawn during the military regime. After 30 years of war Eritrea got def acto independence
in 1991 and de jure independence in 1993. Until May 1991 Eritrea was never been independent.

And also para 5.42 states, “ The details of the line between the Sittona, the river they actually had in mind, and the
Mareb wee, however, left for later delimitation. No formal delimitation was ever carried out.” (Emphasis added.)
(Id. at para. 5.42.).
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The Framework Agreements and Algiers Agreement point to the date of independence, but did not
mention the actual date of independence, apart from reference to the OAU’s Resolution of 1964.
Stating all events that happened since 1935 and concluding that all these events did not change the
boundary line, stating, “[…] the Commission can perceive nothing in that chain of developments
that has had the effect of altering the boundary between the parties. The boundary of 1935 remains
the boundary of today.”137
Until 1950 Badme plains were vacant. As there was more land than the number of people
that may be interested to use it, no one needed it. But in 1950 the development of commercial
agriculture necessitated use of vacant lands. Accordingly the then governor of Tigray operated
commercial agriculture in Badme plains thereby initiating the settlement of Ethiopians. This may
be taken as an actual display of authority that was never challenged.
Even if the treaty or its interpretation on account of unsettled nomenclature of rivers put the
town of Badme on Eritrean side, the rule of effectivites or subsequent conduct should have been
prevailed. Effectivities reveal the true intention of the parties. As EEBC remarks:
“There is no set standard of duration and intensity of such activity. Its effect depends on the
nature of the terrain and the extent of its population, the period during which it has been
carried on the extent of any contradictory conduct (including protest) of the opposing State.
The conduct of one Party must be measured against that of the other. Eventually, but not
necessarily so, the legal result may be to vary a boundary established by a treaty.138

With regard to Badme Ethiopia presented tremendous evidence proving effectivites’ but
never been considered as important evidence. Rather EEBC hunted unilateral comments, reports,
maps and memos that were authored by colonial Italy, which led into a wrong decision that cannot
be accepted unless modified through constructive dialogue.
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6.3.

The Arbitration Award and Consequences
After declaration of the delimitation decision on April 13, 2002, there was confusion and

misunderstanding, as the award did not clearly specify the actual location of Badme. As a result,
both Parties declared success and happily accepted the award.139 Later Ethiopia learnt that Badme
was awarded to Eritrea. After realizing the contours of the award, Ethiopia formally requested for
reconsideration of the delimitation decision with a view to avoid catastrophic effects on the
borderland residents that have been residing on the borderland for centuries. Ethiopia contends that
EEBC awarded some of the territories that were never been under Ethiopian administration to
Ethiopia, and wrongly allocated Ethiopian territories to Eritrea thereby dividing families, ethnic
groups, villages and towns.140 Consequently, Ethiopia has concluded that demarcation on the basis
of literal terms of the delimitation would trigger greater evil that may generate a catastrophic
effect. The Boundary Commission, however, has rejected Ethiopia’s request for reconsideration
stating it was beyond mandate, unless Eritrea so consents. Eritrea expressly denied any form of
revision or reconsideration and started campaigning to pressurize Ethiopia respect terms of the
Algiers Agreement or face sanction.
The two states have virtually declined cooperation with the Boundary Commission though
cooperation was one of the terms of the Algiers Agreement.141 Ethiopia almost stopped working
with the Commission since its request for reconsideration was expressly rejected. Eritrea in its
turn, not only failed to respond to the Boundary Commission’s repeated request, but also restricted
139

There was celebration in Addis Ababa as it was declared on the mass media that Ethiopia won the case taking
Badme. Later it was understood that the AU representative who took part during the declaration of the decision
sent a message to AU headquarter that Badme was on the Ethiopian Side. As Badme was not expressed on the
delimitation map, it was really confusing. According to Healy & Plauti, “ […] the 125 page Delimitation Decision
with accompanying maps, was dense and difficult for a layperson to absorb.” See Healy & Plauti supra note 8.
140
Take, for instance, the case of Tsorena and Fort Cadona that never been under Ethiopia but later allocated to
Eritrea as Ethiopia formally admitted these cities never been under Ethiopian administration and not Ethiopian
territories.
141
Id.

336

movement of UNMEE that has been monitoring the buffer zone thereby breaching the Algiers
Agreement on Cessation Hostilities.142
Despite lack of cooperation from the parties, EEBC attempted to demarcate the Eastern
boundary.143 Ethiopia declined to comment on the proposed boundary map on the Eastern sector.
EEBC took Ethiopia’s silence as acceptance and concluded the boundary point determination was
final. Ethiopia accepted the boundary points and “[…] approved the Commission’s method of
demarcation.”

144

In accordance with the Algiers Agreement EEBC had to carryout an actual

demarcation sector by sector and pillar building in Eastern Sector has to be completed. But Eritrea
refused to allow the actual demarcation stating, “[…] no demarcation should take place in any part
unless it was absolutely clear that demarcation would take place in all parts in accordance with the
Commission’s delimitation decision.”145 As a result, the actual physical demarcation on the
planned Eastern region was stalled. In Central and Western sectors Ethiopia refused to allow
demarcation demanding negotiated settlement with a view to draw a borderline that takes interest
of borderland people.146
After the effort to demarcate the border was failed, EEBC issued directive on November
27, 2006 that the Commission cannot remain in existence indefinitely147 and proposed Parties
reach into agreement for actual demarcation threatening, otherwise, to consider the boundary as “
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[…] automatically stand as demarcated by the boundary points [….]”148 The Parties could not
agree for the actual demarcation as required by the Commission within the one year time frame
and the Commission declared that, “[…] boundary will automatically stand as demarcated by the
boundary points listed … and that the mandate of the Commission can then be regarded as
fulfilled.’ ”149 (Emphasis added). Eritrea has accepted the virtual demarcation while Ethiopia
rejected it, stating a mere legal fiction. 150 Eritrea views that the boundary issue has been resolved
by the virtual demarcation and asserts that Ethiopia illegally occupies sovereign territories of
Eritrea and demands immediate and unconditional surrender. Ethiopia, on the other hand, argues
that the boundary issue is not yet settled as the boundary is not yet marked on the ground in
accordance with the Algiers Agreement and has been pleading for dialogue to settle to issue.
Later, due to the overwhelming international pressure, Ethiopia accepted the arbitration
award “in principle”. To Ethiopia this does not mean attachment of condition, but it has a positive
element, which aims to cure apparent defects within EEBC’s award that may hinder future
relationship and peaceful coexistence. It is a plea for negotiated settlement to address some of the
crucial blockades that would absolutely thwart peaceful settlement of dispute. Ethiopia, therefore,
strongly believes that ambiguous terms of the colonial treaties have caused the unfair delimitation
decision that is hard or impossible to implement on the ground. Unless the obvious anomalies that
would generate irreparable damage are fixed in advance through constructive dialogue, peace
cannot prevail in the region. Plainly speaking, Ethiopia expresses its acceptance of the delimitation
decision but insists for making a true boundary line that is acceptable to borderland residents of

Reports 284 noted by ERITREA – ETHIOPIA BOUNDARY COMMISSION STATEMENT BY THE
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both nations with a view to reduce harsh consequences by considering “[…] the human and
physical geography through the study of facts on the ground,”151 and thereby build peaceful
coexistence and normalize relationship. But Eritrea has rejected any form of dialogue and demands
Ethiopia to comply with the “final and binding” decision as it is.
Nowadays, it has not been uncommon to notice Eritrean authorities, Eritrean diaspora,152
and even some dignitaries demanding Ethiopia’s ‘immediate’ withdrawal from border areas that
were awarded to Eritrea.153 President Isaias Afeworki has echoed Hank Cohen’s proposal, which
demands Ethiopia to “accept symbolic initial takeover by Eritrea of border territories awarded by
EEBC followed by the same day opening of dialogue….”154 It is not clear what the former United
States assistant secretary of state for Africa meant by a “symbolic initial takeover”. Similarly,
Ambassador David Shinn, though fully aware of the ‘drama’ behind the boundary question tends
to suggest, Ethiopia to “give up control over Badme.”155
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This appears awkward for various reasons. Apart from a mere “demarcation” on the map,
an exact territorial limit of both nations is not yet actually set on the ground.156 No monument or
pillar has been emplaced on the boundary line that supposed to separate the contested territories so
far. On account of both Parties failure to cooperate with EEBC for actual physical demarcation,
EEBC has declared a virtual demarcation. A virtual demarcation, which is a mere supposition of
demarcation, simply assumes geographic coordinate157 on the map as pillars or monuments on the
ground. In reality nothing has been done on the actual borderline. As Ethiopia claims it, a virtual
demarcation is simply a fictional demarcation and a legal nonsense.158 Ethiopia, as a result, has
been strongly insisting for an actual demarcation in order the demarcation to be legally binding.159
As a matter of fact, a virtual demarcation serves no different purpose other than the very map. The
geographic coordinates (boundary points) on the map can guide an actual point on which a
boundary pillar to be emplaced, but assuming the points as monument or pillar makes no sense, as
nothing is noticeable on the ground to avoid confusion and conflict. Kathleen Claussen rightly
captioned a boundary line delineated by virtual demarcation as an “invisible border.”160 Needless
to say, an invisible border is an uncertain border that cannot meet the objectives of a defined
border.
To Ethiopia the virtual demarcation is a simple assumption of demarcation, which has
never changed facts on the borderland – still the borderland residents do not know the line of
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international law expert on the EEBC no workable decision has been reached.” Abbink supra 7 note at 141.
157
These are boundary points on the map which normally indicate locations in accordance with boundary markers
supposed to be emplaced. But these points ( coordinates) “[… ] are not necessarily final and the Commission may
be have to adjust or vary them in the course of demarcation. Only final demarcation map will be definitive.” EEBC
supra note 69 para 2.16.
158
Gro Nytuen and Kjetil Tronvoll, The Eritrean- Ethiopian Peace Agreement: Exploring the Limits of Law,
NORDISK TIDSSKRIFT FOR MENNESKERETTIGHETTER19, 16-37 (2008).
159
Id.
160
Kathleen Caussen, Invisible Bordrs: Mapping out Virtual Law, 37 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 257 -278 (2008
- 2009).

340

separation in accordance with the EEBC’s delimitation award. Thus, until the boundary line is
clearly set on the ground, definitely, the confusion and tension will continue. On the contrary,
Eritrea has been campaigning in all international forums demanding Ethiopia to surrender the
territories awarded by the EEBC invoking the virtual demarcation. It alleges that Ethiopia occupies
“Sovereign territories of Eritrea,” and pleas for unconditional surrender. Now a new issue has
emerged: whether Ethiopia occupies Eritrea’s “sovereign territories,” and should surrender them
before sitting for negotiation.
In absence of a visible sign or mark on the borderline, how far should Ethiopia pullback its
forces and surrender a territory to Eritrea, if at all a territory has to be surrendered? On the same
token, in a situation where the Boundary Commission has phased out, who will convert the
geographic coordinates on the map into the actual border on the ground to surrender a portion of
territory? Eritrea? Ethiopia? Or a third party named by Eritrea and Ethiopia? In this dubious
boundary setting is it not fallacious to argue or demand Ethiopia to surrender an ‘Eritrean
sovereign territory”?
Ethiopia has been holding the contested territories from the time immemorial, apart from
temporary moments that it lost possession of the territories during brief Eritrean invasion, but
regained them in June 2000. It is hard to conclude that Ethiopia occupies Eritrea’s “sovereign
territory” and surrender them. Ethiopia has been holding the territories since the time immemorial
notwithstanding the illusive colonial treaties and expansionist tendencies of colonial power.

341

6.4. Possible Remedies to Unlock the Deadlock
6.4.1. The Need to Resolve Latent causes that Instigated the Border Dispute
It is rightly said that understating an actual problem is half of the solution.161 The journey
of identifying of an actual problem, however, may not simple. Given long rooted relationship and
conflicting situation, it may be a perplexing task, but in fact it is a significant step in an effort to
build a lasting peace that will normalize relationship.162 An actual problem may be colored by
numerous apparent problems that may complicate resolution. Contending parties may hide a real
issue that instigates side issues that may be legally claimed until the other party consents to deal
with the latent cause. The side issues may be easily resolved but that will not end conflict. Side
issues are simply bargaining leverages that may veil an actual problem and make resolution hard or
impossible to achieve.
Turning to the Ethio-Eritrean border conflict of 1998 one may invoke several related issues
that may have initiated the border conflict. Why the two nations that have suffered from the
longest civil war, and battling to get out of poverty again plunged into a destructive war while the
previous wound has not yet properly cured? Why the two previous allies who fought their common
enemy turned guns against each other? Specifically, why Eritrea deployed its combat battalion
armed with tanks and missiles to the disputed regions before exhausting all possible avenues of
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Albert Einstein is often quoted for his notorious formula of solving problem. It may appear unbelievable but he
spent lion’s share of his time in studying the true nature and causes of a problem ( if he had an hour to resolve a
problem, he would spend 55 minutes in defining the problem and applies only five minutes in finding solution) and
spent little in devising a solution. (See Lifemind.com regarding Einstein’s Secret to Amazing Problem Solving (
and 10 Specific Ways You can use it), available at https://litemind.com/problem-definition/)
162
A mere attempt to resolve a border dispute may be a temporary solution, just like prescription of a pain killer that
cannot remedy the very source of pain that require a curing medicine.
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peaceful dispute resolution? Why the already constituted Joint Border Commission denied fair
chance to resolve border dispute?163
As President of Eritrea, Isias Afeworki remarks, “It is very difficult to easily find an
answer,” to all these questions.164

Similarly, Ted Dagne when reporting to the United States

Congress rightly remakes, “ The real reason behind the out break of fighting is murky at best.”165
Close look at the flash point of border war and number of lives perished therein and economic lose
the nations have endured makes the war non-sense, unless it was backed by a bigger undisclosed
agenda. Badme is an insignificant barren land having no oil or endowed with other significant
economic resources.166 If blessed with rain, Badme plain can only be used for agriculture from
which few quintals of sorghum may be harvested. Otherwise, Badme is not a tourist attraction
center, nor historical conservation site.167 It is really puzzling to loose huge number of lives and
spend massive resources in fighting for a barren land. Why Eritrea opted for armed confrontation
disregarding possibilities of peaceful resolution for any issues it had harbored? This is a question
often asked than answered.
Prime Minister Meles Zenawi explained Ethiopia’s justification for plunging into the war.
In the words of Melese, “ For us Badme is nothing but the principles behind invading Badme is
163
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everything. For what is at stake in Badme is not a piece of real estate but a cardinal principle of
international law.”168 Prime Minister justifies Ethiopia’s involvement in the war for the purpose of
averting the invasion. Thus, he justifies Ethiopia’s involvement in the war as self-defense. It has
the duty to defend its people and its territory against foreign aggression. Otherwise Ethiopia’s
existence as a State would be meaningless. As pointed out else where Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims
Commission (EECC) Eritrea invaded Ethiopia and occupied territories that were under Ethiopian
administration.169
To find out an acceptable solution and normalize relationship assessment of possible causes
that may have prompted the border war appears imperative.170 As Khadiagala pinpoints, African
border wars “spring from antagonisms that often have no relationship to the common border.”171
(Emphasis added). In Ethio-Eritrean case, there were “[…] myriad unresolved problems […]
rupture-ranging from the nature of political institutions, economic development, currencies and
trade to Ethiopia’s lack of direct sea access [….] ”172 Thus, unless causes of antagonism are
properly addressed and cured , any attempt to resolve border conflict ( the symptom) would be
waste. Touval’s remarks in this regard need to be quoted. To Touval:
The primary conflict between governments may have had a variety of causes: personal
antagonism between leaders, competition in the African arena, one government’s support of
opposition groups against another government and a chain of mutual suspicion and
subversion. When such relations lead to border disputes, these disputes are inadvertent by
products, or systems, of another conflict. At the same time, boundary claims that arise in this
manner may serve as a lever for the exertion of pressure intended to extract concessions in
matters unrelated to the boundary.173 (Emphasis added).
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Pre-war actions that were perpetrated by both nations, the sudden outbreak of the war
without any form of warning and lack of attempt to resolve issues peacefully, and subsequent
decisions taken by Ethiopia and Eritrea, may offer clues to find out latent causes of the conflict
that will enable to devise a “curing” resolution and turn life back to into normal state.174 As
pointed out elsewhere, the border conflict quickly flared up and alarmed not only international
community but also the people of Eritrea and Ethiopia.175 Brief overview of some of the actions
and decisions taken by Ethiopia and Eritrea will suggest possible causes that may have triggered
the apparent border conflict. Numerous research works and political actors conclude the actual
cause of Ethio-Eritrea conflict was not really border issue.176 Thus, the border conflict was simply
a bargaining leverage that cannot be resolved and normalize relationship unless concealed issues
have been solved.
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6.4.1.1.

Economic Reasons behind the Border Conflict

There is no disagreement about the pre-war strong socio-economic relationship between
Ethiopia and Eritrea. Successive economic integration agreements were concluded between
Ethiopia and Eritrea.177 As Khadiagala attests, “ […] Ethiopia remained the principal supplier to
Eritrea of food, revenues related transshipments through the ports and jobs to nearly 300,000
Eritreans.”178 Until 1998, there was little restriction on goods imported from and exported to
Eritrea.179 The only limitation, though not respected by Eritrea, was re-exporting Ethiopian
products to third country. Eritrea, however, did not respect this minimum restriction by exporting
Ethiopian coffee to third countries that has jeopardized Ethiopia’s interest for hard currency.180 All
pre-war economic agreements “had largely benefited” Eritrea and Eritreans “at the expense of
Ethiopia.”181 Consequently, before eruption of the border dispute, Ethiopians had publicly blamed
the Ethiopian Government for affording undue protection to Eritrea and Eritreans.182 But the
Ethiopian Government did not take any serious action.
In addition to the aggressive nature of leadership and government, Eritrea had the ambition
of making the Red Sea State as an African Singapore.183 Eritrea aspired to model its economic
policy on Singaporean mode of export based economic system.184 Ethiopia was market for 60-
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70% of Eritrean factory products.185 Though the Ethiopian law and economic policy state
otherwise, Eritrean business freely traded in Ethiopia alike to Ethiopian businesses. In turn,
Eritrean businessmen and consumers freely transacted Ethiopian agricultural products including
coffee and teff. To further smooth the way to Eritrean businessmen, Eritrea formally sought
Ethiopia to open its doors to Eritrean businessmen residing in to trade or invest in Ethiopia alike to
Ethiopians.186
Contrary to the expectation of Eritrean Government, Ethiopia instead of relying on
Eritrea’s old and light industry products, has been working to develop its own industry.187
Numerous factories and light industries were built in Tigray and Addis Ababa. Pharmaceutical,
cement, textile, car assembly and so forth were started to mushroom, especially in Tigray Ethiopia.
Ethiopia’s attention toward industrialization appears another reason that has irritated Eritrea.
Industrialization of Tigray region of Ethiopia supposed to obstruct Eritrea’s plan to control
Ethiopia’s market. This would dwindle the demand for Eritrean products and curb movement of
Tigrean cheap labor. Ethiopia’s fast economic growth, and special privileges that were reserved a
to Ethiopian investors was another economic measure that thought to hinder Eritrean economic
goals. This was a huge disappointment to Eritrea and it could not reap the benefit of growing
Ethiopian economy and wide market to boost its economic ambitions. As Negash and Tronvoll
succinctly put, “ Eritrea felt that it was effectively shut out of Ethiopian Economy.”188
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The economic rationale behind the border conflict cannot be complete without reference to
currency issue. The immediate cause that quickly spoiled Ethio-Eritrean relationship and triggered
border war of 1998 was issuance of the new Eritrean currency (known as Nakfa) in November
1997. Until that time Eritrea had been using Ethiopian currency (known as Birr) as legal tender.189
With a view to regulate its own macro economic system and as expression of sovereignty Eritrea
issued its own currency, and put it into circulation in equal value to the Ethiopian currency (the
Birr) without knowledge of Ethiopia. However, “Eritrea wanted Nakfa without losing all the
benefits and advantages it used to enjoy when it was using the Birr.”190 Immediately after Eritrea
issued its own currency, Ethiopia, changed its old Birr note with a view to protect its economy
from overflow of currency notes from Eritrea.191 Eritrea had intention to use both currencies side
by side in both countries in parity.192 But this was not acceptable to Ethiopia, as it could not
manage its macro economic policy in divergent monetary and exchange policy, which would put
Ethiopian economy in danger.193 After introduction of Nakfa, Ethiopia moved to avoid common
use of both currencies by issuing its own which rendered old birr notes in Eritrea worthless.194
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agreed to use the Ethiopian currency (Birr) in both countries, Ethiopia to use Eritrean ports for free and run Assab
oil refinery. (See Id. at 35. At the time of liberation of Eritrea the former Ethiopian banks in Eritrea were empty
and EPRDF gave 150,000,000 Birr. (See Adem supra note 10. This money was neither loan nor gift. At that
time, though de facto independent, in legal sense part of Ethiopia until formally declared its independence in
1993. Then Eritrea borrowed three billion Birr from Ethiopian banks. Eritrean business had been borrowing from
Ethiopian banks like any other Ethiopian. ( Id) See also Negah & Tronvoll supra note 1 at 34,
190
Adem supra note 10.
191
See Negah & Tronvoll supra note 1 at 36. According to the research report submitted to Congress, issuance of
Nakfa and subsequent actions Ethiopia took were immediate causes of may 1998 war. See Ted Dagne, The EthioEritrean Conflict, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, order code RL 30598 July 2000.
192
Adem supra note 10.
193
Due to non-application of the September 1993 protocol, a common exchange rate, economic and investment
policy was not devised. The exchange rate of birr for dollar in Eritrea and Ethiopia was different. This drained
Ethiopian dollar supply to Eritrea. This put Eritrea and Eritrean businessmen at advantageous position
194
Eritrea required Ethiopia to exchange old birr note that were in Ethiopia in hard currency. Ethiopia suggested
action to be taken in accordance with advice of IMF taking experience of other similar international situation and this
suggestion was accepted by Eritrea. See Adem, supra note 10.

348

Moreover, Ethiopia took additional economic measure that required Eritrean traders to
make all imports of exceeding 2000 Birr in hard currency through letter of credit.195 Furthermore,
Ethiopia stopped purchasing petroleum from Assab refinery, as it was expensive because Eritrea
used to add cost of investment on the refinery to the price of oil. Ethiopia also started using
alternative ports for its import and export. According to Plauti these series of economic measures
“[…] have rekindled old animosities between the ruling groups of both countries, eroding their
willingness to compromise or negotiate over disagreement.”196
Thus, after issue of Nakifa, the Ethiopian government took series of economic policy
changes vis-à-vis Eritrea that upset Isias Afeworki’s government and promoted the border issue as
a bargaining leverage. Trace Lasley observes effects of issuance and circulation Nakfa and
subsequent effects as follows:
The Nakfa was circulated without any clear agreement as to how the currency would trade.
Ethiopia had little time to prepare for the sudden introduction of the Nakfa and as a result
erected significant hurdles for exchange. The new barriers that were created in response to the
Nakfa proved too much for Eritrea to bear. The Nakfa was issued while Eritrea was at the
height of its dependence on Ethiopian market. Ethiopia’s response to the Nakfa further
frustrated Eritreans until they felt no recourse but to settle their harbored grievance with
force.197

Quick Economic measures that Ethiopia took after issues of Nakfa were absolutely
contrary to the Eritrean plan and caused enormous hardship to Eritrea and Ethiopia, which in turn,
stirred the border conflict.198 Khadiagala observes:
[…] The currency conflict caused considerable economic hardships for both states, as the
hard currency transactions raised the costs of Eritrean ports for Ethiopians and food supplied
for Eritrea. The deteriorating economic relationship heightened the political temperature and
ignited the border conflict.”199
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The price of teff in Eritrea tripled and the price of salt that Ethiopia used to import from
Eritrea went up. According to Negash and Tronvoll, “ […] the new trade policy created a barrier
between the two countries that had never existed before.”200 At a time ports fees were increasing
by the unilateral decision of Eritrea, Ethiopia had to look for alternative options. This was a huge
blow to Eritrea, as it would lose free money in the form of port service fees.201 A commentator
notes, “[…] Ethiopia decried paying for most of the investment cost for the refinery as well as
paying in hard currency for use of Eritrean port services.”202 This prompted Ethiopia to use
Djibouti port alternatively.
After long silence, President Isias Afeworki, responded how the new Ethiopian economic
and trade policy was unacceptable. He argued that the Ethiopian policy draws a new wall between
Eritrean and Ethiopians, which Eritrea rejects. He viewed that the new Ethiopian policies were
mistake and would defeat a long common history that would “[…] have adverse effects on relation
between the two people.”203 To President Isias Afeworki, Ethiopia’s economic policy against
Eritrean turned to be discriminatory which aimed to prevent Eritrea from participating in Ethiopian
economy and the requirement for Letter of Credit (LC) targeted at protecting mushrooming
Ethiopian industry against competition with Eritrean industry products. Finally, the President
remarked that the trade protocols of 1993 “[…] had reached a dead end.”204 Mr. Afeworki
promised that Eritrea would look into alternative solutions205, but was not whether the alternatives
he mentions was possibility of forcing Ethiopia to accept Eritrea’s options under the guise of
unsettled border issue.
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Eritrea lost its ambition of developing its economy by leaning toward Ethiopia resources
and market. This had motivated Eritrea to force Ethiopia to accept Eritrea’s demand, be it
currency, border, market, investment issues. Eritrea wrongly calculated and exceedingly relied on
power of its military personnel and hardware to make Ethiopia kneel to its demands. Thus, border
issue was a side issue that was calculated as bargaining leverage. A political analyst comments:
The border issue showed itself not to be the cause, but rather a symptom of political and
economic tensions and a dramatic arena for the two parties to demonstrate their capacity to
cause trouble and embarrassment for the other.206

Excessive attention on side issue, the drawing a borderline, while the latent issue remains
unsettled appears ineffective. To achieve real peace and normalize relationship, therefore, the two
contending Parties should be willing to sit down deliberate for negotiated settlement for all of the
socio-political and economic hurdles. As we briefly saw, economic issue was the most important
cause that has ignited the border conflict. Conflict over economy can be expressed in range of
assertions. It may be restricting market access, building competing firms, charging exorbitant fees
and taxes, protecting domestic investment and trade, currency issue and so forth. Economic cause
of Eritrean conflict can be inferred from Eritrea’s attempt to destroy pharmaceutical plant in
Adigrat207 and the move to cut major high way route to Djibouti port.
6.4.1.2. Past Troubled Relationship between TPLF and EPLF and Superiority Complex
TPLF, the most dominant force in the coalition of Ethiopia’s governing party, EPRDF, was
hugely assisted by EPLF.208 The first twenty TPLF members trained in Eritrea. The two senior
EPLF fighters later joined TPLF fighters.209 Initially for all logistic and training needs TPLF
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totally relied on EPLF.210 TPLF in turn fought with EPLF against their common enemy (the
Ethiopian military regime) on Eritrean land at a time EPLF was badly needed military help. In
1983 after conclusion of war with Somalia, the Ethiopian government moved almost all the
fighting forces and resources to Eritrea to destroy EPLF once and for all under Red Star Campaign.
At this crucial time, TPLF dispatched thousands of fighters that reportedly saved EPLF.211
In another instance, EPLF deployed TPLF’s trainees to fight for EPLF without
authorization of TPLF Central Committee. This created some gap between the two groups. As a
result, TPLF fighter withdrew from Eritrea and concentrated on fighting on Tigray land. EPLF
considered TPLF as naïve in terms of fighting tactic and political ideology. Consequently, EPLF
closed TPLF’s radio transmission from Eritrea.212 In hard time during 1984 drought while aid had
been pouring to save life in TPLF controlled part of Tigray, EPLF closed a corridor that TPLF had
been using to transport goods from Sudan. As a result, TPLF had to face hard time and reroute all
supplies by devising another route at the conjunction of Tigray and Sudan border.213
As pointed out elsewhere there were ideological and tactical differences between TPLF and
EPLF. EPLF opposed TPLF ideology of the right of nations and nationalities to self-determination
up to secession. Both TPLF and EPLF were communist in ideology but in varying degree and
different version. While TPLF followed Albanian model of communism EPLF chose Soviet
version.214 This ideological difference may reveal disparity in policy direction, but cannot be a
ground that promoted the border war. It, however, shades some light regarding the troubled
relationship between two factions.
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While the two factions were rebel forces, EPLF insisted TPLF for border demarcation on
the basis of colonial treaties. TPLF, however, required postponement of border issue until the end
of civil war to concentrate on battle with the Military Regime, and on account of lack of legitimacy
and supporting documents that would prove the true borderline.215 One may ask why EPLF
worried about border demarcation at a time it controlled only Eritrean peripheries and desert
regions? During civil war border was important because EPLF used to force Eritrean youth for
recruitment from the Eritrean territories. To escape from forced recruitment some Eritrean youth
used to get refugee at the territories held by TPLF including Badme. Thus, with view to recruit
fighters, determination of borderline was needed. In 1988 TPLF and EPLF made tactical alliance
in four days meeting in Khartoum. This had expedited Dergue’s removal.
6.4.1.3. Over Confidence on Military Power to Resolve Presumed Conflict
In terms of size of territory and population, Eritrea is a small country, which may be less
than one-tenth of Ethiopia, but Eritrean rebels were able to fight for 30 years resisting and later
demolishing a powerful military force. At the time Ethiopia had the biggest army in Africa and
was assisted by latest military hardware, but could not wipe out rebellion groups. The Ethiopian
army was not only superior in training and number of fighters, but had a powerful air force that
assisted the ground force. Eritrean rebels did not have fighter jets, but were able to destroy the
Ethiopian military in certain key fronts and ultimately liberated the whole Eritrea. As pointed out
above, TPLF forces assisted the Eritrean rebels in critical moments, and it was TPLF and other
allied Ethiopian forces that led to the ultimate demise of Dergue by occupying almost all the
northern Ethiopia and marched towards Addis Ababa. President Mengistu fled when TPLF forces
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were near Addis Ababa. TPLF forces were more powerful, committed, and tactically, in guerilla
warfare superior to EPLF forces. But this truth was not acceptable to Eritrean elites.
Eritrea, supposedly, believed that it can defeat any force and relied on its veteran fighters to
resolve any potential and presumed dispute by military action. During armed struggle against
military regime EPLF followed the strategy of holding military trench and defend its enemy. Prior
holding of a defensive position makes easier to defend and renders an enemy to pay high cost.
Eritrea has a military policy of occupy defensive position and request for negotiation. Eritrea
exhibited this occupy and negotiate policy against all of its neighbors including Yemen.
As pointed out in the foregoing chapters, Eritrea suddenly invaded Hanish Island and
demanded negotiation with Yemen. This makes Eritrea in superior position as any attempt to repel
forces already held defensive position would make the other party to pay huge cost or accept
wishes of Eritrea. Eritrea applied the same tactic against Sudan, Djibouti and later Ethiopia. On
May 12, 1998 Eritrea suddenly deployed its highly armed forces at Badme, which had been under
Ethiopian administration for several decades. After occupying Badme and its environs and
demanded negation with Ethiopia on Eritrean terms. Eritrea also invaded Djibouti and has been
occupying a swath of Djiboutian territory. Djibouti’s invasion supposedly targeted at revenging
Djibouti for cooperating with Ethiopia by allowing port access.
6.4.1.4. The Bada Conflict of 1997
As pointed out in the previous chapters, the Ethio-Eritrean borderline has disintegrated
Afar ethnic group. The group often disregards borderline and maintains its traditional relationship
with kinship in the other side of the border. When the situation restrains comingling, the group
fights it. Though not implemented on the ground, the 1908 treaty between Italy and Ethiopia

however, did not agree with ELF’s conclusion but allowed ELF to administer Badme area with a view to lose
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required border delineation to be done in way it would allow Afar ethnic group to continue their
traditional relationship including cattle grazing in the other side of the border.
Political actors in each side of the border have been abusing this historic right for political
ends. In 1997 rebels of Afar Revolutionary Democratic United Front (ARDUF) that was camped in
Afar territory of Eritrea repeatedly created havoc in northern Ethiopia, in Afar region of Ethiopia.
As a result of armed rebellion, it was hard for Ethiopia to use its resources and tourist sites in the
northern Ethiopia.216 In July 1997, pursuing ARDUF rebels, Ethiopian defense forces entered Adi
Murug, an Eritrean territory without securing permission from Eritrea. Given friendship and
apparent alliance with Eritrea at the time, Ethiopian forces act was in good faith for the sole
purpose of restraining disturbing rebels that stationed in Eritrea. This can be understood from
Prime Minister Meles’s letter written in response to President Isias Afworki’s request for personal
consideration of the matter.217 President Isias Afeworki wrote two letters demanding investigation
of the matter.218 Now it appears that behind ARDUF’s incursion there was a big motive, which
was not known to the Ethiopian government and the international community.219
Eritrea claims that the May 6, 1998 incidence was a consequence of July 1997
unauthorized border crossing by the Ethiopian armed forces. However, Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims
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Commission did not accept this contention. EECC summed that Eritrean act of May 12, 1998 was
an act of invasion contrary to the Charter of UN.220
This incidence prompted the need for border demarcation and formation of Joint Border
Commission from both States. The Joint Border Commission comprised highest government
officials including Eritrean Defense Minister. The Joint Border Commission set up a technical sub
committee that constituted experts to actually deal with border issue.221 As there was no genuine
stand on President Isias Afewroki’s part to work out the border issue, the work of the Joint Border
Commission was also a mere propaganda tool that could not solve the actual problem. The May 6,
1998 accident happened when the Eritrean delegation was on its way for the schedule meeting on
May 8, 1998 in Addis Ababa. The Commission held its first meeting on May 8, 1998 but suddenly
checked out from their hotel on May 9, 1998 abandoning the scheduled meeting on account of
Eritrea’s move for invading Ethiopia.
6.4.1.5. The Tigray Map that Apparently included Contested Regions
After a month of Adi Murug’s incidence, Tigray Regional State published a regional map
with assistance of GTZ. The regional maps included all contested border territories including Adi
Murug. It is not clear why the Tigray Regional State considered unsettled territories as part of
Tigray. The very motive of for issuing the map was as elementary school teaching aid. Though
Federal Government did not involve in drawing the regional map, the Federal Government did not
take any action against the map. Eritrea never attempted to the presumed issue on Tigray map
amicably.
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For Eritrea the map marked huge implication – the intention of Ethiopia to unilaterally take
action against the contested territories before the Joint Border Commission decides the border
issue. This map was presented to EEBC has Ethiopia’s intent to unilaterally draw the boundary
line.
6.4.1.6.

Dictatorial Nature of Leadership and Suppressive Policy
In most African States, personality of leader determines the nature of government and

national policy. Eritrean and Ethiopian leaders were emerged from long period battle against the
repressive military government. Their confidence is generally built in military power. A
commentator portrays President Isias Afeworki as leader who is, “ Endowed with a battlehardened military and self-confidence, [he] seem[s] ready […] to ‘boost Eritrea’s identity at every
opportunity.”222 The victory over the then Africa’s superior military, and the initial logistics and
military superiority of EPLF over TPLF has shaped, “Self image of Eritrea’s leadership.”223
President Isias Afeworki’s over confidence and reliance on its military power has contributed for
disturbance of regional peace.
Thus, personal character of President Isias Afeworki and his leadership policy has its share
for the sudden eruption of border conflict. A Situation Report of Institute of Security Report
describes personal character of President Isias Afeworki, as aggressive by nature and abhors
negotiated settlement and concession.224 A quote from ISS Situation Report attests:
“[President Isias Afeworki has …] distaste for compromise and diplomacy, both which he
considers weaknesses. [He] has shown a relish for intrigues and displayed an extraordinary
taste for undercover maneuvers with wide regional repercussions in relations with
neighboring states. His militaristic or trigger-happy pattern of behavior in foreign relations
has transpired over an extended period. […] The misguided policy that he loves to call
‘forward policy’ has not been conducive to the building of a stable regional security in the
222
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Horn of Africa. President Issayas has thus established a reputation and record for toughness
and ruthlessness, trying to alter borders by force, willing to got to war for what he perceives
to be Eritrea’s interest, regardless of the outcome of past confrontations.” 225

As noted elsewhere at the beginning of this Chapter, President Isias Afeworki’s own words
also reveal how his leadership policy has shaped Eritrea’s invasive character. President Afewerki
illustrates, “If […] my neighbor destroys my fence and there is nothing I can obtain by taking him
to the magistrate, then I will be obliged to destroy his fence.”226 (Emphasis mine.) As repeatedly
pointed out, guided by militaristic doctrines President Isaias Afeworki, has unleashed his fighters
against all neighboring States before giving any room for peaceful means of dispute resolution. As
ISS proves, to President Afeworki, negotiated settlement and compromise is defeat or weakness.
This in turn implies that resolution of Ethio-Eritrea dispute may not possibly be resolved while
President is in power, unless he makes policy U turn, or changes his authoritarian conduct.
Failure of multitude of international mediation efforts to avert Ethio-Eritrean war
demonstrates uncompromising nature of President Afework’s attitude. President Isias Afeworki
had ignored mediation efforts of OAU, United States, and Rwanda, which required to withdraw its
troops from territories occupied after May 6, 1998 incidence. However, after Ethiopian forces
ejected Eritrean troops from Badme and its environs, President Afeworki immediately declared
acceptance of OAU Framework Agreement. He disclosed the same attitude after Ethiopia liberated
all its territories and entered deep into Eritrea. This characteristic of President Afeworki suggests
the weight and moment he affords to peaceful resolution. President Afeworki resorts to peaceful
deposition only after all means of military solution fails to work.
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A nation lead by autocratic leader is necessarily undemocratic, this in turn, can be source of
conflict.227 Undemocratic nations generally rely on coercion as a means of resolution of dispute.
“Autocratic and ideologically rigid nature of the political regime”228 of both Ethiopia and Eritrea
has direct effect on negotiated settlement of disputes. Though the Ethiopian government often
blamed for suppression of dissent and restriction and imprisonment of journalists and diminishing
political playground for opposition parties, the Eritrean case is worse. Eritrea generally neglects
democratic values having repugnance to western traditions. It trashed a draft constitution and
guided by personal impulses of the President. Opposition party system generally banned, there is
no prospect for any kind of election. The nature of government of Eritrea, therefore, has direct
effect on the Ethio-Eritrean border war. Khadiagala, aptly observes, “Given the wealth of formulas
for resolving territorial tension, escalation of the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict makes clear a
fundamental failure to construct institutions strong enough to stabilize authority.”229
Eritrea’s “virulent nationalism to bolster domestic authority”230 was another reason for
eruption of border war. As pinpointed elsewhere, Italian colonialism and its objective of using
Eritrea as spring board to occupy Ethiopia and other regions of Africa, has shaped Eritrea in a way
it to be different from Ethiopia. During the fifty years time Eritreans had served in Italian armed
forces that served in Libya, Somalia and in Ethiopia. In Ethiopia, Eritrean soldiers were more
important to Italy as they have common culture, religion and in same cases language. Eritreans
served as pacifying forces to Italy. They were salaried personnel that had huge impact in shaping
consciousness. Eritrea had modern infrastructure including asphalted roads and rail way. There
were numerous Italian residents that engaged in business, trade and agriculture. In addition to
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serving in the military, Eritrean people had ample job opportunities. At that time the people of
northern Ethiopia used to go Eritrea to serve in low paid jobs like serving as domestic maids and in
other low profile jobs that Eritreans were not willing to work. This presumably has created ethic
superiority complexity and boosts Eritrean false appearance of superiority. Even before Eritrean
federation to Ethiopia, during federation and after abolition of federation, Eritreans were the most
privileged people in Ethiopia. Colonization boosted their exposure to modernization before the rest
of Ethiopia. There were more educated Eritreans to serve in Ethiopian government offices,
benefited from opportunities that Ethiopia could make available to citizens. This apparently made
Eritreans different from people from other regions of Ethiopia.
The people of Tigray, on the contrary, were the most disadvantaged people in Ethiopian
history. Tigray economy was not only undeveloped but also repeatedly jeopardized by the
successive wars. Most wars including the first and second Italian invasions were fought in Tigrary
land. At a time Ethiopian warriors lacked sufficient logistics to feed. The entire burden was on the
people of Tigray. They had to feed the warriors voluntarily or involuntarily. After finishing their
own resources, the warriors had to raid cattle of their brothers in Tigray. On top of this, as the rest
of Ethiopia, Tigrary had no infrastructure and seriously underdeveloped. Since Italian occupation
of Eritrea, laborers from Tigray had been serving Eritreans in low profile jobs. This has boosted
the feeling of Eritrean superiority and chauvinism, narrow nationalism. The Eritrean government’s
false assumption of trans-border nationalism and the interest to boost domestic authority, as
liberator of Eritrea from backward Ethiopia, was another reason that motivated for use of force.
To sum up, after long journey of political suppression, dictatorship, unending military
conscription, and economic misery as a result of wrong calculation of the government of State of
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Eritrea against Ethiopia under the guise of border issue. Now it appears that the Eritrean people
could not withstand the burnt of dictatorship and unending suppression. However, little attempt has
been made to change the nature of leadership and government.231 In Ethiopia, the split of powerful
founders and involvement of several non-TPLF allies have mitigated the dictatorial role of TPLF,
the Eritrean counterpart remained in tact without any form of check and balance. In Eritrea overall
power has been entrusted on the President. It appears no meaningful decision and action can be
taken unless it sprang from the President.
To resolve the current border or other real issues with Ethiopia, the President has to change
his aggressive and uncompromising personality, which is unlikely, or the President has to be
changed and give way to progressive Eritrean elites. Political elites largely concern for power
retention and narrow nationalism more than long-term benefits of their citizens. They either carry
out shame election for the purpose of political consumption or conduct no election, as if they were
created to lead their people. While the former may describe Ethiopian situation, there is no election
for peaceful democratic transition in Eritrea. This makes the possibility of settling border dispute
unlikely in short term. Ethiopia’s occasional threat to remove the President further complicates the
situation. All options should be left to the people of Eritrea.
6.4.2.

The Need to Appreciate the Changing Nature of Borders and Mandatory Trans
border Cooperation
This is an era where the world is moving toward cooperation and integration to withstand

uncontrollable effects of globalization. In some cases, the tide of globalization compels
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unrestricted contact and integration. The advancement of digital technology has enabled cross
border interaction, trans-boundary commerce, global terrorism, cybercrime and so forth, that may
not be contained by the border wall or detected by border guards. Global cooperation and
integration is not an option, but a necessary effect of globalization that would enable nations resist
undesirable consequences (byproducts or side effects) of globalization. Though some challenges
are still apparent, European Union has already changed the nature of boundaries substantial
member states from barrier to bridges. One of the important motto of African border program is to
change African borders from barriers to bridges. The current Ethio-Eritrean condition points
innumerable possibilities that diverge with actors of globalization.232
In Africa Regional Economic Communities are moving toward economic and political
integration by issuing one passport to its citizens with the ultimate goal of free movement of goods
and service thereby changing borders from barriers to points of contact. As Khadiagala rightly
remarks:
In contemporary Africa, borders are […] continually subverted by deepening
cosmopolitanism, globalization and the civilizational logic of economic integration. Such
integration denudes the attractiveness of frontiers as political and economic objects and
denies the salience of sovereignty. By permitting the mobility of factors of production for
wealth creation, economic integration restrains border conflict, enlarging the institutional
framework for problem solving.233

In addition to the global and African border tide touching Ethiopia and Eritrea, the colonial
boundary has separated the two intertwined people that always aspire for unlimited comingling.
There is interest from both sides to change barrier effect of border. Border closure does not serve
interest of common people of Ethiopia and Eritrea. But the now for all effects and purposes the
two nations are in deadlock. To building good neighborhood, the deadlock has to be unlocked.
This assumption may appear unrealistic, but it is possible. The question may be how? At this stage
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to talk about transforming Ethio-Eritrean border into point of contact is really impossible.
Currently borderland of both nations is manned with forces that are ready to kill each other and
controlled by machines that are armed with missiles, which can destroy thousands of lives again.
The impasse may be unlocked if the leader of both nations are committed build peace in the
region by drawing an acceptable borderline through compromise. They should set their mind that
at any point in the future the two nations will freely move across the border. The leader should be
directed by the long plan of unavoidable integration. To accelerate the inevitable integration, the
leaders should be willing to sit for honest constructive and dialogue rather than playing a legal
game and media campaign. The borderland people, elders and neighboring states of both nations
undoubtedly are aware of the true boundaries. Absolute reliance on the elusive colonial treaties and
unfair decisions will not help the people of both nations.
As Ethiopia publicly declared that Tsorena and Fort Cadorna were not Ethiopian towns,
Eritrea should be honest rather than attempting to benefit from elusive colonial treaties and
unrealistic EEBC decisions. The two nations should make negotiated settlement that would best
meet the rights and interest of both nations. After political decision and directions are designed, a
joint border commission may carry out the actual border setting. A borderline that takes historical
relations, to the extend possible aligns with border treaties and that takes actual interest of
borderland residents would create good neighborhood.

A good neighborhood in turn would

perpetuate peace and boost cooperation that would ultimately make barrier nature of border walls
effect less thereby changing the nature of border from barrier to bridges. Borders lands will turn
into points of contact and center for cooperation thereby reunite the two brotherly people. If the
people of two nations move freely like Europeans in the Schengen area, the difference between
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being an Ethiopian and Eritrean will be a matter of politics simply to elect and be elected in their
respective nations.

If the economic integration finally leads into political integration all

differences will fade away by itself and Ethiopia and Eritrea will turn into a situation they were
before colonial foots landed in Africa.
6.4.3. Political Commitment and Determination to Resolve Dispute Constructively
To achieve a real resolution, contending Parties’ determination and commitment is
paramount. This process demands high political commitment that is non-extent at the moment. If
there is real interest to build peace between two States, dispute resolution will be easier. Generally
there is no unresolvable dispute. The only problem, however, is willingness and interest of leaders
to resolve disputes peacefully on give and take basis. No one disagrees with the assertion, had
there been commitment and determination to resolve dispute, the May 1998 war would never been
erupted and tens and thousands of lives would have been saved. Leaders of both States should
prioritize public interest beyond their own selfish personal interest and honor. Needless to say
public interest does not favor war and destruction while it is possible to resolve disputes amicably.
As attempted to prove in the foregoing Sections, the May 1998 border conflict was simply
a bargaining leverage that was unexpectedly flared up but had been boiling by the unresolved
socio-economic and political divergences. Dealing only with border delineation issues by ignoring
pressing socio-economic issues may not produce a desired result. This appears the most important
cause for the current impasse. The question would be how to deal with all of the issues at the same
time. If there is political commitment and willingness, nothing is impossible. All the issue may be
resolve all disputes side by side. Therefore, before dealing with issues, mediation should focus on
ascertaining willingness and determination of contending Parties to resolve the dispute amicably,
compromising interests.
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If all issues should be dealt side by side, numerous committees may be constituted to
address issues simultaneously. A Joint Border Commission may be reconstituted with a view to
deal with border issues. A high level committee for reviving and implementing the September
1993 Friendship and Cooperation Agreement should be reconstituted. Currency, port, investment
and trade issues should be resolved while border delineation is going on. Resolution on main
issues would expedite border delimitation and demarcation.
The recommendation may be hard to accept, especially to Eritrea, but honest and peaceful
resolution would best satisfy public interest, and enhance welfare of people of the two States. If the
political leaders of both nations really love their people, should be willing to sit together around
negotiation table and find out solution for their own problems. It will avoid animosity and hatred
that will, in turn, stimulate cooperation and integration, which in turn, will expedite the effort of
building peace in the Horn of Africa.
6.4.4. Set Borderline in a way Acceptable to Borderland Resident
Any decision or action that is contrary to the reality known to the borderland residents of
both States cannot create peace and stability in the disputed areas. Local people are aware of the
true lines that actually separate them. Reliance on reality would bring a better solution than simply
wrangling with vague colonial treaties and unrealistic personal sketches. Both nations should
approve a boundary line that is acceptable to the borderland residents, as there is no reason to
argue to the contrary. It is true that colonial border delineation was purely Italian initiative and
favored them and supported their expansionist policy. Eritrea, as a successor of the Italian rights
and interest may opt for strict application of the colonial treaties, colonial maps that were drawn
unilaterally by Italians. This move proved to be unacceptable to the Ethiopian borderland residents
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like Irob. If border setting is a temporary solution that would be will be changed, why Eritrea stuck
to the unrealistic and elusive colonial treaties? Jon Abbink makes a powerful remark as follows:
‘[…] the issue of the boundary appears to be an eminently political issue, hinging on the
future relations between two countries so closely connected in social, cultural and historical
terms. It suggests that – baring another big war – only a mature, democratically supported
political solution, to be reached through negotiation and consultation of local populations as
to self-determination, can bring about stability, and that any legal judgment or arbitration
must in some way encourage that political aspect.234

As the nature of borders soon to be changed into bridges and points of contact, there is no
need to rely on vague provisions of the colonial treaties and attempt to take territories in a way not
acceptable to borderland residents.
In drawing acceptable borderline, borderland residents should play an active role. They
should be afforded with fair chance of deciding their own fate to join anyone of the States they
choose. In a situation where not possible to clearly determine an actual borderline, both states and
should be ready to compromise using traditional dispute settlement mechanism. In a cooperative
environment division of ethnic groups does not matter, as it will not have long-term effect. The
Joint Border Commission should be willing to recognize reasonable decisions of borderland
residents. Borderland residents, including Kunama, Irob or Afar should understand that borderline
is a temporary solution. It will be practically insignificant as people from both sides can freely
interact. Setting an acceptable boundary line would expedite AU’s Border Program that aims at
changing barrier nature of borders into bridges.
6.4.5. The Need to Resolve Disputes though Dialogue
Now Eritrea has been campaigning in all international forums demanding Ethiopia to
surrender territories awarded by EEBC. As attempted to point out above, elusive treaty wordings
of 1900, 1902, and 1908 colonial treaty that did not match with the facts on the ground that stained
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EEBC’s delimitation decision. A measure that EEBC took to cure ambiguities in the treaties and
treaty map, has further complicated boundary making. In search of intention of the Parties, EEBC
relied on maps unilaterally drawn by Italians or Italian agencies, which were not available to
Ethiopia. Similarly, private notes, memos, reports and comments of Italian colonial authorities,
which were not known or embody the Ethiopian version of intent, influenced EEBC’s decision. It
is puzzling to take a note of governor of Eritrea or report of Italian negotiator to ascertain intention
of the parties to fill treaty lacunae.
As a result of these procedural and factual anomalies, EEBC decided in accordance with
the presumed intention of Italy that favored for Eritrea. In some cases EEBC’s award even
widened the gap between the two countries. As discussed in detail in foregoing chapter, at the
juncture of Setit and Maiteb the borderline goes northeast to the confluence of Mareb. Italian maps
disclosed at least four rivers that may be viewed as Maiteb. Ethiopia contends that the first Maiteb
as a treaty Maiteb that situated at the 20 Km distance from Sudanese borderline. There were other
rivers that have link to Setit in the South East. The Belesa confusion and the non-existent river
called Muna appear to render EEBC’s award nonsense. With full awareness of these confusing
river nomenclatures, EEBC did not attempt to ascertain actually facts on the ground. Modern
satellite images are assistive but cannot “communicate” changes took place since making of the
treaties, and regarding changes in river nomenclature, changes in actual geographic conditions or
disclose changing nature of geographic history.
Historical facts including changes in river nomenclature, diversion or dry up of tributaries
or actual or changed geographic realties supposedly best known to the borderland people of two
sides of border. The borderland people were unaware of what was going on in respect of them not
only in colonial time, but also in new era where they were supposed to know a decision that will
234

Jon Abbink supra note 7 at 156
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impact their lives permanently. Though EEBC had no mandate to report its actions and finding or
investigations to the borderland plan, it missed the chance to make the decision realistic and solve
the actual problem instead of complicating the matter basing its disposition on theoretical
hypothesis in The Hague. Borderland residents did not know the conclusion of separating treaties,
but they know the actual separating line. The very objective of EEBC was to settle dispute by
awarding a decision that would actually resolve dispute. With this end EEBC should have used
avenues that would supply honest and unbiased facts. There were ample possibilities to cross
check facts across border by filtering supposedly biased data transparently, but EEBC did not give
room for empirical observation.
With little and unreliable geographic data Italian agents and, especially Emperor Minilik II
who lacked the possibility and means to know actual facts on the grounds, concluded the colonial
treaties at a far distance, in Addis Ababa. Emperor Minilik supposedly signed on a draft treaty
presented by Italian agents. Moreover, by ignoring the supposed treaties Italy invaded Ethiopia and
redraw boundary. This unilateral action has rendered the treaties dead.235. It is not clear why
Ethiopia submitted itself to abide by the already dead colonial treaties.236
Enforcement of the treaties in colonial sense appears contradicting with EEBC’s other
position. Both Ethiopia and Eritrea suggested that the boundary dispute to be resolved in
accordance with Cairo Resolution of 1964, which declared respect to colonial boundary line.
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Negussay Ayele, Reflections on Border Regimes and Colonial Treaties on the Horn, ETHIOMEDIA.COM
(June 17, 2000) , Available at, http://www.mediaethiopia.com/Negussay_On_TheWar.htm ( accessed 03/23/16). See
also Ayele, supra note 53.
236
In Ethiopia this is very politically sensitive issue and it is almost impossible to get empirical data. Where there is
no clear answer varied speculations and intelligent guesses often posed. In this case first chance may be given to
EPRDF’s political addenda. TPLF from the onset believed that Minilik II betrayed Eritrea and its boundaries were set
by the colonial Italy. This assumption was built by ELF and later followed by EPLF. TPLF supposedly molded by
EPLF’s propaganda, and accepted EPLF’s assertion without change. This stand has blinded EPRDF elites to invoke
the dead colonial treaties and the boundary line the treaties sought to draw. TPLF’s stand vis-à-vis colonial treaties
did not safeguard Ethiopia’s national interest, but EPRDF disregarded national interest for sake of its political
commitment even before the Algiers Agreement. As has been pointed out elsewhere, Prime Minister Mele Zenawi
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EEBC decided that the Cairo Resolution of OAU was not applicable to the case at hand. If so on
what basis EEBC has applied colonial treaties, maps, reports, comments and so on? It appears
contradiction in terms. Given confusions in EEBC decision, treaty wordings, and confusing legal
status of treaties, it would be fair to modify the delimitation decision in mutually acceptable way to
building good neighborhood and make lasting peace and stability.
Moreover, the boundary is not yet demarcated in accordance with Algiers Agreement.
Confronted with the deadlock and noncooperation of both Parties, EEBC has declared virtual
demarcation. As pointed out elsewhere, in its delimitation decision EEBC time and again pledged
that geographic facts would be considered during demarcation. Virtual demarcation thus fails to
satisfy these promises. In general, it is possible to suggest that the boundary is not clearly defined.
It is yet porous and if demarcated in accordance with literal wordings of EEBC’s delimitation
decision, the borderline would split families, town and villages that have been living together for
centuries.

Learning facts of the EEBC’s award the people of Irob have petitioned to the

international community and have been pressing the Ethiopian government not to honor EEBC’s
delimitation decision. This stressful pressure has huge impact on Ethiopia’s refusal to cooperate in
demarcation of Central and Western Sectors.
Due to international pressure and commitment to respect international treaty Ethiopia
accepted the delimitation decision in principle and has been demanding dialogue to draw an
acceptable boundary line. Even if Ethiopia accepts the virtual demarcation, an actual point that
Ethiopia has to surrender is not yet marked on the ground.

All these demand honest and

constructive dialogue and political commitment to resolve conflict. The dialogue had to be not
merely to set a dividing line, but it should gear toward resolving all presumed and potential

had been invoking reference to colonial treaties before accepting Modalities and Technical arrangement for
implementation of OAU’s Framework Agreement. ( See Appendix 15, Negash &Tronvoll supra note 1 at 151.
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disputes with the ultimate goals of smoothing ground for creating good neighborhood. Building a
lasting peace and normalization of relationship requires resolution of all disputes through honest
bilateral dialogue for the interest of the two brotherly people of Ethiopia and Eritrea.
Ethiopia has already declared its intent to resolve all disputes with Eritrea through honest
bilateral dialogue. Now it is time to Eritrea to take the same initiative. The people of both nations
will tremendously benefit from negotiated settlement. It will not only resolve the border issue but
also will re-establish socio-economic ties. Eritrea undoubtedly will benefit from big Ethiopian
market and Ethiopia will able to use Eritrean ports, which will add income to Eritrea.237 Currently
Ethiopia has been paying to Djibouti, Sudan and in the future when Ethiopia uses Mombasa port to
Kenya. Both Kenyan and Sudanese ports are far away and add extra transportation cost and
Djibouti port could not efficiently accommodate Ethiopian import and export. Eritrea will also
benefit from Ethiopian products that it cannot get elsewhere. Like teff, coffee, and other special
agricultural products that Eritrean people used to import from Ethiopia. Though currently
Ethiopian factory products are increasing beyond local needs, Eritrean special products, can also
exported to Ethiopia.
In conclusion, in socio-ethnically intertwined people of Ethiopia and Eritrea, it is not
simple enough to draw a clear dividing line. To install a lasting peace among the intermixed people
all disputes should be resolved constructively through honest bilateral dialogue with the objective
of normalizing relationship and reunite the two brotherly people again. But EEBC’s decision has
failed to attain this goal. As a political commentator rightly remarks, “[…] in view of highly
relevant social and historical aspects of the boundary issue, the EEBC Decision is not the best that
could have been made, and may in fact have perpetuated the conflict between the two

237

As a result of the border war Ethiopia routed all its important export traffic to Djibouti. Consequently “Eritrea lost
hundreds of millions of dollars in annual revenue [….]” See Mesfin, supra note 18.
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countries.”238. EEBC’s decision “[…] might be acceptable purely in legal terms but “defeats its
own purpose.” [Emphasis added).239 The decision rather has complicated all possibilities of future
amicable resolution. Eritrea has been invoking the decision as propaganda to pressurize Ethiopia
that further complicates possibilities of future amicable resolution. Mere reliance on elusive EEBC
decision and Eritrea’s dishonest media campaign cannot resolve the issue. Both Parties should be
willing to resolve all disputes through bilateral negotiation.
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Abbnik supra note 7 at 142.
Id at 143. The Award fails to attain the mandate of normalization of relationship as it would split families and
strongly intertwined ethnic group that never viewed themselves as Eritreans and have been residing in the locality for
centuries. They don’t have any intention to vacate from their land nor like to Eritreans.
239
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Conclusions and Recommendations
7.1. Conclusionary Remarks
We are in the era of globalization where uncontrollable trans-border actors, and
multinational entities have been moving to “liberate” the world from the confines of border walls
thereby creating a borderless globe. As pointed out in Chapter Two of this Dissertation, in the 21st
century border walls appear failing to contain invisible forces or powerful global actors, and
properly discharge their traditional function of restraining “others.”1 Needless to say, confinement
within the bounds of border walls is on the verge of being obsolete. In a virtually interlinked
world, an incident happening elsewhere, or an action perpetrated in one part of the globe, for good
or bad, shakes the entire world. Consequently, global community has been cautiously watching
activities and happenings elsewhere to take a countervailing measure.
For instance, United States or other global powers cannot keep quiet while Africa is being
messed with acts of terrorism, as an act of terror may not stop at its origin. Similarly, global
community has concern over environmental pollution, actions triggering global warming, or
financial regulation that may affect economic or financial interest of everyone. Global connectivity
is not simply limited to international financial sector, climate change, terrorism or cyber attacks
that can bypass any border wall. The contemporary world has been witnessing the emergence of
powerful multinational private companies that do not respect border walls.2

1

The current territorial state tendency to bar mobility via huge border wall barrier and invisible intruders that can
bypass the border wall or other global actors, like multinational companies that abhor border wall can be solved by
designing a working solution to address the contradictory global reality vis-à-vis borders. For brief discussion on
effects of globalization on borderlines see Section 2.4.3.
2
For instance, search engine giant, Google, Social media companies, virtual markets like Amazon are in effect global
companies that operate everywhere irrespective of national borders.
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Moreover, nowadays, human needs extend beyond the limits of bordered territories. In 21st
century walled territory policy does not best satisfy the needs and aspirations of the new
generation, neither enhances the wellbeing of the public. The new generation has interest to get
mingled with global citizens freely. Each nation or territory naturally endowed with unique
geographic, and socio-economic resources that would make life more confortable and enjoyable.
Unrestrained movement of people, goods and services will definitely cut cost and make life more
pleasant. Being cognizant of side effects of the traditional borderline, and attracted by the positive
effects of unrestricted movement of its citizens, Europe has effectively changed its internal
borderlines from barriers to bridges in Schengen area. Even though filtering quality of Schengen
area is not well advanced to completely contain “others” like illegal flow of immigrants and
potential terrorist, the benefit of changing the nature of borders from barriers to bridges outweighs
its restraining effects.
With a view to smoothly regulate effects of globalization and enhance welfare of Africans
by changing the traditional role of borders and avoid borderline conflicts or address ongoing
conflicts, AU has devised a special program called African Union Border Program (AUBP) with a
motto of changing the nature of African borders from barriers to bridges. It is generally believed
that AUBP will eventually address Africa’s quest for peace, but currently the young Program not
only suffers from financial, institutional or manpower constraints, but also has been overwhelmed
with widespread border induced conflicts.
Present-day Africa is literally free but colonial footprints are still apparent in variety of
sectors, including borderlands. African borderlines are colonial creations that still divide nations,
nationalities, ethnic groups and in some cases families. Africa’s natural borderline development
was thwarted by the infamous Berlin Conference of 1884 -1885, which partitioned Africa among
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European powers in complete disregard of geographic, ethnographic, linguistic, and cultural
determinants. As result, the intertwined people of Africa have been disintegrated into multiple
states. Ironically, after restoration of independence, founding fathers of African umbrella
organization – OAU - cherished the “sanctity” of colonial boundaries, suppressing Kwame
Nkrumah’s vision of forming United Sates of Africa by removing divisive colonial boundaries
thereby reuniting Africans.
It is understandable that founders of OAU had feared the anticipated effects of
unmanageable conflict that supposed to erupt through out the continent. Prioritizing continental
unity through a strong umbrella organization was a good option, but complete ignorance of
revisionist objectives was a historic mistake.3 As a result, Africa has missed the best chance of
rooting out the root cause of conflict. Some authors and international tribunals tend to conclude
that by adopting the Cairo declaration of 1964, OAU had accepted the principle of uti possidetis
juris that had avoided territorial or boundary conflict among the newly freed nations of Spanish
Latin America, African situation was completely different.4 Unlike Spanish Latin America, Africa
was colonized by several competing European powers that prioritized their interest in complete
disregard of benefits and wishes of Africans, but African brothers should not have ignored the
interest of their fellow Africans.
Complete ignorance of objectives of Kwame Nkrumah’s to redraw African boundaries in a
way acceptable to Africans was not only motivated by fear of opening Pandora’s Box in which

3

Before the signature on OAU’s charter actually dry, in early 1964 a devastating border war erupted in the Horn of Africa
between Ethiopia and Somalia, and in north between Morocco and Algeria. This motivated founding father’s of OAU to
expressly declare acceptance of colonial boundaries “whether they are good or bad,” in First Summit of OAU, in 1964. The
idea of keeping colonial boundaries or changing them with w view to reintegrate Africa had divided Pan Africans into two
camps: the unionist and statist camps. The Unionist Camp propagated immediate political integration of Africa by
abolishing colonial boundaries, the Statist group vigorously argued to keep colonial boundaries. ( For details on this topic,
see Section 4.3 of this Dissertation).
4
For brief discussion on application of uti possidetis rule in Africa and implications of ICJ decision of Burkina Faso/Mali
Case see 3.4.1 and with regard to consideration of the principle of uti possidetis in Africa see 4.3 of this Dissertation.
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supposedly mass of unmanageable conflict locked in, but geared to ward achieving power and
more territory at the expense of millions of Africans. One of the founding fathers of OAU, Haile
Selassie I, for example, suggested Africans to accept colonial boundaries, as they were, whether
the boundaries were “good or bad”.5

It is plausible that Emperor Haile Selassie had interest to

maintain sovereignty over the Somali region of Ethiopia that Somalia had been requesting to unit
with their Somali kinsmen. Similarly, redrawing colonial boundaries was not acceptable to Kenya
because Somalia had been demanding the Somali ethnic group in the northern Kenya to be ceded
to Somalia. The then president of Mali and Mauritania vigorously argued against revision colonial
boundary to meet their own similar private power interest.
The decision to honor colonial boundary line in fact did not suppress territorial or boundary
conflict, as it was supposed. Since heydays of OAU, Africa has been experiencing brutal border
conflicts. In this regard President Chadly of Algeria view, which portrays colonial boundaries as
“delayed action bombs left by colonialism,” is not an exaggeration.6 Put simply, devastating
boundary wars and conflicts have been not uncommon in Africa. Most political commentators
agree that vague and divisive colonial boundary laws and policies take lion’s share of African
interstate conflict. As pointed out elsewhere in this study, boundary issues are by nature very
sensitive that can quickly flare up into armed confrontation.
Though Ethio-Eritrea border conflict was stirred up by multifaceted socio-economic
causes, elusive colonial boundary line that was supposed to be drawn by the colonial treaties of
1900, 1902, and 1908 prompted the most ferocious war in 21st Africa. The war was suddenly
erupted, and quickly flared up consuming lives of 70 – 100,000 people, has destroyed vast amount
of property, displaced millions from their homes, and above all strained relationship of the
brotherly people of Ethiopia and Eritrea.

5
6

See details in Section 4.3 of this Dissertation.
See J.R.V. PRESCOTT, POLITICAL FRONTIERS AND BOUNDARIES, 254(1987).
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Terms of the colonial treaties were extremely vague to set a clear and acceptable boundary
line on the ground. As pointed out in Chapter 6, the treaties were not only vague, but also named
inexistent or wrong boundary rivers a boundary marks. This rendered boundary-making business
almost impossible. In other cases, several rivers were captioned in the same name.7 The main river
course and tributaries found to be indistinguishable.
Confronted with unsolvable scenario, the arbitration tribunal had resorted to unilateral
colonial reports, notes, memorandums and third party maps that were not known to Ethiopia. This
has further complicated boundary setting and the boundary line delimited by EEBC was
completely unacceptable to Ethiopia, as it would further divide families, towns, villages, and
ethnic groups that have been living together for centuries. Some of the villages that were never
claimed by Ethiopia were awarded to Ethiopia, and villages that were never been under Eritrea
administration were allotted to Eritrea. In refusal of both nations to cooperate with EEBC, it
adopted a virtual demarcation thereby declaring Ethio-Eritrea boundary line stood demarcated on
geographic coordinates (boundary points), and ended its business. But nothing has been done on
the supposed borderline – no pillar, beacon or other kind of mark has been emplaced on the
ground.
Now the boundary line is still elusive but Eritrea has been campaigning in all forums to
pressurize Ethiopia to surrender an uncertain territory that was “fictionally” delineated by virtual
demarcation. Even if Ethiopia is willing to give up the contested territories, an actual line of
separation is not yet set on the ground. Thus, unless an actual boundary line is drawn on the
ground through bilateral dialogue, the contested territories are practically undeliverable. As EEBC
is not available to complete the delineation through actual physical demarcation, the only possible
option available is to reach at negotiated settlement either by forming a joint border commission
that will complete border making. With this view in mind, Ethiopia has been insisting Eritrea to
resolve the issue through bilateral dialogue, but Eritrea has refused opting for strict adherence to

7

Take, for example, the case of River Maiteb in Setiti juncture. While the treaty names the river from which a straright line
drawn to Mai Ambessa as Maiteb, there were other confusing nomenclature as Maiten, Meeteb, or Mi Tene. As a result of
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the EEBC’s impracticable legalistic approach demanding Ethiopia to surrender territories that were
awarded by the delimitation decision. As a result, the two brotherly nations are completely locked
up by the no war no peace policy that has rendered borderland residents to pursue uncertain future.
Honest dialogue will not only enable setting a boundary line on the ground, but also will
certainly facilitate resolution of latent disputes that have triggered the border conflict.8 As pointed
out in the foregoing chapters, the border issue was simply a bargaining leverage. Numerous
political and legal analysts and commentator have observed that Eritrea had provoked the
boundary war with intent for force Ethiopia to meet certain economic, monetary, and investment
expectations that Ethiopia failed to honor. Unless these issues are resolved, mere attempt to settle
border conflict, therefore, may not necessarily create a lasting peace and normalize relationship.
Mere reliance on colonial boundary laws or policies, therefore, may not be helpful to recreate
brotherhood and normalize relationship with a view to build good neighborhood.
Hence, border delineation by itself is not an ultimate goal. It is simply a means that would
take the brotherly people Ethiopia and Eritrea into the situation they were before colonial boots
were landed in the area. An acceptable boundary line and resolution of conflict situations will
build brotherhood. Normalization of relationship, brotherhood and cooperation will make the
traditional functions of border wall practically in significant, which would possibly lead into
economic and political integration in line with the objectives of AUBP.
Drawing an acceptable borderline is not an easy task but its fruits are suit. An acceptable
borderline will perpetuate peace, create good neighborhood, and contribute for rebuilding the sense
of brotherhood by avoiding animosity and mistrust.9 Peaceful coexistence, coupled with the
effects of globalization, therefore, would stimulate economic and political integration that would
ultimately remove restraining effects border wall. This will effectuate AU’s Border Program that

confusion in river nomenclature a large swathe of territory including the flash point of 1998 border conflict was awarded to
Eritrea. The ward was unacceptable to the Ethiopian people, as they know for sure the truth.
8
LEENCO LATA, (ed.), THE SEARCH FOR PEACE: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA,
PROCEEDINGS OF SCHOLARLY CONFERENCE ON ETHIOPIA-ERITREA CONFLICT 8 ( 2006).
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aims to change the nature of borders from barriers to bridges that will enable everyone to freely
move all over Africa. Economic or political integration would be easy to achieve if barrier nature
of African borders is changed. This will, in turn, realize Gadafi’s dream of creating United States
of Africa.

7.2. Recommendations
7.2.1. Ethiopia and Eritrea
As pointed out elsewhere just before the outbreak of the border conflict president Isias
Afeworki remarked that common history and socio economic link between the people of Ethiopia
and Eritrea make it impossible to build a border wall that would permanently separate the two
intermingled people. It is true alienation would not benefit either nation. Therefore, leaders of both
nations should work toward normalization of relation and rebuild brotherhood. This can only be
achieved if and only if all outstanding issues at are resolved. With a view to settle either border,
economic, investment or socio-political issues, both States should be willing to sit together and
negotiate.
At this time it appears that the highest level of political authorities are not in a position to
sit together and draw a road map that would take them into a negotiated settlement Thus, third
party mediation appears vital. AUBP or a team constituted by AU can offer meditation. If
mediators succeed in convincing highest political authority of both nations to resolve all issue with
a view to enhance welfare of their people, political authorities can meet together and declare their
determination and political commitment to resolve all issues.

9

The adage, “Good Fences make good neighbors” in this regard works. See Robert Frost, “ Mending Wall” stated the
phrase, “Good Fences make good neighbor.” The poet is available at: http://allpoetry.com/Mending-Wall. Last
accessed 01/30/15.
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Depending upon category or nature of issues, couple of committee may be organized in
ministerial level. Permanent Joint Border Commission may be set up to redraw borderline.
Experts from both nations, AUBP or UN, may assist the Joint Border Commission. Another
Committee may handle economic, monetary or investment issues. Further Committee that work
for resolution of socio-political issues may also be organized. AUBP may play supervision and
consultancy role in each Committee. AUBP may also play vital role in finding sources of funding,
if the whole process appears to be beyond financial capacity of both nations.
7.2.2. African Union
As mapped by the 35 Algiers Conference, African Union should be guided by the longterm goals of political and economic integration of Africa. Commencement of AUBP is a wise
move to resolve African border conflicts. Venturing to resolve actual conflicts is important, but
may not by itself anchor Africa to the planned destiny -- economic or political integration. AUBP
should rather aggressively work toward preventing border related conflicts. This requires a
proactive approach, which demands AUBP to push member States of AU to catalogue all
boundary lines and resolve all potential conflicts in advance and draw acceptable borderline. Each
Member State, therefore, should set up a permanent Joint Border Commission that creates
catalogue of national border, supervise each borderline, clear borderline or rebuild border pillars, if
needed. United States and Canada International Border Commission, for instance, works
permanently and reports to their respective State Department. This has built peace between the two
neighboring states. If Africa follows the same mechanism, all conflict situation would be resolved
before it reaches into armed confrontation. It is understandable that border management requires
huge resources, but is wise idea to spend for conflict prevention than financing killer wars that
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consume not only economic resources but also human life. This process would avoid colonial
footprints or mitigate harsh effects or colonial border policy.
In addition to conflict prevention, and conflict managing, AUBP is expected to work
towards integration of Africa. AUBP should closely work with regional economic communities
that work toward economic and political integration of member states. Integration of regional
economic community will ultimately lead into continual integration. The process of integrating
Africa appears started with issuance of African passport that was declared today (April 6, 2016).
The new African passport at the beginning will be issued to leaders of member states will follow to
ordinary African citizens. The Passport will further reduce barrier effects of African borders. In
accordance with the regulation issuing African Passport, any African can stay 30 days in any
Member States without the need to get visa. Issuance of continental visa proves that African Union
is moving toward realization of Kwame Nkrumah’s vision of forming United States of Africa.
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